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Foreword
The Industrial Revolution brought great progress to humanity. The global population increased sevenfold, life expectancy doubled, 
economic output increased a hundredfold and there are as many telephone connections as people in the world. However, many 
have been left behind. Some three billion people still do not have access to modern cooking and sanitation. A billion people go 
home hungry and do not have access to electricity, yet many of them have to charge their phones. Those left behind are the most 
vulnerable to the negative consequences of the Industrial Revolution, ranging from climate change to biodiversity loss. 
Humanity is at a crossroads. Unbounded growth is endangering planetary support systems and increasing inequalities, the rich are 
getting richer and the poor even poorer. The transformation towards sustainable futures is an alternative possibility for people and 
the planet – a just and equitable world for all. This is exactly what the United Nations 2030 Agenda (adopted on 27 September 2015) 
offers and is thus a great gift to humanity. It presents a new social contract with its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It is 
an aspirational and ambitious vision for the future betterment of humanity and it gives strong reasoning for fact-based understan-
ding of the interrelationships and synergies among the SDGs. 
The World in 2050 (TWI2050) was established by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) to provide scien-
tific foundations for the 2030 Agenda. It is based on the voluntary and collaborative effort of more than 60 authors from about 20 
institutions, and some 100 independent experts from academia, business, government, intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organizations from all the regions of the world, who met three times at IIASA to develop pathways toward achieving the SDGs. 
Presentations of the TWI2050 approach and work have been shown at many international meetings including the United Nations 
Science, Technology and Innovation Forums and the United Nations High-level Political Forums. Two important meetings were 
held, one focusing on governance organized by the German Development Institute (DIE) in Bonn, Germany and the other on re-
gional perspectives organized by the Stockholm Resilience Centre (SRC) held in Kigali, Rwanda.
This report examines the current trends and dynamics that promote and jeopardize the achievement of the SDGs. It presents the 
TWI2050 framework, the integrated pathways which harness the synergies and multiple benefits across SDGs, and approaches to 
governing this sustainability transformation. TWI2050 identifies six exemplary transformations which will allow achieving the 
SDGs and long-term sustainability to 2050 and beyond: i) Human capacity and demography; ii) Consumption and production; iii) 
Decarbonization and energy, iv) Food, biosphere and water; v) Smart cities and vi) Digital revolution. The report provides policy 
recommendations on how to achieve integrated pathways that implement these transformations.
Undertaking such a comprehensive initiative has required extraordinary leadership, intellectual input, support and coordination. 
Completion of this report has involved dedication and sustained contributions from many colleagues around the world. Special 
thanks and gratitude go to all contributing institutions that provided personal and institutional support throughout. The resources 
and the encouragement they provided helped make TWI2050 a reality. We are especially grateful for the contribution and support 
of the SRC, DIE and IIASA teams that have provided substantial in-kind support and vision needed to conduct an initiative of 
this magnitude. Special thanks go to my IIASA colleagues Sebastian Busch, Caroline Zimm and Pat Wagner for coordinating and 
managing TWI2050, to the Lead Authors for their leadership and guidance and all 60 authors without whose knowledge and dedi-
cation this report would not have been possible. 
The publication of this report in July 2018 and its presentation at the United Nations High-level Political Forum is timely. TWI2050 
shows that a transformation toward the sustainable future is possible with strong political commitment. It is my belief that this re-
port will provide policy and decision makers around the world with invaluable new knowledge to inform action and commitment 
towards achieving the SDGs. I hope it will be a roadmap toward a sustainable future along integrated pathways and will divert from 
the alternatives that transcend the planetary boundaries and leave billions behind.
Nebojsa Nakicenovic
TWI2050 Executive Director
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Key Messages
1. Transformation towards a sustainable future is possible but ambitious action is needed now! The world and almost all regi-
ons are currently off course from achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Yet with bold and appropriate changes 
in values and deployment of policy instruments, the world can be steered towards achieving the SDGs by 2030 and providing 
a just and equitable future for all on a stable and resilient planet. These changes need to be based on the fact that sustainable 
development is a societal as well as an environmental challenge. The key is to invest in future priorities such as high-quality 
schools, improved health systems, efficiency and zero-carbon energy, environmental conservation and restoration, better food 
systems, more sustainable lifestyles, good governance institutions, and global cooperation initiatives to leverage dynamics 
towards the implementation of the SDGs. The World in 2050 (TWI2050) shows how to bring about six key transformations 
that will raise living standards, promote jobs, ensure social inclusion, and protect the natural environment, in short, to achieve 
“the future we want.” 
2. Six transformations are necessary to achieve the SDGs! TWI2050 focuses on six transformations that capture much of the 
global, regional, and local dynamics and encompass major drivers of future changes: i) Human capacity and demography; ii) 
Consumption and production; iii) Decarbonization and energy; iv) Food, biosphere and water; v) Smart cities; and vi) Digital 
revolution. Together they give a people-and-planet-centered perspective for building local, national and global societies and 
economies which secure wealth creation, poverty reduction, fair distribution and inclusiveness necessary for human prosperi-
ty while safeguarding the Earth system.
3. Attaining the SDGs in a resilient and lasting way, requires vigorous action now, and a people and planet focus beyond 
2030! While the 2030 Agenda provides a visionary new social contract for the world, the ambitious and aspirational SDGs are 
necessary but not sufficient to lead humanity towards long-term sustainable development. In the globalized era we now live in, 
with rising social and political turbulence and pressures on the planet, sustainable development must fully integrate people and 
planet across scales, and can today be defined as attaining human prosperity and social inclusion within a stable and resilient 
Earth system. Processes that regulate the stability of the Earth system, from climate to water and ecosystems, are subject to 
longer-term and potentially abrupt changes. Diffusion of new infrastructure and major changes in human populations often 
occur on time scales of many decades. This warrants a timeframe until mid-century and beyond. Although achieving the SDGs 
by 2030 will be a difficult transformative process, many SDG targets will have to be revisited to adjust their ambition level with 
regard to longer-term socio-economic and environmental sustainability. 
4. As everything is integrated in the connected world, the grand transformation requires a holistic perspective! The 2030 
Agenda is holistic with deep and complex interactions across the SDG domains. The 17 SDGs are integrated and comple-
mentary and need to be addressed in unison. Focusing on individual or selected SDGs – be this during policy analysis or 
implementation – comes with the danger of adverse side effects related to other SDG domains or missing out on potential 
synergies and resulting multiple co-benefits. A holistic perspective helps to prevent lock-ins and mobilizes opportunities to ac-
celerate and leverage the transformation towards sustainable development. It also enables the exploration of multiple possible 
implementation pathways. There are a myriad of pathways to achieve sustainable development that may differ along multiple 
branching points describing different development characteristics such as technological and behaviour change, economic and 
cultural transformations, transnational and unilateral governance, local implementation and global initiatives. 
5. Transformational change is needed but to succeed we must take along winners and losers! Only with transformational 
changes will humanity be able to close the sustainable development gaps. But such deep change can be a double-edged sword 
– changes will imply winners and losers as history tells. The invention of the steam ‘age’ brought enormous positive economic 
benefit but also unheralded negative societal and environmental impacts. Understanding and analyzing the potential impacts, 
synergies and tradeoffs of the required transformations for achieving the 2030 Agenda will be essential. Likewise, it will be 
important to focus on and align the possible interest of different societal groups with respect to these changes and ensure that 
many of these groups promote the transformation. Transformational change must include ways to protect and provide oppor-
tunities for those who might otherwise be left behind and involve those who might encounter losses as a result of the changes. 
Transformation and justice are mutually interdependent.
6. The world is at crossroads as we are currently experiencing signs of a counter-transformation! A new wave of nationalism, 
populism, ethnic awareness, and loss of values is emerging in many countries around the world. People feel threatened by 
accelerating change, driven by globalization, digitalization, and also the sustainable development transformation. We need to 
build positive narratives oriented towards the future, human centered visions on local, national, and global levels. We need 
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significant investments in social cohesion and robust transformative alliances to enable transformational changes towards sus-
tainable development and to avoid societal backlashes driven by insecurity, injustice and disenfranchisement.  It is even more 
important now to integrate social and economic goals with climate, water, oceans, biodiversity and other Earth-systems so that 
sustainable development is not threatened in the long term.
7. A central element of the sustainability transformation is effective and inclusive governance! Current governance models 
and arrangements, whether global, regional, national or institutional, are ill-suited to develop, oversee or implement truly 
integrated, multi-dimensional sustainable development agendas such as proposed by the SDGs. The transformation to sustai-
nable development will require profound normative, societal, political and institutional changes. Such deep structural change 
is fundamental to achieving all the SDGs. Key elements include investments in capable public institutions, active civil societies, 
sustainability oriented alliances, science, engineering, the private sector and governments, and the formulation of plans and 
roadmaps to achieve the SDGs and long-term sustainability goals.
8. Think globally, act locally! Think long-term, act now! It is all a matter of scale! The 2030 Agenda is a global compact that will 
be implemented across multiple scales from transnational agreements, regional and national agreements and policies, down 
through individual municipalities, to the operations of public and private institutions, and individuals. The applicability and 
priority of individual SDGs will differ across geographies. It requires a culture of global cooperation and strong and growing 
alliances to protect and further develop a rule based global order. To leave no one behind globally, to protect the planet, and to 
develop multiple sustainable development pathways across scales are key ingredients to shape a peaceful future between our 
highly interdependent societies.
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Box 1. The six transformations necessary to achieve the SDGs. 
• Substantial advances in human capacity are needed through further improvements of education and health care. Educa-
tion and health are instrumental for enabling people to live a self-determined life, find decent work and generate income to 
sustain themselves, but also to undertake climate change mitigation and deal with environmental problems. The ambitions go 
hand-in-hand with the goals to end poverty in all its forms and to reduce global inequality.
• Responsible consumption and production cut across several of the other transformations, allowing us to do more with 
less. Evidence shows that it is possible to reduce consumption of resources considerably by taking a more service and circular 
economy-oriented approach with respect to mobility, housing, food systems, and other sectors of our economies. Reductions 
in demand leverage large saving potentials at different stages of the supply chain.   
• It is possible to decarbonize the energy system while providing clean and affordable energy for all. Pathway analysis shows 
that energy-efficiency, increasing the share of renewable energy, electrification and carbon-capture and storage all play a key 
role in decarbonizing the energy system around 2050, while providing access to modern energy for all. Achieving the Paris 
Agreement is still possible but only if combined with a focus on a broader set of SDGs. 
• Achieving access to nutritional food and clean water for all while protecting the biosphere and the oceans requires more 
efficient and sustainable food systems. It is possible to meet the needs of a growing world population and at the same time 
limit the food system’s environmental impacts by combinations of increasing agricultural productivity, reduction of waste and 
losses, and changes towards a less meat-intensive diet. The highest priority is to provide healthy and affordable food for all and 
thereby to eradicate hunger. Heathy diets and lifestyles are also essential for reducing obesity in the world.
• Transforming our cities will benefit the majority of the world population. Pathways show that by 2050 around two thirds of 
human population will live in urban areas. Sustainable cities are characterized by high connectivity and ‘smart’ infrastructure, 
enabling high quality services, with low environmental footprint. Transforming slums into decent housing is feasible with low 
energy and material requirements. Good city design, sustainable lifestyles, empowered local actors and participatory approa-
ches that avoid one-size-fits all solutions are needed to achieve this transformation to sustainable cities. 
• Science, technology and innovations (STI) are a powerful driver but the direction of change needs to support sustainable 
development. The digital revolution symbolizes the convergence of many innovative technologies, many of which are currently 
ambivalent in their contribution to sustainable development, simultaneously supporting and threatening the ability to achieve 
the SDGs. There is an urgent need to bring the sustainability and the digital and technology communities together to align the 
direction of change with the 2030 Agenda and a sustainable future beyond. There is also a need to implement forward-looking 
roadmaps and governance structures that allow the mitigation of potential trade-offs of a STI revolution, particularly relating 
to its impact on the workplace, on social cohesion, and human dignity.
Jeff Sachs, Nebojsa Nakicenovic, Dirk Messner, Johan Rockström, Guido Schmidt-Traub, Sebastian Busch, 
Geoff Clarke, Owen Gaffney, Elmar Kriegler, Peter Kolp, Julia Leininger, Keywan Riahi, Sander van der 
Leeuw, Detlef van Vuuren, Caroline Zimm
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Introduction 
On 25 September 2015, all 193 United Nations (UN) Member 
States unanimously adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development with the 17 Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) (UN, 2015b), which placed sustainable development 
as the core principle of global cooperation and national 
development. The 2030 Agenda provides an aspirational 
narrative for the desired future for human development together 
with an actionable agenda to be achieved by 2030. It specifies 
far-reaching time-bound, often quantified, objectives based on 
the most comprehensive consultation held so far among nations. 
For the first time, a world development agenda is adopted that 
integrates wide-ranging and aspirational goals for inclusive 
social and economic development, to occur within global 
environmental targets for oceans, freshwater, biodiversity, and 
climate, i.e., essentially a roadmap for redefining sustainable 
development as a people and planet agenda for achieving a 
prosperous and fair world within planetary boundaries. The 
Paris Agreement adopted a few weeks later (12 December 2015) 
reiterated the basic objective of sustainable development and 
established an agreed upper limit for human-induced global 
warming to “well below 2°C” and “pursuing efforts to limit the 
temperature increase to 1.5°C” (UNFCCC, 2015). The Addis 
Ababa Action Agenda adopted a few months earlier (16 July 
2016) provided a new global framework for financing 2030 
Agenda and emphasized the importance of science, technology 
and innovation for achieving the SDGs (UN, 2015a).
The World in 2050 (TWI2050) initiative endeavors to 
demonstrate how the objectives of sustainable development 
within planetary boundaries can be met, ensuring prosperity, 
social inclusion, and good governance for all. TWI2050 is 
a global research initiative launched by the International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), the Sustainable 
Development Solutions Network (SDSN), and the Stockholm 
Resilience Centre (SRC). The initiative brings together a 
network of more than 150 participants that includes leading 
policymakers, analysts, modeling and analytical teams from 
60 organizations from around the world to collaborate in 
developing pathways toward sustainable futures and the policy 
frameworks needed for implementing the SDGs, and more 
importantly, for achieving the needed transformational change. 
This report of the international TWI2050 scientific initiative 
was prepared by more than 60 authors and 20 organization and 
was launched at UN High-level Political Forum, 9-18 July 2018.
Major pillars of sustainable development 
The UN member states define sustainable development as a 
world in which all nations enjoy economic prosperity, achieve 
social inclusion, and ensure environmental sustainability. These 
economic, social, and environmental goals are sometimes called 
the ‘triple bottom line’. The 2030 Agenda underscores that 
human, economic, social, and environmental development must 
be underpinned by good governance and global cooperation, 
often called the fourth pillar of sustainable development. 
Each of the 17 SDGs contributes to these four dimensions, viz 
prosperity, social inclusion, environmental sustainability, and 
good governance.
These SDGs are ‘universal’, in the sense that they apply to all 
nations, and to all people within those nations. They are also 
‘holistic’, in that all 17 SDGs must be achieved in unison. In 
the oft-repeated language of the 2030 Agenda, no one (and no 
nation or region or SDG) should be left behind. The 17 SDGs 
are a great gift to humanity and creating a new ‘social contract’ 
for the world.
The universality of the SDGs is unique not only in terms of 
establishing a moral standard for social inclusion and the right 
to decent lives for all, but also in underscoring the obligation of 
all nations to collaborate to meet global environmental targets, 
such as the “well below 2°C limit” in the Paris Agreement. Because 
human activity has already exploited many sustainable limits 
(such as extensive land use that gravely threatens biodiversity, 
and greenhouse gas concentrations that threaten climate 
stability) and have thus transcended planetary boundaries, all 
countries must deliver their share of global responsibility to 
achieve globally agreed environmental targets. 
The SDGs are also interconnected and interdependent as 
many of them contribute to several dimensions of sustainable 
development: 
Prosperity means that basic needs are met for all and includes 
SDG 1 (end of poverty), SDG 2 (end of hunger), SDG 3 (health 
for all), SDG 4 (education for all), SDG 6 (water and sanitation 
for all), SDG 7 (modern energy for all), SDG 8 (decent jobs for 
all), and SDG 9 (modern infrastructure for all).
Social inclusion means that all members of society have an 
opportunity to flourish, and includes SDG 5 (gender equality), 
SDG 10 (reducing inequality), and SDG 16 (freedom from 
violence). 
Transformations for Sustainable 
Development: A Synthesis 
Environmental sustainability means that the climate system 
is stable, biodiversity is conserved, ecosystems function well, 
freshwater is secured, rural and urban settlements are protected 
from pollution and are resilient to climate shocks, and includes 
SDG 6 (freshwater supply), SDG 11 (sustainable cities), SDG 
12 (sustainable production and consumption), SDG 13 (climate 
safety), SDG 14 (conserving marine ecosystems), and SDG 15 
(conserving terrestrial ecosystems), and implicit in many other 
SDGs, such as SDG 2, which stipulates the end of hunger and 
therefore depends on sustainable agriculture.
Good governance puts the interaction of state and non-state 
actors at the center of policymaking. While good governance 
implies that governments are following the rule of law, are 
accountable to their citizens and administer justice in a fair 
manner, non-state organizations are proactively involved and 
part of the governance system. Consequently, they cooperate 
with other countries. Good Governance is at the core of SDG 
16 (rule of law, absence of corruption) and SDG 17 (global 
cooperation and partnerships for the SDGs) and explicitly 
addressed in other SDGs such as 10 on social and political 
equality or 5 on gender equality. SDG 16 is not only a goal in 
itself but also an enabler for other SDGs. Good and inclusive 
governance is thus seen as a precondition for combining and 
aligning visions of local, national, and global common welfare.
Each of the 17 SDGs contributes to the four dimensions of 
prosperity, social inclusion, environmental sustainability, and 
good governance (local to global). 
Why TWI2050 is needed 
The urgent question is how to act on this aspirational 2030 Agenda 
and to have a clear understanding of the full consequences, 
costs of inaction and the benefits of achieving the SDGs 
globally. As the SDGs are universal, and need to be achieved in 
unison, attaining them by 2030 requires deep transformation 
at all scales, from local to global and across all areas of human 
activity, while simultaneously reducing pressures on the Earth 
systems. It also requires new social values and norms as well 
as changes in individual belief systems that shape attitudes and 
behaviors toward achieving a sustainable future for all.
TWI2050 is a first attempt of exploring transformational 
pathways that take a comprehensive people and planet approach 
to attaining the SDGs within planetary boundaries – with a view 
of ensuring a prosperous and healthy future for all on a resilient 
and healthy planet. The 2030 Agenda is an essential part of this 
long-term transformation. The fundamental changes brought 
about by meeting the 2030 goals would need to extend through 
to 2050 and beyond to ensure a sustainable future for all and 
provision of stable Earth systems support for future generations. 
Today, no science-based pathways exist for successfully achieving 
all SDGs simultaneously. The global transformations necessary 
to achieve the SDGs urgently need a robust scientific foundation 
and fact-based way forward. TWI2050 is a global multi-year, 
multi-stakeholder, interdisciplinary research initiative designed 
to help address these issues. TWI2050 is a partnership between 
science and policy that aims to contribute to this understanding 
and to develop science-based transformational and equitable 
pathways to sustainable development. It aims at providing this 
information and guidance for policy makers and the wider 
public. 
Using an integrated and systemic approach, TWI2050 
addresses the full spectrum of transformational challenges 
related to achieving the 17 SDGs, to avoid potential conflicts 
among them, reap the benefits of potential synergies, and 
reach the desired just and safe space for people and planet by 
2050 and beyond. This approach is the first goal-based, multi-
model quantitative and qualitative integrated analysis that 
encompasses the full set of SDGs. The successful identification 
of sustainable development pathways (SDPs) requires a 
comprehensive, robust approach that spans across disciplines 
and methodologies, and that can deal with non-linearity. The 
consortium under the umbrella of the TWI2050 initiative has 
been put together to reflect these necessary competencies. A 
core strength that sets TWI2050 apart from other initiatives 
contributing to the scientific knowledge creation for the SDGs 
is its competence in Integrated Assessment modeling, scenario 
development, and theories of governance and large-scale 
dynamics of social change. However, to best tackle sustainable 
development challenges in the 2030 timeframe and beyond, 
TWI2050 seeks to further deepen (modeling) expertise in non-
resource-based sectors and to better integrate knowledge and 
analytical capacity across social, political, technical, and Earth 
systems.
The TWI2050 framework (Figure 1) includes qualitative and 
quantitative elements and consists of the following: i) a broad 
transformational narrative (see Box 1), ii) targets and indicators 
for 2030, 2050 and beyond, and iii) specific sustainable 
development pathways (SDPs) for six key domains that include 
quantitative elements based on modeling approaches and 
complementary storylines. The key domains are: 
• Human capacity and demography
• Consumption and production
• Decarbonization and energy
• Food, biosphere and water
• Smart cities
• Digital revolution 
There can be many alternative pathways that explore branching 
points, lock-ins, resilience, inclusiveness, cooperation and 
differing transformational dynamics. The TWI2050 framework 
is designed to allow modeling and analytical groups (Integrated 
Assessment modelers, Earth system modelers and others) to 
identify and explore a portfolio of measures needed to achieve all 
SDGs jointly accounting for synergies and trade-off. With such 
common goals, and in some cases agreed common assumptions, 
the framework facilitates inter-comparison of results. This 
report presents of a number of exemplary sustainable pathways 
derived from recent analyses such as the Shared Socioeconomic 
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Pathways (SSPs)1(Riahi et al., 2017). These pathways provide the 
basis for the fully integrated SDPs that will be developed in the 
next phase of the initiative.
1 The SSPs are based on five different development routes for societal trends: i.e. sustainable development (SSP1), global fragmentation (SSP3), strong inequality 
(SSP4), rapid economic growth based on a fossil-fuel intensive energy system (SSP5) and middle of the road developments (SSP2). Each of the SSPs has been elabo-
rated in terms of a storyline and various quantifications using models. The sustainable development scenario (SSP1) combined with stringent climate policy can also 
be seen as an example of a scenario exploring the route towards a more sustainable world – but it should be noted that the SDGs were not targeted in its development.
At the center of the framework is the ‘framing narrative’ 
described in Box 1 (see also Chapter 1). This provides a 
‘backcasting’ narrative within which SDPs can be explored. 
The framing narrative aims to serve as a tool to connect 
the broad global analysis of SDPs to regional and national 
perspectives. For example, what are the narratives in Africa, 
Asia, North and South America, Asia and Europe that might be 
combined to form a coherent global narrative? The boundary 
conditions defined by the TWI2050 narrative translate to a 
set of quantitative and qualitative (multidimensional, science-
based) targets and indicators of desirable end-states. The 
exploration of pathways includes qualitative and quantitative 
analysis of governance mechanisms and dynamics of social 
change needed to implement the 2030 Agenda. A SDP describes 
a multidimensional trajectory of economic, social, and 
demographic change, together with a detailed description of 
the economic, political, and social instruments to support the 
trajectory towards the desired goal. TWI2050 follows a five-step 
process in undertaking such pathway development and analysis:
1. Description of a framing narrative about the transforma-
tion to sustainable futures
2. Identification of the transformations needed to achieve the 
SDG targets and beyond
3. Selection of economic, political and social instruments to 
promote the transformations
4. Quantification of the timing, technologies, and costs of the 
transformations 
5. Identification of measures including public awareness, pu-
blic deliberation, social activism, and democratic oversight 
of science and technology, to overcome obstacles to change 
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Box 1. TWI2050 overarching narrative.
Globally and rapidly, awareness grows that the universally adopted SDGs can only be achieved through an unprecedented trans-
formation of the technologies, economies, and societies worldwide. Only through such a transformation, is it possible to achieve a 
world in 2050 that is characterized by prosperous, equitable, and inclusive societies safely operating within planetary boundaries. 
Support for such transformational change emerges from rising societal uneasiness of slow progress on environmental and societal 
concerns and linked to renewed impetus to meet international agreements. This plays a role at the very local scale, where seeds for 
transformative processes continue to grow - but also in key sectors such as finance. 
As a result, driven by a growing awareness of the social, cultural, and economic costs of unilateral decision making at all levels, a 
new joint global cognitive and normative framework emerges that provides the necessary perspective to tackle the world’s sustain-
ability challenges. The outcome is unprecedented levels of inclusiveness and cooperation at all levels from local to global. Knowl-
edge societies emerge worldwide with an emphasis on public goods such as science, technology, and global commons. Heterogene-
ity of values and norms among societal groups, including religion, and nations continue, but are generally better aligned with this 
new ‘global identity’ based on shared responsibilities and vision for a sustainable future. Inequality is greatly reduced within and 
between countries. The number of conflicts including violence and homicides fall rapidly, and the world enjoys extended periods 
of geopolitical and social stability. 
This overall change in mindsets, values, and norms, coupled with more effective governance for long-term sustainability, facilitates 
deep simultaneous transformations within six interconnected domains while the 17 SDGs are universally adopted as the new social 
contract.
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Figure 1. An illustration of TWI2050 conceptual framework. Two sets of scien-
ce-based, normative targets provide bounds for the transformation toward sus-
tainable future. The first are symbolized by the SDGs for 2030 and the second for 
2050 and beyond symbolizes the achievement just and equitable future for all on 
a resilient planet. The gray band illustrates the overarching narrative that indica-
tes how the future is connected to the present. It is about what needs to change 
to achieve the transformation toward sustainability by ‘backcasting’ from the 
normative targets. Also shown are alternative SDPs that provide model-based 
quantifications of the transformational changes. They can be interpreted as al-
ternative realizations of the overarching narrative. SDPs in this report are indi-
cative and the next phase of TWI2050 will focus on more integrated pathways 
although some characteristics would remain to be qualitative such as justice and 
peace. Source: TWI2050.
World at crossroads
The universal and unanimously agreed goals of the 2030 
Agenda were chosen for reasons of both hope and fear. The 
hope arises from the scientific and technological revolutions, 
resistance of democracy, freedom and effective governance 
already underway across a number of societies, which could 
enable us to achieve goals that were out of reach for previous 
generations, including the end of extreme poverty and hunger, 
and the feasibility of achieving decent and fulfilling lives for all. 
Hope also arises from a multitude of initiatives across the world 
to define prosperity in non-growth terms alone, preparing the 
way for the emergence of novel and sustainable lifestyles. It 
also draws inspiration from the experience of the Millennium 
Development Goals, which showed how global goals can 
motivate and enable massive improvements, as demonstrated 
by unprecedented progress in reducing child mortality and 
combating HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. Contrary 
to some perceptions, progress was accelerated in some of the 
poorest and most fragile countries in the world (McArthur et 
al., 2018). 
The fear arises from the stark realization that the world is 
currently not achieving sustainable development. The world 
is falling short in all four dimensions. Some parts of the 
world are still trapped in extreme poverty. Some regions are 
suffering from growing gaps between the rich and poor. Many 
countries lack essential state and governance capacities. All 
regions of the planet are suffering from three human-induced 
calamities of environmental degradation: global warming; loss 
of biodiversity; and pollution of the air, soils, freshwater, and 
oceans. And in many regions and nations populist nationalistic 
politics undermines global cooperation. In just over three short 
years since the SDGs were universally adopted we have seen 
the emergence of an anti-immigrant and anti-globalization 
backlash and marginalization of science that may undermine 
the 2030 Agenda. 
While all countries are committed in principle to achieving the 
17 SDGs and the Paris Agreement, there remain considerable 
doubts as to whether the goals will actually be achieved and 
significant disagreements as to how this can be done. Some 
critics of the SDGs argue that the goals are simply out of reach, 
too idealistic and infeasible in practice. Others argue that 
economic growth guided by market forces will be sufficient to 
achieve the SDGs. Markets will solve all problems and that all 
that is needed is a bit of patience. 
Based on rigorous analysis and modeling, we suggest our own 
viewpoint: 
Humanity is at a crossroads: sustainable development is 
feasible at all scales – local to global – if stakeholders (national 
governments, cities, businesses, academia, and civil society) adopt 
actions in line with the SDGs and the Paris Agreement. Success is 
a matter of choice rather than inevitability or infeasibility. Choice 
requires the deployment of economic, political, social instruments, 
technological and cultural innovations, and changes in lifestyles to 
bring about the needed transformational changes at every scale.  
There is overwhelming scientific evidence showing that a 
prerequisite to achieve the aspirational socioeconomic goals 
agreed upon with the SDGs, is a transformation to world 
development on a stable and resilient planet. Humanity has 
entered a new geological Epoch, the Anthropocene, where 
humanity – one single species – constitutes the largest driver 
of environmental change on Earth. Global environmental risks 
are high and rising. We have transgressed several planetary 
boundaries that regulate the stability of the Earth system (Steffen 
et al., 2015; Rockström et al., 2009), and thereby the ability 
of Earth to provide essential support functions, fundamental 
conditions for good and healthy lives, and ultimately a stable 
state of the planet. 
It is therefore fundamental to consider the SDGs as a necessary 
but not sufficient milestone for global sustainable development. 
The human quest is to meet the SDGs by 2030, then continue 
meeting them for all citizens, in an increasingly populated and 
wealthy world by 2050 and beyond, and to do so within the safe 
operating space of a stable and resilient planet. In short, global 
sustainable development is a world that transforms to meet 
the SDGs within planetary boundaries. This will entail deep 
transformations of the world’s societies. The global consultation 
among all nations (which gave us the SDGs) combined with 
the latest advancements in Earth system science (expressed, 
e.g., through the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) and the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform 
on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES)), provides 
humanity, for the first time, with a clear road map for a desired, 
prosperous, equitable and environmentally sustainable future 
for people and planet. This defines an overarching goal of 
world development for 2030 and 2050. The TWI2050 framing 
narrative and SDPs indicate what needs to be done to achieve 
this goal. The grand challenge and opportunity is to explore and 
embark on the myriad transformational pathways necessary to 
achieve it. This is key, as the 12 years between now and 2030 and 
the 32 years between now and 2050 will be critical for global 
wellbeing, even for survival. 
TWI2050 gathers the scientific community in dialog with 
decision makers and multiple stakeholders to analytically 
support the exploration of SDPs to attain the SDGs within 
planetary boundaries by 2050. The 17 SDGs and 169 targets 
define an integrated and universal framework for a trajectory 
towards global sustainability development by 2030. Extending 
these to 2050 and integrating them with scientific targets for a 
biophysical safe operating space on Earth, delineates pathways 
for global sustainable development this century. 
To meet the SDGs within planetary boundaries by 2030 and 2050 
will require major changes across all human activities, lifestyles and 
values, and cooperation from national to global scales. This said, 
we have identified six major transformations – encompassing 
human capacity and demography, sustainable consumption and 
production, decarbonization and energy, food, biosphere, water 
and oceans, smart cities, and digital revolution – that empirical 
evidence, global assessments and analyses, show are necessary and 
potentially sufficient to attain the SDGs on a sustainable planet.
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We summarize the evidence on these pathways in four 
sections below: i) we describe the current trajectory of the world 
economy and major regions; ii) the six major transformations – 
encompassing human capacity and demography, consumption 
and production, decarbonization and energy, food, biosphere, 
and water, smart cities, and digital revolution – that are both 
necessary and sufficient to achieve sustainable development are 
presented. Together they are all needed to raise productivity, 
ensure social inclusion, protect the planet, and create the 
conditions for political stability, peace and cooperation 
within and between societies. iii) we describe the obstacles 
to implementing the SDGs, such as vested interests and the 
long-term and complex nature of the SDGs; iv) the economic, 
political and social instruments and transformative governance 
mechanisms that will be needed to achieve the deep changes 
towards sustainability are dealt with in the final section.
The current trajectory
The current economic, social, and environmental trajectory, 
at the global scale and within most regions of the world, follows 
an unsustainable development path. If we define a sustainable 
development trajectory as one that simultaneously achieves the 
three dimensions of economic prosperity, social inclusion, and 
environmental sustainability at a pace sufficient to achieve the 
quantified objectives of the SDGs for 2030 and 2050, then most 
of the world falls seriously short of SDG objectives in one or 
more dimensions. 
We identify five major sustainable development challenges 
that are described by the SDGs. 
First, many people are trapped in extreme poverty, especially 
in sub-Saharan Africa and parts of South Asia, South-East 
Asia and Latin America. The poverty is multidimensional and 
comprises income (SDG 1), hunger and malnutrition (SDG 2), 
lack of healthcare (SDGs 3), lack of education (4), and lack of 
access to basic infrastructures services (SDGs 6, 7, 8, and 9). 
Second, many countries have high and rising inequalities of 
income, employment and social status. Inequality is covered in 
particular by SDGs 5 (gender equality), 10 (income inequalities), 
and 16 (peace and justice). In addition, inequalities in access to 
public services (e.g., SDGs 3 and 4) as well as infrastructure and 
basic needs (SDGs 6, 7, 8, 9) are both causes and outcomes of 
other kinds of inequalities. 
Third, human activity is degrading the physical environment 
and the global commons, violating planetary boundaries and 
thereby putting the stability of Earth within a Holocene-like 
state at risk. Major environmental challenges include human-
induced climate change (SDG 13), destruction of biodiversity 
and ecosystems in oceans and on land (SDG 14 and 15), 
deterioration of finite freshwater resources (SDG 6), and release 
of chemical pollutants, from heavy metals, micro-plastics, 
pesticides, nuclear waste to overload of reactive nitrogen and 
phosphorus, into the air, soil, and water (SDG 12). 
Fourth, demographic stresses are arising from high fertility 
rates (mainly in sub-Saharan Africa and parts of the Middle-
East), rapid urbanization (especially in Africa and parts of Asia) 
(SDG 11), and rapid aging (in high-income and upper-middle 
income countries). They are driven in parts by lack of education 
(SDG 4), insufficient access to sexual and reproductive health 
and high child mortality rates (SDG 3), as well as gender 
inequality (SDG 5). 
Fifth, weak and bad governance, failing institutions, and a rise 
in nationalism (SDG 16) in many countries and regions, as well 
as intensifying international conflicts and eroding multilateral 
systems (SDG 17) are undermining the local, national and 
global capacities to implement the 2030 Agenda. 
These challenges are driven by long-term, path dependent 
second-order dynamics which are deeply embedded in our 
societal structures, have many feedback and anticipation loops 
among themselves and will prove extremely difficult to change. 
This requires us to change our perspective in order to understand 
and deal with the societal and socio-environmental dynamics 
involved. We need to view them in their full complexity. That 
perspective should focus on learning from the past, about the 
present, and for the future! At any time in the past (and the 
present), there were options among the directions that system 
dynamics could take. Some of these were adopted, others were 
not. We are not at crossroads where we need to adopt the right 
options – this requires proactive and anticipatory planning!
One of the main reasons the world is not on track towards 
achieving the SDGs is that sustainable development is not a 
self-organizing property of market-based economic systems. 
Market-based economic growth alone is rarely socially inclusive 
and environmentally sustainable. Without countervailing 
policies, markets are often reasonably efficient but also highly 
unfair, making the rich richer and the poor poorer. Moreover, 
producers and consumers rarely have the incentive to protect 
the air, water, soils, and climate, since most of the damage they 
cause is incurred by others, including future generations, rather 
than by themselves. Markets underprovide so-called public 
goods like infrastructure and protection of the global commons 
(the environmental systems and processes on Earth, e.g., the 
climate system, oceans, forest biomes, glaciers, clean air) that all 
citizens share and depend on for local environmental stability 
and provision of services, and they undersupply so-called merit 
goods such as health and education, which should be accessible 
to all people irrespective of income or social status, thus driving 
greater economic prosperity. 
Because markets underprovide public goods, governments 
(and to a lesser extent, civil society) must provide them. The 
challenge therefore is to re-embed markets and shape them 
towards the sustainability goals. But governments often also fail 
to provide public goods. Sometimes they are too poor to provide 
them unless they benefit from development cooperation. 
Sometimes they are not competent to provide them. Sometimes 
the global good must be protected by many or all governments, 
because the problem is truly global in nature (as with most global 
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commons such as climate change). And often the government is 
not motivated to protect the global good, perhaps because the 
time horizon of politicians is too short, or perhaps because the 
government is financially corrupt and therefore not interested in 
the true wellbeing of the population. These are all reasons why 
good governance and global cooperation are vital to achieving 
sustainable development. 
Transformations to sustainable development
The transformations to sustainable development imply deep 
structural changes, profound reforms of institutions, shifting 
mental maps and norms, changing patterns of human behavior, 
widespread awareness raising and mobilization, the adoption of 
a complex adaptive systems approach to sustainability issues, 
and unprecedented problem solving. As transformative change 
is needed, countries around the world require transformative 
governance.
In view of the complexity and breadth of the changes occur-
ring, and those to be expected, it is essential that we begin an 
effort to move beyond the sectoral and fragmented approach 
much sustainability research has followed thus far. Rather than 
investigate the role of water, or food, or energy, or even the wa-
ter-food-energy nexus, we should design an approach that tru-
ly integrates all possible domains affected, focuses on tradeoffs 
and co-benefits and generally takes a holistic perspective that is 
at the core of 2030 Agenda. Another synergetic approach of the 
2030 Agenda strives to harness science, technology, and inno-
vation (STI) to accelerate progress. The holistic approach im-
plies that the full complexity of the dynamics involved in each 
domain of social, social-environmental, and social-environ-
mental-technological interaction – from the basic values and 
world view of individual societies and cultures, to their ways of 
interacting, their institutions, their governance, and so forth – 
will play out and impact on every aspect of present and future 
societies.
To move in that direction (at least for the moment as we are 
not able to deal with the full complexity of the total systems 
involved), we have selected to focus on the following six 
exemplary transformations that capture much of the global, 
regional, and local dynamics and thus encompass major drivers 
of future changes: 
• Human capacity and demography
• Consumption and production
• Decarbonization and energy
• Food, biosphere, and water 
• Smart cities
• Digital revolution
Arguably, the six transformations are necessary to achieve the 
SDGs by 2030 and to 2050 and beyond. Each transformation 
will require Herculean governance efforts and imply deep 
societal, cultural, and normative dynamics of change that we 
analyze in Chapter 4. 
The six transformations are not intended to be a new clustering 
of the 17 SDGs nor to be a ‘reduced form’ of the SDGs and their 
169 targets, but rather to describe systemic and integrative 
changes that are related to all SDGs as illustrated in Figure 2. 
Furthermore, they are central to the six SDGs reviewed at 2018 
HLPF (SDGs 6, 7, 11, 12, and 15 as well as progress on 17). 
Arguably, they are not merely interlinked and interdependent 
with all SDGs, but also at the center of the great transformation 
toward sustainability and fundamental in ‘turning the tide’ of 
change. 
Figure 2. TWI2030 focuses on six transformations that capture much of the glo-
bal, regional, and local dynamics and encompass major drivers of future chan-
ges: i) Human capacity and demography; ii) Consumption and production; iii) 
Decarbonization and energy; iv) Food, biosphere and water; v) Smart cities; and 
vi) Digital revolution. Together they give peoples-centered perspective: building 
local, national and global societies and economies which secure wealth crea-
tion, poverty reduction, fair distribution and inclusiveness necessary for human 
prosperity. They are necessary and potentially sufficient to achieve the SDGs if 
addressed holistically in unison. Source: TWI2050.
Why these six transformations?
Foremost, the six exemplary transformations give a people cen-
tered perspective: building local, national and global societies 
and economies which secure wealth creation, poverty reduc-
tion, fair distribution and inclusiveness are necessary for human 
prosperity in any society and any region of the world. While 
these objectives may be pursued differently in different con-
texts, there are some domains of action which appear to be uni-
versal including: i) institutions to enable and improve human 
capacities and capabilities, demography that includes secondary 
and not just primary education, adequate access to health care, 
fair labor markets, universal rule of law and means for mana-
ging aging societies; ii) essential and strategic infrastructure of 
any local, national, global economy and society such as energy, 
food systems, cities, settlements and mobility systems; iii) pro-
duction and consumption systems where deep transformations 
need to take place to create wealth and ensure a good work-life 
balance, aiming at leaving no one behind and iv) STI that are 
essential for further progress toward achieving the SDGs. This 
is the paradox as STI has, in the past, created many negative 
externalities like transgression of planetary boundaries, but it is 
also indispensable for the transformation toward sustainability. 
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Progress on the SDGs will be facilitated if we can build and im-
plement detailed STI roadmaps at levels that range from local to 
global (Colglazier). This is central as STI drives all SDGs and 
one of the most fundamental disruptive changes in human his-
tory – the digital revolution which puts comprehensive artificial 
intelligence at the center. A major challenge will be how to use 
the transformative nature of digitalization to create wealthy and 
inclusive economies and societies.
The six transformations nicely capture these domains of ac-
tion allowing achievement of human wellbeing in all its dimen-
sions. There are however further arguments for the selection of 
exactly these six transformations: all of them are associated with 
powerful dynamics that could result in very different develop-
ment outcomes for humanity – both positive and negative. At 
the same time, all these processes take place in systems whose 
evolution depends on governance, values, policy tools, etc.; that 
is, these processes can be managed, and the outcomes depend 
on choices made by humans. Moreover, as the six transformati-
ons interact essentially with all the SDGs they also provide and 
entry point for achieving all SDGs in a way that can be managed.
Putting governance, values and policy tools into 
the center
It becomes very clear, that the six major transformations require 
governance structures and capabilities, political action and the 
formation of actors of change on local, national and global levels. 
Taking the 2030 Agenda seriously implies that, incremental 
change is no option, transformative governance is needed. 
Transformations to sustainability are likely to be disruptive 
and, thus, could even trigger violent conflict. Throughout 
history, most great transformations were accompanied by 
violent conflict, including war (Osterhammel, 2010). Although 
a peaceful transformation to sustainability is the role model for 
the 2030 Agenda as TWI2050 we need to consider scenarios, 
which consider potential outbreaks of conflictive dynamics. 
Governance and peace are two sides of the one coin. If 
states fail to govern, peace is at stake. The six transformations 
to sustainability require profound governance changes that 
are likely to challenge existing power constellations, create 
uncertainties and thus foster instability. Strong political 
institutions are thus crucial but they will only be effective for an 
integrated and peaceful implementation of the 2030 Agenda if 
they are able to accommodate the disperse distribution of power, 
multiple centers of authority and competitive relationships 
that characterize policymaking between the state, market and 
society in a multi-polar world (Fukuyama, 2004). Democratic 
oversight will be needed to govern the six transformations in an 
inclusive way. 
The most likely constellations of state fragility show how 
the macro-political starting points for implementing the 2030 
Agenda vary across regions from dysfunctional states to states 
with low levels of state capacity, legitimacy or authority (see 
Chapter 4). We emphasize therefore the importance of linking 
pathway-analysis with governance considerations. Investing in 
governance capacities and capabilities, building alliances for the 
great transformations towards sustainability, triggering mental 
mind shifts towards the 2030 Agenda, creating cornerstones 
of a global culture of cooperation and developing multiple, 
attractive. Context specific narratives on sustainability futures 
are becoming imperatives and preconditions for moving 
towards sustainable pathways at local, national and global levels 
(Chapter 4).
The 2030 Agenda (in contrast to the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs)) puts the people centered approach into planetary, 
Earth system perspectives. What does this imply for the six 
major transformations? We argue that the six transformation 
arenas remain the same. However, the goal systems in each 
of the six transformation arenas change profoundly. Instead 
of optimizing transformations processes ‘only’ towards 
traditional people centered development goals (growth, wealth 
creation, poverty reduction, reducing inequalities), sustainable 
development transformations now need to accept the local and 
global boundaries of the Earth`s system, to avoid planetary 
tipping points which would threaten human wellbeing and even 
human civilization. 
This leads to the conclusion that implementing the 2030 
Agenda requires a systematic alignment of people centered 
policies with strategies reducing and eliminating greenhouse 
gas and other emissions, managing local and global resource 
flows in a sustainable way, and avoiding pressures on ecosystems 
which might trigger unmanageable tipping points in the Earth 
system.
Thus, for the first time in human history, in the Anthropocene 
humans need to take responsibility to stabilize the planet 
itself– a civilizational shift in perspective is required. The 
transformations to sustainability therefore create not only 
economic, technological, social, and governance challenges, but 
also an imperative for deep cultural innovations.
We symbolized the potentially dual nature of the six 
transformations as being on the brink of the world at a crossroad. 
As argued above, the unanimously agreed SDGs were chosen 
for reasons of hope and fear. We demonstrate the gaps in all six 
exemplary transformations – between trajectories and pathways 
to inclusive sustainable development or counter transformation.
It is important to emphasize that the six major transformations 
need to take place in a very specific historical context.
Bifurcations 
We argue that the implementation of the 2030 Agenda marks 
a major bifurcation in human history. The transformation 
towards sustainability is confronted with dynamics of speed, 
scale, and acceleration on many fronts: global population is 
on path to reach 9–10 billion people by 2050(Lutz et al., 2018); 
energy, food, and water demand could grow by up to 50% by 
midcentury (Riahi et al., 2017) if no significant departure 
from current trends occurs; urban population is likely to reach 
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almost 70% in the same, short period of time (UNDESA, 
2018) with associated expansion of urban infrastructure. The 
deep six transformations will require strategies, governance 
mechanisms, and adaptive capacities that enable our societies 
to cope with the described disruptive changes and to develop 
pathways towards sustainability. 
The sustainability and 2030 Agenda oriented discourse still 
neglects, that there are two other major bifurcations in our 
societies and globally which are taking place in parallel.
First, the transformation towards sustainability coincides with 
an accelerating digital revolution, with artificial intelligence 
(AI) as its core driver, which astonishingly was not considered 
as a relevant trend in the 2030 Agenda. These innovations 
could enable the implementation of the SDGs, but also multiply 
already existing development problems (inequalities, power 
concentration, erosion of civil rights, erosion of governance 
capacities) and create a completely new generation of sustainable 
development challenges (Chapters 2 and 4): How could the 
digital innovations help to trigger the major six transformations 
early? How can we ensure that digital technologies and AI will 
be used to implement the 2030 Agenda, to improve the lives 
of the bottom 40 % of the global population, and to stabilize 
the planet? How will the AI revolution transform the global 
economy, trade patterns, global value chains and impact 
socioeconomic perspectives in the Global South? These issues 
are currently neither at the center of the debate about the 
digital age not at the center of sustainability and SDG oriented 
discourses. But we need to go even further. Beyond our comfort 
zones we need to start new debates about sustainability and 
the future of humans in the emerging Digital Age: How can we 
secure human control over semi-autonomous technical systems 
and AI? How would we like to shape the co-evolution of general 
purpose AI-driven technical systems and human civilization? 
Do we need normative guardrails for human enhancement and 
the emerging possibilities of deep transformations of humans 
based on technological innovations? We need to ask and discuss 
these questions now, in order to shape the digital future. The 
new challenge is, to learn to shape the digital revolution, and 
to align digital and sustainability transformations to implement 
the 2030 Agenda. We are entering the digital Anthropocene.
Secondly, the transformation towards sustainability and 
the digital revolution are coinciding with major changes 
and turbulence within our societies, regarding political and 
normative orders, and global power shifts. Right wing populism, 
narrow minded nationalism, xenophobia, hostility towards 
science, re-emerging 19th century power strategies threatening, 
instead of improving, a rule-based global governance system are 
gaining importance in many societies in both the Global North 
and the Global South, potentially undermining transformations 
towards sustainability. We should not ignore these counter-
transformations.
We discuss the interdependencies of these three major 
bifurcations which our societies are confronted with, trying 
to present multiple pathways towards sustainability within 
turbulent local, national and global environments (see Chapter 
4). 
Six exemplary transformations 
We consider each transformation in turn and emphasize from 
the outset that each transformation contributes to several SDGs. 
Human capacity and demography 
Human capacity promotes the wellbeing of individuals from 
birth to old age. Sustainable development policies should 
support, enable and empower each individual throughout their 
entire life from infancy and early childhood development to 
primary and secondary schooling, the transition from school 
to work, prosperous working years and leisure time, and high-
quality years in old age and retirement. Achieving such results 
will require high-quality public infrastructure and services, 
and budgetary support for public investments, services, and 
transfers to vulnerable households. 
The whole-of-life approach to human capacities should 
anticipate several demographic trends, including the 
transformation from rural to urban life, the increasing rates of 
technological change, the rising market demand for skills, the 
inequality of market earnings, the high participation of women 
in the labor force, the aging of the population and the low 
fertility rates and stable or declining populations. 
In general, low-income countries today are characterized by 
predominantly rural populations; relatively low educational 
attainments and job skills; relatively low levers of technological 
change, relatively high inequality of market incomes; relatively 
low engagement of women in formal employment, and high 
participation in home production, smallholder farming, and 
self-employed market trade; large youth population and low 
median age; and fertility rates above replacement rates, and still 
relatively high child mortality despite recent progress. 
By contrast, high-income countries are generally characterized 
by predominantly urban populations; high educational 
attainments; high rates of technological change, relatively low 
inequality of incomes based on extensive fiscal redistribution 
(though inequality has been rising and can be very high in some 
countries); high participation of women in formal employment; 
high and rising median age; and fertility rates at replacement 
rates or lower, leading to aging populations and associated 
health challenges of noncommunicable diseases. Medium-
income countries lie between the low-income and high-income 
countries along these six demographic dimensions. 
The transformation of human capacities and demography will 
entail the support for the transition to urbanized, high-skilled, 
high-employment, and aging populations, with low fertility rates 
leading to stable or declining populations (Figure 3). Major public 
investments in human capacities include universal health coverage 
(SDG 3), education (SDG 4), and basic infrastructure (water and 
sanitation, SDG 6; modern energy services, SDG 7; and transport 
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and connectivity, SDG 9). The education process itself will have to 
empower young people to understand the nature of the sustaina-
ble development challenges and the kinds of global cooperation 
needed to achieve the globally agreed goals. Educational attain-
ment is a major lever for fertility and mortality patterns (Figure 4). 
Sustainable pathways are characterized by gradually rising 
enrolment levels (Figure 5) such that by 2030 enrolment levels 
are achieved that lead to universal attainment of primary and 
secondary education levels for both boys and girls. High-
quality education standards and education facilities are offered 
publicly, reflecting the public good nature of education. This is 
achieved through higher budget allocations and employment 
in the education sector and, where applicable, prioritizing 
official development assistance towards education. Sustainable 
pathways are also characterized by improved health outcomes. 
By 2030 a major reduction in premature, and causes, of deaths 
is achieved through the provision of universal preventive and 
curative medical care especially in low-income countries and 
with a specific focus on children. Advances in biomedical 
research aided by the digital revolution will allow for more 
targeted treatments of diseases leading to higher curative 
outcomes. Prevention of typical lifestyle diseases will benefit 
from higher levels of education and dietary changes. Overall 
health is a high priority with an emergent focus on ‘mental 
and social’ health, resulting in growth in economic output, 
employment, and increased life expectancy (Figure 6).
Advances in STI will lead to increased human knowledge 
and powerful knowledge-based systems and institutions 
leading to truly knowledge-based societies. For this to happen 
governments and institutions at all levels need to prepare for 
these advances and actively promote and support the relevant 
community.
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Figure 3. A range of future world populations is shown for three SSP pathways 
developed by the scientific communities for the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
IPCC. The population dynamics are based on the IIASA projections that range 
from a very high global population of almost 13 billion by the end of the century 
down to just 7 billion, a shade lower than the current population of 7.6 billion. 
The ranges are based on the probabilistic projections by the UN Population Di-
vision. While the range of global population by 2030 is relatively small from 8 
to just over 9 billion, by 2050 it increases from about 8.5 to just over 10 billion. 
High populations are associated with lower rates of development together with 
high fertility while lowest ones are associated with high rates of development 
and low fertility. The later are also characterized by high levels of education at-
tainment and health care and thus in line with the achievement of the SDGs. 
Source: Abel et al. (2016).
Figure 4. Number of live births per woman (1970-75 to 2010-2015) are shown 
as a function of women’s educational attainment in years for select countries 
(1970 to 2010). At very low or no educational attainment, women have a larger 
number of children, ranging up to eight children per woman. In Italy and Po-
land, the fertility is now below the replacement level while in the United States 
it is just above. This indicates that the education of women is key for whether 
future populations will be big or small and thus also an important prerequisi-
te for achieving sustainability in the world. Source: Education data from Barro 
and Lee (2013), fertility data from UNDESA (2017). Graphic courtesy of Raya 
Muttarak.
Figure 5. About 85% of global population over the age of 15 or some six billion 
people have primary education in the world, up from just over 70% in 1970. 
Three SSP projections are shown: SSP1 as an ambitious pathway and a proxy for 
an SDP, SSP2 and SSP3 as trend scenarios. In SSP1 and SSP2, the historical trend 
continues toward almost universal primary education, but the SDP calls for uni-
versal secondary education. SSP3 portrays no improvement at all. Secondary 
education attainment doubled form some 30 to 60% of people over 15 years of 
age. SSP1 portrays a significant acceleration reaching over 85% by midcentury. 
SSP3 portrays a deterioration leading to higher birth rates and population in the 
world. Most importantly, tertiary attainment increases in SSP1 and stagnates 
in SSP3. Even in SSP1 the midcentury level is just over 30% and not that much 
different from secondary education attainment in 1970. This is a huge challenge 
for the knowledge societies in times of digitalization. SDP would definitely need 
a higher educational attainment if no one should be left behind. Source: Data 
from Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital (2015) 
and Lutz et al. (2018).
Synthesis
Consumption and production
Today’s consumption and production patterns lead to excessive 
use of natural resources through highly inefficient resource use 
(such as water, raw materials, wild catch from oceans, or land 
use) and generate unsustainable levels of pollution, including 
chemicals, plastics, nutrients, untreated sewage, and municipal 
waste. Unsustainable consumption and production patterns are 
one reason why countries around the world need to transform 
their energy systems, food systems, and cities. Inefficient resource 
use and poor waste management by industry and households 
are another challenge. To promote sustainable consumption 
and production patterns, we need to transform consumption 
and production patterns towards a circular economy. 
The circular economy refers to the change of practices by 
businesses and households to ensure that both production 
and consumption behavior are consistent with environmental 
sustainability. A metaphor for the circular economy is that of 
a living cell that through efficient metabolism recycles many of 
the materials within the cell wall and reduces the exchange with 
the external environment. Ultimately, the circles of resource 
use will need to be closed to decouple human wellbeing from 
environmental resource use and pollution. 
Consumption and production cuts across several of the 
other transitions, especially related to the resource-oriented 
and society-oriented SDGs, providing an ideal entry point for 
integrated pathway development. Across a variety of resources 
(energy, water, land, materials) end-use demand is the ultimate 
driver of current resource systems and associated improvements 
in efficiency and reductions in waste therefore offer the 
largest ‘upstream’ systems leverage effects. A key element of 
a transformation to sustainable consumption is the notion 
that wellbeing does not necessarily rely on the consumption 
of resources per se but is rather derived from the services and 
amenities these resources help providing. In particular the 
digital revolution offers huge potentials to make accessible these 
services in a much more resource efficient manner (Figure 7).
Figure 7. The rapid progress of information and telecommunication techno-
logies could be an indication of the path-breaking potential of next-generation 
digital technologies and their clustering in new activities and associated beha-
viors. A smart phone needs between 2.2 Watts in standby to some 5 Watts in 
use, while the numerous devices portrayed in the figure that it replaces need 
up to hundred times more power. Bundling of services from various devices in 
the smart phone can be seen as an example for the power of the digital revolu-
tion and the huge potential of increasing the resource efficiencies through new 
technologies and behaviors. Graphic courtesy of Nuno Bento based on data in 
Grubler et al. (2018) and visualization of Tupy (2012).
We have already mentioned several aspects of sustainable 
production practices in energy (efficiency in energy use, 
conversion from fossil fuels to renewable energy including 
renewable power-to-gas conversion, fuel switching), food 
and biosphere (dietary shift away from a high beef diet, more 
efficient fertilizer use, reduced food loss and waste), and cities 
(recycling of urban wastes, sewerage and wastewater treatment, 
urban planning for high-density agglomerations). 
Other priorities for the transformation of consumption and 
production patterns include improvements in material efficien-
cy and lower emissions, for example by reduction of iron ore 
with hydrogen, use and reuse of materials such as carbon, recy-
cling and ‘urban mining’ to close the circle on the use of rare mi-
nerals. The shift towards a circular economy requires life-cycle 
approaches to products across a broad range of industrial value 
chains as well as human agglomerations, such as a large city. 
Decarbonization and energy
The world requires universal access to modern energy services 
together with a decisive drop in CO2 and other greenhouse gas 
emissions. Over a billion people do not have access to electricity 
and some three billion to clean cooking (IEA, 2017). This leads 
to about four million premature deaths, especially women 
and children who spend most time indoors (WHO, 2014). 
Universal access is essential for development and environmental 
sustainability. Positive effects on reduction of greenhouse 
emissions are likely due to better combustion and shift toward 
renewables, but far from sufficient at current rates of progress. 
The climate science is clear. To have at least a two-thirds 
probability of remaining below 2°C global warming (above 
preindustrial levels) requires that the cumulative net emissions 
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Figure 6. During the last century global average life expectancy doubled from 
some 35 to over 70 years. In the SSP1 pathway this development continues, rea-
ching 85 years by midcentury. SSP1 characteristics are close to what is needed 
to achieve the SDGs and thus an important basis for the SDPs. SSP2 has signifi-
cantly lower life expectancy while SSP3 portrays essentially no improvement at 
all. Source: Data from UNDESA (2017) and Wittgenstein Centre for Demogra-
phy and Global Human Capital (2015).
of CO2 from 2011 onwards should not exceed 1,000 Gt 
(Gigatons) of CO2 (Pachauri et al., 2014). Yet annual emissions 
from fossil-fuel combustion, industry and land-use change 
have been on the order of 40 GtCO2 per year since 2011 (Le 
Quéré et al., 2018), meaning that humanity has roughly 18 
years remaining of CO2 emissions at the current global rate. 
Some recent studies (Goodwin et al., 2018; Millar et al., 2018; 
Tokarska and Gillett, 2018) indicate that the remaining budget 
could be slightly higher as less of it would have been used in 
the past. This however does not change any of the implications 
to succeed on two decisive global benchmarks: i) the global 
curve of CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel burning and land-use 
change must turn steeply downwards in the next few years, and 
ii) by 2050 we should have largely transformed to a fossil-fuel-
free world energy system (with a residual of remaining CO2 
emissions < 5 GtCO2/year). To the energy-related emissions we 
need to add the emissions due to land-use change, considered 
below in the discussion on food and the biosphere. And to add 
to the drama, global CO2 emissions due to energy use in the 
past years continued to rise as the world economy grows despite 
the relative decoupling between CO2 emissions and GDP 
growth. This implies that the current trajectory with gradual 
decarbonization and efficiency improvements is in no way 
sufficient to reach the Paris Agreement. 
It is therefore necessary to reduce energy-related greenhouse 
gas emissions dramatically and decarbonize the world’s energy 
system by midcentury. The most plausible path is a phase-out of 
fossil fuels and their replacement by zero-carbon energy sources 
such as wind, solar, hydro, geothermal, ocean, nuclear (where it is 
politically and socially acceptable), and other potential sources. 
The options available to any particular location will depend on 
the local alternatives and the options for long-distance transport 
of zero-carbon energy carriers. Long-distance transport may 
include long-distance power transmission (for example, using 
high-voltage direct-current transmission to reduce transmission 
losses) and the conversion of zero-carbon energy into other 
forms such as hydrogen or synthetic hydrocarbons that can be 
transported in other ways (such as pipelines, ships, rail, etc.). 
Given the rapid speed required and relative difficulty and limited 
set of options for decarbonization in the heating and transport 
sectors also implies a gradual electrification of these sectors. 
While currents trends do not indicate that the world could 
embark on a trajectory of limiting global warming below 2°C, 
levers, that are so far hardly tapped, could still turn the tide, 
viz., energy demand and distributed energy generation. Energy 
demand could be reduced drastically with the right incentives in 
place. For example, energy demands could be as much as 40% 
lower in 2050 relative to 2010 due to transformation towards 
efficient energy technologies and responsible consumption 
behavior (Grubler et al., 2018). Distributed energy generation, 
facilitated by the digital revolution, could lead to a much faster 
rate of decarbonization than experienced in the past. Recent 
developments and price dynamics suggest that we could be at 
the brink of such a revolution in the energy sector. 
A sustainable pathway for the energy-system emissions 
therefore could be constructed as follows (Figure 8): Consider 
a phase-out path in which today’s 40 Gt of CO2 emissions are 
reduced to zero in a linear down-ramp to constrain cumulative 
emissions to about 700 GtCO2. If the linear down-ramp starts 
in 2020, fossil-fuel based emissions would end in 2050, and 
would reach 20 Gt (that is, roughly half of current emissions) 
in the year 2035. If instead, there is a geometric decline, with 
emissions falling by half each decade (7% per year), emissions 
would reach 20 Gt by 2030, 10 Gt by 2040, 5 Gt by 2050 and then 
asymptotically to zero (Rockström et al., 2017).
Figure 8. Cumulative and annual emissions and sinks of CO2 are shown for 
stabilizing global climate at below 2°C and 1.5oC. Most of carbon emissions 
shown in gray are energy-related. Together with land-use emissions they need 
to decline toward zero by midcentury. The figure is called “Carbon Law” as a 
metaphor to Moore’s Law of semiconductors where a number of transistors on a 
chip doubled every 2.5 years. Carbon Law indicates that global emissions need 
to be halved every decade. In addition, human carbon sinks need to increase to 
almost half the magnitude of current positive emissions: A tall order. Carbon 
capture from biomass (BECCS) and land-use change are here the key. Third, 
biosphere carbon sinks need to be maintained as atmospheric concentrations 
decline. The vertical gray bars show cumulative emissions since the beginning of 
the industrial revolution of some 2,000 billion tons CO2. This budget, or carbon 
endowment of humanity, will be exhausted shortly as the remaining emissions 
for achieving stabilization at below 1.5°C are essentially nil while we still emit 
some 40 billion tons CO2 per year. Net-negative emissions are needed to stay 
within this budget. The remaining budget for stabilizing at 2°C is a bit more 
generous so that the demand on net-negative emissions can be significantly 
reduced. The Carbon Law can be seen as roadmap towards making the Paris 
Agreement and the SDGs a reality. Pathways shown in this report like the SSP1 
variant focused at the 1.5°C target or the alternative scenarios portray similar 
dynamics whereas the latter is quite unique among stabilization pathways as it 
does not need net-negative emissions because of vigorous changes in end-use 
technologies and behaviors. Source: After Rockström et al. (2017).
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Decarbonization brings multiple benefits by reducing ener-
gy-related pollution at all scales, including those from transport 
and industry, which are major drivers of (indoor and) urban 
PM2.5 pollution. Universal access to electrification based on 
renewable energy can eliminate indoor air pollution, which is 
a major cause of respiratory disease especially for children and 
women who spend much of their time indoors. 
The various decarbonization scenarios suggested in recent 
studies (Figure 9) all point to the same overall strategy for 
the energy transformation. It comprises four pillars: i) energy 
efficiency, to reduce energy use per unit of economic output; ii) 
zero-carbon power, the shift of electricity generation from fossil 
fuels (coal, oil, and gas) to renewable sources; iii) electrification 
and fuel switching, the conversion of current uses of fossil fuels 
outside of power generation (such as the internal combustion 
engine; boiler and heaters in buildings; and various industrial 
processes such as steel production) to zero-carbon electricity 
and biofuel-based technologies – vehicles will shift from internal 
combustion engines to battery electric vehicles or hydrogen-
based fuels; heaters will shift from boilers to electric heat 
pumps; biomass and recycling may replace fossil fuels in some 
industrial applications, and so forth; and iv) universal access for 
all and especially those excluded today to decarbonized, clean 
cooking and electricity. 
The energy transformation would not be sufficient, however, 
to stay within the carbon budget as another 5-10 Gt per year 
of CO2 emissions result from land use (farming, livestock) and 
land-use change (deforestation and conversion of grasslands 
to pastures). Moreover, many pathways towards decarbonizing 
energy systems project significant increases in bioenergy, 
which must be understood in the context of food security, 
biodiversity conservation, water use, nitrogen and phosphorus 
needs for fertilizers, and other constraints on sustainable land 
use and food systems. Thus, the energy transformation must be 
accompanied by a transformation of land use and food systems, 
as detailed in the next section. 
Is the energy transformation feasible and affordable for the world 
and for every major region? The answer appears to be yes. Thanks 
to the rapidly falling costs of renewable power and improved 
technologies to tackle the four pillars of the energy transformation, 
several estimates of the cost of decarbonization suggest that the 
overall cost of transformation should be no more than 2.5% of GDP 
per year on average across the world. That suggests a price tag on 
the order of up to US$1 trillion per year (increasing gradually from 
about US$300 billion in the near term), a hefty but manageable 
sum. The US$1 trillion per year represents not the annual total 
investment in energy, which would be around more than two up 
to four times that amount (depending on pathway), but rather the 
incremental costs of moving to zero-carbon energy (McCollum et 
al., 2018). The latter paper has shown that the most important task 
is to align projected investment patterns better with sustainability 
goals. Improving energy security, eliminating air pollution and 
decarbonization at the same time brings multiple benefits and 
simultaneously reduces incremental investment costs (McCollum 
et al., 2013; Riahi et al., 2012).
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Figure 9. Historical evolution of the global primary energy is shown and in the 
three different pathways. a) Integrated SDG characterized by low demand, b) 
the lifestyle change scenario developed by IMAGE – implementing measures 
related to food and energy systems and lifestyle change  and c) SSP1 1.9 scenario 
(a sustainability scenario achieving the 1.5°C target). Today, fossil sources pro-
vide about 80% of primary energy after two centuries of exponential increase of 
about 2% per year. Historically, there was a shift from traditional biomass to coal 
with the advent of seam, steel and railways and later to oil and gas with develop-
ment of the internal combustion, electricity, chemicals and many other techno-
logies. Integrated SDG pathway portrays almost complete decarbonization of 
energy by midcentury with small residual use of oil and gas. This is achieved 
through major changes in energy end use and behaviors. The second pathway is 
still relatively fossil-intensive by mid-century and relies on bioenergy with CCS 
in the second half of the century this could lead to conflicts with food produc-
tion and preservation of biodiversity. In the scenario, this is mitigated via assu-
med changes in food waste, diets (less meat intensive) and yield increase. The 
SSP1 1.9 stabilizes climate change below 1.5oC requiring carbon capture and 
storage from natural gas and biomass. All pathways portray vigorous efficiency 
improvement compared to SSP2 baseline pathway; differences are shown in gray 
(savings). Source: a) “integrated SDG” from Parkinson et al. (2018), b) “lifestyle 
change” from van Vuuren et al. (2018), c) SSP1-1.9 from Rogelj et al. (2018), SSP 
Database (2012-2016).
Food, biosphere, and water
The third great transformation is in food systems and land use, 
while enhancing the resilience of other parts of the biosphere 
including water and oceans. The current patterns of land use, 
mainly related to the production of food, biofuels, and fiber, are 
unsustainable in three ways. First, today’s agricultural systems 
(including livestock and aquaculture) are major contributors to 
human-induced climate change, unsustainable water use, poor 
health through inadequate nutrition, eutrophication through 
nutrient overload, air and water pollution, deforestation, and 
the loss of biodiversity. At the same time, agricultural systems 
and other forms of land use are vulnerable to the environmental 
changes now underway, through the increasing severity of 
droughts, floods, diseases, and land degradation caused, in 
part, by climate change. Similarly, most ocean and freshwater 
fisheries are overexploited, and oceans are exposed to high 
levels of pollution, including acidification from CO2 in the 
atmosphere. Third, today’s food systems do not deliver healthy 
diets with some 800 million people undernourished (FAO et 
al., 2017) and nearly 2 billion overweight (WHO, 2015). Taken 
together, transformations of land use and ocean management 
must reduce the human-induced damages caused by agriculture 
and the food system while also making agriculture more 
resilient to environmental changes now underway and ensuring 
healthy diets. 
Consider first the many ways that agricultural systems and 
fisheries contribute to environmental degradation. Since the 
advent of agriculture some 10,000 years ago, humanity has 
transformed approximately 40% of the Earth’s ice-free land 
surface into different forms of agriculture (rangelands and 
cropland) (Foley et al., 2011). This is the prime cause of the global 
mass extinction of species now underway and the transgression 
of the planetary boundaries on land use (which puts us at risks 
of destabilizing major biomes, such as forests). Agriculture and 
associated land-use changes are a major source of greenhouse gas 
emissions, by some measures the single largest source. Agricultural 
production results in several kinds of greenhouse gas emissions: 
CO2 emissions directly linked to energy use in the farm sector (for 
example, farm machinery and the transport of food from farms to 
end-users), N2O (nitrous oxide) emissions from nitrogen-based 
fertilizers, and CH4 (methane) emissions from both livestock 
and rice production. Also, deforestation that results from the 
expansion of farmlands and ranchlands leads to the release of CO2 
from soils, vegetation, and tree cover, and reduces the capacity of 
the land sector to act as a sink for greenhouse gases. In addition to 
the environmental damage from land-use change and greenhouse 
gas emissions, farms and aquaculture also contribute to the loss 
of biodiversity through pollution from pesticides and chemical 
fertilizers; the introduction of invasive species; overhunting and 
overharvesting of plant and animal species; and soil degradation 
resulting from tillage and other farm practices. Aquaculture in 
particular accelerates unsustainable fishing practices through its 
use of wild catch as feed. Fisheries around the world are severely 
overexploited, and modern fishing practices, such as trawling, 
cause large-scale destruction of natural habitats – increasingly 
also in the deep seas.
Agricultural systems, fisheries, and the livelihoods that 
depend on them are highly vulnerable to the human-induced 
environmental changes now underway. Global warming will 
threaten food production in many regions, especially in the 
tropics and sub-tropics, as higher temperatures lower yields. 
Climate change will lower crop productivity through a greater 
frequency of extreme weather events, such as droughts, floods, 
and high-intensity storms. Freshwater scarcity will generally 
increase in today’s dryland regions. Higher temperatures will 
mean higher rates of evapotranspiration and reduced soil 
moisture. Groundwater depletion will mean less freshwater 
availability in many of today’s breadbaskets, such as the 
Gangetic Plains and north China plains, where millions of 
bore wells for crop irrigation are extracting water from aquifers 
much faster than recharge. Global warming also leads to the 
melting of glaciers in several regions (including the Alps, 
Andes, and Himalayas) that currently provide a continuous 
flow of freshwater for farms and households during spring and 
summer months. Human-induced changes in habitat (such as 
through deforestation and conversion of grasslands to pastures) 
reduces biodiversity and introduce invasive species that threaten 
agricultural production. 
Similarly, global warming, ocean acidification, overfishing, 
and pollution of oceans and coastal ecosystems are threatening 
biodiversity and the livelihoods that depend on fisheries. Many 
of the world’s fisheries are on the brink of collapse due to excess 
fishing. Almost 30% of fish stocks commercially fished are 
estimated to be over-fished, and nearly 60 % of the fish stocks 
are fully fished (FAO, 2016). The oceans are also burdened by 
acidification (due to atmospheric CO2), eutrophication (due to 
the massive runoff of chemical fertilizers), and pollution, such 
as with micro-plastics that have entered marine food chains. 
Coastlines are especially vulnerable as they are hit by many 
human forcings, including drainage of wetlands, coastal over-
development, destruction of mangrove forests, and of course 
multiple forms of pollution. 
The implications are clear. The world will need a major trans-
formation of agricultural systems and fisheries both to mit-
igate human-caused environmental degradation and to build 
resilience into agricultural production. There will be several 
dimensions of that transformation. One guiding principle will 
be the effective regulation of land use. To preserve biodiver-
sity and ecosystem functions, some parts of the planet must 
become protected areas; the biologist E. O. Wilson has called 
for protecting “half Earth” (Wilson, 2016). There is mounting 
scientific support for such a transformative approach to safe-
guard ecological functions and resilience for all food produc-
tion and the supply of ecosystem services. This provides sup-
port to the conclusion that the world has reached a juncture 
where feeding humanity (and attaining global sustainable de-
velopment) must essentially occur on already transformed and 
existing agricultural land. This means safeguarding the remai-
ning “half Earth” under natural forests and other ecosystems, 
for ecological functions and resilience, which in turn transla-
tes to a global sustainable agricultural revolution, providing 
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more and healthier food through sustainable intensification 
on existing farm land, returning land to nature (Figure 10). 
For land that is in agriculture use as croplands, pastures, 
and managed forests, this means modification of agricultural 
practices to minimize environmental damage and maximize 
resilience. Such practices include precision farming to 
economize on fertilizer and water use and to maximize yields 
(Figure 11); no-till farming to protect soil quality; agro-ecology 
to optimize the crop mix to sustain biodiversity and resist the 
dangers of pests and pathogens; and improved harvesting and 
storage practices to reduce post-harvest losses. 
Similar considerations apply to ocean management. Fisheries 
practices around the world have so far failed to limit fishing 
to sustainable levels in most regions. Here too the ocean 
will need a variety of measures, including protected marine 
areas; restrictions on fish catches; crackdowns on illegal and 
undocumented fishing; reduced flows of chemical fertilizers to 
the sea; protected coastlines and wetlands; and others. 
Yet another priority for action relates to diets and the loss 
and waste of food. Countries need to encourage healthier diets 
through public awareness campaigns, removal of subsidies 
for unhealthy and environmentally harmful production 
techniques, and careful management of land use, oceans, and 
other environmental resources. In countries with high beef 
consumption per person, reductions in beef consumption can 
promote human health while also protecting the environment. 
Beef has an especially adverse ecological burden because 
each kilogram of edible beef requires 10-15 kg of feed for the 
cattle. Similarly, some 30% of food is lost or wasted and does 
not reach the plate. Reducing food loss and food waste is one 
promising way to reduce the environmental pressure from, and 
vulnerability of, current food systems. Only about a half of the 
food yield ends being eaten (FAO, 2011).
Smart cities
Cities today are home to around 55% of humanity and 70% of 
global economic output. By 2050, urban populations are projected 
to account for around 70% (Figure 12) of humanity and perhaps 
85% of global output (Jiang and O’Neill, 2017; UNDESA, 2017). 
What happens in cities, therefore, will determine the wellbeing of 
most of humanity and the prospects for sustainable development. 
For this reason the world’s national governments adopted SDG 
11 on sustainable cities to promote cities that are for people, are 
economically productive, socially inclusive, and environmentally 
sustainable. Unfortunately, most of the world’s cities do not now 
pass the three-part test for sustainable development. A further 
complication is that most of the urban population lives in smaller 
to medium sized cities so that the transformation must occur 
simultaneously across all settlements and not merely in the mega 
conurbations like the Tokyo-Osaka corridor, Pearl River delta, or 
the Boston-Washington corridor of the US. 
Many cities lack the basic urban infrastructure needed for 
economic productivity, social inclusion, and environmental 
sustainability. Informal cities and slums account for a quarter of 
the urban population. Most lack the basic amenities for fulfillment 
of fundamental needs like sanitation, electricity, clean heating 
and cooking fuels, education, mobility, security, and healthcare. 
Yet, urban infrastructure should include an efficient transport 
system; universal access to reliable and low-cost electricity, 
safe water and sewerage; recycling and other sustainable waste 
management; high-speed and low-cost broadband connectivity 
to support businesses and public service delivery. These should 
be deployed according to urban development plans that take 
account of future population growth. This is a tall order in any 
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Figure 10. Global forest cover decreased to about 40 million square kilometers 
(4 billion hectares) and would continue to decrease in the SSP2. The opposite is 
the case in the other pathways toward sustainability where the forests increase 
because land is ‘returned to nature’. However, the variation is very large. In the 
SSP1 1.9 range, the upper case is depicted by scenarios that implement land-sa-
ving practices such as higher, sustainable yields, reduction of food waste from 
production to use and changing dietary practices. Historical developments and 
those in the pathways are indexed at 2010 level so as to eliminate differences 
in data sources and across the models for the future. Source: “integrated SDG” 
from Parkinson et al. (2018), “lifestyle change” from van Vuuren et al. (2018), 
SSP1-1.9 from Rogelj et al. (2018), historic data from FAOSTAT (2018), SSP 
Database (2012-2016).
Figure 11. Yields continue to increase across all pathways in the figure inclu-
ding the SSPs ranging from a 50% to almost another doubling. The transforma-
tion to sustainability needs land-saving practices to leave “half Earth” to nature 
and at the same time mitigate environmental degradation and to build resi-
lience into agricultural production systems. Historical developments and those 
in the pathways are indexed at 2010 level so as to eliminate differences in data 
sources and across the models in the base year. Source: “integrated SDG” from 
Parkinson et al. (2018), “lifestyle change” from van Vuuren et al. (2018), SSP1-
1.9 from Rogelj et al. (2018), historic data from FAOSTAT (2018), SSP Database 
(2012-2016).
city, but particularly in informal settlements with a lack of urban 
planning and investment capabilities. 
Many cities also lack policies to ensure social inclusion. Cities 
are often strongly sorted between rich and poor, by ethnicity, 
or both. Public services such as transport, health, education, 
water, and sanitation may be deficient or even non-existent in 
the poorer areas. The poor may have little access to decent jobs 
because of large distances involved in commuting and other 
restrictions to job creation. 
Yet perhaps most shocking are the hazardous environmental 
conditions and the vulnerability to disasters afflicting hundreds 
of millions of urban dwellers in the large cities of the developing 
world. Many of these cities are chronically burdened by high 
air pollution, such as particulate matter (e.g., PM2.5) that 
is several times higher than the limits specified by the World 
Health Organization (WHO). The air pollution results from a 
combination of vehicular emissions, fossil-fuel burning in power 
plants and factories, coal use in homes, pollutants from heavy 
industry, and the burning of crop residues. The WHO estimates 
that air pollution is implicated in the premature deaths of millions 
of people each year. Often the water supplies are no better, with 
untreated household sewerage and toxic pollutants released 
into the waterways. Climate change adds enormously to the 
urban environmental stresses, by causing heat waves, droughts, 
increased transmission of urban vector-borne diseases such as 
dengue fever, and extreme precipitation, high-intensity tropical 
cyclones and flooding. Both environmental degradation and 
vulnerability to disasters exacerbate inequalities and exclusion 
since poorer neighborhoods tend to be affected more severely.
At the same time, half of the global CO2 emissions from energy 
use are emanating from the vehicles, factories, commercial 
buildings and homes of the world’s cities. Cities vary in their 
CO2 emissions per capita according to density. High-density 
cities with public transport and walking areas (e.g., Barcelona) 
emit far low emissions per capita than low-density sprawling 
cities that rely on private automobile use for most transportation 
(e.g., Atlanta).  
The transformation to sustainable cities requires an integrated 
set of actions, city by city, around the world. While urbanization 
processes evolve in a very specific context, and thus challenges 
may vary significantly, we can suggest some components that 
we think should be integral to any city in the world. SDP are 
characterized by high connectivity and ‘smartness’. The digital 
revolution and the availability of autonomous, high-speed 
transport options change the nature of urbanization with more 
people able to connect to the dynamism and services offered by 
cities in more remote locations, leading to increased integration 
of the urban hinterland. The emergence of polycentric, high-
density-urban-rural landscapes in conjunction with the digital 
revolution facilitates the rapid uptake of cleaner, smarter and 
decentralized technologies and production processes such that 
cities overall are becoming more self-sufficient, less polluting, 
and circular in terms of resource consumption. The backbone 
of every well planned, functioning city is a reliable, low-carbon 
infrastructure including low-carbon electricity, electric-
powered public transportation, electric light-duty vehicles, 
electric heating and cooking, efficient road networks, broadband 
connectivity, and water, sanitation and sewerage, accessible 
to every inhabitant of the city. Equally, high-quality public 
services, including healthcare, education, and utilities (power, 
water, connectivity), security that are universally accessible and 
affordable are a necessity. Further characteristics that define 
cities in the TWI2050 integrated pathway are inclusiveness, 
access to open spaces (incl. green areas) and a high level of 
social interaction. This is achieved inter alia through a paradigm 
shift in housing policies, that no longer lead to segregation by 
class or race and where housing is no longer considered a purely 
private shelter but is an essential component of a larger social 
system giving people better opportunities to connect with each 
other thus reducing ‘urban anonymity’. The key competence 
required in this regard is urban planning and design which 
respect the rights of all city dwellers and enable basic drivers of 
human wellbeing such as security, trust, local identities, lively 
neighborhoods and participatory approaches. 
Digital revolution
Perhaps the greatest single enabler of sustainable development 
in the coming years would be the digital revolution, constituted 
by ongoing advances in AI, connectivity, digitization of 
information, additive manufacturing (3D printing), virtual 
reality, Internet of things (IoT), machine learning, block chain, 
robotics, quantum computing and synthetic biology. The 
digital revolution rivals the steam engine, internal combustion 
engine, and electrification for the pervasive effects on all parts 
of the economy and society. It has been made possible by an 
interconnected set of discoveries and inventions, including 
semiconductors, logic gates, computer architecture, integrated 
circuits, microprocessors, packet switching, the Internet, mobile 
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Figure 12. Urbanization is a very powerful force in human development. More 
than half of people or almost four billion already live in urban areas, most is 
small to medium sized cities and many in emerging urban corridors and ag-
glomerations. The urbanization trend intensifies in the SSP1 while it stagnates. 
Past and projected global urbanization rate according to three SSP scenarios. 
Urbanization of United Kingdom is shown for comparison as representative of 
high-income countries where most of the people live in urban areas and only 
a few percent are left in rural settlements. The situation will be similar on the 
global level should the urbanization rates observed today prevail during this 
century. Source: Jiang and O’Neill (2017) and UN-Habitat (2016), SSP Database 
(2012-2016).
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broadband, public-key cryptography, and global positioning 
system (GPS), among others. The pace of advance continues 
exponentially with imminent breakthrough prospects for AI, 
quantum computing, virtual reality, 5G broadband, and other 
technologies. As in the industrial revolution that initiated 
explosive development through the convergence of steel, steam 
and railways, coal and textile and other new manufacturing 
process, it was the convergence of these technologies, 
institutions, settlement patterns and lifestyles that generated the 
deep transformations. Likewise, the convergence of new digital 
technologies could be even more explosive with great winners 
and losers. 
An enormous success among many development failures 
is that mobile phones reach four-fifths (World Bank, 2016) 
of the world’s 7.6 billion people (UNDESA, 2017). This was 
fundamental in improving the lives of many including those 
previously excluded. Ironically, one billon phone owners do 
not have access to electricity! The mobile phone revolution may 
lead to ‘leap-frogging’ of the developing world ahead of the 
most industrialized countries with the diffusion of new services 
such as mobile money and more effective financial services for 
establishing businesses (Figure 13). At the same time, it is clear 
that the digital revolution poses the danger of increasing the 
divide between the poor and the rich at unprecedented speed.
The digital revolution is already reshaping work, leisure, 
behavior, education, and governance. Digital technologies 
are disrupting production processes in nearly every sector 
of the economy, from agriculture (precision agriculture), 
transport (self-driving cars), mining (autonomous vehicles), 
manufacturing (robotics. 3D printing), retail (e-commerce), 
finance (e-payments, AI trading strategies), media (social 
networks), health (AI diagnostics, telemedicine), education 
(online learning), public administration (e-governance, 
e-voting) and the IoT. In general, these contributions of 
digital technology can raise labor, energy, resource, and 
carbon productivity, lower production costs, expand access, 
dematerialize production (from physical books to e-books, for 
example), improve matching in markets (such as on electronic 
market places), enable the use of big data (disease epidemiology 
and drug design), and make public services more readily 
available (online voter registration, licenses and permits). 
Yet there are also clear dangers and downsides to the digital 
revolution, including the loss of jobs, rising inequality, and 
the further shift of income from labor to capital. Processes of 
automation have been underway for decades, and one important 
consequence, it appears, is the net reduction of demand for 
lower-skilled workers. With advances in AI and robotics, many 
more workers, even those highly skilled, may find their jobs and 
earnings under threat. While new jobs might replace old ones, 
the new jobs may come with lower real earnings and working 
conditions. The fears about rising inequalities have given rise to 
a new interest in a guaranteed minimum income. 
There are several other perceived threats from the digital 
revolution. Digital identities can be stolen, or artificial identities 
can be created. Digital information can be stolen especially 
with the diffusion of 3D printing where complete information 
about manufacturing is stored digitally. At the same time, this 
information can be used to circumvent export and import 
barriers by simply manufacturing locally with 3D printing. 
Governments and private businesses can invade privacy 
and monitor individuals against their will or without their 
knowledge and in extreme cases destroy real identities. A few 
digital portals may use their advantages in amassing big data 
to gain a dominant monopoly position in their respective 
markets (e-commerce, digital advertising, social media, cloud 
services, etc.). Cyberattacks can interrupt or degrade private 
and public service delivery. Cyberwarfare can paralyze a society 
by disrupting the flows of information, or destroy machinery 
connected to the Internet. Social media can be manipulated, 
undermining democratic processes. The personal use of online 
technologies can be addictive and cause the onset of depressive 
disorders. AI codes can incorporate statistical discrimination 
that may be hard to identify. Instructions for 3d printing in the 
additive manufacturing can be stolen and applied elsewhere to 
produce identical parts and products. Special danger relates to 
advanced weapons. The most fundamental question is whether 
the digital revolution as a self-evolving evolutionary process 
that has generated huge global monopolies is even amenable to 
‘social steering’.
The digital revolution will have even deeper impacts on our 
societies, creating a next generation of sustainability challenges. 
General purpose AI will be used in more and more decision 
making processes embedded in devices (like self-driving cars), 
in our economies (in banks, trading firms, stock markets) 
and in our societies (in courts, in parliaments, in health care 
organizations, in security organizations such as police and 
army), complementing, substituting, challenging human driven 
decision making processes. We need to learn to manage and 
control the next generations of AI, machine learning, and 
(semi)autonomous technical systems and to align those with 
our normative settings. Moreover, the digital transformation 
will redefine our concept of us as humans. In the Anthropocene 
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Figure 13. Future diffusion of exemplary and enabling digital infrastructures 
and technologies. By 2030 most of them, including the average of all, would 
reach above the 50% mark, or the inflection point meaning that the increase 
till then would be exponential. This illustrates the possibility of a very vigorous 
growth of digitalization in the world along with the emergence of new activities 
and behaviors. The opportunities and potential dangers are high and related to 
all SDGs. Source: Saniee et al. (2017).
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humans became the main drivers of Earth system changes. 
In the digital Anthropocene humans also start to transform 
themselves, enhancing cognitive and brain capacities, thinking 
about how to program brains, how to enhance human capacities. 
Humanity is moving toward new civilizational thresholds. 
Super-intelligent machines might even develop a life of their 
own, with the capacity to harm human agents. 
The digital transformation calls for a comprehensive set of 
regulatory standards and normative frameworks, physical in-
frastructure, and digital systems, to capture the benefits of the 
digital revolution while avoiding the many potential downsides. 
An essential priority should be to develop science, technology 
and innovation roadmaps to better understand the potential 
benefits and dangers of digitalization. The principles of digital 
transformation for sustainable development have yet to be writ-
ten, but some of the likely priorities and example measures are 
shown in Table 1.
Points of resistance to sustainable development 
Success in the transformations to sustainable development also 
requires a thorough understanding of the potential pitfalls and 
sources of resistance to change. We identify five major types of 
resistance, summarized in Table 2.
The first is vested interests, specifically enterprises and 
individuals who are benefiting in the short-term from 
unsustainable practices. Two major groups are predominant and 
include i) the current owners of fossil fuels, who stand to suffer 
large capital losses from the move to zero-carbon energy, and ii) 
the beneficiaries of unsustainable land and ocean practices, such 
as cattle ranchers engaged in deforestation and land clearing 
and fishing fleets engaged in overfishing. 
The second comes from elite groups more generally. Major 
wealth owners are typically resistant to the taxation needed to 
fund public services and public investments. Their political 
influence and threats to move residencies in the face of 
increased taxation are often enough to prevent political support 
for necessary public investments. Similarly, major wealth 
owners of industries engaged in extractive activities (mining, 
hydrocarbons, fishing, and forestry) are typically resistant to 
environmental regulation as mentioned above. 
The third is the limited capacity of governments to plan and 
implement policies with time scales of decades, such as the 
transformation to zero-carbon energy. There are two kinds of 
obstacles. The first is the political business cycle, and the search 
for policies with short-term payoffs. The second is technical 
capacity. Most governments currently lack strong planning units 
with the capacity to chart technically sound transformation 
pathways. These capacities need to be built, including through 
enhanced partnerships of governments, universities, and think 
tanks. 
The fourth is the difficulty of a suitable balance in public-
private partnerships. There are two sources of failure. When 
the private sector is the dominant partner (often because of 
corporate lobbying), then regulatory agencies can be captured by 
vested interests. When the public sector is the dominant partner, 
on the other hand, private initiative and entrepreneurship may 
be quashed. 
A fifth obstacle is a lack of public understanding and a 
resistance to change. When the public is ill-informed about 
the challenges of sustainable development and the needed 
transformations, fear and uncertainty may provoke a ‘status-
quo bias’, and an overall public resistance to change. This is 
also the case when the government fails to utilize redistributive 
policies to ensure that winners appropriately compensate losers 
(for example, displaced workers) during the transformation. Ill-
informed publics are vulnerable to populistic appeals to short-
run gimmicks and false solutions. And the public will often 
resist the introduction of new technologies that are feared and 
poorly understood.
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Principles for digital transformation Example measures
Enabling digital infrastructure • Universal access to high-quality, low-cost mobile broadband
Online services • Online governance to support public services and participation
• Online finance and payments to facilitate trade and business services
• Regulatory security for online identity and privacy
• Online national systems (or “platforms”) for healthcare and education
Digital systems to increase efficiency of resource use • Smart grids and IoT for sustainable cities
Instruments for a sustainable digital revolution • Income redistribution to address income inequalities arising from digital scale up 
• Tax and regulatory systems to avoid monopolization of Internet services
• Democratic oversight of cutting-edge technologies (biotech, nanotech, AI, big data, autono-
mous systems)
• Universal access to high-quality, low-cost mobile broadband Education to avoid new digital 
divides and to develop capacities for sustainable digitalization
• Aligning the emerging digital technologies and infrastructures with human norms and the 
paradigm of sustainable development
Table 1. Principles for digital transformation.
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Finally, the needed transformations are of course highly 
complex and require long-term change to avoid path dependency. 
Governments and business often focus on incremental change 
and lack the tools, institutions, and knowledge to undertake the 
long-term transformations. As described above, managing such 
deep and long-term changes will require new policy instruments 
as well as integrated roadmaps on the way forward rooted in 
the pathways to sustainable futures. Importantly such roadmaps 
need to be developed at all levels including regional, national, 
subnational and cities as these are there levels at which much of 
the implementation of sustainable solutions will need to occur.
Policy instruments and societal innovations to 
support the six transformations 
The general strategy of sustainable development is to build 
alliances for change, overcome vested interests, invest in new 
governance capacities and adopt a range of economic policy 
instruments to steer the economy and society along the six 
major transformations towards sustainable development. The 
guiding principle is that of the economist Jan Tinbergen: there 
should be as many independent instruments as there are targets 
or goals. The Tinbergen framework of instruments and targets 
must of course recognize the time dimension as well. The goal 
is to steer each national economy, and the global economy as 
a whole, through the many targets set for the years 2030 and 
2050. This process is necessarily complex, requiring national 
plans that are mutually harmonized to achieve shared global 
objectives as well. 
There is a tendency in public discussions to over-simplify 
the enormous and complex governance and policy challenges 
posed by sustainable development. Public discussions tend to 
focus excessively on short-term policy instruments (such as 
the macroeconomic tools of monetary and fiscal policy) and 
on single instruments (or ‘magic bullets’) to achieve complex 
and multidimensional objectives. For example, economists 
have tended to emphasize a ‘price on carbon’ as the key 
solution to the challenge of energy transformation, even though 
the transformation will require several policy instruments, 
including carbon prices but also regulations on energy and land 
use, public procurements, energy efficiency standards, directed 
R&D, and other measures. 
There is also a tendency to over-emphasize economic 
instruments (such as tax and spending policies) to the neglect 
of other dimensions of policymaking, notably the importance 
of political and social innovations. The SDGs require collective 
action, and so it is not surprising that political and social 
institutions, pioneering actor constellations, and discourses 
and dialogs on changing norms and values must play a large 
role in the transformations alongside economic policies. 
Political institutions are the key conduits for providing public 
goods; social institutions such as religious institutions and civil 
society organizations are the key propagators of social norms 
and cultural values; knowledge organizations of many kinds 
and cultural actors are incubators of creativity, innovation, 
and imagination, and therefore key drivers of sustainability 
transformations. A summary of economic, political, and social 
institutions, innovations, and instruments is shown in Table 3.
Economic instruments 
To promote the needed changes in resource allocation, several 
types of economic instruments will have to be deployed as a 
policy package. 
The fiscal framework is certainly the single most important 
set of economic instruments to achieve the SDGs. Many of the 
transformations involve public investments, for example in 
infrastructure (SDGs 6, 7, 9, and 11) and R&D (SDG 9). Others 
involve public financing of services, for example in healthcare 
(SDG 3) and education (SDG 4). Still others require income 
transfers to vulnerable groups, such as the alleviation of poverty 
(SDG 1) and the reduction of inequalities (SDG 10). In all these 
cases, the respective transformations will require increased 
budgetary outlays, which in turn will require an adequate level 
of current and future tax revenues. 
Corrective pricing is a second powerful and pervasive tool. When 
private costs and social costs diverge, as in the case of CO2 emissions, 
a corrective price (in the case of CO2, a carbon tax or a tradable CO2 
emissions permit) can bring private incentives in line with social 
objectives. Such corrective pricing, most typically through taxes, 
charges, and tradable permits, is pervasive, and can apply to a wide 
range of externalities, such as greenhouse gas emissions, the overuse 
or underuse of ecosystem services, and socially undesirable products 
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Vested Interests • Owners of Fossil Fuels
• Beneficiaries of unsustainable land and ocean practices
Power of Elites • Resistance of Income Redistribution and Taxation
• Resistance to Regulation
Lack of Planning • Short-run Political Cycles
• Shortfalls in Government Planning Capacities
Imbalances in Public-Private Relations • Regulatory Capture by Private Interests
• Stifling of Entrepreneurship by Public Administration
Lack of Public Awareness and Understanding • Fear of Change
• Vulnerability to Populism
• Resistance to New Technologies
Table 2. Obstacles or the Transformation to Sustainable Development.
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subject to abuse with external costs (such as cigarettes and alcohol). 
Direct regulation and mandates are a third powerful 
instrument of government, used far more frequently than 
most economists recognize. Zoning, protected reserves, bans 
on hazardous products, building codes, technology standards, 
safety requirements, labor codes, emissions limits (on vehicles 
or production processes), energy efficiency requirements, and 
the like, are all examples of regulations useful for promoting 
the sustainable development transformations. A recent case of 
environmental regulation is the move by several countries to 
restrict or ban the sale of non-electric light-duty vehicles after a 
certain date in the near future. 
Development financing is a fourth major area of policy. 
Development financing is a form of project financing in which 
an official funding agency (such as a multilateral or national 
development bank) works with government entities to plan 
and execute a complex investment project. The project typically 
requires a set of policy measures (budget, regulation, pricing) and 
policy processes (such as public consultations, environmental 
audits, legislative actions, and community participation) 
alongside the mobilization of financial instruments. The funding 
may involve private sector funding (bonds, bank loans, venture 
capital, etc.) alongside public funding, and the implementation 
of the project may involve both private companies and public 
agencies. The major characteristic of development financing is 
complexity: the need to combine funding, public oversight, and 
policy measures with the investment outlays. 
In addition to budgets, corrective prices, direct regulation, 
and development financing, governments possess a set of 
further policy instruments. These include: public procurement, 
publicly directed R&D, information disclosure requirements 
(for example on patents and financial instruments), company 
law, liability law, bankruptcy code, licensing, technical standards 
(e.g., for 5G wireless broadband), public auctions (e.g., of 
electromagnetic spectrum), and public land management 
practices. 
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Economic Instruments • Fiscal Outlays:
 - Public Services
 - Public Investments
 - Transfer Payments and Redistribution
• Fiscal Revenues and Public Debt:
 - Taxation
 - Tolls and Tariffs on Public Services
 - Deficit Financing and Debt Management
• Corrective Pricing 
• Direct Regulation (Land, Labor, Technology) 
• Development Financing
• Public Procurement 
• Publicly Directed R&D
• Legal Standards: Disclosure, Company Law, Liability Law, Bankruptcy Code, Licensing 
• Technical Standards
• Public Land Management 
• Auctions of Public Assets (e.g., EM Spectrum)
Political Instruments • Integrated Planning
• Public Deliberation
• Public-Private Partnerships
• Independent Commissions and Agencies
• International Diplomacy
• Democratic Oversight of Science and Technology
• Official Sustainable Development Metrics
Social Instruments • Public Awareness
• Social Norms and cultural innovations
• Grassroots Activism
• Investment activism
• Consumer activism
• Shareholder activism
• Moral Teachings of Major Religions
Table 3. The sustainable development policy instruments.
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Public institutions, political instruments, and 
transformative governance 
We identify several public institutions and political processes 
needed to support the six transformations to sustainable 
development. The single most important of these is government-
led integrated planning. Every government needs a way to 
plan for the SDGs taking into account the complex synergies 
and tradeoffs across the various SDGs. Typically, this work is 
undertaken by the planning agency (such as the Indonesian 
National Planning Agency BAPPENAS and the Chinese National 
Development and Reform Commission), the economy ministry, 
or an inter-agency task force chaired by a senior cabinet official 
such as the prime minister or deputy prime minister. 
A second major institution is public deliberation. 
Governments often produce preliminary papers (sometimes 
called ‘green papers’) to elicit public feedback. Commissions 
are established together with national science academies. 
Universities are recruited to provide research overviews. Public 
‘town hall’ meetings are undertaken around the country by 
public officials to obtain first-hand feedback. Surveys may be 
undertaken to elicit public opinion. 
A third major public institution are public-private 
partnerships, in which a formal partnership is formed between 
government agencies (often serving as funders) and private 
business (often serving as implementers). Public-private 
partnerships are pervasive in sustainable development, typically 
because the private sector is the exclusive holder of the requisite 
technologies and large-scale management capacities, with the 
public sector needed to mobilize resources for public goods that 
would otherwise be underprovided by the market. 
A fourth major public institution are independent agencies 
established to implement long-term policy frameworks. When 
policy challenges are complex, politically charged, and with 
a time horizon beyond that of the election cycle, it is often 
expedient to establish an independent agency or commission to 
oversee the long-term policy implementation. Decarbonization 
policy is a case in point. The decisions on the siting of long-
distance transmission lines and renewable energy sites (e.g., 
for wind, solar, and hydro power) are often fraught with 
lobbying pressures. Decision making might then usefully be 
removed from the fray of day-to-day politics. Just as modern 
central banks were given their policy independence, subject 
to democratic oversight but not direct political intervention, 
a decarbonization agency might be tasked with establishing 
timelines, protocols, bidding, and funding streams to bring 
about long-term systems change, subject to general democratic 
scrutiny by elected officials. 
The fifth political process is the tools of international diplomacy 
and law to secure the benefits of cross-border cooperation. Most 
of the environmental SDGs require significant international 
cooperation. Biodiversity, climate change, freshwater and 
ocean conservation all require cooperation at a trans-national 
scale, often at the scale of a watershed or ecosystem. Global 
treaties, technical working groups, regional and international 
development banks, and UN agencies are various institutions 
established to secure the needed but fragile cross-boundary 
cooperation. 
A sixth political institution is the democratic oversight of 
science and technology. The oversight of science is crucial not 
only to prevent scientific mishaps and abuses, but to ensure 
the public’s confidence in scientific conclusions. When that 
confidence is lost, the costs can be very high. The anti-scientific 
campaigns against vaccination, for example, are leaving large 
numbers of children needlessly exposed to diseases because 
parents lack the confidence to immunize their children in the 
face of unsubstantiated claims that vaccinations pose substantial 
health risks. To maintain public confidence in AI, genomics, 
biodiversity conservation, energy transformation, healthy diets, 
and so on, there will have to be a high public confidence in, 
and understanding of, expert opinions. Special consultative 
and oversight bodies can be crucial in explaining science to 
the public and feeding public doubts back to the scientific and 
engineering communities.  
Finally, we should note the critical role of official SDG data 
that is produced by credible public agencies to track progress 
or lack thereof in achieving the SDGs. Governments undertake 
censuses, publish budgets, produce surveys, and publish official 
data. All of this is invaluable in creating systems of public 
accountability so that governments are kept to their word. Of 
course the data must win the public’s confidence; and cases 
of political meddling in official data can leave long-term scars 
and mistrust that can deeply undermine governance and block 
economic progress. Every government should maintain and 
publish a credible and high-quality set of SDG indicators to 
track SDG progress, support policy management, and keep 
governments accountable to their commitments. 
Societal change and social policies 
Economic and political innovations and instruments are the 
tools of government. Yet large-scale societal transformation 
also depends on social movements, actors of change, societal 
values and public acceptance. Often, large-scale social change 
is won first in the hearts and minds of the people, and only 
afterwards accepted in legislation and economic policies. This 
is the case with the mass movements against slavery, led by 
William Wilberforce, against colonialism led by Mohandas 
Gandhi, against apartheid led by Nelson Mandela, for civil 
rights led by Martin Luther King Jr., and for women’s rights led 
in the UK by Emmeline Pankhurst, reproductive rights, and 
sexual rights, led by countless activists. In these cases, the battle 
for transformation started with social movements, actors of 
change, it was first a battle for hearts and minds, leading later to 
legislation and international law. 
The movement for sustainable development is also a battle for 
hearts and minds. Humanity must be convinced to care about 
nature, the planet, the future, the poorest of the poor, and the 
dignity of people all over the world. And those moral opinions 
must prevail against the determined opposition of vested 
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interests, such as the large fossil-fuel companies of the United 
States that are lobbying the US Congress to oppose the global 
consensus in the Paris Agreement on climate. Public values 
must change, and social change has its own mechanisms for 
promoting broad changes in public attitudes and in behavior. 
The starting point is public awareness. All social movements 
inherently depend on a widening arc of public awareness 
and understanding, often catalyzed by science and science 
communication. Environmental activists since Rachel Carson in 
the 1960s, the Club of Rome in the 1970s, and Dr. James Hansen 
since the 1980s, have been advocating for action to address the 
risks of human-induced environmental degradation. Similar 
campaigns have been underway for decades to end poverty 
and hunger, promote gender equality, and ensure equal access 
to health, education, and other basic needs. Indeed, one can 
say that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) is a 
moral charter of civil society that already 70 years ago expresses 
many of the foundational principles of sustainable development, 
especially regarding social inclusion. 
A second step is to establish social norms. In this 
regard, the Brundtland Commission of 1987 must be 
seen as a global watershed, by introducing the concept of 
sustainable development and famously defining it in terms 
of intergenerational responsibility (meeting the needs of 
the current generation without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their needs). Agenda 21, adopted 
at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, was a second major step, 
although Agenda 21 has so far failed to achieve sufficient public 
awareness and political commitment to reverse the course of 
environmental degradation. 
The MDGs, adopted by the UN member states in 2000 to be 
achieved by 2015, can be seen as another watershed in global 
public awareness. This effort initiated by then UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan caught the attention and imagination of 
governments and civil society around the world, and gave an 
enormous impetus to the fight against extreme poverty. In 2005, 
civil society, supported by Nelson Mandela, campaigned “to 
make poverty history,” giving an added impetus and sense of 
urgency to the MDGs. The MDGs were of course followed by 
the SDGs in 2015, which combined the fight against poverty 
with the struggles for social inclusion and environmental 
sustainability. The SDGs therefore offer, for the first time, a clear 
and understandable set of global goals constituting sustainable 
development. 
A third step in a social movement is grassroots activism. The 
fossil-fuel divestment movement, calling on asset managers of 
pension funds, insurance funds, and university and foundation 
endowments, to divest of holding in fossil-fuel companies is a 
prime example of mass social action that is both symbolic and 
substantive. Trillions of US dollars under management have by 
now committed to invest according to environmental, social, 
and governance (ESG) objectives, including divestment from 
various fossil-fuel-based energy companies. 
Similar kinds of grassroots activism are witnessed in 
consumer boycotts and the preferential purchases of goods 
and services from companies that abide by ESG objectives. Fair 
Trade coffee is an important example. Consumers pay more 
for Fair Trade coffee with a portion of the proceeds returned 
to farmer cooperatives that abide by agreed principles of good 
governance.  
Shareholder activism is yet another example of effective 
grassroots campaigning. In US company law, shareholders 
meeting certain minimum ownership criteria are able to launch 
shareholder resolutions that goes for a vote by all shareholders. 
Activist shareholders of ExxonMobil, for example, launched a 
shareholder resolution to require the company to report on how 
climate change regulations could affect the company’s assets and 
future profitability. 
A fourth component of mass social transformation is to 
expound the moral teachings of the world’s major religions in 
the context of sustainable development. Pope Francis’ encyclical 
Laudato Si’ (Pope Francis, 2015) has inspired individuals around 
the world to fight for climate justice and help for the poor. 
Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew of the Eastern Orthodox 
Church has made remarkable efforts for more than a quarter 
century for ecological justice. Other major religions are similarly 
joining the global movement for sustainable development and 
climate justice.
Transformation towards sustainable future is 
possible – but ambitious action is needed now! 
The world and almost all regions are currently off course from 
achieving the SDGs. Yet with a bold and appropriate deployment 
of policy instruments, the world economy can be steered to 
achieve the SDGs in 2030 and 2050. Based on our overall 
assessment, we conjecture that the incremental global costs of 
achieving the necessary transformations will be no more than 
4% of global output per year. The key is to raise national saving 
rates by a few percentage points of national income and invest 
the incremental saving on priorities such as zero-carbon energy, 
high-quality schools, improved health systems, environmental 
conservation and restoration, good governance institutions, 
and global cooperation initiatives to leverage dynamics towards 
the implementation of the SDGs. This study shows how the 
incremental saving should be deployed to bring about six key 
transformations that will raise living standards, promote jobs, 
ensure social inclusion, and protect the natural environment, in 
short, to achieve “the future we want.”  
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1.1 The global agenda for sustainable development 
One of the most pressing challenges humanity faces is how to 
realize the benefits of global social and economic development 
within a safe and just operating space of a stable Earth system. 
There is significant inequality between and within societies 
with billions left behind and overwhelming evidence of rising 
global risks due to ever-increasing human pressures on the 
planet. Ensuring future sustainable development for all will 
require socioeconomic development for improved human well-
being while preserving Earth system resilience, referred to as 
sustainable development within planetary boundaries. 
In 2015, the United Nations adopted the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development including 17 Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs, UN, 2015b) which provide an aspirational narrative 
and goals for the desired future for human development with 
an actionable agenda to be achieved by 2030. It specifies far-
reaching time-bound, often quantified, objectives based on the 
most comprehensive consultation held so far among nations. 
For the first time, a world development agenda is adopted that 
integrates far-reaching and aspirational goals for inclusive 
social and economic development, to occur within global 
environmental targets for oceans, freshwater, biodiversity, and 
climate, i.e., essentially a roadmap for redefining sustainable 
development as a people and planet agenda of achieving 
a prosperous and fair world within planetary boundaries. 
Together with the 2015 Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015), 
which commits all signatories to a long-term target of holding 
global warming to well below 2°C above preindustrial levels, 
as well as the 2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda (UN, 2015a), 
the 2030 Agenda recognizes the necessity of attaining social 
and economic development within the safe operating space of 
a stable and resilient Earth system.
The High-level Political Forum (HLPF) on Sustainable 
Development is the United Nations central platform for the 
follow-up and review of the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs. The 
Forum, which meets annually, provides political leadership, 
guidance and recommendations on the 2030 Agenda’s 
implementation and follow-up; keeps track of progress of the 
SDGs; spurs coherent policies informed by evidence, science, 
and country experiences; and addresses new and emerging 
issues. Since the adoption of the 2030 Agenda, the Forum 
has chosen to undertake in-depth reviews of progress for a 
subset of related SDGs each year. In 2018, the theme will be 
Transformation towards sustainable and resilient societies under 
which Goals 6, 7, 11, 12, and 15 will be reviewed. Progress on 
Goal 17 – Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize 
the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development, is reviewed 
each year. 
1.2 Why TWI2050 is needed
The urgent question now is how to act on this aspirational 
agenda. To do so, the global community needs to have a clear 
understanding of the full consequences and cost of inaction 
and the benefits of achieving SDGs in every major region of 
the world. While the SDGs provide normative guidance on the 
direction of change that should be pursued, the exact pathways 
depicting how to get there are far from clear. There are several 
challenges associated with identifying pathways that achieve 
the SDGs. Firstly, the targets associated with the SDGs have 
been set mostly without considering all interactions among the 
goals, however, it is probable that progress towards one SDG 
will inevitably create trade-offs and synergies in the progress 
towards achieving SDGs. 
Secondly, the SDGs in a way extrapolate the present to the 
future, i.e., they assume that current preferences and trends do 
not change substantially and no major unforeseen hurdles or 
tipping points occur over the next 12 years; whereas in reality, 
the SDGs will be more a moving target, since the only thing 
certain is that the future is uncertain, and the deep and radical 
transformations necessary to achieve the SDGs and their 
interactions will likely, and necessarily, result in significant, and 
perhaps unpredictable, changes in human behaviors and social 
structures along the way. Moreover, transformations towards 
the SDGs have to cope with global mega trends, such as the 
digital revolution, that are driven by path-dependent second-
order dynamics. 
Today, no science-based pathways exist for successfully 
achieving all SDGs simultaneously. The global transformations 
necessary to achieve the SDGs urgently need a robust 
scientific foundation and fact-based way forward. The World 
in 2050 (TWI2050) is a global multi-year, multi-stakeholder, 
interdisciplinary research initiative designed to help address 
these issues. TWI2050 is a partnership between science and 
policy that aims not only to contribute to this understanding but 
also to develop science-based transformational and equitable 
pathways to sustainable development that can provide much-
needed information and guidance for policymakers responsible 
for the implementation of the SDGs, such as the HLPF. 
Using an integrated and systemic approach, TWI2050 
addresses the full spectrum of transformational challenges 
related to achieving the 17 SDGs, to avoid potential conflicts 
among them, and reap the benefits of potential synergies, and 
reach the desired just and safe target space for people and planet 
by 2050 and beyond. This approach is the first goal-based, multi-
model quantitative and qualitative integrated analysis that 
encompasses the full set of SDGs. The successful identification 
of sustainable development pathways (SDPs) requires a 
comprehensive, robust approach that spans across disciplines 
and methodologies, and that can deal with non-linearity. The 
consortium under the umbrella of the TWI2050 initiative has 
been put together to reflect these necessary competencies. A 
core strength that sets TWI2050 apart from other initiatives 
contributing to the scientific knowledge creation for the 
SDGs is its competence in Integrated Assessment Modeling 
(IAM) and pathway development. However, to best tackle 
sustainable development challenges in the 2030 timeframe and 
beyond, TWI2050 seeks to further deepen and better integrate 
knowledge and analytical capacity across social, political, 
technical, and earth systems. 
TWI2030 focuses on six transformations that capture much of 
the global, regional, and local dynamics and encompass major 
drivers of future changes: i) Human capacity and demography; 
ii) Consumption and production; iii) Decarbonization and 
energy; iv) Food, biosphere and water; v) Smart cities; and 
vi) Digital revolution. Together they give peoples-centered 
perspective: building local, national and global societies and 
economies which secure wealth creation, poverty reduction, fair 
distribution and inclusiveness necessary for human prosperity.
1.3 TWI2050 framework
A starting point to analyze pathways towards goals is to establish 
an agreed framework. TWI2050 proposes an overarching 
framing narrative and quantitative and time-bound targets 
and indicators that set the outer boundary conditions for the 
transformation of the world between now and 2050 through 
the SDGs and the Paris Agreement. The objective is to thereby 
mobilize the international research community to explore 
multiple sustainable development pathways (SDPs) by applying 
backcasting analyses of how to achieve the goals in the framing 
narrative at multiple scales. At an overarching level the objective 
is to achieve all SDGs by 2030, and by 2050 continue meeting 
all SDGs in an evolving prosperous and just world for all while 
stabilizing the Earth system within planetary boundaries and 
remaining cognizant of Earth and human systems dynamics on 
longer time horizons out to 2100. 
The TWI2050 framework (Figure 1) includes qualitative and 
quantitative elements and consists of the following: i) a broad 
transformational narrative, ii) targets and indicators for the 2030 
and 2050 and iii) specific sustainable development pathways 
(SDPs) that include quantitative elements based on modeling 
approaches. These are paired with governance elements that 
induce the transformations and are thus an integral part of the 
overall framework. There can be many alternative pathways that 
explore branching points, lock-ins, resilience, inclusiveness, 
1 The SSPs are based on five different development routes for societal trends: i.e., sustainable development (SSP1), global fragmentation (SSP3), strong inequality 
(SSP4), rapid economic growth based on a fossil-fuel intensive energy system (SSP5) and middle of the road developments (SSP2). Each of the SSPs has been 
elaborated in terms of a storyline and various quantifications using models. The sustainable development scenario (SSP1) combined with stringent climate policy 
can also be seen as an example of a scenario exploring the route towards a more sustainable world – but it should be noted that the SDGs were not targeted in its 
development.
cooperation and differing transformational dynamics. The 
TWI2050 framework is designed to allow modeling and 
analytical groups to identify and explore a portfolio of measures 
needed to achieve all SDGs jointly accounting for synergies 
and trade-off. With such common goals, and agreed common 
assumptions, the framework facilitates inter-comparison of 
results. This report presents a number of exemplary sustainable 
pathways derived from recent analyses such as the Shared 
Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs, Riahi et al., 2017).1 These 
pathways provide the basis for the fully integrated SDPs that will 
be developed in the next phase of the initiative.
Figure 1. An illustration of TWI2050 conceptual framework. Two sets of scien-
ce-based, normative targets provide bounds for the transformation toward sus-
tainable future. The first are symbolized by the SDGs for 2030 and the second 
for 2050 and beyond symbolizes the achievement just and equitable future for 
all on a resilient planet. The gray band illustrates the overarching narrative that 
indicates how the future is connected to the present. It is about what needs to 
change to achieve the transformation toward sustainability by ‘backcasting’ 
from the normative targets. Also shown are alternative sustainable develop-
ment pathways (SDPs) that provide model-based quantifications of the trans-
formational changes. They can be interpreted as alternative realizations of the 
overarching narrative. SDPs in this report are indicative and the next phase of 
TWI2050 will focus on more integrated pathways although some characteristics 
would remain to be qualitative such as justice and peace. Source: TWI2050.
1.3.1 Overarching sustainable development   
 narrative
At the center of the framework is the overarching and ‘framing 
narrative’. This provides largely qualitative boundary conditions 
to be met within which SDPs can be explored. Here are some of 
the key elements of the narrative:
Globally and rapidly, awareness grows that the universally 
adopted SDGs can only be achieved through an unprecedented 
transformation of the global economy and societies worldwide. 
Only through such a transformation, is it possible to achieve a 
world in 2050 that is characterized by prosperous, equitable, and 
inclusive societies safely operating within planetary boundaries. 
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Support for such transformational change emerges from rising 
societal uneasiness of slow progress on environmental and 
societal concerns, and linked to renewed impetus to meet 
international agreements. This plays a role at the very local scale, 
where seeds for transformative processes continue to grow - but 
also in key sectors such as finance. 
As a result, driven by a growing awareness of the social, 
cultural, and economic costs of unilateral decision making at 
all levels, a new joint global cognitive and normative framework 
emerges that provides the necessary perspective to tackle the 
world’s sustainability challenges. Heterogeneity of values and 
norms among societal groups, including religions and nations 
continue, but are generally better aligned with this new ‘global 
identity’ based on shared responsibilities and vision for a 
sustainable future. Inequality is greatly reduced within and 
between countries. The number of conflicts falls rapidly, and 
the world enjoys extended periods of geopolitical and social 
stability. 
This overall change in mindsets, coupled with more 
effective governance for long-term sustainability, facilitates six 
interconnected transformations:
Human capacity and demography. In low-income countries 
premature causes of death decline rapidly through the provision 
of universal preventive and curative medical care. Improvements 
in health care in the developing world lead to increased life 
expectancies which by mid-century are comparable to those 
in the developed world. Investment in education increases 
dramatically with a special focus on girls in the developing 
world such that by 2030 enrolment levels are achieved that lead 
to universal attainment of primary and secondary education 
levels for both boys and girls. This contributes to a demographic 
transition towards slower global population in the order of nine 
billion by 2050 and decreasing to current levels by the end of the 
century. Slower population growth has led to a gradual ageing. 
New employment demand arises in the health, education, 
research, and social sectors. Digital revolution places high 
demand on high educational attainments and skills. 
Consumption and production. By 2050, the consumption 
and production of goods and services has moved towards a 
sustainable pattern. Consumption patterns are driven by changes 
in behavior and based on a sense of shared responsibility, which 
demand sustainable use of resources with reduced waste, 
pollution, and environmental degradation. On the production 
side, industry is highly automated and organized by a mixture 
of hubs and distributed elements. In the transition period, this 
can be facilitated by, for example, additive manufacturing. 
Production systems are more localized and self-sufficient, and 
to a substantial extent operate circularly with full recycling 
and reuse. Large cost reductions, and changes in regulations 
and behavior lead to a massive improvements of efficiency and 
uptake of zero-carbon energy systems. 
Decarbonization and energy. By 2050 the world has largely 
decarbonized and is accompanied by universal access to clean, 
affordable modern energy services. The seeds of this transition 
can already be seen in the rapid technology development in key 
sectors, such as renewable energy, electric mobility, and battery 
storage. By 2030, global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have 
been falling for some time as all nations start to follow deep 
decarbonization pathways towards net-zero GHG emissions. 
Focus is on the provision of energy services, whereby energy 
supply is a combination of both centralized and decentralized 
systems, with high energy efficiency standards being the norm 
everywhere. Together with behavior change and technological 
innovation this leads to reduced energy demand and large 
savings on the energy supply side. Moreover, there are reinforcing 
feedback loops enabled by government incentives and other 
dynamics, for example huge investment in sustainable resilient 
and efficient infrastructure, technological breakthroughs and 
cost decreases, sector coupling and digitalization, and behavioral 
change and energy self-sufficiency.. 
Food, biosphere and water. The 2050 vision requires the 
sustainable use of land that both provides sufficient food for all 
and supports global biodiversity. By 2030, global agricultural 
productivity is significantly increased through sustainable 
intensification of the agricultural sector with the adoption of 
agro-ecologic elements and better functioning of agriculture 
markets. The agricultural demands for freshwater are reduced 
and the expansion of agricultural land has halted to preserve 
remaining biodiversity and enhance the resilience of carbon 
sinks. Improved management of artificial fertilizers greatly 
reduces nutrient pollution of marine and freshwater ecosystems. 
Hunger and malnutrition are eliminated with universal access 
to clean, safe, nutritious food year-round. Worldwide, diets 
are significantly healthier, implying reduced reliance on meat. 
This means that food production can be less resource intensive 
than today, while food waste and food loss can be significantly 
reduced through more localized distribution. Fish stocks and 
other marine resources are sustainably managed, and levels of 
marine pollution significantly reduced improving the health of 
marine ecosystems. These changes together allow biodiversity 
loss to halt. Food systems and other anthropogenic land and 
marine use serves to store carbon and enhance biodiversity. 
Smart cities. By 2050, the world’s cities remain innovation 
engines and have transformed to prosperous, thriving, livable 
metropolises with low levels of pollution and high resilience. 
By midcentury, cities are carbon neutral. Digital progress has 
changed the nature of urbanization with more people able to 
connect to the dynamism offered by cities in more remote 
locations, leading to increased integration of the urban 
hinterland. Former informal settlements and slums are now 
livable settlements. Urban transformation pathways differed 
significantly between developed and developing nations and 
local governments acted as primary agents of change. Global 
and regional hubs are more connected. Despite this increased 
interconnectivity settlements are more self-sufficient, less 
polluting, and circular in terms of resource consumption. 
Housing is no longer considered a purely private shelter and is 
an essential component of a larger social system giving people 
better opportunities to connect with each other. Transport 
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solutions are more integrated and systemic, autonomous, 
emissions free, and increasingly shared. Longer-distance travel 
is undertaken largely by a combination of fast rail, magnetic 
levitation transports and low- or zero-emission aircraft.
Digital revolution. The ‘Fourth Industrial Revolution’ is the key 
driver of the sustainability transformation. Digital technologies 
support the transition to zero-carbon societies, circular and 
resilient societies. By 2050, the convergence of transformative 
digital technologies have far-reaching consequences across 
all sectors and for the organization of societal life though 
innovations for example in artificial intelligence, block chain, 
big data, additive manufacturing, robotics and synthetic 
biology. Effective mechanisms are established that steer the 
transformation towards the benefit of humanity instead of 
eroding human control or intruding on human rights of 
privacy and freedom of access to information. Completely new 
professions arise, and novel resources become available for roles 
that cannot be substituted. The sharing economy emerges as a 
significant component of economic activity and employment. 
Advances in synthetic biology have resulted in significantly 
increased agricultural yields, healthier foods, and improved 
and more personalized health care. Technological progress 
remains a key driver and enabler of sustainability outcomes, 
supported by major investments in research and development 
and generating new employment opportunities.
Spurred by these transformations developing countries grow 
rapidly and there is a gradual, conditional convergence between 
developing and developed countries, resulting in overall 
reduced income inequalities. Globally economic activity moves 
away from a focus on growth per se to be more broadly based 
on individual and social wellbeing and towards achieving global 
and national development and sustainability goals. 
To support these transitions, global governance becomes 
more effective throughout the period. This requires improved 
international cooperation and fair-trade rules, and in due 
course new, international policies are introduced, such as 
transnational minimum tax standards to avoid competitive, 
destructive underbidding. In general, there is a shifted emphasis 
to lower taxes on desirable activities, such as labor, and to 
higher tax on undesirable and destabilizing developments such 
as pollutants and unsustainable resource use. There is a system 
of global carbon pricing in place and risky financial market 
transactions prevented via a Tobin tax. Further reductions in 
wealth inequality are achieved through a variety of means and 
incentives. 
The advances in human capacity and empowerment 
strengthen multilateral institutions and transnational networks. 
This has led to a growing awareness and acceptance of solutions 
to meet the challenges of increasing global resource constraints, 
economic and environmental crises, and societal stability 
that cannot be addressed by market forces or private decision 
making alone. 
Stabilization of the Earth system through aligned investments 
in local, national, and global commons has become the new 
imperative in the world. Socially responsible institutions are 
entrusted with the provision of the corresponding goods and 
services reflected in a new ‘social contract’ rooted in the SDGs 
and based on shared responsibility and vision for a sustainable 
future. The social contract is also reflected in new governance 
structures, where global regimes, transnational networks, and 
standards are developed further, pushed, and implemented 
by multi-actor constellations. Transformations are spurred by 
pioneering actors. Sustainability oriented investments and deep 
reforms in regional and multilateral organizations facilitate the 
transformation towards a human-centered paradigm shift in 
the global economy. There is a transformation from a basically 
inter-governmentally driven international system to an 
emerging pluralistic and diverse ‘global society’ characterized by 
an exponential growth of transnational networks, transnational 
cooperation alliances and actor constellations, giving birth to a 
polycentric, poly-lateral global order.
Changes in resource transformation processes have reduced 
the human impact on Earth and ecosystems to a minimum. 
In 2050, the global economy is operating within the planetary 
boundaries that regulate Earth system stability. The rate of 
change of the Earth system due to anthropogenic interference 
is slowing. By 2100, Earth system processes have enabled the 
world to continue evolving within a manageable inter-glacial 
state. The long-term rate of change of the Earth system due 
to anthropogenic causes approaches zero. Nevertheless, in 
reaching this new state the Earth is significantly transformed 
compared with the present with changed patterns of human, 
plant and animal distribution resulting from the irreversible 
impacts of climate and other Earth-systems changes.
TWI2050 is based on one broad, overarching narrative that 
includes some variants, with the possibility for sub-narratives 
for individual pathways and regional and national perspectives. 
For example, this could include the narratives in Africa, Asia, 
North and South America, Asia and Europe that might be 
combined to form a coherent and more comprehensive global 
narrative. 
1.3.2 Targets and indicators
TWI2050 identifies two multidimensional, science-based 
targets, one for 2030 and the other for 2050 and beyond in 
terms of quantitative and qualitative characteristics consisting 
of boundary conditions applying to every major region of the 
world. In the 2030 Agenda, nations agreed on 169 targets to be 
reached by 2030. However, the full set of SDG targets (and related 
indicators) cannot be directly used in a scientific assessment. 
First, some targets cannot be operationalized in quantitative 
scenario analysis. Second, a more concise set of targets is needed 
to focus model analysis and comparison of results across models 
and to facilitate better communication to policymakers. In the 
end, a wide array of analytical approaches, and different sets of 
indicators (tier-based system) at varying degrees of granularity 
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is needed. While the 2030 targets can be informed strongly by 
the SDGs, the 2050 values would need to maintain this ambition 
level or further progress and ensure developments stay within 
planetary boundaries. This may include additional indicators 
and adaptations as science advances. Accounting for dynamics 
post 2030 warrants a longer-term view and greater flexibility in 
sustainability implementation. 
TWI2050 is using experts and stakeholders from relevant 
fields to undertake a selection process for determining targets 
and indicators based on a consistent set of selection criteria. 
This process allows TWI2050 to reduce the full set of targets and 
indicators for the SDGs to a list of ‘essential targets’ for each SDG. 
Reducing complexity while limiting information loss helps both 
modelers as well as communication with policy makers. The 
main objective is to specify targets as quantitative information 
to complement the TWI2050 overarching narrative. 
Following this process, TWI2050 will identify two 
multidimensional target spaces, one for 2030 and the other 
for 2050 and beyond, in terms of quantitative and qualitative 
characteristics consisting of boundary conditions applying to 
every major region of the world. Each target space will comprise 
a set of targets and indicators, corresponding to each SDG.
It is important to note that the target space is not intended 
to be an alternative set targets or indicators for achieving the 
SDGs. Both sets are important, but based on very different 
selection criteria, and serve very different purposes. The SDG 
targets provide the 2030 Agenda the necessary specificity and 
aspiration of what needs to be done to achieve the individual 
goals, whereas the target set to be proposed by TWI2050 aims 
to support quantitative analysis and to serve the scientific 
community by providing a standardized set of boundary 
conditions which can be tested and evaluated in multiple 
scenario studies. 
1.3.3 Sustainable development pathways
The Sustainable Development Pathways (SDPs) represent the 
myriad routes from the present to 2050 and beyond, across 
domains and sectors, for example, energy, urbanization, 
technology, governance, education, and food security (Chapter 
3). The objective is for the framing narrative to function as a 
common set of generic boundary conditions to allow modeling 
groups to develop and analyze multiple SDPs that explore 
transformations within this narrative and associated target 
spaces. The SDPs will consist of quantifications and qualitative 
storylines which support operationalization of multiple 
pathways to meet the target spaces. 
The pathways may differ along branching points describing 
different development characteristics, such as technological 
vs. behavior change in the energy system; or dynamics of 
transnational governance vs. unilateral political power politics in 
the global political system. The pathways encompass at relevant 
scales, for example, population, technological, economic, 
and environmental dynamics. They include, for example, the 
quality of institutions and governance, shifting values and 
norms, the levels of corruption or equity. The assessment of 
possible branching points and differing characteristics across 
the pathways can be a tool for determining important trade-
offs among the achievement of SDGs and human development 
within planetary boundaries. The TWI2050 framework will 
facilitate analysis of essential conditions and options for 
flexibility within the SDPs in line with the overarching narrative.
1.4    Outline of the TWI2050 report
This report comprises key messages, synthesis and four chapters. 
Chapter 1 introduces TWI2050 framework. The narrative and 
target spaces are presented briefly here in Chapter 1 and will be 
further refined in the next phase of TWI2050 and published. 
Chapter 2 examines, at the global scale, some major current 
trends in demography, economics, finance, society and politics. 
It presents potential major tipping points and dynamics that are 
likely to interact thereby creating a very different world from 
the present. It assesses currently observable megatrends and 
historical patterns with corresponding path dependencies. The 
chapter points to several of these megatrends that need to be 
taken into consideration how to achieve the transformation to 
sustainability. 
Chapter 3 investigates the characteristics of pathways that 
would lead to a sustainable future. It first assess the scientific 
literature on pathways that achieve several SDGs. Next, 
implications of the linkages across SDGs are highlighted by 
presenting model-based pathways which follow an integrated 
approach with special emphasis on the six transformations. 
Pathways are presented that feature SDGs under review at HLPF 
2018 (SDGs 6, 7, 11, 12 and 15). The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of research implications. 
Chapter 4 presents - from multiple perspectives - the 
governance framework required to achieve and steer 
transformations toward sustainability. This governance 
framework comprises of both fine tailored policy principles 
across the social, economic and political domains as well as 
enabling conditions for the great (societal) transformation that 
is needed to achieve the sustainability aspirations. 
The main findings and conclusions of the four chapters are 
summarized in the Synthesis presented at the beginning of the 
report that also connects them to policy interventions. 
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Key Messages
1. Sustainability is a societal issue
For many years sustainability issues were principally the domain of the natural and life sciences. Now they are studied as socioen-
vironmental system dynamics in order to mitigate the consequences of human behavior, rather than studying how to change that 
behavior itself. We must finally acknowledge that the real sustainability challenge is societal, not environmental. 
Societies define and shape what they consider their environments, what they see as the main challenges in those environments, and 
what kind of solutions they can try and offer. Hence, placing society at the center of the sustainability debate is the next quantum 
jump to develop in our thinking. 
Over long-term time, the many human societies on Earth have developed different ways to interact with their environments, 
through a co-evolution between perceptions, ideas, values, institutions and ways. We must investigate these at the global level as 
well as at that of the cultures involved.
2. The importance of the long term
Most current sustainability research is confined to the study of the last couple of centuries. This is insufficient because in doing so 
we cannot understand three different aspects of the complex processes involved:
• The slow, millennial, societal and natural dynamics against which the faster, shorter-term dynamics play out – tectonics and 
deep cultural evolutions for example. These are not easily noticeable at shorter timescales, but can play important roles;
• The full range of system states that socioenvironmental dynamics can assume – there may have been such states in the past that 
could be useful to understand in the present. Biological agriculture, for example, harks back to farming before the invention 
of chemical fertilizers and pesticides;
• Second order changes (changes in the way change proceeds) that reveal important dynamics that often play out very slowly, at 
deep levels, and change the dynamics driving shorter-term processes. 
Moreover, such a short-term approach looks at the current, highly disturbed state of the socioenvironmental system without un-
derstanding other, less disturbed ones. It is as if one would be trying to heal a very ill patient without knowing what a healthy person 
looked like.
3. The sectorial approach is not getting us any further. 
By studying the dynamics of individual sectors of our terrestrial life-support systems (water, biodiversity, food security, climate, 
energy etc.) we cannot take the many connections between these subsystems (and others) fully into account, thus missing crucial 
interactions. Well-nigh thirty years of research have enabled us to know the sectorial dynamics of such domains rather well, but 
have not brought us much closer to understanding the ways in which they are connected. We need to adopt a holistic approach to 
reach the next level of understanding of the very complex socioenvironmental dynamics that have driven us into the current sustai-
nability conundrum. This goes against a long-standing tradition of western thinking that isolates parts of a whole, studies them in 
detail and then assumes that by bringing them together we gain a perspective on that whole. Thus we distinguish between nature 
and society, as well between scholarly disciplines. Those distinctions shape many of our practical decisions about the environment, 
as well as our research.
In practice, however, the whole is more than the sum of its parts. To truly understand the dynamics involved holistically, we must 
achieve intellectual fusion between disciplinary ways of thinking, and that is hampered by our education as well as our career- and 
science funding structures.
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4. To think about our future, we need to use a Complex Adaptive Systems approach
Rather than be reactive to the dynamics driving us towards unsustainability, we have to become pro-active and begin to design for 
change. That implies learning from the past about the present (as we currently do) for the future (which we don’t usually do). Our 
western science originally developed to explain the present by systematically proving its theories and ideas, which one cannot do 
for the future. Thinking about the future was therefore not conducive to one’s scientific career.
The Complex Adaptive Systems approach responds to this need in that it assumes that all systems are complex, that “Occam’s ra-
zor” (always opting for the simplest theory) is not helpful, and that instead of focusing (ex post) on the origins of dynamics, we must 
(ex ante) study the emergence of novelty, acknowledging the fact that multiple futures can emerge at any point in a system’s trajectory. 
5. The ICT revolution is accelerating many ongoing trends
Currenty, the acceleration of the Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) is rapidly accelerating a number of societal 
trends that have begun long before this latest technological revolution. Among these are:
• The desintegration of the rules that govern the interaction between (nation-) states;
• The underming of the structure of our representative democracatic systems; 
• The destruction of communities based on solidarity, particularly in urban contexts;
• The loss of control over information processing that led to a relative convergence of societies around basic norms and values;
• The reduction of the dimensionality of our experience through television, film and computer gaming.
Together, these trends are affecting the very basis of our current social structures and insitutions. They will produce major societal 
tipping points once they start interacting more closely, and this might very probably happen before 2030 or 2050, thus putting in 
jeopardy our chances of achieving the SDGs.
6. Exceeding planetary boundaries is destabilizing our environment 
All this must be seen in light of the environmental tipping points that will result from current developments in climate, biodi-
versity, pollution of land and sea, saturation of the environment by certain chamicals, etc. The interaction between these ongoing 
natural processes may well cause major environmental tipping points alongside the societal ones mentioned under point 5, either 
before or after 2050. Such a conjunction of societal and environmental tipping points on a global scale is unheard of in human 
history, and may well lead to a period of chaotic system behavior, in which the current symbiosis between humans and their natu-
ral environments is profoundly distorted, societies will lose their current structure and people will be at a loss on how to proceed. 
The threat of societal instability makes the search for staying within environmental boundaries only more urgent and important.
7. From here to the future and back, or the inverse?
To project into the future is, of course, fraught with difficulties. It can be done in two ways. Either one extrapolates from the pre-
sent to the future, or one determines what kind of future is plausible and desirable and then constructs a roadmap from the present 
to the desired future. In the former case, the resultant futures are constrained by present-day thinking and existing trends, while 
the second approach does enable us to conceive “out-of-the-box” futures, but it is more difficult to see how these could be realized. 
We must link these two ways of conceiving our future. On the one hand, we should project a fundamentally different (sustainable) 
future, to be implemented differentially across countries, while on the other we must assume some form of “progress” from the 
present to that future or futures. This dilemma requires that one ‘sails between Scylla and Charybdis’, following a very narrow 
set of paths. The methodology for such a way forward is in many ways still to be developed, so that we can take the possibility of 
fundamental changes in our socioeconomic and environmental conditions into account. Our models are an attempt at moving 
forward in that domain.
8. We need to know much more about human perception, cognition and decision-making
These topics have thus far remained outside the core of the sustainability sciences, yet they are essential in understanding and 
where possible predicting how the system (or parts of it) might behave. There are a number of major potential choices coming up 
if we are to attain a sustainable environment, such as “What role to accord to future technologies?”, “How to improve the global 
governance system to avoid major tipping points?”, etc. But there are also, in daily life, myriad decsions that cumulatively impact 
on the overall trajectory of our Earth system. So in both (and other) instances it is of great importance to understand biological or 
societal dynamics that might impact on decisions taken.
Any and all of these decision also have unintended consequences, and improving our capacity to look for these and evaluate 
decisions against the options that we open at the time but were not chosen, is another domain that, if better understood, could 
contribute to improving our chances for a sustainable long-term socioenvironmental system.  
Many of our societies are now at a tipping point where they can step up the pace of transition towards implementing the 2030 
Agenda and the Paris Agreement. This tipping point situation is characterized by three major bifurcations: The transformation 
towards sustainability, nationalist counter-transformations and the far-reaching dynamics of the digital transformation.
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2.1 Introduction 
One of the assumptions of the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) is that achieving the vision underpinning the 
SDGs will be possible on the foundations of our current 
global socioeconomic system and its natural environment. 
This chapter places some question marks behind that 
assumption. The first of these concerns the future of the 
global socioeconomic system and the environment in which 
it functions. There are many signs that we are currently 
involved, worldwide, in a major transformation of the global 
societal world order: the shifting of the political structure 
from the long-standing Euro-American to an East-Asian 
center of gravity; the rapidly emerging self-confidence of 
Islam as a global force; the emergence of Africa as a developing 
continent, etc. 
Other issues also provide warning signs of potentially 
complicating developments, such as the ever-increasing 
wealth discrepancy in many countries that might trigger 
social tensions; growing insecurity around the provision of 
basic environmental services such as food and water, which 
may lead to (inter-) national conflicts; emerging identity-
related populist tendencies that are in contrast with the wave 
of globalization that we have seen over the last half century. 
Moreover, the current Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) revolution has, and will continue to have, 
a major (and accelerating) impact on these issues by fuzzing 
the distinction between signal and noise, undermining our 
societies’ alignment around certain existing worldviews and 
values, as well as transforming human communication.
In this chapter, we will (in Section 2.2) signal, in the form 
of narratives, some of the tendencies that might emerge. 
We acknowledge that looking into the future is fraught with 
difficulties and uncertainties, but it clearly is relevant to 
include these emerging trends in any considerations relative 
to the future of our planet and our societies.
But beyond these individual trends, a much larger danger 
emerges: the possibility that due to the interaction between 
several of these destabilizing trends, the whole of our societal 
organization is thrown into disarray. We conclude that, rather 
than, as is usual, deal with developments in each domain 
separately, we need to consider them together, in a holistic 
manner, if we are to become aware of such interactions. 
Next, in Section 2.3, we will show how, on balance, current 
trends in six major, highly interactive domains (Human 
capacity and demography, Decarbonization and energy, 
Food, biosphere and water, Smart cities, Consumption and 
production, and Digital revolution) are currently not, or 
insufficiently, contributing to sustainability. One of the world’s 
major policy foci in the next thirty years must be to invert 
those trends in a sustainable direction, or when they are 
contributing to sustainability, to strengthen them. 
We will conclude the chapter (Section 2.4) with arguing 
that by adopting a strategy of designing for change (rather 
than changing when in trouble) we could greatly improve our 
chances of achieving the SDGs.
2.1.1 Placing society at the core
After many years in which sustainability issues were principally 
the domain of the natural and life sciences, the social science 
community is getting seriously involved. Hence, sustainability 
is now viewed as a socio-environmental challenge, and much 
research is dedicated to the immediate relationship between 
societal and environmental dynamics. But we must go further 
and finally acknowledge that the real sustainability challenge 
is societal, not environmental. Societies define and shape what 
they consider their environments, what they see as the main 
challenges in the environment, and what kind of solutions 
they can try and offer. If humanity is to re-equilibrate with 
the environment, that will have to come from changes in 
mindsets, societal structures and human behavior. 
Hence, placing society at the center of the sustainability debate 
is the next quantum jump that we have to implement in our 
thinking. This is reflected in the structure of Section 2.2: from 
people via institutions, technology, values and economics 
to natural resources. But, of course, there are many human 
societies on Earth, and these have different ways of perceiving 
and dealing with their environments. Each has developed 
over long stretches of time in a path-dependent co-evolution 
between perceptions, ideas, values, institutions and ways to 
interact with the environment. The socio-cultural diversity 
of human societies is profound and is an important aspect 
of socio-environmental relations. Yet, as the SDGs have been 
adopted as global goals, to be implemented by each country 
at the national level, we must try to discuss them at the global 
level as well as at that of the cultures involved.
In this chapter, which we see as a first step in a longer-term 
research process aimed at doing just that, we will confine 
ourselves to the global level, emphasizing existing trends and 
ways forward (Chapters 3 and 4) that are globally relevant. 
In subsequent work we will see how some of these trends 
are instantiated in different cultures and nations, and how, 
therefore, the exact way forward may differ in each instance. 
2.1.2 From here to the future … or back? 
To project into the future is, of course, fraught with difficulties. 
When life was slower, it did not matter so much as we had time for 
regular reassessments that could keep our systems functioning 
under changing circumstances. But with the acceleration 
of everything- innovation, communication, transportation, 
technology, etc., - that is no longer the case, and we must learn 
how to improve projections.
This can be done in two ways. Either one extrapolates from 
the present to the future, or one determines what kind of future 
is plausible and desirable (Bai et al., 2016) and then constructs a 
roadmap from the present to the desired future. 
Whereas future(s) arrived at by taking the present as the 
point of departure are constrained by present-day thinking and 
existing trends, the second approach does enable us to conceive 
“out-of-the-box” futures, but it is more difficult to see how these 
could be realized. 
The SDG approach is inevitably a hybrid attempt to link these 
two ways of conceiving the future. On the one hand, it projects a 
fundamentally different (sustainable) future, to be implemented 
differentially across countries, while on the other it assumes 
continued “progress” from the present to that future or futures. 
It takes the present as point of departure and yet focuses on 
arriving at a very different future (or set of futures). In doing so, 
it not only limits the range of visions that may be conceived for 
our future to those that can be extrapolated from our present, 
but it also ignores the possibility that fundamentally disturbing 
dynamics might unfold between the present and 2030, c.q. 2050, 
which could completely change the societal contexts in which 
the SDGs would be implemented. 
The role of the TWI2050 project is to bridge that gap between 
the present and the future by developing different scenarios 
describing potential trajectories from present to future. 
Scenarios that take the possibility of fundamental changes in 
our socioeconomic and environmental conditions into account. 
In the next section, we will therefore touch upon some major 
ongoing long-term trends that are likely to trigger events that 
will require fundamental decisions about the pathways we may 
take to achieve the SDGs. 
2.2 A critical examination of some current trends
We have chosen to examine, at the global scale, some major 
current trends in demography, economics, finance, society 
and politics. Although each of these trends in itself has 
potential to trigger major tipping points for our current 
world system, the importance of this examination is the fact 
that these dynamics are likely to interact, thereby creating an 
uncontrollable development that may change the world so much 
that 2030 and 2050 will be presenting a very different context 
from the present. In that process the rapid evolution of ICT is a 
crucial factor, with consequences for almost all aspects of our 
current world order. But it is important to emphasize that the 
underlying trends are not new – in some instances they go back 
centuries, in others 50 or more years. They have gained so much 
momentum that changing them will be very difficult. So, the 
major challenge we face is to understand such interactions and 
identify mechanisms that could orient them towards the future 
we want.
2.2.1 People
2.2.1.1 Global demography and health
Figure 2.1 compares several recent population projections by 
the United Nations (UN) (probabilistic) and International Ins-
titute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) (Shared Socioeco-
nomic Pathways) to the end of the century illustrating the un-
certainties in projecting so far into the future. Some scenarios 
based on rapid development show a peak of world population 
into the future, but noticeably not before 2050. Some others im-
plementing a stalled development result in a continuous increa-
se. This figure poses a fundamental question: will the current 
global population explosion continue, or not?
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Figure 2.1. Future world population growth as projected according to the three 
SSP scenarios, the range of SDG scenarios presented here, and the probabilistic 
ranges given by the UN population projections. Source: Abel et al. (2016). 
Figure 2.2.  Population growth is very uneven. Population by region: estimates, 
1950-2015, and medium-variant projection, 2015-2100. Source: After UNDESA 
(2017).
Figure 2.3. Life expectancy at birth (years) by region: estimates 1975-2015 and 
projections 2015-2050. Source: After UNDESA (2017).
It appears that with growing wealth in the developing world, 
the crude birth rate will go down as life expectancy increases 
(Section 2.3). A crucial question is, however, whether growth 
in wealth and decrease in birth rate will manifest themselves at 
more or less the same rates or not? Another question is how 
these processes will play out in different parts of the world. No 
one knows, but it is clear that 200 years of industrial economy 
have created important demographic discrepancies that may 
impact on global sustainability. Figure 2.2 shows that the 
increase in projected world population is uneven; Africa show 
major increases, Europe and other regions are projected to 
slightly decrease. Figure 2.3 shows how life expectancy at birth 
is also very unevenly distributed in ways that are similar to that 
of wealth. 
Currently, in a number of developed countries, aging and a low 
birth rate combine to cause decreasing numbers of inhabitants 
of working age: Japan, China and Germany are examples. 
Others still have an expanding population due, for example, 
to important immigration (the US, Canada, Australia) but in 
a general political climate in which immigration is increasingly 
subject to xenophobia, those fluxes may well decrease. That will 
have an impact on the nature and size of their economies. On 
the supply side people will be replaced by automation, leading 
to unemployment, and this might negatively affect the demand 
side. 
The opposite is the case for South East Asia and Africa, where 
birthrates are still higher and the working-age population will 
be growing for some time. There, economies will continue to 
grow, and one of the interesting questions that raises is whether 
this will also entail a shift in global power balance towards these 
continents. 
That will in part depend on whether, and in how far, they will 
be able to develop their technologies and economies, as well as 
their institutions and legal systems. China has shown, over the 
past few decades, how this can be done. 
Another fundamental characteristic of the current world, but 
with ancient origins, is the occurrence of large-scale migrations. 
Current research indicates that on a global scale, migration has 
not recently increased substantively, but at local and regional 
scales it has shifted demographics. According to the United 
Nations, during 2005-2050 the net number of international 
migrants to more developed regions is projected to be 98 
million (UNDESA, 2017). Such regional migration is likely to 
further accelerate in the foreseeable future due to, for instance, 
climate change, sea level rise, and food and water availability. 
But there may also be increasing pressure towards migration 
for societal reasons, such as warfare, failing states, populism, 
ethnic cleansing or criminal violence. The counterpart may be a 
defensive reaction in developed countries, fed by local populism 
and identity issues, which creates more barriers to migration 
and globalization, as is now happening in Southern Europe and 
the United States.
We may therefore anticipate major cultural, social and 
economic challenges in the developed world as well as in the 
developing world wherever state control is not willing or able to 
prevent mass migration. 
2.2.2 Institutions
2.2.2.1 Globalization and conflict
For five centuries the European (and later the Western) 
socioeconomic system has spread across the world. Initially this 
occurred through trade (1500-1800), then (1800-1945) through 
agricultural and mineral resource exploitation under military 
and administrative control, and since the Second World War 
(WWII) in the form of economic colonization. But since 
WWII, a counter-trend is also visible, in which ex-colonies 
gain independence, find their economic footing, and gain self-
confidence in part through learning from developed countries. 
Now the Euro-American sphere is coming under increasing 
political and economic pressure. The rise in importance of the 
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) countries 
is a sign of this trend, which is bound to be a source of uncertainty 
while the world searches for a new political organization.
An important underlying trend is that a reduction in the 
dimensionality of metrics (and awareness) of human wellbeing 
has emerged. Different cultures and populations now interact 
principally around the dimension ‘wealth’ when they judge 
themselves, compare among each other and transact exchanges. 
This has increased the emphasis on productivity and growth and 
has led to the over-consumption of natural and social capital in 
many regions. Other dimensions such as religion, community 
solidarity, art, culture, have decreased in importance as primary 
drivers of decision-making except among focused subsets of 
societies whose interaction creates ‘hotspots’.
Current populist movements find their origins at least in part 
in the need to re-appropriate those multidimensional communal 
value sets, as was finely analyzed by Polanyi (1944) and members 
of his school in anthropology (Munck, 2005; Graeber, 2001). 
Elites have been able to make the transition towards a globalized 
society, whereas a very large majority of citizens worldwide has 
been left behind, focused on their local community and thus 
resistant to the reduction of the dimensionality sphere of their 
identity. This has shaped two ‘deep’ (second-order) fields of 
tension. Globalism poses a threat to the future of governance 
because it disenfranchises the vast majority and empowers 
a technocratic elite. But it also stimulates the emergence of 
identity issues, which are creating fields of tension between 
nations. Both trends are increasing the risk of (inter)national 
conflicts.
2.2.2.2 Our global governance system
The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and the Congress of Vienna in 
1815 laid the foundations for the organization of the European 
nation-states and the philosophy that shaped it, based on 
sovereignty (the freedom of national governments to act as 
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they see fit in their territories without outside interference), 
and a balance of power between states. That order collapsed 
in the 20th century when individual states pushed the system 
out of balance, leading to the two world wars and the collapse 
of several major empires (Haass, 2017; Kissinger, 2014).
After WWII, all efforts were directed at re-establishing 
stability, by creating a series of global institutions such as 
the UN and its agencies. This led to a more or less stable 
geopolitical order for another 40 years, thanks to the balance 
of power between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and the Warsaw Pact. But with the collapse of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), this order 
fell apart, both between states and within them. As the US 
military completely dominated the globe, competition shifted 
to the economic sphere; nations focused on internal economic 
development and increasing economic interdependence 
through closer trading relationships. Economic frictions were 
negotiated through the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), at the World Trade Organization (WTO), and 
by means of bilateral trade agreements.
With growing interdependency between nations that was 
the result of growing trade flows, the relationship between 
domestic and international dynamics came to the fore, recently 
eroding the sovereignty that was the basis of the bipolar 
post-WWII system and creating an unstable multipolar 
one.  Regional ‘hotspots’ emerged across the world, where 
competition between regional players led to (potentially 
explosive) tensions of mixed economic, nationalist, religious, 
ethnic and tribal nature. 
These trends seem for the moment on an ascendant path. 
We cannot, between now and 2030 or 2050, count on a global 
web of stable governments and have to envisage that the 
political world may look very different by that time.
2.2.2.3 Democracy and its values under pressure
The governance system of most developed countries is, since 
WWII, democratic. Individuals delegate their political power 
to an elected elite that makes decisions for a limited amount of 
time. This system works as long as internal tensions in societies 
can be worked through by discussion, debate or vote. 
In most developed countries, there seems to have been a 
connection between the adequate functioning of the democratic 
system and the rise of the consumer society, leading to huge 
increases in use of raw materials, energy and human capital 
in the countries concerned, and our current sustainability 
challenges.
Currently, as material and social stresses increase, mainstream 
media and long-standing political parties are losing power, as 
is clear from the recent Brexit referendum, as well as elections 
in Europe and the United States of America. The vacuum has 
been filled by populist organizations that find their base in 
social networks and undermine the democratic system in four 
different ways: 1) accelerating the decline of political parties 
and other institutional forms of engagement, 2) weakening 
the legislative branches, 3) reducing a sense of social cohesion 
and 4) undermining democratic state competence. In some 
instances, this has led to hybrid democratic regimes which keep 
the trappings of democracy, including seemingly free elections, 
under leaders who control the election process, the media 
and the scope of permissible debate. This is currently a highly 
debated issue, and to illustrate it we have chosen a few, relatively 
random, examples (Edsall, 2017; Selian, 2003; Horrocks and 
Pratchett, 1995; Abramson et al., 1988).
Underpinning this process is the loss of alignment around 
sets of values more or less shared by people in the developed 
countries. The recent multiplication of sources of information 
enables subgroups in society to focus on a narrow set of sources 
for their information, leading to different conceptions of ‘truth’, 
‘signal’ and ‘information’ and fracturing the overall alignment 
of societies (“people live in different bubbles”). 
2.2.2.4 The de-construction of communities
In his ‘Great Transformation’ (1944) Polanyi distinguished 
between 1) “markets” as auxiliary tools to ease exchange of 
goods serving to maintain social relations - and 2) “market 
societies”, in which the society becomes subject to the laws of 
the market, subordinating the dynamics of society to the economic 
dynamics of the market‘s “invisible hand”. As part of the 
Industrial Revolution (roughly from the 1830’s to the 1850’s), 
a fundamental transformation between these two approaches 
seems to have occurred in the UK, which then spread across 
the world as part of globalization. A financial, unidimensional 
economic logic was progressively dis-embedded from the wider, 
multidimensional, socio-cultural logic and grew in importance 
to the detriment of the latter (Ussher et al., 2018; Frieden, 
2006; Graeber, 2001; Polanyi, 1944). Munck (2005) has posited 
that globalization is at the root of the destruction of social 
communities because it undermines the multidimensional value 
spectra that keep communities together. People need to both 
belong to a group, and to distinguish themselves as individuals 
within that group. In order to enable that, a community needs to 
have many conceptual- and value dimensions. Such values are 
social creations shaped in the social networks that constitute the 
context of individuals.
Whether one agrees with these arguments or not, the 
destruction of many communities, in the process of migration, 
urbanization and rural abandonment, agricultural efficiency-
related reorganization and so forth, is a fact, leading to an 
erosion of the structures at the base of our societies. 
2.2.2.5 Urbanization
Urbanization is a global phenomenon that has rapidly 
accelerated and spread across the world. The relative longevity of 
the built infrastructure may explain why urbanization has so far 
been the most persistent societal dynamic known to mankind. 
Fossil energy enabled the explosive global urbanization of the 
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last century. Urbanization is therefore often seen as a major 
stabilizing trend for the future. But most of the predictions 
about urbanization, and in particular that by 2050, 68% of the 
world’s population is projected to be urban (UNDESA, 2018), 
and possibly about 80-90% by 2100, are based on a linear 
extrapolation of the current dynamics. We are actually dealing 
with a complex and highly vulnerable system with many 
nonlinearities and unintended consequences, and hence, such 
a linear scenario is not appropriate. Food and water security 
challenges may well force populations to disperse from their 
highly concentrated agglomerations. The ICT revolution may 
undermine the need for spatial concentration of information 
and material processing that drove the need to live in cities. 
Climate change will exert pressure to increase transport costs 
and to reduce the use of bulk transportation, so that we may 
have to develop economies that are more regional, more local. 
Together such dynamics may very well upset the business-
as-usual scenario for urbanization. In order to deal with that, 
cities may have to change their policies from “changing under 
pressure” to “designing for change”.
2.2.3 Technology
All the above structural, long-term ongoing developments 
are likely to be impacted, over the next decennia, by the rapid 
developments of technology that have emerged from the 
Industrial Revolution and the lifting of the energy constraints 
on innovation. These are commonly summarized as the Nano-, 
Bio-, Information- and Communication (NBIC) technologies. 
The first two of these are still in experimental stages and it is 
therefore difficult to outline their potential impact on society. As 
far as we can see at the moment, the devolution of information 
processing and communication to electronic systems is the most 
important driver to have a transformative impact on the near-
term global future of our societies. It drives a transition that we 
will not be able to cope with by simply becoming more resilient 
while remaining organized as we have been. The acceleration 
of information processing, driven by increasing interactivity, 
communication between more and more people in possession 
of more and more complex and effective tools for thought and 
action is causing unintended consequences of actions and 
decisions in a dynamic that is beyond our control. We have no 
sense at all of how to deal with the second-order changes this 
may be triggering. 
2.2.3.1 Dis-embedding information 
The ICT revolution is nothing new. It is the culmination of a 
process of knowledge acquisition that began when humans 
‘bent their minds around’ the challenge of creating artifacts. 
It accelerated under the impact of the Industrial Revolution, 
which put virtually unlimited quantities of relatively cheap 
energy at societies’ disposal. Thus, lifting the energy constraint 
on innovation set in motion an explosive development in 
technology and knowledge acquisition (and thus information 
1 As roughly calculated by Friedman (2016), technological innovation generations last some 5-6 years, while changing behavior in society to fully exploit these 
technical advances takes up to 15 years.
processing) of all kinds, improving overall health, wealth and 
resource use wherever the social conditions were favorable, and 
notably favoring education. 
Until the 1860s, matter, energy and information were 
embedded in each other, mostly being transmitted in language, 
in the form of artifacts, but also in the structure of customs 
and organizations. Writing was a major step in dis-embedding 
information by substantiating symbols with informational 
meaning onto a material substrate, and thus facilitating 
communication beyond immediate interaction, and beyond 
unity in time and space. Printing popularized this means of 
communication.
With the telegraph and telephone, transmitting information 
became possible in the form of pure (electrical) energy, reducing 
the cost of communication hugely. But this electrification did 
not extend to the processing of information. 
Due to the territorial limitations of national governance, the 
increasing efficiency of information processing has enabled – 
and been driven by – the growth of the large multi-national 
corporations. It now spreads over much of the globe, accelerating 
the creation of a global extraction-to-waste economy (Steffen et 
al., 2015) contributing to an increase in wealth differentials, 
exponential growth of cities, dependency on the fossil energy 
industry, globalization and the consumption society. It also 
reduces the chances that outsiders can become insiders. 
But as part of that trend, the global information processing 
network will itself become more accident-prone and sensitive 
to minor disturbances because of its growing interconnectivity 
(Helbing, 2013).
2.2.3.2 Electronic information processing
At the root of the current tipping point is the fact that, presently, 
information is not only transmitted, but also processed in digital 
form, enabling the semi-independent processing of information 
by machines, reducing the time and energy involved in 
information processing to (near) zero, and accelerating 
second-order change in information processing into a nearly 
exponential one. Coupled with a very rapidly accelerating 
algorithmic software evolution, the acceleration is such that 
societal information processing is no longer able to deal with 
it.1 This has important social consequences. The people directly 
engaged in informatics have an enhanced opportunity to 
accelerate invention. But this group is proportionately getting 
smaller as the technology becomes more complex, whereas 
those outside that small community are left behind. That is 
profoundly affecting our societies’ general capability to absorb 
change. 
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2.2.3.3 Changing relationships between society 
and space
During the last 200 years, the acceleration of our means of 
transportation (cars, airplanes) has reduced time needed for 
going to places and increased the frequency of displacements. 
The ICT revolution has accelerated interaction further by 
enabling anyone to share any information immediately across 
the world. 
This has implications for the relationship between humans 
and space, as the transformation of ‘spaces’ into ‘places’ 
(locations ‘created by human experience’, cf. Tuan (1977)) is 
deliberately disabled. That could ultimately undermine our 
current reliance on spatially defined administrative entities such 
as municipalities, provinces, states and nations. Territoriality 
is not a ‘natural’ state of affairs, but one created over time by 
specific historical circumstances. 
As people become increasingly ‘place-less’, will other, non-
territorial modes of organization emerge? An experiment 
with such a novel organization is currently being carried out 
in Estonia, which accepts applications for e-residency from 
anywhere in the world. Were others to follow that example, 
location would no longer define the laws and statutes governing 
a person or firm’s transactions, but the organization that 
guarantees the transactions would do so, wherever in the world 
it might be established.
2.2.3.4 The impact of ICT on time management
Central to the evolution of the relationship between the individual 
perception of time and its societal management are external, 
mechanical devices enabling an “objective” measurement of 
time. Since the age of sundials and hourglasses, larger and 
larger communities have delegated their time management to 
mechanical devices of increasing precision, so as to manage the 
explosion of interactions involved in their growth. 
A dynamic relationship between the size of the flow of 
information processed and time perception seems to be 
confirmed by everyday experience: when an individual is very 
busy (processes a lot of information), time seems to be ‘flying’, 
whereas when information processing falls below a certain level, 
time is perceived to move very slowly. If such a relationship 
exists, then the growing volume of information processed would 
seem to relate to an increasing subdivision of temporal intervals 
in societal time management. Would this come to a point that 
only closer integration between people and computers can deal 
with societal time management?
2.2.3.5 Loss of control over information 
processing
The ICT revolution is progressively transforming “information 
processing without central control” into “information processing 
without any control”. Until now there have always been nodes 
that controlled information processing to some extent, whether 
through enforcement, institutionalization, incentives or 
otherwise. Each node involved only a limited number of people 
(subscribers to a daily, or listeners to a radio station), and 
there were barriers to the flow of information between them 
(spatial isolation, differences in culture, identity, administrative 
organization, finance or other). That enabled each node to 
maintain its culture, align its members on certain values, 
procedures and institutions. The reduction in information 
-  processing space/time that culminated in the internet, is 
removing these barriers, generating an explosive increase in 
horizontal information processing at all levels of society across 
the globe. This has made it much more difficult for societies 
to maintain their own identities. On the one hand, ideas and 
values now move very easily from society to society, while on 
the other the risk of social fragmentation has increased, as ideas 
within a society get increasingly differentiated.  
2.2.3.6 ‘Fuzzing’ the boundary between 
information and noise
One important consequence of this loss of control over 
information processing involves the status of ‘information’ 
itself.  Numerous internet sites now proclaim to provide ‘news’ 
but launch egregious ‘information’ that has little relationship 
with commonly experienced realities. Deliberately or by default 
‘factoids’ are presented as ‘facts’ according to the worldview of 
the presenter. Though that is nothing new – the rumor mill has 
always, in every society, had this effect – in the internet age it is 
much more difficult to find out how information has emerged, 
and what its relationship to the realm of phenomena is. This 
undermines in many societies the distinction between signal and 
noise and the alignment of people around shared sets of values. 
Over time this could fundamentally affect the existence of 
all social institutions because it obfuscates the boundaries 
between the institutional structure of our societal interactions 
and the surrounding stochastic chaos. Individuals would lose 
their alignment and compass, feeling lost and immobilized by 
indecision.
2.2.3.7 Big data and individuation
The capability to collect, store and process ‘Big Data’ in 
great detail is transforming our understanding of societal 
phenomena. Traditionally, in social science, conclusions were 
based on statistical generalizations around limited samples. We 
can now enhance resolution to deal with individuals separately, 
improving our understanding of many societal dynamics at the 
cost of hugely increasing the need for processing power. This is 
one of the trends driving High-Performance Computing.
In practice, this trend also enabled a major concentration of 
information processing, and thus political and financial power, 
in the hands of a very small group of corporations that use the 
data in completely opaque ways. Governments have difficulty 
limiting negative effects, protecting privacy, ensuring full 
transparency and thus re-establishing eroding trust. This field 
of tension is potentially a very destabilizing side of the ‘Big Data’ 
revolution.  
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2.2.3.8 Automation and artificial intelligence
Relatively recent advances in information processing have also 
enabled the automation of increasingly complex mechanical 
tasks. In the last thirty years, robots were specifically designed 
to perform relatively simple, monotonously repetitive tasks. 
But that, too, is changing. Very recently the combination of 
‘Big Data’ with ‘Cloud Storage’ has laid the foundations for 
the development of contemporary artificial intelligence (AI) 
based on Machine Learning (ML). It programs the computer to 
recognize and identify patterns by analyzing very large numbers 
of data through approaches in which initial approximations of 
meaning are tested and refined many times until they come 
close to correct understanding (cf. ‘fuzzy sets’) (Zadeh, 1975). 
Such reflexive learning based on analysis of very large datasets 
enabled computing to conquer important new domains of 
information processing, including non-routine and relatively 
complex analytical tasks for example. It enables an ICT-based 
system to operate and adapt to changing circumstances with 
reduced or even without human control, as in the case of the 
self-driving car. 
But AI is shifting from ‘narrow’ (sets of specific applications 
for discrete problems) to ‘general’ (multi- and cross-domain 
‘broad spectrum’ applications). As this shift proceeds, human-
machine teaming will grow in importance. This opens the road 
to employment opportunities that are not likely to disappear in 
the next few years. But filling these slots requires high levels of 
education and training people in the specific skills required.
2.2.3.9 Exploding connectivity among ‘tools for 
thought and action’
The ‘Big Data’ revolution has exponentially inflated the volume 
of information that we can gather and process. But it also 
engendered an even more rapid increase in the connectivity 
between different signals and dimensions of the information 
processed. The ubiquitous availability of information from 
across the globe, and improvements in ways to search for, 
and identify, complementary components has accelerated this 
process further, enabling an important shift in the nature of 
innovation, from reliance on originating innovations (which 
open up a completely new technology) towards reliance 
on recombinant innovations (Strumsky and Lobo, 2015; 
Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2011). A next step in this process is 
the development of the internet of things, connecting many of 
our everyday tools to each other so that they can interact, with 
or without human intervention.
2.2.3.10 ICT and education
Information technology is increasingly penetrating all aspects 
of our life and confronting all citizens whether they like it or 
not. It is currently applied for identity management by capturing 
biometrical data. According to the company Smartmatic (2018), 
the employment of their biometric technology helped to reduce 
the citizen registration time of Haitians from three months to 
a few days. Through the possession of an identification card, 
citizens are for example allowed to vote (Smartmatic, 2018). 
In Denmark, a central person registration system is in place 
(Lifeindenmark.dk, 2018). Anyone who stays longer in the 
country than three months, or six months if EU/EEA citizen 
or from the Nordic countries, is obliged to register with the 
municipal authorities to receive their personal CPR number. 
It gives access to a range of services such as social security, 
handling taxes, open a bank account, conclude a phone contract, 
among others (Lifeindenmark.dk, 2018). However, strong 
cyber security needs to be provided, to protect from potentially 
damaging cyber attacks.
In the absence of increased, universal, “data-literacy” 
developments such as these will rapidly lead to major societal 
challenges. Retrieved data needs to be critically assessed to 
understand who provided the data, which method was used 
and what it conveys when embedded in a wider context. Our 
current education systems are not up to the task – relatively few 
people are educated to the necessary level, creating a very small 
elite in control of information, and many forms of education are 
themselves sub-optimal. 
The transformation of education through the digital 
revolution takes many forms. Online education platforms such 
as Coursera (2018), or Khan Academy (2018) have become an 
established part of the education system and have allowed a 
larger public to engage and access information. Virtual reality 
simulation courses from i.e., Labster ApS (Labster, 2018), which 
allow students to learn a laboratory method before physically 
entering the laboratory, are currently in development. 
Citizen science is another, complementary, new development, 
using technological innovations to engage the wider population 
in research. For example, the European Commission’s Joint 
Research Centre encouraged citizens to report invasive alien 
species in their region by using a specifically developed app 
(Galiay, 2018; Tsiamis et al., 2017). In the United States, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) developed a toolbox 
with low-cost sensors for citizen scientists, among others, to 
collect local data on air quality, to help interpret it, as well as 
to compare it with data collected by regulatory stations (EPA, 
2018).
But viewed overall, most educational institutions at all levels 
still practice teaching approaches that were developed many 
years (in some cases centuries) ago. Moreover, we need not 
only to focus on moving capacity building in technological 
research forward, but also to invest research time and money on 
discussing and reflecting how we will control such developments 
in ways to maximize societal benefits (Tegmark, 2015).
2.2.4 Economy
In many ways, the economy is both the best- and the worst- 
studied of the socio-environmental interactions. The best 
studied because there is a wealth of data available, but the worst 
studied because many formal macro-economic models used to 
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explain observed patterns are insufficiently sensitive to detail, 
while in most instances they are dynamic equilibrium models 
unsuited to deal with the complexity of the dynamics underlying 
behavior (Beckert, 2016).  
2.2.4.1 Finance
In recent years a very important, and growing, proportion of 
total financial capital is no longer engaged in the production of 
goods or services, but entirely devoted to speculation. Figures 
2.4 and 2.5 show from two different perspectives how a larger 
and growing proportion of capital in the US is devoted to 
speculative than to productive activities.
The mobility of such speculative capital, and the fact that these 
huge financial means are controlled by fewer and fewer people 
and institutions, has had the destabilizing effect of contributing 
to a rapid succession of financial crises that we have seen in the 
last sixty years (Economist, 2014). Several aspects of this trend 
are so dangerous that we need to include them in our thinking 
about the future. 
2.2.4.2 Trade, protectionism and investment 
flows
Several developed economies have exhibited a trend 
towards protectionism. While protectionist policies are 
often implemented under the pretext of protecting jobs or 
correcting bilateral trade imbalances, they ultimately restrict 
economic growth in the long run, since it inhibits trade in 
intermediate goods and the creation of value chain niches. 
The uncertainty produced by the threat of protectionism 
also hampers flows of investment in global capital markets, 
as it generates uncertainty regarding future economic growth 
(Erokhin, 2017). This is aggravated by trends in international 
aid, migration, climate change and geopolitics. Protectionism 
also threatens food sustainability by drastically shifting value 
chains and forcing replacement of staples and other foods with 
less sustainable varieties. Trade has a major role in stabilizing 
food prices, as well as shifting production from areas of high 
environmental risk to less risky areas (IFPRI, 2018). 
The effects of protectionism in developed countries will 
be felt most acutely in the least developed countries (LDCs) 
(UNDESA et al., 2018). Many LDCs are dependent on 
external demand for commodity exports, as well as foreign 
aid for budget support (Timmer et al., 2011). In a closed 
world economy, many LDCs will continue to lag behind 
more developed economies, and this will have important 
ramifications in other sectors. LDCs will not achieve the 
economic growth required for sustainable development 
without a significant increase in investment. However, many 
of these countries are unable to attract the levels of investment 
they require due to institutional deficiencies, an over-
dependence on commodities subject to fluctuation in prices, 
and a dearth of basic infrastructure to support fledgling 
industries.
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Figure 2.4. Gross leverage for speculative-grade and investment-grade firms, 
2000-2016. Gross leverage is the ratio of the book value of total debt to the book 
value of total assets. Source: US Federal Reserve (2016). 
Figure 2.5. Fraction of total GDP (in the US) invested in production (orange 
line, without capital gains tax) and speculation (green line, with capital gains 
tax). The global recession of 2008 has depressed both trends, but the relationship 
is still the same. After: Washington Center for Equitable Growth (2018).
Figure 2.6. Private debt in developed and developing countries exceeds public 
debt. After: Hugman and Magnus (2015). 
2.2.4.3 Debt 
The rapid increase in global indebtedness (Figure  2 .6) is directly 
linked to overall financial and economic stability. As long as the 
world - and most countries - are on a growth trajectory this is 
not necessarily a problem as people have enough confidence 
that this debt will be reimbursed, and because inflation reduces 
the debt load. 
We have to remember, though, that this whole system is 
fiduciary, and that if trust in it is for some reason or other 
undermined, it could collapse very easily, leading to major 
social unrest. There are many hair triggers that may cause such 
a collapse. We have seen how individual nations have seen trust 
in their financial systems collapse due to mismanagement or 
actual cheating (Argentina, Greece or Ireland are more recent 
examples). That is not affecting world financial stability as long 
as there are other economies that can serve as ‘lenders of last 
resort’ because they are bigger and in better shape. However, 
with the overall increase in debt level among both large and 
small countries this mechanism may itself be under threat. 
And because each crisis is countered by central banks with an 
increase in their debt levels, the underlying instability increases 
with each such event (Figure 2.7). Moreover, as an ever-larger 
percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) is devoted to 
interest payments, the proportion of GDP that is available for 
spending is reduced. Ultimately, this may limit the potential for 
further investment in infrastructure or towards the expansion 
of productive capacity.
Figure 2.7. Public debt in the US, other developed countries, and emerging 
markets. After the 2007 debt crisis, public debt has increased rapidly, to level off 
(except in the US) after 2010. After: Durden (2017).
2.2.4.4 Aging population effect on savings, debt 
and pension systems
A major demographic trend with tremendous economic 
implications that represent a challenge for sustainability is 
population aging and its consequences on welfare systems in 
developed and developing economies. This includes pension 
and healthcare systems, in addition to a possible decrease in 
savings and investments (Bosworth et al., 2004).
The irreversible trend of an aging world population has 
profound implications on the sustainability of social welfare 
systems. In developed countries, an increased burden will be 
placed on public transfer systems, due to concurrent trends 
of a growing proportion of pensioners and a diminished tax 
base. However, the majority of the increase in the population 
above the age of 60 will occur in the Global South (UNDESA, 
2017), where the elderly are less likely to have retirement savings 
plans or to be supported by public welfare systems, and instead 
depend on assets and labor income. 
Without the means to support themselves in retirement, 
many of these people are susceptible to poverty. An aging world 
population also means that the share of non-communicable 
diseases in the global disease burden will grow, increasing 
pressure on countries’ health expenditure, adding to the fiscal 
burden of government budgets.
Low productivity growth in developed economies in recent 
years has been explained by aging workforces, a slowdown 
in total factor productivity in the ICT sector, declining 
contributions of trade to economic growth, and stagnation in 
levels of educational attainment (Adler et al., 2017).  
Between countries, global inequality has decreased globally 
in the last decade thanks to the contribution of China and India 
in their economic development process. As these and other 
emerging markets continue to grow, the economic hegemony 
of the United States and its Western allies will be gradually 
replaced by a multipolar world economy, in which India, China, 
Indonesia and Brazil become increasingly important economic 
hubs for financial services, manufacturing and innovation 
(Timmer et al., 2011). 
However, this trend does not mean that economic growth 
will be evenly distributed. Many LDCs are at risk of continued 
vulnerability to economic shocks for reasons mentioned above. 
Their economic vulnerability is compounded by the fact that 
many of the LDCs are facing disproportionately high threats 
from climate change, have rapidly-growing populations, and 
also have weak governments and vulnerable security situations. 
These trends are inhibiting the ability of LDCs to bridge the gap 
between themselves and the emerging and developed economies. 
Without appropriate economic growth and investment, their 
populations may continue to grow at unsustainable rates, they 
will not be able to provide adequate education to their youth, 
and the coverage of health services will remain incomplete and 
fail to tackle preventable causes of morbidity and mortality 
(UNDESA et al., 2018).
2.2.4.5 Wealth differentials
The global economy has created excessive material wealth 
differentials between individuals by concentrating material 
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wealth in a relatively small, if growing, proportion of the world’s 
population (Figure 2.8). This has caused a steepening of the 
wealth disparities within and between countries in another very 
long-term ‘deep’ trend (Scheidel, 2017).
Figure 2.9. Global growth incidence curve, 1988-2008. One sees that below the 
10th percentile incomes have grown very strongly, while incomes between the 
between the 10th and the 50th percentile incomes have grown substantially, 
whereas from the 50th percentile to the 80th, incomes have substantially 
declined. From the 80th to the 95th, they have grown some, and beyond the 
95th, they have grown exponentially. Source: Licensed under CC BY 3.0 IGO by 
Lakner and Milanovic (2016).
If we look at the evolution of wealth globally (Figure 2.9), the 
so-called “elephant curve” (Lakner and Milanovic, 2016), 
representing the growth in average household income of each 
percentile group worldwide between 1988 and 2008, we see 
the combined effect of three trends: 1) rapid and substantive 
income growth for the poorest part of the world population, 
especially in developing countries, but starting from a very 
low base, 2) absence of, or low, income growth for the middle 
classes in the developed countries, and 3) rapid growth for the 
richest people in the developed and some developing countries 
(notably China). 
Corlett (2003) shows that differences between countries’ 
population growth rates and the selection of countries included 
in the statistics (notably Russia, Japan and China) accentuates 
some of the contrasts, but this does not fundamentally change 
the picture that the middle classes in developed countries have 
not seen any increase in real income in this period. 
Figure 2.10 shows the evolution of the wealth gap over the last 
century (1900-2010). In particular, it illustrates how the ‘big 
bang’ of the 1980s, engineered by Reagan and Thatcher, has 
hugely increased the wealth gap in the English-speaking world, 
but much less so in continental Europe. The important lesson is 
the fact that, indeed, governments do shape markets, and would 
be wise to regulate them if they want to preserve social peace!
Education is one of the major differentiating factors in lifelong 
earnings capacity. The increased reliance of industry and services 
on ICT requires higher levels of education to deal with more and 
more complex tasks. Currently, this is one of the major barriers 
to optimize use of modern technologies. Turning now to some 
of the consequences of the wealth gap, Figure  2 .11 presents the 
relationship between income inequality and societal challenges 
in a number of countries worldwide, by projecting energy use 
(here taken as a proxy for wealth) against social progress. 
The growing wealth discrepancy seems a manifest case of a 
societal planetary boundary that we are approaching or have 
already crossed. Some see it as an early warning sign of major 
social adjustments - in the developed nations as a protest against 
the squeeze of the middle classes, and in developing nations as 
a ‘revolution of rising expectations’ triggered by the fact that a 
small proportion of the population is getting (very) rich.
2.2.4.6 Innovation 
When politicians and other people, talk about “innovating our 
way out of the sustainability conundrum”, we would respond 
that the last two-and-a-half centuries of accelerating, undirected 
innovation in every domain of human life have actually caused 
our present sustainability predicament! 
In accordance with their values, our Western societies will 
strive to maintain a degree of innovation. But their current 
“(technological) progress”-related orientation and its values 
should not blind us to the fact that for many populations, this 
may not be such a fundamental value.
Moreover, there are dynamics within our industrialized 
societies that could undermine our innovativeness. Summers 
(2016) argued that we may be reaching a plateau in the 
expansion of our global economies. Whereas his argument is 
purely couched in terms of economics and finance, it raises a 
more fundamental question: “Is it becoming more and more 
difficult to ‘invent’ novelty that has a major impact on value 
creation?”
One observes in the USA an overall decrease in return 
on invested capital (Figure 2.12) as well as a decline of 
entrepreneurship (Figure 2.13) that might be linked to an overall 
decline in the frequency of major innovations. Strumsky et al. 
(2010) show that between 1947 and 2006 the average number 
of patents per inventor has gone down from 2.4 to 1.7, while 
the number of people involved in a patent has gone up from 
about 0.6 to 2.5. If this trend continues, it will affect the growth 
potential of the economy. 
2.2.4.7 From production to distribution 
In the current system, our production economy derives its 
profitability from the gap between cost of production and 
perceived value of the product in the eyes of the consumer. That 
has driven the search for ever cheaper production methods 
worldwide, ever more efficiency in all aspects of production: 
human, financial, logistical, and technological. But worldwide 
limits to cheap labor, enabling large-scale industrial production, 
are looming. Although there remain pockets of relatively low 
labor cost, the profitability and existence of the traditional 
market-based production economy may come under stress. 
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Figure 2.8. Worldwide difference in wealth distribution. Source: Blundell (2018) based on Sutcliffe (2004).
Figure 2.10. The evolution of inequality. The 1980s ‘big boom’ in the financial regulation has inverted the reduction of inequality in the anglo-speaking world, but 
at least until 2010 not in other parts of Europe. Source: Licensed under CC-BY-SA by Roser (2018). 
Figure 2.11. Social Progress Index vs Energy per country. The relationship between per capita energy use (here taken as a proxy for wealth) and social progress 
(an indicator combining life expectancy, math and literacy, infant mortality, homicides, imprisonment, teenage births, trust, obesity, mental illness, including drug 
and alcohol addiction, social mobility). Source: Wikipedia (2018), licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0. 
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Automation will no doubt mitigate this as robotics and AI 
replace human activities. Computers can increasingly associate 
diverse information into patterns, enabling them to respond 
appropriately to changing circumstances. For one, how to use 
information can now be determined by computers, enabling many 
more economic and other activities to be managed by them.
Economist and technologist Brian Arthur (2017) argues that 
this will bring us to a point where it is possible to produce enough 
goods and services for everyone through automation [if we can 
find ways to do so in environmentally sustainable ways]. This 
will trigger a major shift from an economy in which production 
of goods is the driver to one in which ensuring general access to 
what can be produced is the challenge. Arthur argues that this 
will bring about the following major changes:
• The criteria for developing and assessing policies will change. 
GDP and productivity are relatively good measures of the 
physical economy, but are much less effective in measuring 
the virtual economy.
• The free-market philosophy will be less suitable to the new 
situation because the focus shifts to more or less equitable 
distribution of value, away from the idea that the more is 
produced, the better it is.
• The new era will not be an economic, but a political one. The 
paradigm of the society at the service of the economy will 
have to be inverted to place the economy at the service of 
the society.
The transition is likely to cause a period of major upheaval, in 
which a number of social questions need to be answered: “How 
will we find meaning in a society where jobs no longer provide 
it?”, “how will we deal with privacy in a society where every bit 
of information about everyone is concentrated in databases?”, 
and “will we abdicate individual learning in favor of computer 
data and algorithms?” The changes and the upheaval will be as 
important as those that accompanied the Industrial Revolution, 
and may well take as long. Who knows?
2.2.5 People’s experiences and Ideas
In this domain, we want to draw attention to two of the many 
potential changes that are currently observable, but which are 
only indirectly related. 
2.2.5.1 The spectacularization of experience
Radio and television are among the earlier precursors of the 
full information technology. People did not have to be literate 
to peruse them, and their visual nature greatly enhanced their 
impact. Together, they hugely enhanced people’s capacity 
to escape from everyday existence and live, albeit for a short 
moment, in a fantasy world. Guy Debord (1994) pointed to the 
fact that these media promoted the confounding of sincerity 
with authenticity and of emotion with emotional images. 
As the tele-amusement industry developed, it habituated 
more and more people to live, at least in part, in a fantasy world. 
Over the past half century or so, this led to a fuzzing of the 
boundaries between fantasy and reality. In the 24 hour news 
cycle, this is achieved by presenting news in a simplified ‘bite-
size’ form. Most websites follow the same pattern, leaving it up 
to the user to digest the full message or only a highly simplified 
version, leaving much to the viewer’s fantasy.
The computer games industry is a direct continuation of this 
trend, but here the opportunity to escape into a fantasy world is 
no longer centrally controlled. In the process, many dimensions 
of reality have been removed. That has created a field of tension 
between people’s experience and the real world, which in our 
opinion is, and will continue to be, of great impact on people’s 
ideas and decisions.
2.2.5.2 Changes in society’s ‘value space’ 
In the relationship between observations, information and 
knowledge/understanding, values play an essential role. They 
distinguish between signal and noise, and align a society’s 
members around certain information and resource flows, 
enabling them to communicate, collaborate and differ of 
opinion within a set of – often implicit – values. We call the 
society’s ‘value space’ the total set of dimensions according to 
which a society attributes value to ideas, actions, institutions, 
material goods, etc. 
Individual value differences are the result of the fact that 
people acquire their individual cognitive system (‘world view’) 
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Figure 2.12. Evolution in return on invested capital in the US 1965-2011. The 
blue line represents the evolution of Return on Assets; the green line that of 
Return on Investment. After: Hagel et al. (2010). 
Figure 2.13. Annual new firm creations (dark blue line) and existing firm 
deaths (light blue line). After: Hathaway and Litan (2014).
in different socio-environmental networks. Sharing a value 
space means that people’s conceptions are sufficiently close to 
facilitate frequent constructive interaction. Within it, value 
differences allow individuals to create an identity and drive the 
information exchanges that are responsible for societal (and 
socio-environmental) change. Partaking in these information 
exchanges requires knowledge of the society’s ‘tools for thought 
and action’ (language, customs, institutions and belief systems). 
When a society is growing, it includes more and more people, 
knowledge and resources.  That involves the construction 
of a set of utility functions, which initially will be relatively 
adaptable, but over time experience and complexity will 
expand and harden. A few terms come to dominate, leading 
to simplification and loss of dimensionality. Eventually the 
functions become brittle and can no longer adequately deal with 
change. The limits of the value space are reached. That generally 
results in an important increase in unintended consequences of 
actions, and in a reduction of the society’s ability to implement 
new inventions. Is our current society at that point?
2.2.6 Natural resources
Due to the way in which the research into sustainability-related 
issues has developed, investigating natural resources and their 
relationship with society from the outside inward (for instance, 
having climate change, deforestation or carbon emissions as 
the starting point), the domains that fall under this heading 
have been extensively explored. As this section specifically 
aims to develop an inside-out perspective that puts the societal 
dynamics at the core and sees their impact on the environment 
as secondary, we will not contribute much to these domains, 
but only briefly (‘pro forma’) point to some of them. We use 
the energy and food sectors as examples. Both will be discussed 
more extensively in Section 2.3 as well as in later chapters.
2.2.6.1 Energy
Clearly, this topic has been looked at from all angles and 
disciplines, and there is very little to be added. Basically, the 
societal dynamics that are driving our societies have increased 
energy consumption from approximately 20 gigajoules (GJ) per 
capita per year at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution 
to approximately 80 GJ per capita per year now (Figure 2.14). 
Clearly this is very unevenly divided between the developed 
and the developing world. In the US, in 2013, average per capita 
consumption in the order of 290 GJ equivalent per year, while 
in India it was only about 25 GJ. Most of that serves in building, 
maintaining and running our material and institutional 
infrastructure.  A growing need for energy is fundamental to 
the way in which the world is currently moving, and energy 
consumption, for political and economic as well as societal 
reasons, is not likely to decrease in the foreseeable future. 
Reduction of its climate impact is therefore essential.  
As the sustainability conundrum has not been tackled at its 
societal root but mostly from the environmental perspective, 
core societal and social dynamics affecting the role of energy 
indirectly in the sustainability transition have thus far suffered 
from a lack of investment and attention.
Without tackling the societal causes of that development, we 
will not attain a sustainable development for human societies 
on this planet!
2.2.6.2 Food (in-) security
We are facing a potential crisis in the provision of water and 
food for the world population that could very easily trigger 
major conflicts as a result of climate change, for example in 
Africa where the major powers are currently buying up land 
suitable for cultivation. Recent increases in food prices due 
to speculation are early warning signs that food security 
is becoming a worldwide concern. Figure 2.15 shows how, 
worldwide, food prices came under pressure because of one 
political act (stimulus of vegetal ethanol production) in one 
of the countries that exports a very large quantity of food (the 
US). It immediately led to food riots in Mexico! That tension is 
likely to grow further with the increase in global population and 
the demand of more and more non-vegetal foods. Currently 
we see that traditionally food exporting countries are beginning 
to import substantive quantities of food. The topic is of major 
concern, both scientifically and politically.
2.2.7 Conclusion: non-linear interactions
We have highlighted a selection of domains in societal dynamics 
where there are substantive chances for quantum non-linear 
change. The selection is of course arbitrary. We could have taken 
different themes and looked at them from different perspectives. 
They all concern the current or near-future state of long-term 
trends that are the cumulative result of earlier events and 
processes. But underlying, long-term path-dependent second-
order dynamics are the drivers behind the trends involved.
These are very deeply embedded in our societal structures, 
have many feedback and anticipation loops among themselves 
and will prove extremely difficult to change. Almost all of them 
individually have potential “tipping points” in their trajectories 
– non-linear change points that are due to the unanticipated 
consequences of earlier dynamics. 
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Figure 2.14. Evolution of per capita energy consumption since the Industrial 
Revolution. Source: Tverberg, Our finite World, licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0.
But that is not all. As mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter, the real danger for our societies is that a collision between 
several such non-linear tipping points will generate colossal 
disruptions, leading to a period of global chaos in all areas of 
human activity. Accelerated by rapid technological change, such 
as the ICT revolution, this may well occur on much shorter 
timescales than the occurrence of eventual natural (climate-
related) tipping points. It is against this backdrop that the models 
in later chapters of this paper need to be viewed.
This requires us to fundamentally change our perspective 
in order to understand and deal with the societal and socio-
environmental dynamics involved. We need to view them 
in their full complexity. Our introduction of a long-term 
perspective shows that history matters – and that it is shaped 
by human decisions and events. At any time in the past (and the 
present), there were options among the directions that system 
dynamics could take. Some of these were adopted, others were 
not. Which trajectories were instantiated depended on a highly 
complex, multidimensional set of interactions between both 
societal and natural dynamics operating at different spatial 
and temporal scales (from the millennial to the instantaneous). 
Such interactions created, for different domains and different 
societies, path-dependent evolutions, in which the options the 
system adopted at any point co-determined later outcomes. The 
present-day manifestations of these path-dependent evolutions 
are the different cultures, technologies, institutions and values 
that we observe on the planet. One conclusion of this section is 
therefore that there are no ‘planetary’ solutions to the current 
sustainability conundrum – different societies will have to 
develop different ways forward. There is no universal 2030 or 
2050 tool box that fits all!
The different dynamics involved can for long periods remain 
unobserved, then suddenly lead to unanticipated interactions 
among each other that rapidly change the structure of a system 
(‘tipping points’). It seems to us that we are currently in an 
epoch where this is happening at a global scale, so that we are 
faced with a situation in which approaches that seemed thus 
far to enable us to understand and manage the various regional 
and local systems are no longer able to do so. We can no longer 
manage dynamics that, using our traditional perspective, are 
unmanageable. We can no longer hope to steer everything. 
Unanticipated consequences of earlier systemic actions are 
creating entirely novel, uncontrollable syndromes.  In the face of 
these, the best we can do is to identify guardrails and to try and 
leverage dynamics so that they stay within bounds compatible 
with them. We have to move from designing for control of system 
dynamics to designing for change in these dynamics!
To do so, we have to open up our complete sets of societal 
norms, practices and values, all levels of our societal institutions, 
to fundamental change. It is not only a question of our systems 
of societal and social-environmental governance, but also of 
our collective and individual ‘truths’, the nature of our social 
interactions, and (in short) everything we hold dear about our 
current way of life. Many, if not all, among us will in one way or 
another resist that, and it will therefore be difficult to consciously 
achieve at a societal scale. But as we can observe already in 
many instances in the last decade or so, the emerging changes 
wrought by the information revolution will, willy-nilly, force 
us to adopt novel values, norms and behaviors. That process 
is driven bottom-up, as people adapt to the new technologies 
involved. It cannot be driven towards a particular set of goals 
or values. Rather than attempt to do that, we will (have to) adapt 
our values and goals to the uncontrolled and uncontrollable 
dynamics involved! Although that may seem very challenging, 
our long-term perspective points to the fact that humans have 
done exactly that under a range of different circumstances in 
the past. It is one of the characteristics of human beings that has 
enabled them to become the dominant species on Earth. But 
generally, they have not really done so until they were in a ‘force 
majeure’ situation.
2.3 Turning the tide 
In Section 2.2 we have introduced a number of long-term 
trends in current global societal dynamics, and how they might 
be impacted and accelerated by the current ICT revolution. 
We have concluded that the real danger is in the non-linear 
interactions between a number of these dynamics. We have 
then reasoned that any attempts to deal with these different 
dynamics individually will be insufficient in view of the intimate 
embeddedness of the various dynamics that are acting upon our 
societies and their environments. Instead, we argue for a holistic 
approach to the sustainability conundrum and to the SDGs that 
emphasizes the many different dynamic relationships between 
dynamics that are usually considered singly or in pairs. Now we 
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Figure 2.15. Food prices have recently spiked as a result of speculation and ethanol production to partly replace fossil fuel. Source: FAO (2017).
need to turn our attention to what can, and should, be done to 
inflect current trends. 
The challenges that we have presented so far prompt choices 
from among the following:
1) Trying to stop the current trends by attacking the roots 
of much Western “progress-related” thinking and the 
market-based system that it has generated, including 
the idea that technology will continue to progress in the 
direction it has taken in information technology, genetics 
and related fields. 
2) Admitting that a de-growth scenario is at least for the 
moment impossible, and instead trying to mitigate the 
consequences or our current dynamics. That is what the 
carbon dioxide (CO2) mitigation efforts are all about, and 
raises the question whether we could extend the same 
approach to other domains and what that would take, 
scientifically, politically and economically?
3) Try and reduce the vulnerability of different subsets of the 
overall societal dynamics by taking structural measures 
that constrain their envisioned negative consequences. 
One could describe that as placing guardrails along 
the trajectories of these dynamics, while searching for 
pathways to reach the SDGs (combining forward-looking 
and backcasting).
4) Move towards one or more scenarios that are rooted in 
an alternative, more stable and more sustainable vision of 
the future by trying to fundamentally change the mindsets 
that drive the current dynamic, and re-build our global 
societal systems based on such novel mindsets, values, 
goals and institutions.
Option 1) is difficult to achieve in view of the trends we have 
already set in motion. We are currently seeing, globally, in the 
Earth system community a distinct move towards option 2), 
supporting political efforts such as the protection of the oceans 
and the arctic, as well as civic initiatives such as that of the 
Transition Towns movement. That effort should evidently be 
continued, but it seems to be insufficient from the perspective of 
the societal dynamics that are driving us currently. The TWI2050 
initiative is committed to achieving option 4) by backcasting 
from the TWI2050 normative goal rooted in the aspirations 
of the SDGs. The approaches to deliver option 4) are however 
still being developed and that is why we think for the time 
being investing simultaneously in options 3) and 4) is the most 
suitable way forward. 
2.3.1 Selecting domains of action
In view of the complexity and breadth of the changes occurring, 
and those to be expected, any exploration of pathways to the 
SDGs must consider that the full complexity of social-environ-
mental interactions discussed in the last section – from the basic 
values and world view of individual societies and cultures, to 
their ways of interacting, their institutions, their governance, 
natural resources use and so forth – will play out and impact on 
every aspect of present and future societies.
In order to move ahead, because we are not able to, at least for 
the moment, deal with the full complexity of the total systems 
involved, we have decided to focus on six exemplary domains 
that capture a large proportion of the current global, regional, 
and local dynamics that drive us away from sustainability, and 
which must thus undergo major transformations to redirect the 
global system towards sustainability: 
• Human capacity and demography
• Decarbonization and energy
• Food, biosphere and water
• Smart cities
• Consumption and production
• Digital revolution
We have selected them because they are the domains that, 
together, to a large extent drive the overall current dynamic of 
our planet and the societies on it in an unsustainable direction. 
Hence, they need urgently to be tackled at every level of our 
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Figure 2.16. Six major transformations. Six domains that urgently need a change in direction. Source: TWI2050. 
societies, from the global to the local, and for which we believe 
the tools to do so are available or will be available in the near 
future. We argue that transformations in these domains are 
both necessary and potentially sufficient to come close to 
achieving the SDGs by 2030 and to 2050 and beyond. But 
each transformation will require Herculean governance efforts 
and imply deep societal, cultural, and normative dynamics of 
change that we analyze in Chapter 4. 
We emphasize that these domains are intended to be neither 
a new clustering of the 17 SDGs nor a “reduced form” of 
the SDGs and their 169 targets, but rather serve to describe 
systemic and integrative changes that are related to all SDGs 
as illustrated in Figure 2.16. Each of these domains relate to a 
large number of SDGs and can boost them holistically, focusing 
on their synergies. They should be seen and studied as domains 
on which the processes outlined in Section 2.2 are impacting to 
a greater or lesser extent, and in which major transformations 
must occur if we are to deal with the sustainability conundrum 
and realize the SDGs.  
They are central to the six SDGs reviewed at the 2018 HLPF 
(SDGs 6, 7, 11, 12, and 15 as well as progress on 17). Arguably, 
they are not merely interlinked and interdependent with all 
SDGs, but they are at the center of any great transformation 
toward sustainability, and thus fundamental in “turning the 
tide”.
2.3.2 How do these six domains cohere into a 
people-centered, holistic perspective?
Foremost, the six exemplary transformations give a people-
centered perspective: building local, national and global societies 
and economies which secure wealth creation, poverty reduction, 
fair distribution and inclusiveness are necessary for human 
prosperity in any society and any region of the world. While these 
objectives may be pursued differently in different contexts some 
domains of action which appear to be of universal nature in this 
regards include: (i) institutions to enable and improve human 
capacities and capabilities, demography that includes secondary 
and not just primary education, adequate access to health care, 
fair labor markets, universal rule of law and means for managing 
aging societies; (ii) essential and strategic infrastructures of 
any local, national, global economy and society, such as: (a) 
energy; (b) food systems; (c) cities, settlements and mobility 
systems; (iii) production and consumption systems where deep 
transformations need to take place in order to create wealth and 
ensure good life and work, aiming at leaving no one behind and 
(iv) science, technologies and innovation (STI) that are essential 
for further progress toward achieving SDGs. This is a paradox, 
as STI has, in the past, created many negative externalities like 
transgression of planetary boundaries, but it is also indispensable 
for the transformation toward sustainability. STI drives one of 
the most fundamental disruptive changes in human history – 
the digital revolution which puts comprehensive AI at the center. 
A major challenge will be how to use the transformative nature 
of digitalization to create wealthy and inclusive economies and 
societies.
2.3.3 The current state of the six domains 
Our first task, then, is to assess the current state of affairs in 
each of the six domains. In the next part of this chapter, we will 
see that either ongoing developments are currently pushing away 
from sustainability, or that our attempts to do something have so 
far been insufficient to turn the tide. In the following Chapters 
3 and 4 we will focus in detail on developing approaches that 
might steer our global systems in the right direction. We expect 
that if they succeed in inverting the current developments 
that will consequently contribute to improve prosperity, social 
inclusion and sustainability in many societies. 
In dealing with these domains and their interactions, we 
have to rely on research from very different disciplines, and, 
as importantly, research that is at very different levels of 
completion. In cases such as that of the energy dynamic, which 
has been subject to thirty years of intensive investigation, 
much more can be said than on the role of oceans, for example. 
But altogether, we believe that what is known about these 
six domains captures much of the dynamic that is currently 
pushing our societies towards an unsustainable future.
2.3.4 Human capacity and demography
Any global effort to achieve sustainability of our planetary 
systems, and in particular trying to reach the SDGs is closely 
related to the development of the global human potential – 
which we understand as the product of human capacities and 
human capabilities - in the next decades.  By global human 
potential we thus understand the integrated dynamic of human 
biological and social factors that determines the resilience and 
potential for change of our societies. These are impacted by a wide 
range of factors, including human physical wellbeing, education 
and appropriate social organization, as well as environmental, 
economic, technological, material and other factors. They are also 
very different depending on local geographies, histories, and 
cultures. We will focus our analysis on the physical, biological 
and educational basis of human wellbeing. At the basis are, of 
course, the dimensions that determine the size and health of the 
population, and the level of education that it has.
2.3.4.1 Human demography 
In 2018 the population of the world is growing at an average 
annual rate of 1.1%. This rate has been declining since 1965-
1970, when it peaked at around 2.1%. The fact that world 
population growth is on the decline can be explained by the 
Demographic Transition Theory (Notestein, 1945). Eventually, 
according to this theory, all societies evolve from a pre-
transition situation (stage 1) where fertility and mortality are 
unchecked and high, thus producing low population growth, 
to a stationary population (stage 4) when a society reaches 
low levels of fertility and mortality. This pattern is quite well 
established and exceptions have so far been of a temporary 
nature. 
The main variability involved is the pace of fertility and 
mortality decline between stage 1 and stage 4. In most 
52
The Challenge Ahead2
industrialized countries, where the transition was slow and 
happened over many decades, population growth was not 
dramatic. But in countries that started their demographic 
transition in the second half of the 20th century after many 
health-promoting advances had been made, mortality rates 
dropped relatively abruptly while fertility was kept high, leading 
to rapid population increase. 
There are two major and important uncertainties involved. 
First, while it is very likely that the fertility will go down, it is 
difficult to know how long that will take and that makes a big 
difference. Whether for instance sub-Saharan Africa reaches 
replacement fertility in 2065 (the low-fertility variant of the 
UNDESA (2017)) or in 2100 (the medium variant), makes a 
difference of about 50 million in 2030, 210 million in 2050, and 
1,200 million in 2100. 
The second uncertainty concerns the number of children the 
population would have. This adds a further stage (stage 5) to the 
theory of Notestein, in which fertility is so low that generations 
do not replace themselves and the population starts declining 
(Lesthaeghe, 2014). Most industrialized countries seem to be 
on this path. For instance, in many Eastern Europe countries 
and in Japan, women have fewer than 1.5 children on average 
and fertility does not seem to recover to replacement level (e.g., 
Bosnia Herzegovina or Hungary). 
Whether all countries currently going through the 
demographic transition will also experience this decline will 
be key to the future number of people on the planet. Some 
researchers contend that due to the arrival of contraception the 
fertility of women will be more and more determined by their 
individual preferences, following culturally anchored norms. 
We will need a few more decades to see whether some societies 
are trapped in such low-fertility situations (Lutz et al., 2006). 
But it is worth noting that when fertility decision processes 
become more and more individualized, providing financial and 
structural benefits to support childbirth is rarely crowned with 
success (see South Korea, and China) (Frejka et al., 2010). 
However, although the uncertainties about the pace and the 
nadir of fertility seem to point to a world population that will 
eventually peak and diminish, this is not guaranteed. Moreover, 
the 21st century will witness continued population increase, 
concentrated spatially in the poorest socioeconomic settings. 
2.3.4.2 Population health 
Global statistics show that we are healthier and live longer 
than ever before. This substantial progress results from major 
advancements in public health and health care (e.g., health 
systems), including improved hygiene practices, health 
education, legislative changes, and technological developments, 
such as vaccination. Many recent health gains resulted from 
exploitation of natural resources, particularly for food and 
energy provision. Advancements in human health were critical 
for the human “great escape” out of poverty over the past 250 
years (Deaton, 2013) as Figure 2.17 shows, leading to today’s 
unprecedented levels of high global life expectancy and 
increasing survival of children under five years. 
Despite significant overall progress, substantial improvements 
are still needed. Massive health inequalities continue to exist, 
and in some cases are widening, within and between countries. 
For example, average life expectancy varies between 50 years in 
Sierra Leone to 84 years in Japan, and children are 14 times more 
likely to die before the age of five in sub-Saharan Africa than in 
the rest of the world (UNICEF and WHO, 2017). Further, in 
recent years, life expectancy appears to be declining in the US 
(CDC, 2018) and the UK (Office for National Statistics, 2017). 
Figure 2.18 shows how the burden of disease measured in 
disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) for men and women 
changed from 1990 to 2006 to 2016 (Gakidou et al., 2017).
Environmental, social, and political transformations can 
affect health directly and indirectly. We focus on critical 
dynamic trends already detrimentally affecting the health of 
specific populations: global aging, maternal and child health 
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Figure 2.17. Major advancements for human health 1740 – today. Source: Provided by courtesy of Pauline Scheelbeek.
The Challenge Ahead 2
improvements, emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases, 
the growing prevalence of non-communicable diseases, and 
urbanization. Several of the trends and health outcomes 
described are linked to global sustainability and could be 
negatively affected by climatic changes (Ebi et al., 2018). If not 
adequately addressed, these challenges will influence future 
health trajectories. Health is a cross-cutting issue throughout 
the SDGs, as changes in health impact the trajectories of other 
SDGs (and vice-versa).
Global aging
A key health challenge that countries around the world are 
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Figure 2.18. Leading 30 risk factors by attributable DALYs at the global level. Years 1990, 2006, and 2016 for males (A) and females (B). Risks are connected by lines 
between time periods. Behavioral risk factors are shown in red, environmental risk factors in blue, and metabolic risk in green. Source: Licensed under CC BY 4.0 
by Gakidou et al. (2017).
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beginning to and will continue to confront is population aging. 
As global fertility rates continue to decline and life expectancies 
lengthen, the median age is increasing throughout the world, 
although some countries, particularly those in East Asia and 
Europe, will be disproportionately affected (Lutz et al., 2017). 
Aging populations, particularly an increase in those over 75 
years of age, will create sizable challenges for health systems due 
to greater burdens associated with non-communicable diseases 
and providing more frequent and expensive treatments for an 
older population, leading to increased overall health expenditure 
(WHO, 2015b). Although the retirement age is increasing in 
many parts of the world, people over 75 years of age are less likely 
to work, and could impose an economic burden on families and 
society (Bloom et al., 2015). Governments will have to grapple 
with how to address rising health care costs while continuing to 
fund other needed services. 
Figure 2.19 shows the contribution of population growth and 
aging to the percent change in deaths and DALYs at the global 
level, 2006-2016. 
Maternal, newborn, child, and adolescent health
Achieving a healthy world depends on improving the health 
of women, children, and adolescents. Investing in early 
childhood development is one of the best investments in 
boosting economic growth, promoting sustainable societies, 
and eliminating extreme poverty and inequality. Transforming 
maternal and child health will require efforts in the coming 
decades to increase education of women, address threats to the 
quality and quantity of our food and water, improve the quality 
and coverage of health systems, and promote nurturing care.
Maternal mortality (deaths due to complications from 
pregnancy or childbirth) fell by 44% between 1990 and 2015 
(WHO, 2015b). However, this is less than what is needed to 
achieve the maternal mortality target for SDG 5 (Good Health 
and Wellbeing). Almost all maternal deaths are preventable. The 
lifetime risk of maternal death in high-income countries is 1 to 
3,300 compared with 1 to 41 in low-income countries.
While significant progress in reducing childhood mortality 
has occurred over the past two decades, much remains to be 
done. In 2016, 5.6 million children under the age of 5 years died 
(excluding newborns within their first year of life), roughly 
15,000 deaths per day (UNICEF et al., 2017b). Yet, other 
information confirms that most of these deaths were in the first 
year of life. More than half of under-5 childhood deaths were 
due to diseases that are preventable and treatable. 
During the past few decades, the world has taken significant 
steps towards improving child nutrition, with child stunting 
prevalence nearly halving from 39.5% in 1990 to 22.9% in 2016 
(UNICEF et al., 2017a). Despite this progress, key challenges 
remain. In 2011, 1 in 3 people worldwide were affected by some 
form of malnutrition (including undernutrition, over nutrition 
and micronutrient deficiencies), 50 million children suffered 
from acute undernutrition (wasting) and 3 million children died 
from hunger (Horton and Lo, 2013). All aspects of food security 
will potentially be affected by climate change, including food 
access, utilization, food quality, and price stability, challenging 
continued progress on reducing undernutrition (Porter et al., 
2014).
Most childhood diarrheal disease results from inadequate 
access to safe water and improved sanitation. It is estimated that 
1.2 billion people gained access to piped water supply between 
2000 and 2015 (UNICEF and WHO, 2017). There are still 
around 2.3 billion people who do not use improved sanitation 
and 844 million who do not have access to improved water 
sources, concentrated among rural populations with fewer 
resources and among fragile states (UNICEF and WHO, 2017). 
Moreover, in low-income countries, almost 90% of sewage is 
discharged without any treatment and some countries also 
continue to release wastewater to the environment without 
sufficient treatment (Baum et al., 2013). These practices increase 
the risk of childhood diarrheal disease. 
Emerging and re-emerging vector-borne, zoonotic, and 
other infectious diseases
The radical transition in the contribution of infectious diseases 
to population health is one of the hallmarks of the 21st century. 
The global burden of infectious diseases has likely never been 
lower (Figure 2.20), and progress indicators across a range of 
key infectious disease categories continue to climb (Figure 2.21).
Despite these positive trends, infectious diseases continue to 
present a serious global health threat. For example, more than 1 
billion cases and around 1 million deaths occur annually from 
vector-borne diseases alone (Campbell-Lendrum et al., 2015; 
Kilpatrick and Randolph, 2012), and the incidence, impacts or 
geographic range of several high impact diseases have increased 
globally (e.g., dengue, zika) (Stanaway et al., 2016). Additionally, 
the rate of novel disease emergence has grown (Fisher et al., 
2012; Jones et al., 2008). Many of these increases in risk have 
been linked to a range of large-scale and rapid environmental 
and socio-demographic changes that have occurred in recent 
decades. These include climate change, land-use change such as 
deforestation and agricultural expansion, social and development 
trends including increasing international travel and trade, and 
widespread use of antimicrobials (Semenza et al., 2016). 
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Figure 2.19. Percent change in deaths and DALYs at the global level. From 
2006-2016, due to population growth, population aging, trends in exposures 
to all risks included in the 2016 Global Burden of Disease study, and all other 
factor. Source: Licensed under CC BY 4.0 by Gakidou et al. (2017).
Climatic changes have affected some infectious disease vectors 
or reservoirs, and in some cases have contributed to a rise or 
redistribution of infectious disease risks. The dramatic rise in 
dengue cases in the past few decades, for example, may be at 
least partially linked to improved environmental conditions for 
disease transmission or to increases in the geographic range of 
vector populations (Watts et al. 2017). Given that warming of 
nearly 1.5°C above preindustrial temperatures is projected to 
occur by about 2030-2040, increases in the burden of climate-
sensitive health outcomes are very likely, with the magnitude and 
relative burdens dependent on the extent to which proactive and 
effective adaptation policies and measures are implemented (Ebi 
et al., 2018). In other cases, climatic changes are likely to have 
reduced disease risks as conditions suitable for transmission, 
vectors, or reservoir hosts are pushed beyond their climatic 
optima (Escobar et al., 2016). Determining the balance and 
geographic distribution of increases versus decreases in disease 
risk attributable to recent and projected climatic changes is an 
important scientific challenge for the Anthropocene. 
Major environmental and social pressures and challenges 
embedded in the SDGs could also directly or indirectly influence 
infectious disease risks. Ongoing changes to food production 
systems, including intensification and pest control, are 
contributing to antimicrobial resistant strains of pathogens that 
are poised to reverse a long period of gains in intensive disease 
control (Holmes et al., 2016). Urbanization, while typically 
associated with improved health outcomes, can contribute to 
rises in some infectious disease risks (Tian et al., 2018). Land-
use change for agricultural and socioeconomic development 
(including urbanization and road networks) will continue 
to drive contact between disease hosts/vectors and humans, 
resulting in yet further opportunities for disease emergence and 
spread (Murray et al., 2016; Jones et al., 2013). However, such 
trends could be partially offset, as vectors and hosts themselves 
become casualties from habitat loss or fragmentation (Cable et 
al., 2017).  
Moreover, increa sing globalization – in both passenger 
travel and international trade – has increased the likelihood of 
country-to-country spread of infectious diseases. At best, these 
processes will produce repeated disease introductions, sustain 
or promote transmission of endemic infections, and catalyze 
limited, albeit unpredictable, epidemics (e.g., 2014 Ebola 
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outbreak). At worst, they could help facilitate a global pandemic 
(Morse et al., 2012). 
Increasing prevalence of non-communicable diseases
Non-communicable diseases (NCDs) include an array of 
serious health conditions, including cardiovascular diseases, 
cancers, diabetes, and chronic lung diseases. In 2015, 70% 
of deaths worldwide were due to NCDs, including 45% from 
cardiovascular diseases, and 22% from cancers. Over three-
quarters of NCD mortality occurred in low- and middle-
income countries, with about 48% occurring before the age of 
70 (WHO, 2015b). This results in a ‘double-burden’ of disease, 
with high rates of communicable and NCDs in lower income 
countries. Major risk factors for NCDs include the environment 
(e.g., air pollution, Landrigan et al 2018), older age, unhealthy 
behaviors (e.g., poor diets, tobacco use, alcohol consumption 
and lack of physical activity), and metabolic factors (e.g., high 
blood pressure, obesity, and high blood glucose), often also 
related to diets. 
Despite the world producing enough food from a caloric 
intake perspective, the food system is failing to deliver nutritious 
and healthy diets to all. Global diets are rapidly shifting towards 
processed and animal-source foods. Dietary factors now account 
for eight of the top twelve leading causes of death globally. 
Consumption of animal- source foods is increasing, which, 
combined with excess food consumption, is resulting in greater 
natural resource use than is needed for healthy, balanced diets 
(Aleksandrowicz et al., 2016; Green et al., 2015). The number of 
overweight/obese people in low- and middle-income countries 
more than tripled between 1980 and 2008: from 250 million to 
904 million (Keats and Wiggins, 2017).  
Urbanization
Population growth in recent decades has been concentrated 
in cities, with more than half of the world’s population now 
living in urban areas (UNDESA, 2018). On average, urban 
environments may provide net benefits for health and wealth 
(an ‘urban advantage’) because of factors such as improved 
access to services (including health care, employment and 
education), better sanitation, and lower levels of malnutrition. 
However, rapid urban development has also resulted in a wide 
range of social and environmental problems. In some regions, 
most notably sub-Saharan Africa, urbanization has not been 
accompanied by significant economic development, with 
negative effects on health. Health outcomes in areas of urban 
disadvantage, particularly in urban slums, may be much worse 
than in other urban areas (Ezeh et al., 2017). Moreover, heat 
islands (areas of higher temperature associated with the built 
environment) are associated with adverse health outcomes. 
Greater urban sprawl may exacerbate these effects (Stone 
et al., 2010), although effective planning and urban design 
that emphasizes green spaces can mitigate these challenges 
(Kleerekoper et al., 2012). 
2 This section is largely based on the entry of Goujon, A. V. 2018. Human Population Growth. In: Fath, B. (ed.) Encyclopedia of Ecoloogy. 2nd ed.: Elsevier.
Summary and conclusion
The status of population health and health systems in 2050 will 
depend on the interactions in the intervening decades among 
the trends discussed in this and other sections. Focusing only 
on health trends without considering trends in agriculture, 
demographics, land use, freshwater quality and availability, 
technology development, and other factors would provide a 
misleading picture of what is needed in order to improve health 
over coming decades. Understanding the implications of the 
interactions and magnitudes of these trends for health requires 
systems-based projections. Effective, proactive policies and 
measures, and increased investment in research, development, 
and implementation could lead to continuing improvements in 
health.
2.3.4.3 The education challenge2
Which means exist to influence the size of the human population? 
Scientific findings tend to demonstrate that formal education 
has a role to play in influencing both fertility and mortality 
patterns (Goujon, 2003). Formal education has an important 
impact both on the fertility of women and on the mortality of 
children born to those women (Jejeebhoy, 1995). Girls who go 
to school are exposed to the environment and society outside 
their own household and their neighborhood, breaking their 
isolation. There is thus a large difference (up to two children on 
average in Kenya and in the Dominican Republic) between the 
number of children born to a woman who has been to primary 
school (even if she has not completed all grades) and a woman 
who has never been to school. If girls stay in school, they will 
delay marriage and hence the onset of fertility. Furthermore, 
having an education increases the chance of finding employment 
outside of the house and therefore increases the opportunity 
cost of having children.
Moreover, the more education a woman has the more likely 
she is to use modern contraceptives, and space the birth of her 
children. By increasing her autonomy, education will increase 
her say in household (including fertility) decisions. Education is 
one of the most influential factors causing fertility to no longer be 
a given, but within the calculus of choice of couples, particularly 
women. Figure 2.22 shows the difference in the number of 
children of women with studies beyond upper-secondary, and 
those born to women who have never been to school (or less 
than a year). Differences are larger in sub-Saharan Africa and 
can exceed four children as in Angola (a five-child difference), 
Mozambique and Democratic Republic of Congo. 
While levels of educational attainment influence the 
demographic behavior of people, population increase has 
also been detrimental to education expansion in many parts 
of the world. First of all, as a result of population growth, the 
population of children of schooling age has increased, but not 
everywhere, as can be seen from Figure 2.23.
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In more developed countries the population of schooling 
age, whether at the level of compulsory schooling (usually 
completion of lower secondary education) or post-secondary 
schooling, has been diminishing or stagnating in the most recent 
decade. However, in the LDCs, the population of compulsory 
schooling age has increased dramatically, more than five times 
since 1950. 
2.3.5 Consumption and production
2.3.5.1 We are running out of natural resources
One major challenge associated with moving toward 
sustainability in production and consumption activities is 
the high and rapidly growing use of natural resources (e.g., 
materials, energy or land) required in the process. Without 
dealing with this issue, sustainability cannot be attained, and 
neither can the relevant SDGs. The focus in this section is on 
other materials (raw materials, their transformations into 
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intermediate and final products, as well as wastes, emissions and 
recycled materials), but energy and water are also considered 
from their resource efficiency dimension, whereas land is dealt 
with in more detail in other sections.  Methods to trace these 
processes include material flow analysis (MFA) developed in 
Ecological Economics, Industrial Ecology and Social Ecology 
(Krausmann et al., 2017a; Haberl et al., 2016; Pauliuk and 
Hertwich, 2015; Fischer‐Kowalski et al., 2011; Ayres and 
Simonis, 1994). High use of physical resources is associated 
with depletion of non-renewable resources, over-stretching of 
natural systems to generate renewable resources (e.g., biomass/
land use), pollution, area demand (e.g., of infrastructures) and 
many other potential unsustainable systemic effects discussed 
below.
There exist many strategies to tackle the problem of natural 
resources by raising the efficiency with which materials are used, 
a strategy often called “eco-efficiency”, “material efficiency” 
or “decoupling of physical and monetary growth” (Fischer-
Kowalski et al., 2011; Steinberger and Krausmann, 2011). 
Essentially these efforts aim to raise the output of services and 
products while reducing the volume of raw materials required, 
and hence the adverse sustainability impacts of rising raw 
material use. This would require more efficient production 
systems (agriculture, industry, etc.), but also more efficient 
systems to convert physical products (e.g., final energy) into 
the required services (e.g., comfortable living spaces) and might 
even reconcile GDP growth with reduced resource use and 
environmental impacts. 
However, even though material efficiency has generally been 
increasing over the last century, and in particular the last few 
decades, the extraction and use of raw materials is growing 
unabatedly, although now at a lower rate than GDP. This is a 
phenomenon called “relative decoupling” (Steinberger et al., 
2013; Worrel et al., 2016). Many scholars today lean towards 
believing that eco-efficiency, although it has its undoubted 
benefits, will not be sufficient to “bend the curve” – in other 
words, the “gospel of eco-efficiency” may be good, but most likely 
not good enough (Martinez-Alier, 2003).
2.3.5.2 Developing a new approach to resource 
use measurement 
Huge efforts have been expended to quantify and analyze 
material flows and their relation to GDP, technology 
development and other important drivers. This is rendered 
difficult by the fact that a substantial part of these resource flows 
serves to build up socioeconomic material stocks (often called 
“in-use material stocks”) such as buildings, infrastructures, 
production capacities, machinery, etc. Indeed, the share of all 
material inputs (including food, fossil fuels, etc.) humanity puts 
in such in-use material stocks has increased from around 20% 
in 1900 to over 50% today (Krausmann et al., 2017b). 
Including stocks into the picture is hugely important for a 
host of reasons, for example: 1) stocks transform resources 
into services. For example, crude oil or electricity does not 
allow one to go from A to B, only when coupled with a suitable 
infrastructure (rails, railway stations, trains, etc. respectively 
refineries, roads and cars) they can provide the service. 2) 
Building up, maintaining and using stocks requires very 
substantial amounts of materials. 3) Stocks create dynamics and 
lock-ins that last long and are difficult to change, e.g., transport 
infrastructures (e.g., railroads vs. highways, heating of buildings, 
transport demand resulting from settlement patterns vs. location 
of workplaces, etc.). 4) Stocks form structures influencing social 
organization, the organization of production and consumption 
activities (including work etc.), mobility of people and goods, 
and thereby shape social institutions, practices and values. 
Moreover, most such stocks result from investment decisions 
that are negotiated in the social, political and economic arena, so 
they are in principle amenable to be changed through strategic 
decisions (Chen and Graedel, 2015; Hertwich et al., 2015; Weisz 
et al., 2015; Pauliuk and Müller, 2014).  
2.3.5.3 But this perspective only sheds a starker 
light 
Including stocks and services in the analysis of the societal 
metabolism, respectively the physical economy, allows us to 
substantially enlarge and strengthen the current strategies 
focused primarily or even exclusively on “decoupling”. It results 
in what has recently been called “stock-flow-service nexus” 
(Haberl et al., 2017; Weisz et al., 2015; Pauliuk and Müller, 2014). 
This approach aims to provide sufficient high-quality services to 
human societies in relevant domains (e.g., food, energy, shelter, 
mobility, communication & data services, etc.) while reducing 
flows of material and energy through better stocks (more 
efficient, based on more sustainable materials, resource-saving 
spatial patterns, etc.). This approach recognizes that indicators 
such as GDP may be as much a problem as a solution (Fleurbaey, 
2009), and therefore maximizing GDP might not be compatible 
with a sustainability transformation (Kallis et al., 2012; Van 
den Bergh and Kallis, 2012). This approach is closely linked 
to discussions on how to achieve a good living for all within 
planetary boundaries (O’Neill et al., 2018; Rao and Min, 2018; 
Brand-Correa and Steinberger, 2017).
Rather than shed a dominantly positive light on current 
dynamics, this approach also demonstrates limitations of useful 
and currently prominent strategies to raise eco-efficiency and 
reduce pressures on resources, for example the circular economy. 
As most resource flows end up in stocks, and much of the 
remainder is used dissipatively, e.g., for food and energy, the 
potential to close material loops or cycles is limited (Haas et 
al., 2015), at least as long as material stocks are growing in 1:1 
unison with GDP, which has been the case over the last century 
(Krausmann et al., 2017b). This results in huge challenges for 
sustainability transformations (Görg et al., 2017). 
2.3.5.4 Efficiency potentials in resource use 
Figure  2 .24 presents global efficiency cascades and improvement 
potentials for energy, water, and using steel as an example for 
materials as well. 
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Within the context of energy, the final demand and subsequent 
conversion to useful energy and energy services have long been 
identified both as the least efficient part of the global energy 
system and as having the largest improvement potentials. 
Second, improvements in end-use efficiency leverage significant 
upstream savings in energy resources. Conversion efficiency 
from primary to useful energy in the global energy system 
is currently around 40% (Figure 2.24, panel a). This means 
that one unit of useful energy conserved through efficiency 
improvements translates into a reduction of 2.5 units of primary 
energy. Nakićenović et al. (1990) extended traditional energy 
efficiency calculations to include energy-service provision. 
The conversion efficiency of total primary energy inputs into 
energy services delivered is conservatively estimated at 14% 
on average for the global energy system in 2020. This means 
that improving energy efficiency at the service level by one unit 
yields a reduction in primary resource requirements by a factor 
of seven.
Lastly, as demonstrated by Riahi et al. (2012), improved end-
use efficiency and lower demands also yield significant upstream 
supply-side benefits, increasing resilience and reliability of supply, 
and allowing more discretionary choice (failure tolerance) among 
often contested supply-side options such as nuclear or carbon 
capture and storage. 
A comparable efficiency cascade for water (Figure 2.24, panel b) 
based on irrigation water embodied in global food production and 
consumption yields a comparable conclusion. While the global 
irrigation water use efficiency of some 40% (Sadras et al., 2011) 
is relatively modest, losses at the end-use part of the food chain 
estimated at 43% efficiency (Lundqvist et al., 2008) are equally high, 
yielding an aggregated embodied water for food systems efficiency 
(from farm to plate) of 17%. These losses in water embodied in 
farm products arise from conversion losses in animal protein 
production, food losses in food retail and distribution and - above 
all - in food waste at end-use consumers, estimated to amount up 
to 30% in industrialized countries by Gustafsson et al. (2011). 
The case of steel (Figure 2.24, panel c) also confirms above 
conclusions: Globally only 47% of all primary iron and steel scrap 
end up as steel in purchased products (Allwood and Cullen, 2012) 
and only 13% of primary material inputs come from re-utilized 
post-use steel scrap (Allwood and Cullen, 2012).3
Any physical loss of resources due to processing, production, or 
consumption waste not only increases the overall environmental 
footprint of consumption it also translates into higher costs. 
Estimates (Ekins et al., 2016) of economic savings across a 
range of natural resources (energy, water, food, materials) are 
substantial estimated to total US$3,704 billion by 2030. Around 
54% (US$1,511 billion) of the itemized specific savings (US$2,812 
billion) accrue at the level of end-users and consumers (Ekins 
et al., 2016). Improving end use and consumption efficiency 
under a “responsible consumption” paradigm thus has not 
just environmental and resource benefits, but also economic 
3 Data for global steel production in 2016, updating (Jonathan Cullen, pers. comm.) Allwood, Cullen et al. (2012).
ones. These are particularly salient for improving the material 
wellbeing of the poor where efficiency and waste minimization 
allow to maximize the social benefits of material wellbeing while 
minimizing costs and resource use.
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Figure 2.24. Panel a (top) Energy conversion cascades in the global energy sys-
tem. Lines show percent of extracted primary energy delivered as final energy, 
useful energy, and services respectively for three end-use sectors (industry, resi-
dential & commercial buildings, transport) and totals for the whole energy sys-
tem in 2020. Energy flows exclude non-energy feedstock uses of energy (labeled 
as N-E). Total energy flows (EJ) are shown at each stage of the energy conversion 
cascade. Service efficiencies are first-order (conservative) estimates based on 
Nakićenović et al. (1990) and Nakićenović et al. (1993). Panel b (middle) Irriga-
tion water embodied in global food: resource efficiency cascade (percent of ori-
ginal irrigation water remaining in respective step of conversion chain). Source: 
First-order estimates based on Lundqvist et al. (2008) and Sadras et al. (2011). 
Panel c (bottom) Materials efficiency shown for the example of steel from pri-
mary raw material inputs (iron ore and steel scrap) to final retail, and recovery 
of post-use steel (scrap). The difference to primary inputs are comprised of ad-
ditions to the material stock in form of buildings and infrastructures but also 
due to material losses, part of which may be recoverable in future. Source: up-
dated with 2016 data (J. Cullen pers. comm.) from Allwood and Cullen (2012); 
Fischer‐Kowalski et al. (2011); Ayres and Simonis (1994). Figure provided by 
courtesy of Arnulf Grubler and Benigna Boza-Kiss. 
2.3.6 Decarbonization and energy
After thirty years of increasingly intensive and wide-ranging 
research and debate, most of us are aware of the fact that since the 
Industrial Revolution global societies’ ability to use fossil energy 
has been a necessary element in the societal, environmental 
and material dynamic that has, over the last 250 years, created 
our modern world. We are completely dependent on using 
huge quantities of non-human energy. Most of the drivers 
behind this dependency are well-known: human settlement 
in not very suitable places such as deserts, the introduction of 
many creature comforts, and increasing dependency on long-
distance transport of basic necessities, to just name a few. Yet 
this dependency is coming to haunt us, as it is responsible for 
greenhouse gas emissions and climate change. We urgently and 
imperatively need to change this dynamic, and a number of ways 
in which we can attempt to do so are emerging, as discussed in 
the following sections.
2.3.6.1 Conceiving an optimal energy system
For a general framing of energy consumption at the meta level, 
the concept of the ‘energy triangle’ is often used, which classifies 
the objectives along three dimensions a) economic viability, b) 
environmental soundness and c) security of energy supply. The 
transformation of these objectives into metrics at various scales 
needs to consider context specific circumstances and implies 
normative judgments. 
One of the first energy model-based assessments at the 
global scale to adopt a normative set of goals was the Global 
Energy Assessment (GEA) (GEA, 2012). The four goals were 
to 1) ensure energy access, 2) reduce air pollution and improve 
human health, 3) avoid dangerous climate change and 4) 
improve energy security. They represent domains in which the 
current system is clearly inadequate.
Based on the findings of GEA, work of the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) on access, work of the International 
Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) on renewable energy 
and other literature the UN Secretary General’s High-Level 
Advisory Group on Energy and Climate Change has identified 
two complementary domains where progress needs to be made: 
•	 The need to provide universal access to modern energy 
services; 
•	 The need to reduce global energy intensity by 40%;
•	 The need to double the share of renewables in final energy 
to 30% also by 2030, was added later. 
The three SDG 7 targets for 2030- provide universal access 
to affordable, reliable and modern energy services; to increase 
substantially the share of renewable energy in the global energy 
mix; and double the global rate of improvement in energy 
efficiency- closely mirror these earlier goals. In the following 
section, we will consider the three SDG targets and the targets 
for climate change mitigation and health to evaluate currents 
trends in the global energy system.
2.3.6.2 The current situation is inadequate
In the past 15 years an additional 600 million people, mostly 
situated in Africa and Asia gained access to electricity, lowering 
the number of people without access to 1.1 billion in 2016 
(IEA, 2017). Due to recent cost decreases, electricity access can 
increasingly be supplied by renewables, in particular by off-grid 
solar, which however is not sufficient alone for constant access. 
Despite the progress in many parts of the world, current trends 
and policies according to the latest IEA (2017) projections will 
still leave about 700 million people unserved by 2030, primarily 
situated in rural areas of sub-Saharan Africa. 
Universal access to clean and modern energy for cooking 
is currently far from attainment as some three billion people 
still rely on traditional non-electric energy sources for cooking 
and heating. While in principle a more rapid scale-up of new 
technologies is feasible, the current rates of new people gaining 
access to clean options are far too low. The lack of access to clean 
fuels and technologies for cooking, and the resulting household 
air pollution are also cause for some four million deaths from 
NCDs including heart disease, stroke and cancer, as well as 
childhood pneumonia (WHO, 2015a). 
In the past years the share of renewables in total final energy 
consumption has been rising gradually to about 20% today, 
whereby most of the dynamics have taken place in power 
provision, with water, solar and wind power contributing 
the most (REN21, 2018), whereas action in the heating and 
transport sectors is lagging behind. Recent growth rates in the 
share of renewables in total final energy consumption average 
around 0.2 percentage points per year (IRENA, 2018). 
Energy efficiency improvement at global level, expressed by 
primary energy intensity, has long been in the order of 1.4% per 
year and recently has seen some significant reductions, stepping 
up to about 2% per year. This additional push was mostly 
achieved by additional efforts in key end-use sectors (buildings 
and industrial facilities), whereas supply-side potentials remain 
largely untapped. But even with this increase, advances are 
insufficient.
The fact that the energy sector currently emits about 32 gigatons 
of carbon dioxide (GtCO2) per year accounts for about 80% of 
total global emissions (Le Quéré et al., 2018). In past years, the 
yearly emission levels have been a race between carbon intensity 
reductions in the energy mix and increasing energy demand 
due to economic and population growth. Due to the stronger 
improvement in carbon intensity reduction caused by progress 
towards the SDG 7 targets in more recent years, emission 
levels that have been steadily increasing thus far could at least 
be stabilized. The IPCC (Pachauri et al., 2014) estimated that 
from 2011 onwards (at 66% likelihood) the remaining carbon 
emission would be 400 GtCO2  for staying below 1.5°C and 
1,000 GtCO2 for staying below 2°C. From this budget however 
already about 280 GtCO2 have been used since then (Le Quéré et 
al., 2018). At current ambition level, i.e., the full implementation 
of the nationally determined contributions, available global 
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carbon budget for 1.5°C with 50-66% probability will already be 
well depleted by 2030 and only 20% of the budget for 2°C would 
be left (UNEP, 2017). Some recent studies (Goodwin et al., 2018; 
Millar et al., 2018; Tokarska and Gillett, 2018) indicate that the 
remaining budget could be slightly higher as less of it would 
have been used in the past. This however does not change the 
implications that much more transformative actions including a 
large-scale phase-out of coal are needed. 
2.3.6.3 Drivers of energy system transformation 
and current trends 
The decisive driver for all activities along the energy value chain 
is the demand for energy services, which has changed quite 
dramatically over the past 150 years or so in terms of magnitude 
and structure, mainly caused by population and income 
increases and the fact that new services became available 
(Grübler et al., 2012). This transition, only made possible 
through technological innovation both in energy supply and end 
use, has been characterized by two major transformations. The 
first of these was the development of the steam engine triggered 
the substitution by coal of traditional energy sources- which 
human development had relied upon thus far – a transformation 
that lasted until the early 1920s, when coal reached its maximal 
share of close to 50% of global primary energy.
During the second energy transformation, primary energy 
demand increased even more rapidly, reaching up to 6% growth 
annually in a period from the late 1940s to the early 1970s. 
This development phase was characterized by two features. The 
first was an increasing diversification of both energy supply 
sources and energy end-use technologies. Perhaps the most 
important innovations were the introduction of electricity as an 
energy carrier which could be easily converted to light, heat, or 
work at the point of end-use, and of the internal combustion 
engine, which revolutionized individual and collective mobility 
through the use of cars, buses, and aircraft (Grübler et al., 2012; 
Nakićenović et al., 1998). The second was a gradual transition 
towards cleaner grid-bound fuels and energy carriers that has 
led to a decrease in the specific emissions of CO2 per unit of 
energy. The current rate of decarbonization is however far too 
low to bring the aims of the Paris Agreement within reach and 
a continuation of past trends is insufficient to bring us on track 
for the achievement of other energy reductions. 
There are however positive signs that give reasons for hope 
that non-linear change could be possible in the future. Today, 
we are probably at the brink of another energy revolution, where 
again technological innovations in combination with regulatory 
and behavioral changes offer the potential for disruptions in the 
future evolution of the global energy system. In particular, we 
want to point to a set of trends here summarized under four 
headings that are likely to substantially transform the future 
shape of the energy system and – if managed well – can positively 
affect the achievement of energy targets and objectives.
2.3.6.4 Technological innovations triggering cost 
dynamics 
While different constraints in the energy system have imposed 
challenges, they have also frequently triggered new innovation. 
The development phase of the energy system in most of the last 
century was characterized by relatively high levels of energy 
security due to abundant supply with fossil fuels paired with 
modest environmental constraints so that energy innovation 
was rather inert. The oil crises in the 1970s raised new awareness 
for security of supply, and in particular concerns about climate 
change added new constraints to the way we transform energy. 
This was the start signal for the search of new, cleaner and more 
decentralized options to transform energy and has led to a strong 
uptake of modern renewables in the energy system, in particular 
in the electricity sector. The market uptake also brought about 
– facilitated by learning by doing and the modular, granular 
nature of many renewables – cost decreases that could not have 
been anticipated some time ago. In particular, the falling cost of 
solar photovoltaic (PV), which today in auctions has reached 
levels of some US$40 per Megawatt hour (MWh) below the 
costs of fossils, has been a tremendous success story. This gives 
hope that energy system transformation and universal access 
can be accomplished at faster rates than observed in the past 
thus far. It will be key to achieve similar successes, both in 
terms of technology and costs development, for energy storage 
technologies and options.
2.3.6.5 Energy sector integration and 
digitalization
Another important trend is that the traditional systems 
boundaries within the energy system and between the energy 
sector and other sectors continually diminish. Striking examples 
are the integration of the electricity sector with the heat and 
transport sectors and the integration of the energy sector as 
a whole with the mobility or digital sectors. This integration 
can bring about several advantages with regards to unlocking 
flexibility options. One key advantage is the enhanced integration 
of variable renewable generation which at the same time offers 
the opportunity to decarbonize the heat and transport sectors 
through increased electrification. The integration across sectors 
also goes along with enhanced competition between (formerly) 
different types of players seeking to provide consumers with 
energy services and leading to new innovations. For instance, 
mobility companies develop new energy storage concepts that 
can also be used in balancing supply and demand in the energy 
system. Digital companies add ‘smartness’ that helps make 
sense in connecting many small units to a functioning system. 
For instance, lots of decentralized renewables can be bundled 
into a virtual power plant, demand can react in real time to 
supply changes or shared cars and bicycles can be allocated in 
an optimal way and coordinated with other transport options 
in this manner.
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2.3.6.6 Prosumerism and environmental 
awareness
The two trends in renewable energy expansion and digitalization 
also provide energy consumers with new opportunities. This, 
together with increasing interests to be more self-sufficient and 
autarkic, has led to new conceptions of energy supply where 
households and other consumers directly supply their own 
energy needs through distributed technologies (e.g., rooftop 
solar PV, heat pumps) and even sell their excess generation 
to the market, or to neighbors connected via a micro-grid, 
through technologies such as blockchain. Suddenly, energy is 
not just a commodity anymore, but has become more tangible 
lifestyle issue, which has caused additional willingness to 
pay for green innovations. This goes along with an increased 
notion of energy services rather than merely supply, and in turn 
creates new incentives to deploy efficiency potentials. While 
this phenomenon is currently mostly concerned with certain 
lifestyles in industrialized countries, it has the potential to 
trigger innovations in these fields that prospectively can be to 
the benefit of all consumers.
2.3.6.7 Policies at all levels
Growing public concern has propelled policymakers towards 
action. At the national level a widespread adoption of instruments 
to support the expansion of renewable energies has taken 
place. In 2016, 126 countries had corresponding regulations 
(feed-in tariffs, portfolio standards, etc.,) in place in the power 
sector and 68 in the transport sector (REN21, 2018). At the 
international level the nationally determined contributions hold 
195 signatory countries of the Paris Agreement accountable to 
implement measures leading to the achievement of this target. 
But policies have also been implemented at subnational scales, 
and in the private sector, often in the form of bottom-up self-
commitments. For instance, in the RE100 initiative more 
than 100 of the world’s largest companies committed to 100% 
renewable electricity. But it will be clear from the earlier parts of 
this section, that this is far from sufficient to turn the tide.
2.3.7 Food, biosphere, and water
Food security for the world has been a major consideration, 
and in particular the need to achieve SDGs 1 and 2. It is clear 
that we will not achieve these goals without major changes in 
our water management and food production systems, but also 
global transformations in attitudes towards food, including an 
important shift towards consumption of plant foods (with the 
added benefit of reducing diabetes and related afflictions among 
the overconsuming population). Another dimension of this 
issue is the reduction of food waste, which in some countries 
amounts to about 50% of foodstuffs brought into the market.  
2.3.7.1 Agricultural land use
Land use for provisions of food, fiber, wood and energy is one 
of the foundations of our current human civilization (DeFries 
et al., 2004). There was, and in certain quarters there still is, 
growing pessimism about the possibilities of feeding growing 
populations, as exemplified in the writings of Malthus. But 
contrary to Malthus’ predictions, global agricultural production 
has grown much faster than global population in the past half 
century, not eliminating hunger and malnutrition but allowing 
for a dramatic decrease in the proportion of the world’s people 
at the risk of hunger (Rosegrant and Cline, 2003). The food 
needs of the growing population of currently about 7.6 billion 
people (UNDESA, 2017) were met by expanding the cultivated 
agricultural area and by a technological revolution that has 
increased yields through increases in modern inputs such 
as irrigation water, improved seeds, fertilizer and pesticides 
(Tilman et al., 2011; Rudel et al., 2009).
However, land is a limited resource that has to fulfill multiple 
functions and the gains associated with increased agricultural 
production have been counterbalanced by harmful impacts 
on the environment and on ecosystem services. Agricultural 
land-use activities – whether converting natural landscapes for 
human agricultural use or changing management practices on 
human-dominated lands – have transformed a large proportion 
of the terrestrial surface so that today’s agricultural systems 
(cropland and pasture) occupy about 40% of the Earth’s ice-
free land surface (Foley et al., 2011). The transition from wild 
lands to agricultural use over the past several hundred years has 
for example strongly reduced previously forested lands (Gibbs 
et al., 2010). Such land-use changes often came along with 
unintended consequences such as changed freshwater flows 
and considerable losses of biodiversity through the reduction 
and modification of habitats (Newbold et al., 2015; Gibson et 
al., 2011). In recent decades, agricultural intensification, when 
existing lands are managed in order to be more productive, often 
through increased use of irrigation and fertilizers, has been 
responsible for most of the increases in agricultural production. 
Hence, agricultural freshwater-use for irrigation accounts for 
around 70% of human water withdrawals (Rost et al., 2008) and 
plays an important role in global food production.
Due to such disturbances, many freshwater ecosystems have 
been degraded (Grafton et al., 2013) and as a consequence, 
freshwater vertebrate populations have declined and many of 
the world’s amphibian species are threatened with extinction 
(Dudgeon et al., 2006). Furthermore, global nitrogen fertilizer 
application has increased by 800% and large amounts move 
into aquatic ecosystems (Galloway et al., 2003), leading to 
groundwater pollution and increased nitrate levels in drinking 
water, marine eutrophication, blighted coastal zones as well as 
increased frequency and severity of algal blooms. Such modern 
agroecosystems are also often depleted in biodiversity and 
habitat heterogeneity, with a reduction in resilience as a result 
of their biological monotony. Both agricultural expansion and 
intensification are also major contributors to climate change. 
Agriculture is responsible for a huge share of global greenhouse 
gas emissions, largely from tropical deforestation, methane 
emissions from livestock and rice cultivation, and nitrous oxide 
emissions from livestock and fertilized soils (Smith et al., 2013).
In the future, the land-use systems will be facing new 
intersecting challenges. The global population will continue to 
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grow and combined with higher purchasing power, especially in 
developing and emerging countries, food demand will increase 
and a greater demand for resource-intensive livestock products 
is to be foreseen (Popp et al., 2017; Bodirsky et al., 2015).
In addition, substantial environmental change – such as 
increasing temperatures, ozone concentrations, and salinization 
or decreased water availability could affect agricultural yields, 
carbon stocks, freshwater resources and biodiversity strongly 
(Rosenzweig et al., 2014; Schewe et al., 2014). This will be 
the case for cereal crops that feed the majority of the world’s 
population, but also for vegetables, legumes and fruits – which 
are important constituents of diets (Scheelbeek et al., 2018). The 
latter could have further implications for levels of malnutrition 
beyond caloric intake, such as vitamin and mineral deficiencies. 
In addition, the faster growth rates associated with higher 
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide result in lower 
values of protein, micronutrients, and B vitamins in several 
important cereal grains (Liu et al., 2016; Loladze, 2014; Myers 
et al., 2014). Furthermore, biodiversity loss, including of critical 
crop pollinators, and loss of soil quality will have substantial 
adverse impacts on global fruit supply and - in turn - on 
population health (Smith et al., 2015). 
On the other hand, to avoid negative impacts of climate 
change, huge potentials for climate change mitigation for the 
terrestrial system have been discussed, by providing biomass 
for bioenergy or conserving carbon rich ecosystems from 
agricultural expansion (Popp et al., 2014). These additional 
pressures would pose huge challenges for the sustainability both 
of food production and of terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems 
and the services they provide to society.
Therefore, more sustainable land-use methods, less resource-
intensive diets but also new incentives and policies for ensuring 
the sustainability of land use and the protection of ecosystem 
services are needed in a future world that is even stronger 
exposed to challenges and pressures (Humpenöder et al., 2018). 
2.3.7.2 The role of the oceans and their coasts
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD, 2016) report on the blue (ocean) economy identified it 
as “essential to the welfare and prosperity of humankind” and 
as “a key source of food, energy, minerals, health, leisure and 
transport upon which hundreds of millions of people depend.” 
The report stated that our “maritime industry landscape is 
poised to undergo a profound transition” and estimated that 
economic activity will double to US$3 trillion by 2030. 
Concomitant with these developments will be the need for 
existing and emerging industries to operate in a changing 
climate, which is already profoundly affecting the rapidly 
changing and developing world’s coastal zones and the 
livelihoods of coastal people. Coastal societies and economies 
strongly interact with the ocean. Coastal zones are home to 
over 10% of the world’s population and are experiencing up to 
three times higher population growth and urbanization rates 
compared to inland areas (Neumann et al., 2015). Currently, 
most of the world’s megacities are located in coastal zones and 
many of these megacities are situated in large deltas, where 
combinations of specific economic, geographic and historical 
conditions have historically driven coastal migration. Extreme 
events affecting coastal infrastructure and activities; extraction 
of groundwater and oil resources leading to accelerated 
subsidence; the redistribution of commercial, recreational and 
keystone habitat forming species; increased outbreaks and 
toxicity of harmful algal blooms; increased habitat destruction 
and productivity declines through acidification on economic 
and health impacts are some of the issues that coastal regions 
will face over the forthcoming decades. These issues constitute 
barriers to sustainable development of coastal regions.
Embedded within the complex socio-ecological systems that 
encapsulate coastal communities is the need to adapt to rising 
sea levels, which will shape coastal areas in the years to come. 
In this context, sustainable development of coastal regions must 
balance the trade-offs between the needs of increasing coastal 
populations for food, energy and shelter and the conservation 
of biodiversity.
2.3.7.3 Food, materials and energy from the sea
Meeting the food requirements of a growing world population 
will be one of the major challenges in coming years. The 
ocean hosts some of the most productive ecosystems and will 
play a crucial role in the provision of protein and essential 
nutrients (Beveridge et al., 2013; Kawarazuka and Béné, 2011). 
Sustainable wild capture fisheries are likely bound below 130 
million tons per year, but mariculture production is increasing 
rapidly (Pauly and Zeller, 2016). Thus, marine food production 
is to continue making a significant contribution to human 
prosperity and wellbeing, with small-scale and artisanal 
fisheries and mariculture production providing not only 
food but also employment and income for millions of people 
(FAO, 2016). However, in the face of climate change, pollution, 
growing competition for natural resources and the changing 
geopolitical landscape, the sustainable development of ocean 
food production, both in capture fisheries and aquaculture, is 
under pressure (Jennings et al., 2016). In addition, continuous 
overfishing and intensive mariculture currently still exert major 
pressures on the ocean’s ecosystems by depleting fish stocks, 
degrading habitats, altering native species compositions, and 
introducing infectious diseases.
At the same time, future requirements for raw materials and 
energy are steeply increasing and might not be satisfied through 
conventional sources. The ocean might hold some of the future 
energy sources through renewable energy production, wind, 
wave, tidal, in coastal and even off-shore areas. In addition, 
the deep ocean, with the deep seafloor, is supposed to contain 
some crucial new sources of minerals, energy and genetic 
resources. However, answers to how to mine these resources 
in an environmental least impacting way and how deep-sea 
mining can be reconciled with the concept of sustainability while 
contributing to sustainable global development are yet unknown.
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2.3.8 Smart cities
2.3.8.1 The dynamics of urbanization
Urbanization is one of the major drivers of societal and 
environmental change and is a major topic of discussion in the 
sustainability context (Seto et al., 2017; Seto et al., 2012). It is 
in effect the most long-standing materially observable societal 
transformation that we know, as it originated around 6,000 years 
ago. Current projections of the growth of urbanization seem to 
indicate that by 2050 68% of the global population will live in 
cities (UNDESA, 2018). As mentioned in Section 2.2, however, 
it is not clear that such linear projections are trustworthy, as 
there are a number of factors (high institutional vulnerability, 
rising transport costs due to climate change, food security, 
potential changes in governance structure) that may force the 
drivers of urbanization in a different direction. 
Although there are possibly as many explanations for the 
existence of towns as there are towns (Jacobs, 1961), one recent 
approach, proposed by (Bettencourt, 2013; Bettencourt et al., 
2007) relates their existence and many of their features to societal 
information processing. Based on allometric scaling analyses, 
they argue that there is a direct relationship between innovation 
and urban scale, expressed by the fact that with urban scale (as 
expressed in population numbers), innovation activities grow 
super-linearly while energy use grows sub-linearly. Hence, one 
could argue that the main driver behind urban growth has, since 
the emergence of towns, been the need for society to process 
more and more information by reducing communication and 
stimulating interaction leading to invention and innovation, 
while energy has served as a constraint to limit urban growth. 
Over the past two centuries, the trend towards urbanization 
has rapidly accelerated alongside the explosion of innovation 
enabled by the discovery and harnessing of fossil energy that 
reduced the energy cost of implementing innovations in society. 
That has created a number of major stresses for the urban 
component of the global system dynamics (UNDESA, 2018). 
Urban systems are costly and highly vulnerable both socially 
and environmentally. As can be seen in many developing parts 
of the world, economic inequality, crime, food insecurity, lack of 
hygiene all abound in urban systems unless very costly social and 
infrastructural measures are put in place. The growth of urban 
systems has hugely increased the (energy-costly) worldwide 
flows of goods, including foodstuffs and water, as well as an 
increasingly wide range of other products across the world. It 
has thus exploded the footprint of the global urban population.
The growth of urbanization should also be seen in the 
perspective of the rural depopulation that is occurring, or 
has recently occurred, in many parts of the world, uprooting 
communities, transforming landscapes and industrializing 
agricultural production methods in developed and developing 
areas. 
One of the fundamental questions of capital importance for 
sustainability in all domains of human endeavor is therefore 
whether the current trend towards further urbanization will 
continue as is assumed by the linear projections of our current 
“business-as-usual” scenarios? In view of our assumption 
that the need for increased communication has over the long 
term been one of the major drivers of urbanization, it will be 
particularly interesting to see how the changes wrought by the 
ICT revolution will affect global urbanization.
2.3.8.2 Variation in challenges to urbanization
While in developed and some parts of developing countries 
the very process of urbanization could possibly be redesigned 
to support sustainable types of solutions (e.g., compact cities 
for resource and energy efficiency, or the introduction of new 
technological solutions including those in the ICT sector), in 
other instances urbanization could be a barrier to the reduction 
of poverty and cause a relative scarcity of sustainable kinds of 
investment, such as for appropriate infrastructure. It is not only 
the application of new technology that is at stake here, but also 
the response to various socio-cultural-ecological and governance 
conditions in orchestrating the needed transformations. 
In sub-Saharan Africa about a third of the population lives 
in rural areas - whereas in the European Union only a quarter 
are rural dwellers. Sub-Saharan Africa is currently (2018) home 
for some 1 billion people and with growth rates of 2.6%, the 
figure will jump to 1.4 billion in 2030, reaching 2.16 billion by 
2050. Recent projections by the UNDESA (2018) indicate that 
by 2050, some 42% and 16% of the population will be living in 
rural areas in sub-Saharan Africa and Europe, respectively. 
Rural-urban migration in sub-Saharan Africa is driven by 
forces that do not follow the known trends experienced in 
Europe, the USA and China over the past few decades (Martine, 
2012). Unlike in the other continents, where the rural-
urban migration was, and is, mainly driven by the Industrial 
Revolution and the development of manufacturing in urban 
centers, factors like climate change, population pressure and 
the digital revolution play a big role in case of sub-Saharan 
Africa. Not only is population pressure affecting the availability 
of arable farmland and grazing areas, thereby forcing people to 
move to cities, it also impacts other social sectors like education 
and health negatively. With respect to climate change, abnormal 
weather patterns (i.e., severe floods and droughts) experienced 
in the past few decades have had negative impacts on agricultural 
production systems (both crop and livestock), forcing more, 
particularly young, people to migrate to urban areas. 
Thus, urbanization will take different forms, and have different 
consequences for sustainability in different parts of the world.
2.3.8.3 Multi-level interactions
The issues involved relate different systemic patterns at different 
levels, such as different environments and different forms of 
cityscape, the combinatorics of complex regional urban-rural 
settings, and various global forms of megacity collaboration and 
competition. The current trend is towards unsustainability. To 
change that, cities have to transform themselves by developing 
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new visions for, and approaches to, city planning, as well as 
innovative investment strategies. Urban-rural connections 
will have to be reshaped both with regard to resource/waste 
flows and with respect to the combined economics of the labor 
market, the transport system and the infrastructure investments 
for larger areas, as well as food, water and energy security. 
This will have to take distinct forms at local, subnational 
regional, and national levels. Already, at the global level, 
connectivity between the mega- (and other large) cities of the 
world is emerging with respect to governance, through new 
types of collaborative schemes initiated by mayors and other 
authorities. These are exploring best practices, identifying new 
solutions and growing innovative experiments. Other types of 
actors, such as different representatives from various industrial 
sectors and from civil society, are increasingly getting involved 
in the transformation process at large. 
2.3.8.4 Time is short
Strong trends point at a further strengthening of the dominance 
of current urban economic activities that threaten the long-
term sustainability of our current urban systems. However, the 
combination of rising transport costs, food insecurity, local 
energy provision and ICT developments that will change the 
pattern of where one physically works, may soften the stress 
on cities and in part repopulate rural areas, and will offer 
opportunities for positive change.
These tendencies that support sustainability-directed 
forms of urban transformation must, however, deliberately 
be strengthened in all their diversity, and the pace at which 
innovations are introduced needs to accelerate in order to face 
the challenges within the different time horizons involved in 
the SDG initiative. This requires more deliberate investigation, 
involves political initiatives, the rapid introduction of 
experimental facilities, and the development of appropriate 
methods and investments. Many of the large infrastructure 
transformations needed will have to be planned now and 
initiated experimentally as soon as possible. They need to take 
into account the full range of concerns reflected in the systemic 
interplay of most of the SDGs.
2.3.8.5 Food production and the greening of 
urban space 
In the current world market, the production of food can be 
seen as ubiquitous, including production at sites very far from 
where the food is consumed. This trend towards (expensive) 
global food transportation is unsustainable. Food security and 
quality, closeness to local norms and preferences and sanitary 
control reasons argue for closer linkages between the sites of 
production and consumption, within subnational regional 
settings (Elmqvist et al., 2013). This should be encouraged by 
increasing connectivity between neighboring urban and rural 
areas, so that they are more strongly woven together in mixed 
“agglomerations”. Changes in the spatial distribution of labor 
market considerations in such a “mixed” functional wider space 
are emerging, supported by increased transportation network 
connectivity and new possibilities generated by ICT (e.g., to 
partially work from a distant home base). But for the moment 
this happens only in small, patchy instances. Climate impact 
will further change the dynamics of the relation between urban 
and rural, as will regional renewable energy production, such 
as bio-based fuel production or wind-generator parks. New 
ICT control and surveillance capabilities will enhance these 
possibilities.
“Greening” of urban space, including “vertical” plantations 
on houses and local urban gardening in underused spaces, is 
another potentially positive trend. The reasons are manifold: 
economic and social in relation to the production of food and 
the related risks, but also the use of local ecosystem services 
of various sorts and water management options. Different 
psychological and aesthetic reasons drive a varied group of 
people of all ages, from youngsters to retired people, toward 
implementation of such activities. But only major upscaling 
of such efforts will have a noticeable impact on achieving 
sustainability. 
2.3.8.6 Governance and management concerns
Current forms of management and governance are a major 
handicap in changing urban systems. In urban planning, 
generally, changes are only thought about and implemented 
once the need for them is strongly felt. As our urban systems 
are undergoing accelerated change, social norms, practices 
and regulations will be changing more rapidly, which will 
require rapidly developing novel approaches to management 
and governance that take the new functional relations among 
the various urban and rural geographical domains of action 
into account. Currently emerging teleconnections between 
large (as well as more limited) urban areas can be seen as one 
contribution. Such connections can be found here and there 
within fairly limited regional areas, as well as at more global 
scales. 
2.3.8.7 Conclusions
The strong drive for urbanization is clear. But the ways in which 
it will take form in different parts of the world are very different, 
as are the conditions under which one may see the emergence of 
novel ways to enhance sustainability. This calls for international 
efforts to encourage approaches to comparing developments 
under different conditions, and using these experiences in yet 
other locations, which will increasingly to be of crucial concern. 
2.3.9 Digital revolution and technology 
Technology as an interface between society and its environment 
has in recent years developed so rapidly and has led to so many 
increasingly fundamental changes in our lives that it must be 
an essential part of our discussions. In particular, the NBIC 
technologies are in the process of fundamentally changing the 
world. 
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The role of technology in the global change process is one of 
the drivers of our present conundrum. Due to major events in 
the history of Western societies, among them the development 
of the Enlightenment (leading to a shift in focus from the 
past to the future alongside the growth of a rational scientific, 
albeit reductionist, approach to explaining natural phenomena 
(Girard, 1990)), and the rapid, fundamental changes brought 
about by the Industrial Revolution (placing abundant fossil 
energy at the disposal of societies adapting to technological 
inventions), followed by the inversion that began changing the 
balance between society and economy in the 1830s and ‘50s 
(Polanyi, 1944), technology came into its own as an engine of 
change. The potential changes are so vast that summarizing 
them here is impossible. 
But it is relevant to consider two aspects of this development. 
First of all, the fact that it constitutes its own path-dependent 
dynamic, related to, but not determined by either societal 
dynamics or environmental ones. It serves as an interface 
between these two domains but does not follow the logic of 
either. Its logic is all its own. 
Second, that logic has had a profound impact on the ways our 
current societies process information. From the very beginning 
of human societies, artifacts have modified behavior by solving 
problems, thus serving as tools to alleviate specific kinds of 
information processing. Early stone tools and arrowheads, 
for example, reduced the information processing needed in 
cutting down trees and killing game. Bowls, cups, saucers and 
plates still serve as tools to facilitate unthinking dealing with 
liquid and solid nutrients. Cars serve to solve the challenges of 
transportation, channeling the information processing needed 
to get from point A to point B. Genetic modification changes 
the information content of the genes involved and thereby alters 
the challenges involved in achieving changes in the behavior of 
living beings that suit our needs. 
From that perspective, the information revolution is the 
culmination of a many- millennia long development that 
transfers specific aspects of human information processing 
from the brain to the material environment of our societies. In 
our opinion, therefore, the role of innovations in information 
technology is more fundamental than that of other novel 
technologies. Hence, in Section 2.2, we have devoted 
considerable attention to the ways in which the ICT revolution 
is currently changing the playing field for many societal trends, 
notably accelerating certain developments (disintegration of 
societal structures; changes in values; concentration of power in 
a very small circle within societies, etc.). 
Here, however, we are considering the wider field of technology 
development, in many different domains, which has developed 
at a revolutionary speed. That has brought our societies to a 
position to be able to conceive and realize just about anything. 
Although the many changes that this revolution brings offer 
plenty of opportunities to move towards a more sustainable 
and equitable society globally, for that to happen a number of 
current, fundamental challenges need to be dealt with:
•	 Leveling the playing field between governments, major 
corporations and society. Currently only major corporations 
are setting the trend in developing technologies in all 
cutting-edge domains, and this leads to many challenges 
in the field of privacy, political control, potential misuse of 
technology, etc. A more balanced approach is needed.
•	 Reconsidering the idea of continual progress. This approach 
has driven Western societies since the 17th century and 
has led to a kind of ever-accelerating race forward that 
poses the question whether it should, and could, continue. 
A more balanced approach may be necessary if we are to 
achieve some form of sustainable balance between society 
and its environment, and a more equitable distribution of 
wellbeing among peoples on Earth.
•	 Understanding and handling innovation. Up to the 
present day, innovations are introduced to ‘solve’ emergent 
challenges (whether these were known or not), and in 
the process these solutions create new, unanticipated 
challenges. This is in its current form an unstoppable 
feedback/feedforward loop.
•	 Our societies are essentially able to invent anything, given 
the time, talent and investment. But some of its impact could 
be directed in a different way if we were much more precise 
in our ways of thinking about invention and innovation, 
and in particular if we systematically focused innovation 
on domains where the need is clear, considered alternatives 
and invested in understanding potential unanticipated 
consequences of our inventions with respect to the SDGs.
•	 Reinforcing our societies’ value spaces. In particular, the 
ICT revolution, but also developments in biotechnology 
and genetics are rapidly transforming our common societal 
values. This contributes to the erosion of common values 
that can threaten societal coherence. To counter this, in a 
number of societies that were until recently ‘open’, political 
control over the media is put in place. However, in the 
long term, this is likely to trigger potentially destructive 
reactions. A balance needs to be sought between diversity 
and adherence to core values on which institutions can be 
based. 
2.4 Conclusion: designing for change
The main conclusions to be drawn from this chapter can be 
summarized as follows:
•	 Our current global society has come close to a tipping 
point in its long-term evolution. Patterns that have been 
established many years - in some cases centuries - ago 
have almost imperceptibly led to a conundrum that has 
our current societies in its grip. The degradation of the 
natural environment is but one aspect of this, albeit a very 
perceptible one. Other dimensions of this evolution, here 
called ‘mega-trends’, touch on our international diplomatic 
order, our democratic form of government, the societal and 
economic health of our communities, our values, etc. 
•	 These mega-trends are currently accelerating very rapidly 
as a consequence of the ICT revolution, which is likely 
to change many aspects of our relationships with space 
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and time, our experience of the natural and societal 
realms in which we function as human beings, our social 
organization, etc. Because we are only at the beginning of 
this development, it is difficult to get a sense of where how 
this development will play out, but an important period of 
relative chaos is certain. 
•	 Our reductionist, fragmented approach to science is partly 
responsible for the fact that many relationships between 
these trends have not been observed. In particular, we need 
to develop a better integrated perspective on the world 
around us, which strives to be holistic, bridging the many 
gaps between current disciplines and sectors, including the 
SDGs. That perspective should focus on learning from the 
past, about the present, and for the future! 
•	 Therefore, rather than focusing on individual SDGs 
or groups of them, we have chosen to define six 
transformations where the interaction between the many 
sectors that define the SDGs plays out. These are 1) Human 
capacity and demography, 2) Decarbonization and energy, 
3) Food, biosphere and water, 4) Smart cities, 5) Production 
and consumption, and 6) Digital revolution.
•	 We have then attempted to describe some of the major 
trends in each of these domains, and to accentuate how 
current dynamics are driving each of them, to a greater or 
lesser extent, either away from sustainability or insufficiently 
closer to that goal to have a hope of achieving it in time.
The particular societal dynamic in which we have been 
involved, globally, over the last few centuries has, in its extreme 
form, led to the production-to-waste dynamic that governs 
many present-day societies. Without tackling the core of that 
dynamic, sustainability cannot be achieved. Technological or 
other solutions to specific challenges in particular domains 
will not suffice. That core is the societal dynamic that drives 
human interactions with the environment. After all, humans 
define what they consider their environments by selecting 
aspects of that environment that they become conscious 
of, and many others which they ignore. On that basis, they 
define the environmental challenges they perceive, and the 
“solutions” that they conceive to deal with them. Thus, all 
issues concerning the environment are dealt with within society 
itself. There is no direct communication with the environment, 
only (self-referential) communication within society about the 
environment (Luhmann, 1989).  
Hence, the dominant approach to socio-environmental 
matters, for historical reasons, has focused on their societal 
dimensions from the outside – from the perspective of the 
environment. It has thus focused predominantly on the 
symptoms of the current conundrum, rather than its causes, 
on the relationships humans have had with their environment, 
rather than on the drivers that have pushed societies into the 
current particular forms of production-to-waste relationships 
with the Earth system.
Another core lesson from this chapter is that rather than 
change course when circumstances (whether social or 
environmental) force us to do so, we have to anticipate the 
need for change in all we design or decide. Hence the title of 
this conclusion: designing for change. The developments that 
our societies have set in motion with the Industrial Revolution 
have so accelerated change that we can no longer be content to 
be re-active to what is going on around us in the global socio-
environmental Earth system. Instead, we have to anticipate and 
be continuously interactive with all other elements of the system 
we are a part of.
Thus far, we have as human societies mainly related to 
linear projections from the past and present into the future. 
This is no longer sufficient: the global system we are part 
of is fundamentally a complex system with many different 
nonlinearities which, over time, create tipping points and 
unanticipated consequences of human decisions and actions. Its 
complexity exceeds our capacities to understand or deal with it. 
But we can (and must) do better than we have up to now.
Part of achieving that is developing a high-dimensional holistic 
perspective that stretches our minds across the interactions 
that are likely to occur between phenomena and dynamics in 
specific domains. That perspective should replace society at the 
core of its concerns, rather than the economy. It also requires 
much more frequent and in-depth reflexivity on all processes in 
society, so that course corrections can be implemented. Third, 
it implies the development of our capacity to understand our 
relationship with the future, to accept the need for anticipation 
and long-term planning, and the need for a priori evaluation 
of potential unintended consequences of our decisions and 
actions.
To achieve these goals, it seems imperative that we adopt a 
complex adaptive systems approach to sustainability issues. 
Looking at societal processes bottom-up, identifying the 
behavior of individuals and all the different groups and networks 
that constitute societies will give us a very different perspective 
on the dynamics driving us in an unsustainable direction, and 
will thus facilitate designing different trajectories to achieve 
our goals. The ICT revolution is on the brink of enabling us 
to so, as the combination of ‘Big Data’, High-Performance 
Computing, the Cloud and ML together enable us to move away 
from the traditional social science approach based on polls of 
a very limited number of people (a few 1000’s or 10,000’s out 
of populations of millions or more) followed by generalizing 
extrapolation onto whole populations. We will be able to 
analyze the attitudes and dynamics of each of the individuals 
in populations of millions directly, as is already to some extent 
done for major elections on the basis of the thousands of data-
points about every individual that have been collected by certain 
companies. That in turn, using network analytics will enable us 
to trace the emergence of new ideas, attitudes and interaction 
networks between very large numbers of individuals.
But we are currently not there yet. Let us, in the next chapters, 
see what can be done with the tools that we currently have at 
our disposal!
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Key Messages
1. Reaching the full set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) by 2030 and continuing on sustainable pathways thereaf-
ter requires transformative change in several areas. Given the linkages between the various transformations, an integrated 
approach is needed. Model-based scenarios can be a useful tool to explore the efforts associated with these transformations as 
well as to assess possible synergies and trade-offs between them.
2. A wide body of literature exists on how goals connected to the environment-related SDGs can be achieved. For the SDGs 
related to human development, quantitative scenarios are less common, but relevant characteristics can be identified. They 
emphasize responsible consumption and efficient production, global cooperation, and good governance of the energy-wa-
ter-land nexus, aided by reduced inequalities. Recently, several studies have started taking a more integrative, backcasting 
approach.
3. Achieving all SDGs will require substantial further improvements of education and healthcare. Education and health are 
instrumental in enabling people to live a self-determined life, find decent work and generate income to sustain themselves, but 
also to undertake climate change mitigation and deal with environmental problems. The ambitions go hand-in-hand with the 
goal to reduce poverty in all its forms and reduce global inequality. 
4. Consumption and production cut across several of the other transitions, by ensuring an efficient use of resources and pro-
viding an ideal entry point for integrated pathway development. Evidence shows that it is possible to considerably reduce 
demand for resources by taking a more service-oriented approach. This will allow improvement of the overall efficiency of the 
systems. Changing consumption patterns contribute to achieving sustainability by keeping the size of the system manageable. 
5. Energy efficiency, increasing the share of renewable energy and carbon capture and storage play a key role in decarboni-
zing the energy system while providing access to modern energy for all. Achieving the Paris Agreement is still possible but 
only if combined with focus on a broader set of SDGs. Constraints set by the SDGs require a rapid phase-out of fossil-based 
power generation: about 100% of electricity will likely need to be produced with zero and low-carbon technologies in 2050. 
This can only be achieved with a rapid increase in energy efficiency. At the same time, carbon dioxide-removal strategies need 
to be implemented. 
6. In 2050, the land-use system will have to produce enough food and biomass to feed about nine billion people, to meet de-
mand for wood, fibers and bioenergy. To limit the food system’s environemntal impacts and to conserve biodiversity, current 
agriculture area cannot be increased. This requires improving land-use practices, dietary changes toward less meat-intensive 
diets, and increasing the efficiency of the systems rapidly, reversing the long-term trend of falling yields.
7. Integrated pathways for cities are characterized by high connectivity and ‘smartness’. Pathways show that by 2050 around 
two thirds of human population will live in urban areas, calling for new investments in urban infractructures. Smart city design 
can be a major factor for limiting future resource demand. 
8. Digital technologies support the sustainability transition and cut across all the other transformations. Further digitali-
zation and automation can both support and be a threat to achieving the SDGs. It is therefore important to implement for-
ward-looking governance structures that allow to mitigate potential trade-offs of the digital revolution.
9. Mobilizing the necessary financial resources will be critical to achieve the transformation towards the SDGs. This above 
all comprises a fundamental change in the investment portfolio across all sectors of the economy, towards sustainable solu-
tions. It will also imply an increase in investments.
10. Further development of model-based scenarios is a key priority. A list of research priorities can be identified, including i) 
increasing the coverage of SDGs and their interactions, ii) a stronger focus on efforts to achieve a set of SDGs simultaneously, 
iii) a better representation of the underlying geographic and societal heterogeneity and iv) better reflection of the importance 
of societal change and governance dimensions. This will require a multi-disciplinary approach in which integrated assessment 
modeling is combined with the contribution of other scientific disciplines.
3.1 Integrated pathways 
Reaching the full set of UN Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) by 2030 and continuing on sustainable pathways the-
reafter towards the wellbeing of the planet and its people re-
quires transformative change in several areas. An integrated 
assessment of sustainable development pathways (SDPs) will be 
needed to better understand the enabling factors and require-
ments for this change, as well as the synergies and trade-offs 
between different goals. The nature, extent and timing of this 
transformation can be explored with integrated pathway mode-
ling, which connects where we want to be in 2030 and beyond 
with where we are today. 
Current trends are not moving towards sustainable develop-
ment (Chapter 2). Although the 1992 and 2012 Rio Conferences 
resulted in many activities aimed at sustainable development, 
historical trends have not been reversed in key areas. In fact, 
projections of current trends indicate that without new policy 
initiatives, many of the SDGs will not be achieved by 2030. Whi-
le in some areas (e.g., related to reducing hunger and poverty) 
progress is expected in line with trends in the last decades, the 
expected improvements are projected to be considerably slower 
than aimed for. For other goals (e.g., climate change, protec-
tion of biodiversity) trends even often go in the wrong direc-
tion. Chapter 2 also discusses some of the key trends that will 
possibly shape the future during the coming decades, including 
population growth and urbanization, but also further develop-
ment of information technology and digitalization. Handling 
these “megatrends” well will play a key role in ensuring that sus-
tainable development can be achieved in the coming decades. 
There is a significant body of literature that has looked into 
the question of how future pathways that will achieve one or 
only a few SDGs may look like. Most of this literature has looked 
into specific issues, such as the energy sector (IEA, 2017; Ria-
hi et al., 2012) climate change mitigation (Kriegler et al., 2015; 
Clarke et al., 2014). A much smaller set of scenarios has looked 
into approaches that aim to achieve a wider set of SDGs, some 
examples are van Vuuren et al. (2015b) and Parkinson et al. 
(2018). The literature on individual targets, with those studies 
looking at multiple targets depicting this even more strongly, 
clearly shows that a fundamental system transformation will be 
needed to achieve the SDGs in 2030 and further sustainable de-
velopment beyond 2050. 
Cognizant of the mega-drivers literature, a set of key transfor-
mations have been postulated in Chapter 2. 
• Enable and improve human capacities and capabilities. 
This transformation ensures the development of human ca-
pacity by ensuring full access to secondary education and 
adequate health care and equal chances for all, while at the 
same time focusing on eradication of poverty and reducing 
inequality.
• Ensuring more sustainable consumption and production 
patterns. Key characteristics of the second transformation 
are: ensuring a more sustainable level of consumption by 
emphasizing a service perspective, including efficiency 
improvements, lifestyle changes and circular production 
modes.
• Decarbonization of the energy system, while at the same 
time ensuring access to clean and affordable energy for 
all. These goals imply that CO2 emissions of the energy 
system are reduced to zero by 2050 by rapid introduction 
of climate-neutral energy carriers. 
• Eradicating hunger while at the same time preventing fur-
ther degradation of biodiversity and water resources. Key 
characteristics of this transformation include more efficient 
use of food, redistribution, sustainable agricultural practi-
ces, higher yields, careful use of fertilizers and efficient use 
of water for irrigation. 
• Achieving smart and sustainable urban development pat-
terns. This will ensure that city infrastructures develop to 
allow for meaningful urban lives, while staying within pla-
netary boundaries.
• Managing the digital revolution. The digital revolution 
and associated trends to automation and cognitive tasks, 
increasingly taken over by machines, should be targeted so 
that they support the transition towards reaching the SDGs.
These transformations are intimately linked. Integrated 
analysis is needed to look into the possible linkages across 
these transformations - in particular in order to reduce the risk 
of trade-offs and increase the possibility of synergies. This is 
needed in order to achieve the vision of how the world should 
look like in 2050, as presented in Chapter 1: a world in which 
the SDGs have been achieved and sustainable development has 
led to prosperity, peace and partnership for all people, while 
preserving the integrity of our planet.
In this chapter, we assess the scientific literature on pathways 
towards achieving several SDGs, on the way to achieving this 
vision. In the remainder of Section , we highlight implications 
of the linkages across SDGs by briefly looking into important 
connections in the existing literature (Section 3.1.1) and 
discussing pathways which follow a more integrated approach 
(Section 3.1.2), relevant for the six-transformation processes 
introduced above. In Section 3.2 we discuss the literature on 
achieving human development goals. In Section 3.3, we assess 
existing scenario literature on achievement of a set of selected 
SDGs, which are under review at the High-level Political Forum 
(HLPF) 2018: SDGs 6, 7, 11, 12 and 15. This includes more 
detailed insights into the interlinkages from the perspective of 
these SDGs (Krey et al., submitted). Finally, in Section 3.4 we 
discuss research implications. 
3.1.1 Linkages across SDGs
Each of the six transformations described above is tied to the 
achievement of many of the SDGs, highlighting the fact that 
the SDGs are intricately linked. In fact, approaching the SDGs 
in the context of a sustainable development pathway based on 
these underlying transformations provides a holistic view on 
achieving them together rather than in isolation. Several reports 
and papers have recently focused on the linkages across different 
SDGs (Krey et al., submitted; van Soest et al., in review; Nilsson 
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et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2016b). Insights into these linkages are key 
for successfully achieving the SDGs. 
SDGs focusing on human capacity building like education, 
health and gender equality are fundamental for empowering 
humans to lead a self-determined and prosperous life 
(Section 3.2). They not only allow people to find decent work 
and generate income to sustain themselves, but also enable 
them to undertake climate change mitigation and deal with 
environmental problems.  
Likewise, recent studies (Grubler et al., 2018; Parkinson et al., 
2018; van Vuuren et al., 2018) provide an indication that higher 
efforts in responsible consumption and production (SDG 
12) will lead to many co-benefits with other SDGs without 
significant trade-offs, providing an indication that responsible 
consumption and production might be a synergistic entry point 
for many other SDGs. Reducing resource demand may not only 
positively affect SDGs related to human needs such as energy, 
water, and food and environmental SDGs on climate, land, 
oceans, but also may facilitate achieving several of the SDGs 
related to human capacity, such as health, and society, such 
as poverty. Further research is needed to assess the economic 
impact of reduced demand. Finally, these studies also emphasize 
the importance of transforming production systems, while 
taking account the crucial linkages between supply of food, 
energy, water and other material (the so-called nexus).
For decarbonizing the energy system, assessments show 
that there are strong relationships with several other SDGs. In 
many cases, there are rather positive interactions, but there are 
also negative ones (trade-offs). Positive examples include for 
instance the reduction of air pollution (SDG 3 and SDG 11) 
(Portugal-Pereira et al., 2018) and providing energy to support 
human development (SDG 7). One important trade-off could be 
between bioenergy (and other land-based mitigation options) 
and eradicating hunger (SDG 2) and protection biodiversity 
(SDG 15). Large-scale 2nd generation bioenergy deployment 
forms a key element of 1.5°C and 2°C transformation pathways 
(Popp et al., 2017; Schleussner et al., 2016; Rogelj et al., 2015), 
but clearly its use needs to be planned carefully in order to 
avoid trade-offs with sustainable food supply and preserving 
biodiversity. Another trade-off may occur between climate 
mitigation and universal modern energy access objectives if 
mitigation efforts increase energy costs for the poor (SDG 7). 
Also, here, it is possible to limit trade-offs by specific policies 
(Cameron et al., 2016). 
For the transformation of agriculture and land use, there are 
possible trade-offs between producing sufficient food (SDG 2), 
preserving terrestrial species and ecosystems (SDG 15), and 
taking climate action (SDG 13). This comes from the competing 
uses of land for preserving biodiversity and providing food, 
feed, and fiber for industrial processes, biofuels and carbon 
storage (Humpenöder et al., 2018; Popp et al., 2011; Wise et 
al., 2009). It is possible to avoid these trade-offs via agricultural 
intensification although this will require the management 
of possible environmental impacts from increased water use 
(SDG 6) (Humpenöder et al., 2018; Obersteiner et al., 2016) 
or the use of fertilizers. Diet changes to less meat-intensive 
diets and reducing food waste (SDG12) can also mitigate land 
pressure (SDG 15) and decrease food prices, mitigating hunger 
(Humpenöder et al., 2018; Obersteiner et al., 2016; Bajželj et 
al., 2014). This also contributes to climate mitigation through 
leading to lower CO2 emissions from land-use change (SDG 13) 
(Springmann et al., 2016a; Stehfest et al., 2009). 
The majority of humanity lives in cities which are responsible 
for a substantial share of economic activity. Hence synergies and 
trade-offs related to basic needs and services are relevant for the 
urban population. Urbanization that is inclusive to, for example, 
providing electricity and energy services, and that promotes 
urban mobility via electric public transport (avoiding urban air 
pollution) will provide synergies between SDGs 3, 7, 11 and 13. 
The demand for long-lived infrastructure and growing urban 
population shares calls for sustainable investments in buildings 
and transport networks. 
Nilsson et al. (2016) provided an important step by highlight-
ing the importance of these linkages. More recently, van Soest 
et al. (in review) systematically discussed the linkages across 
an even wider set of SDGs as discussed in sustainability lite-
rature, but also more specifically in the model-based scenario 
literature. Clearly, more linkages between the SDGs exist than 
currently covered by integrated assessment models (IAMs). 
IAMs are strong in covering important linkages related to the 
energy-water-land-climate nexus, including climate (SDG 13), 
energy (SDG 7), food security and land use (SDG 2 and SDG 
15), water (SDG 6) and responsible consumption and produc-
tion (SDG 12). Linkages of these SDGs to the other SDGs are 
represented more sporadically, e.g., the link to sustainable ci-
ties (SDG 11) via reduced air pollution and electrification of 
buildings and passenger transport. Life in the oceans (SDG 14) 
can be coupled quantitatively to IAM analysis using climate and 
marine biosphere models, although this has rarely been done 
to date. In contrast, the modeling of interlinkages to economic 
SDGs relating to prosperity (SDG 1 on poverty eradication, 
SDG 8 on decent work and economic growth, SDG 9 on indus-
try, infrastructure and innovation and SDG 10 on reducing in-
equality) will require major advances in terms of capturing the 
effect of the digital revolution and machine learning and repre-
senting inequality in the models. Finally, the SDGs on human 
development (SDGs 3, 4 and 5 on education, health, and gender 
equality) and peace, governance and partnership (SDGs 16 and 
17) enter IAM analysis so far merely as assumptions reflected 
in model parameter settings and scenario assumptions. Despite 
the current shortcomings in modeling all SDGs and their inter-
linkages, a range of interlinkages can already be explored with 
quantitative scenario analysis.
3.1.2 Key characteristics of sustainable 
development pathways
There are some studies available that look into global pathways 
consistent with achieving multiple SDG indicators using IAMs. 
The studies typically are based on a backcasting approach, 
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focusing on the level of effort and measures required to achieve 
a set of SDGs. These studies show that there are alternative 
pathways along which the SDGs could be achieved. The analysis 
also highlights important co-benefits and trade-offs among the 
different SDGs. Similar IAM tools need to be enhanced in order 
to cover a broader range of SDG indicators. We use two of these 
studies together with the wider scenario literature (Box 3.1) to 
describe some of the key characteristics of pathways that are 
successful in achieving multiple SDGs and the possible trade-
offs. Figure 3.1 shows a selection of sustainability indicators and 
their future trajectories for the six transformations from a range 
of sustainable scenarios. We briefly discuss them below.
3.1.2.1 Human capacity and demography
Improving human capacity to promote wellbeing is at the 
core of the people and prosperity dimensions of sustainable 
development. Education and health are especially fundamental 
for this as they empower humans to take care of themselves 
and participate in economic and social life (Section 3.2). 
Therefore, SDPs need to achieve a strong increase in educational 
attainment and health care access of the global population, 
leading to increases in life expectancy (Figure 3.1b). In SSP1 
(Lutz et al., 2018), for example, the number of people with no or 
only primary education is reduced to 1.4 billion in the age group 
15+ (approximately one fifth of the population) in 2030 and less 
than 0.8 billion (approximately one tenth of the population) in 
2050, compared with around 1.9 billion people today. The SDG 
target on universal lower secondary education by 2030 is only 
achieved through the leaving of a cohort of students in SSP1, 
highlighting the high ambition of this goal (Figure 3.1a). This 
can only be achieved by also including a dedicated effort to 
educate adults that did not have access to secondary education 
during their youth. Increased educational attainment is known 
to have an impact on accelerating the demographic transition 
and slowing and eventually reversing population growth. 
A key mechanism here is the empowerment of women. As a 
result, population in SSP1 peaks below 8.9 billion around mid-
century and returns to current levels by the end of the century. 
This is markedly lower than in other SSPs with less educational 
attainment. In fact, in SSP3 population size can increase to over 
12 billion people causing - all else being equal - higher pressure 
on environmental systems and societies. 
Education and health are also instrumental in enabling 
people to find decent work and generate income to sustain 
themselves and to respond to climate change. However, here, 
other factors also play a role, such as gender equality and equal 
access to markets for all population groups, a sophisticated 
robust economy with sufficient supply of high-skilled labor, 
well-functioning financial markets, and good governance. If 
these conditions are met in SSP1, per capita incomes can rise 
to around US$24,000 per year in 2030 and US$40,000 per 
year in 2050 compared to around US$16,000/year today (in 
purchasing power parity (PPP)). This is accompanied by a 
reduction in poverty levels and a broad reduction of income 
inequality (Figure 3.1c). The reduction of inequalities may 
have to be supported by redistributive policies to the extent 
that educational attainment, health and access to markets will 
continue to vary between people. 
3.1.2.2 Consumption and production
A key element of a transition to responsible consumption and 
production is the notion that wellbeing does not necessarily 
rely on the consumption of resources per se, but rather on 
the services and amenities these help to provide (Creutzig 
et al., 2018b) (Section 3.3.1). The key entry point for such a 
transformation is the demand for services in current systems of 
resource production and use. 
Responsible consumption and production cuts across several 
of the other transitions, especially related to the resource oriented 
and society-oriented SDGs, providing an ideal entry point for 
integrated pathway development. Across a variety of resources 
(energy, water, food, land, materials, see Figure 3.1d-f) end-
use demand is the ultimate driver of current resource systems 
(Section 2.3.9.2) and associated improvements in efficiency 
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Box 3.1. Examples of pathways looking into achieving multiple SDGs applying the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs).
In Section 3.1.2, we draw upon an important body of literature focusing on future societal and environmental changes are the 
Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) (Riahi et al., 2017). The SSPs are based on five different development routes for societal 
trends: i.e. sustainable development (SSP1), global fragmentation (SSP3), strong inequality (SSP4), rapid economic growth based 
on a fossil-fuel intensive energy system (SSP5) and middle of the road developments (SSP2). Each of the SSPs has been elaborated 
in terms of a storyline and various quantifications using models. These storylines can be combined with different assumptions on 
climate policy, forming a matrix of socioeconomic developments and the level of climate change (van Vuuren et al., 2015b). The 
sustainable development scenario (SSP1) combined with stringent climate policy can also be seen as an example of a scenario ex-
ploring the route towards a more sustainable world – but it should be noted that the SDGs were not targeted in its development. 
Further information on the SSPs can be found at: https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/SspDb/
In addition, we explicitly focus on two studies that have looked into achieving a wider set of SDGs. These are the Roads from 
Rio+20 study done by the IMAGE team at PBL (van Vuuren et al., 2015a) and a quantitative representation of multiple SDG 
indicators into the MESSAGE-GLOBIOM framework at IIASA (Parkinson et al., 2018). Process-based IAM like these provide a 
consistent global picture of interlinked water-energy-land systems transformation under assumptions surrounding future human 
development and various climate change. The detailed technological representation of the IAM enables quantitative interpretation 
of the SDG targets for energy, water and climate as scenario outcomes and provides a tool for estimating the implementation costs. 
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Investments in education, health and reducing inequality can enhance human capacities and capabilities.
Changing consumption patterns contribute to achieving long-term sustainability goals by keeping the total size 
of the system manageable.
The challenge of supplying clean energy for all and achieving full decarbonization mid-century can be achieved 
by shifting investments towards renewables, efficiency and providing access to electricity and clean technologies.
The sustainable land-use challenge of supplying sufficient food and other services for all while keeping biodiver-
sity can be achieved via improving land-use practices and increasing the efficiency of the systems.
New investments in urban infrastructures are urgently needed to achieve all 17 SDGs in cities.
Sm
ar
t C
iti
es
Fo
od
, B
io
sp
he
re
 &
 
W
at
er
D
ec
ar
bo
ni
za
tio
n 
&
 
En
er
gy
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
&
 
Pr
od
uc
tio
n
H
um
an
 C
ap
ac
ity
 &
 
D
em
og
ra
ph
y
Figure 3.1. Selected sustainable pathways achieving several SDGs and their performance on key indicators, meant as illustration for SDPs. We show select trans-
formation pathways (magenta variants) and a counterfactual trend scenario (mostly SSP2-Middle of the Road, black dotted line) for five of the six transformations 
till 2050, including recent historic development (depending on data availability). Blue arrows indicate the difference between the transformative and trend scenarios. 
The transformation pathways are: the “SSP1” (van Vuuren et al., 2017) or the variant looking into stringent mitigation (SSP1-1.9) (solid line), “integrated SDG” 
from Parkinson et al. (2018) (dashed line), the “Roads from Rio+20” scenario from van Vuuren et al. (2015a) (dash-dot), and scenarios under development (“SDG”, 
dotted) which achieve the SDGs: a) Share (%) of 15-24 year olds completing lower secondary education, b) global average life expectancy at birth in years, c) GDP/
capita (1,000 US$2015) and Gini coefficient across countries; d) domestic water demand (km3), e) total (and livestock) food supply (EJ), f) final (useful) energy 
demand (EJ), g) population (billion) without access to clean cooking, assuming that the population relying on solid biomass for their cooking energy needs will have 
increasing access to improved cooked stoves. Note that no baseline scenario currently exists where solid fuels are eradicated as a cooking energy source, h) CO2 
emissions (Gt CO2) per year, i) share (%) of unabated fossil fuels and non-biomass renewables in primary energy , j) population (billion) at the risk of hunger; k) 
share (%) of mean species abundance, l) global cereal yield, indexed at 2010; m) urban population (billion) without clean water access and sanitation and n) urban, 
rural and slum population (billion). The slum population is phased out from 2017 level. Sources: based on data from a) Lutz et al. (2018), b) historic data from 
UNDESA (2017), Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital (2015),  d), f) h), m) Parkinson et al. (2018), g) historic data from IEA (2017), 
McCollum et al. (2018b), j) Hasegawa (in preparation), k) van Vuuren et al. (2015a) l) historic data from FAOSTAT (2018), n) Population living in slums from UN 
Habitat (2016), c), e), l) n) SSP Database (2012-2016).
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and reductions in wastes therefore offer the largest “upstream” 
systems leverage effects. A demand or service perspective that 
emphasizes efficiency increases flexibility on the supply side. 
Many SDPs are therefore characterized by a very efficient use 
of energy, food and water, resulting in relatively low demand 
levels compared to other scenarios. This can be brought about 
by a rapidly decreasing energy intensity, a strong reduction in 
food waste and low share of animal products in consumption. 
The latter is especially important for protecting biodiversity and 
natural habitat as land can be returned to nature as a result of 
changes in diets which are less land intensive (Figure 3.1). 
Resource use is also the key interface to human wellbeing 
(as opposed to resource extraction and processing) that is of 
core concern for a variety of SDGs. Here again, reductions in 
demand can free resources (natural and financial) for addressing 
poverty and aiming at a more equitable distribution of material 
wellbeing. 
3.1.2.3 Decarbonization and energy
At the moment, around 1.1 billion people still lack access to 
electricity and 2.8 billion are not cooking with clean fuels 
(IEA, 2017; UN, 2017). SDG 7 therefore emphasizes the need 
to ensuring universal access to affordable, reliable and modern 
energy services. At the same time, however, the current energy 
system also forms a key driver of environmental degradation, 
in particular, climate change and urban air pollution. In this 
context, it will be important to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions from the energy system to nearly zero around mid-
century. Scenario studies have looked into the question of how 
to achieve these targets (Figure 3.1j-i), while at the same time 
preventing trade-offs with other SDGs. 
Several of these scenarios have shown how universal access 
to energy can be ensured. Achieving this target implies that 
yearly around 100 million people obtain access to electricity 
and almost 200 million people start relying on clean fuels and 
cooking technologies (IEA, 2017). For electricity, this could be 
based on expansion of both grid-connected and off-grid power 
supply (in remote areas) (Dagnachew et al., 2018; van Ruijven 
et al., 2012). Renewable sources would play a major role in such 
cases, covering up to 84% and 92% of the additional electricity 
demand in mini-grid and off-grid applications, respectively. For 
cooking fuels, the SDG implies a shift away in the fuel mix from 
traditional biomass towards gas (35%), LPG (30%), electricity 
(17%) and improved biomass (16%) (IEA, 2017). While this will 
lead to some increase in energy demand, the impact is assessed 
to be small. 
The temperature goals of the Paris Agreement require 
basically a total decarbonization of the energy system by 2050 
(depending on assumptions on the possibility of CO2 removal) 
(Figure 3.1i and Figure 3.2a). Constraints set by other SDGs 
with respect to the sustainable impact on land and water, imply 
a major role for energy efficiency, electrification and renewable 
energy. These scenarios require the rapid phase-out of fossil-
based power generation: more than 70% of electricity will likely 
need to be produced with low-carbon technologies in 2030 
and about 100% in 2050. The different scenarios also show the 
portfolio of different options can differ, for instance with respect 
to the role of wind, photovoltaics (PV), bioenergy and fossil 
fuel with carbon capture and storage (CCS) (van Vuuren et al., 
2015a; Clarke et al., 2014). This allows for some flexibility. The 
literature also shows that reducing energy demand can play a 
key role in reducing possible trade-offs (Section 3.1.2.2). While 
the scenarios also show an important role for bioenergy, either 
to decarbonize sectors that will also in the future use liquid fuels 
(e.g., air traffic and some industrial sectors) or to remove CO2 
from the atmosphere (in combination with CCS), its supply is, 
however, constrained by the need to also meet biodiversity and 
food SDGs. The Paris Agreement temperature goals require 
the decarbonization rate to increase from 1-2% historically, to 
around 4-6% in the 2020-2050 period.
3.1.2.4 Food, biosphere and water
For agriculture, the key challenge is to ensure enough food pro-
duction to meet the needs of a growing world population and 
at the same time limit the food system’s environmental impacts. 
This includes, in particular, goals with regard to biodiversity, 
water scarcity, nutrient cycles and climate change. For biodiver-
sity, it should be noted that historically expansion of agricul-
tural area (at the expense of natural habitats, such as forests) 
has been the most important factor leading to biodiversity loss 
(Chaplin-Kramer et al., 2015).
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Figure 3.2. Examples of sustainable pathways achieving several SDGs and their performance on key indicators, meant as illustration for Sustainable Development 
Pathways (SDPs). The figure shows a) primary energy, b) land use and c) water consumption. The transformation pathways are the SSP variant looking into strin-
gent mitigation (SSP1-1.9) from Rogelj et al. (2018) and the “integrated SDG” scenario from Parkinson et al. (2018). SSP data from the SSP Database (2012-2016).
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In the period between 2015-2050, global population is expec-
ted to grow from seven to about around nine billion people even 
in more sustainable scenarios (Lutz et al., 2018). Combined with 
the goal to provide food security and nutritional diets to all peo-
ple (Figure 3.1j), this could require an increase in agricultural 
production, in trend scenarios typically in the order of around 
60% depending on future diets and a more equal distribution of 
food supply. Shifts towards less meat-intensive diets in line with 
health recommendations, reducing food waste and changes in 
food distribution, could lead to a much lower required increase 
in food production (see the sustainable consumption transfor-
mation). The requirement of protection of biodiversity (Figure 
3.1k) implies a reduction of total agricultural land (Figure 3.2b) 
in order to compensate for the increase in other factors affecting 
biodiversity, such as climate change. Scenario studies show that 
this requires stabilization or increases in forest area and signi-
ficant increases in yields (Figure 3.1l). Historically, about 80% 
of these increases have been achieved via productivity increases 
(Smith et al., 2010). Moreover, in many areas yields are still sig-
nificantly below potential yield levels (Neumann et al., 2010). 
This means sustainable scenarios are based on a combination 
of diet change and yield increase. In the most extreme cases, 
yield improvements would need to return to levels achieved his-
torically. Meeting other SDGs means this transition will have to 
limit water consumption and prevent a major increase in ferti-
lizer use. 
For water, current production practices would entail rapid 
further growth in water consumption for energy, domestic, 
industrial and agricultural water use. However, it is possible 
to reduce water consumption through technological efficiency 
increases (Figure 3.2c). Water intensity can also achieve a fur-
ther 30% reduction relative to the baseline demands through 
assumed improvements in behavior. Technological diffusion 
constraints related to financial barriers are relaxed to reflect 
increased access to project financing during implementation 
of the SDGs. This implementation is described in Parkinson et 
al. (2018). While these measures can reduce water scarcity, still 
there will be people living in areas suffering water scarcity. This 
will require sufficient adaptation measures as well as changes 
in the governance structures related to water. A deeper dive on 
nexus governance issues and potential solutions related to the 
water-energy-land nexus at different governance levels is provi-
ded in Section 4.3.
3.1.2.5 Smart cities
Scenarios show that by 2030 around 60% and by 2050 around 
70% of human population will live in urban areas (Figure 
3.1). Increased economic opportunities and cultural offerings 
are among the drivers of this trend. Integrated pathways are 
characterized by high connectivity and ‘smartness’ of cities. The 
digital revolution and the availability of autonomous, high-speed 
transport options however change the nature of urbanization 
with more people able to connect to the dynamism and services 
offered by cities in more remote locations, leading to increased 
integration of the urban hinterland. The rapid urbanization 
process, however, also poses challenges.
The emergence of polycentric, urban-rural landscapes in 
conjunction with the digital revolution facilitates the rapid 
uptake of more localized technologies and production processes 
such as building integrated PV, smart home systems, urban 
farming or advanced on-site printing of things, such that 
cities overall are becoming more self-sufficient, less polluting, 
and circular in terms of resource consumption. Further 
characteristics that define cities in the integrated pathway are 
inclusiveness, access to open spaces (including green areas) and 
a high level of social interaction. This is achieved, among others 
means, through a paradigm shift in housing policies that do 
not any longer lead to segregation by class or race and where 
housing is no longer considered a purely private shelter but is 
an essential component of a larger social system giving people 
better opportunities to connect with each other thus reducing 
‘urban anonymity’. 
As parts of these improvements take place gradually, 
informal settlements are transformed organically to reach 
adequate standards. A striking indicator reflecting this progress 
is the share of people who have access to an improved water 
source. It reaches 100% in 2030 (Figure 3.1m), depicting the 
progress towards minimum adequate housing standards and 
inclusiveness. Slums are eradicated (Figure 3.1n). Paramount to 
all pathway elements is the capacity of urban city planners to 
design policies which respect the rights of all city dwellers and 
enable basic drivers of human wellbeing such as security, trust, 
local identities, and lively neighborhoods.
3.1.2.6 Digital revolution
Digital technologies support the sustainability transition and cut 
across all the other transformations. They are both indicators 
used for tracking the SDGs in themselves (e.g., Internet or 
mobile coverage) as well as enabling technologies to harness 
efficiency gains and inducing life style changes, for example in 
the energy system (e.g., smart metering, car sharing), related to 
environmental quality and health (e.g., water or air pollution 
monitoring). 
The digital revolution and increased automation of 
cognitive tasks are expected to be major drivers of change 
concerning human capacity and prosperity. Digitalization 
and automation will boost technological progress and provide 
the next wave of innovation to drive economic productivity 
(SDG 9), counteracting the risk of secular stagnation. They 
are also projected to offer large benefits for improving 
preventive and curative health care (SDG 3) and providing 
high-quality education (SDG 4). However, if unmanaged, 
the digital revolution could also lead to a rapid increase in 
energy consumption. Moreover, they can also have significant 
impacts on the work force and personal incomes due to rapidly 
increasing automation. If the increased profits generated by 
automation accrue to only a few, and if no decent substitutes 
for replaced jobs can be found, major challengers for achieving 
SDGs 8 and 10 can occur. Education can again play a large role 
here for providing people with the necessary skills to adapt to a 
rapidly changing labor market which may be characterized by 
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an increased focus on human and social interactions and the 
contextualization of knowledge. 
In summary, digitalization and automation can be key drivers 
and enablers of sustainability outcomes across the SDGs, 
supported by major investments in research and development. 
Yet, they need to be managed well (Section 4.4.3) to harness 
their full potential for the sustainability transformation and 
avoid adverse impacts. Current models fall short of capturing 
such disruptive technological advances. 
3.1.2.7  Investment needs for the sustainability 
transition
Mobilizing the necessary financial resources (Figure 3.3) will 
be critical to achieving the transformation towards the SDGs. 
This needs to comprise a fundamental change in the investment 
portfolio across all sectors of the economy. Additional investment 
needs, estimated in one study to be around $1.4 trillion per 
year until 2030, can be identified in particular for education 
(SDG 4), health (SDG 3), sustainable agriculture (SDGs 2, 13, 
15), infrastructure (SDG 9) and access to clean energy (SDGs 
7 and 13) and water (SDG 6) (Schmidt-Traub, 2015). A large 
part of financing the sustainable development transformation 
is not concerned with raising additional sources of investment, 
but with re-directing existing investments from unsustainable 
to sustainable activities, such as re-directing investments into 
energy supply from fossil fuels to low-carbon energy sources.  
IAM-based analyses have focused so far mostly on investments 
needs for decarbonizing energy use and providing energy access 
(McCollum et al., 2018b; McCollum et al., 2013). These studies 
have shown that even without new policies investments in the 
energy system would be around US$2000 billion per year. In 
addition to a massive shift away from fossil fuels, an additional 
investment of around US$300-500 billion per year in the period 
until 2030 (around 17-25% of 2015 energy system investments 
worldwide) would be needed for decarbonization. Moreover, 
around US$60-200 billion per year would be needed additionally 
for providing access to energy. This means low-carbon supply 
investments will need to overtake fossil investments already 
around 2025, and reach, in many pathways, an 80% threshold 
already by 2035. A fundamentally restructured energy system 
would on the other hand also bring economic benefits, such 
as for air pollution control costs which would drop close to 
US$200 billion per year (due to the reduced use of fossil fuels 
and the need for accompanying pollution control equipment). 
Consequently, investments into unabated fossil infrastructure 
(i.e., without CCS) also have to be scaled down rapidly, leading 
to disinvestments in the order of hundreds of billions of US$ 
per year by 2050 (compared to baseline pathways without 
sustainability policies). Investments in energy efficiency and 
demand-side solutions lead to energy savings consistent with 
the SDG 12 sustainable consumption narrative, provides 
significant wiggle room in the form of avoided investment in 
traditional supply technologies (on the order of hundreds of 
billions of dollars). 
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Figure 3.3. Integrated policy design needed to steer sustainable investments towards achieving the SDGs. Projected energy investments for climate mitigation 
(SDG13) and how they relate to four other SDG dimensions (energy access-SDG 7, food security-SDG 2, water-SDG 6 and air quality- SDG 3). Total (panel a) and 
incremental change compared to the baseline (panel b) in average annual investments between 2016 and 2030. Light blue bars show mean investment in 1.5°C pa-
thways across results from six different models, and dark blue for 2°C pathways, respectively. Whiskers represent minima/maxima across estimates from six models. 
Water and air investments are available only for one model. Negative investments reflect reduced investment needs (disinvestments) into fossil fuel (energy sector) 
or cost savings for air pollution control (synergies). Investments for different sustainable development dimensions denote the investment needs for complementary 
measures to avoid trade-offs (negative impacts) of mitigation. For example, energy access reflects policy costs for ensuring 100% clean fuel adoption throughout 
the world by 2030, via subsidies and microfinance for cooking stoves and fuel price support (SDG target 7.1), even in spite of rising energy prices due to stringent 
climate mitigation. Food security reflects mitigating trade-offs of SDG 7 and SDG 13 policies on the situation of people at the risk of hunger due to potentially 
increasing food prices, the costs do not correspond to completely eradicating hunger (SDG target 2.1). Water includes achieving SDG targets 6.1 to 6.4 and a wide 
range of municipal water technologies, excl. irrigation costs. Air pollution represents costs to substantially reduce premature deaths from air pollution (SDG target 
3.9). All investment values are undiscounted and in US$2015 per year. Source: estimates from CD-LINKS scenarios summarized by McCollum et al. (2018b).
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Investments in the water sector, including pumping, 
distribution, storage, treatment and conservation will need to 
be scaled up rapidly to about US$1.2 trillion per year globally 
in order to achieve the core objectives of SDG 6 (Parkinson et 
al., 2018). In the water sector, most of the investment is needed 
in order to develop, maintain and replace piped water and 
wastewater collection infrastructure, particularly in developing 
regions currently lacking infrastructure (e.g., South Asia, 
Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa). Roughly 40% of the 
investments are needed for the water supply infrastructure; 40% 
for wastewater collection and treatment; and about 20% of the 
investments are needed for improving the efficiency of water 
uses across the sectors. The SDG 6 targets would be partially 
achieved by accelerated investments into wastewater treatment 
and wastewater recycling infrastructure. The latter would be 
used increasingly to support water efficiency targets and demand 
growth in water-stressed regions. Efficiency investments are 
an important part of the SDG 6 solution portfolio, leading to 
reductions in withdrawals and return flows. In the long term, 
more sustainable consumption and production behavior 
consistent with the SDG 12 targets provide the foundation 
for reduced water supply costs when compared to the other 
scenarios featuring a continuation of current consumption 
trends.
Infrastructure investments in the energy and water sectors 
need to be complemented by dedicated measures to improve 
distributional effects of some of these policies and to assure 
access to basic living standards for all. This comprises, for 
example, investment needs in the order of US$225 billion per 
year to 2030 into universal access to affordable and reliable 
(cooking) energy, or around US$40 billion per year into food 
security to assure access to affordable food (in case of land-
use changes brought about by with stringent climate policies) 
and US$180 billion for universal education ((McCollum et al., 
2018a), Figure 3.3). 
3.2 Transforming human capacity: Health, 
education and demography 
People are at the core of the transformation towards sustainable 
development and a low carbon society. Not only do human 
activities drive global environmental change, human beings are 
also affected by it and thus, long-term human thriving is the 
goal of sustainable development. In what direction a society 
will develop and transform thus depends on human capabilities 
which encompass a set of knowledge, skills, competencies and 
psychological and physical abilities. In particular, health and 
education are fundamental elements of human capacities and 
subsequently the development process. While in the 2030 Agenda 
health and education are often seen as an outcome of successful 
development, we argue that they are both  means to achieving 
key sectors of the global development agenda (Bengtsson et al., 
2018; Nunes et al., 2016). Poverty reduction, attaining quality 
education and reducing inequalities, for instance, cannot simply 
be achieved if a population does not have good health and 
wellbeing. Likewise, also quality education is a precondition for 
achieving many aspects of sustainable development (Bengtsson 
et al., 2018).
In the following section , the transformation of human 
capacity, with a focus on education and health and its nexus 
with other SDGs is considered in relation to the ‘five Ps’ – 
people, planet, prosperity, peace, and partnership. These five 
critical dimensions capture the broad scope of the 2030 Agenda 
adopted by the United Nations.
3.2.1 Education and demography
Education is a key factor for the achievement of sustainable 
development. First, education has an intrinsic value. For 
instance, a person may value knowing something since 
knowledge is intrinsically satisfying. Second, education has 
several instrumental roles both at the personal and collective 
levels in promoting productivity and bringing about social 
change (Drèze and Sen, 2002). Education is a means to 
exercise all other SDGs because education not only enhances 
human capital (individual’s productive ability) but also human 
capabilities (capability to achieve valued functionings) (Sen, 
1997). Education thus can also have an indirect role in bringing 
about social development. For example, expanding girls’ 
education can help reduce gender inequality and fertility rates. 
Figure 3.4 illustrates the impact of education on demography 
using the SSP1 and SSP3 scenarios (Lutz et al., 2018). The 
SSP1 assumes accelerated educational and health investments, 
including successful implementation of SDG target 4.1 on 
universal secondary education. This promotes the demographic 
transition, leading to a relatively low world population with 
increased well–being and a peak in global population in 2050 
and a well-educated global population. This strongly contrasts 
with the SSP3 scenario with much less emphasis on education. 
The consequence is a much higher, and growing global 
population at the turn of the century. Moreover, large segments 
of the population (in less developed countries) have low levels 
of educational attainment. The low population developments 
in SSP1 will facilitate sustainable development in several 
dimensions, e.g., access to clean energy and water and the 
provision of nutritious diets without endangering biodiversity. 
All of these would prove major challenges in SSP3.
Beyond its impact on demography, education is a key driver 
of economic and societal development. While a positive 
relationship between education and other dimensions of 
sustainable development has been documented (Baker, 2014; 
2007), extant literature on interactions between SDGs still 
overlooks education as a potential driver of the attainment of 
other goals (Pradhan et al., 2017; Nilsson et al., 2016). This is 
possibly due the lack of evidence and knowledge on the pathways 
by which education influences other sectors of development. 
Indeed, the benefit of education goes beyond its instrumental 
value, described in the neo-classical utilitarian economic theory 
as a tool to acquire skills and knowledge enabling individuals 
to be more productive and earn higher wages (Becker, 1962; 
Schultz, 1961). The rights-based discourse perceives education 
as a fundamental human right. Based on the concept of rights, 
Amartya Sen (1999; 1985) developed the capability approach 
which focuses on improving individuals’ substantive freedoms 
or real opportunities to promote or achieve functionings 
they value and have good reasons to value. Basic education is 
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perceived as fundamental precondition for developing such 
capability as well as included as a capability in its own right. 
In this view, education is also a tool for human empowerment.
Recently, there has been an attempt to conduct a 
comprehensive review of literature from a wide range of 
disciplines showing the role of education and learning in driving 
positive change in environmental and sustainable development 
and overall human wellbeing. This review is part of the Global 
Education Monitoring Report 2016 (UNESCO, 2016). The role 
of education in sustainable development is considered in an 
integrated manner: by not only linking education with other 
goals but also looking at reciprocal linkages between them. 
3.2.1.1 People 
There is abundant scientific evidence on the role of education in 
promoting human and social development in relation to health, 
nutrition and access to water and sanitation. This includes health 
behaviors ranging from smoking, drug abuse mental health, 
chronic diseases to mortality (Smith and Sagar, 2014; Meng 
and D’Arcy, 2012; Baker et al., 2011; Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 
2010; Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2008; Grossman and Kaestner, 
1997). Children of better-educated mothers or households are 
less likely to be undernourished (Alderman and Headey, 2017; 
Pamuk et al., 2011) and have better access to quality water and 
sanitation (Munamati et al., 2016; Tiwari and Nayak, 2013). 
By building health literacy and enabling individuals to pursue 
nutrition and healthy behaviors, education plays a fundamental 
role in driving people’s wellbeing.
3.2.1.2 Planet
While the relationship between education and health is 
relatively well researched, the link between education and the 
environment has  more recently developed into a research area 
(Bengtsson et al., 2018). Still education attainment is highly 
relevant for climate mitigation and adaptation (Lutz and 
Muttarak, 2017). Education contributes to the reduction of 
vulnerability to environmental change (Butz et al., 2014; Lutz et 
al., 2014). For instance, it is found that highly educated societies 
or households have higher disaster-preparedness, suffer lower 
loss and damage and recover faster from catastrophic shocks 
(Muttarak and Lutz, 2014). The relationship between education 
and sustainable lifestyle and consumption is more complex. 
On the one hand, highly educated individuals express greater 
concern about the environment and climate change and are 
more likely to report carrying out pro-environmental behaviors 
(Chankrajang and Muttarak, 2017; Meyer, 2015; Muttarak 
and Chankrajang, 2015). On the other, higher income at 
the aggregate level education is also associated with greater 
environmental stress and GHG emissions (Hill and Magnani, 
2002; Gangadharan and Valenzuela, 2001). Some scholars 
argue that the relationship between economic development 
and environmental degradation will follow an ‘inverse-U’ 
shaped pattern whereby at high-income levels, the relationship 
between income and environmental degradation and pollution 
reverses, leading to environmental improvement (Stern et al., 
1996; Grossman and Krueger, 1991). Education could play a 
role here in increasing consumption efficiency and facilitating 
the adoption of modern, cleaner energy sources (Song et al., 
2015; Pachauri et al., 2012). The empirical evidence on this issue 
remains inconclusive (Hervieux and Mahieu, 2014; Goldman, 
2012; Carson, 2010).  A direct co-benefit of increased adoption 
of clean energy is the reduction of exposure to indoor air 
pollution, thus improving the health, especially of women and 
children (Section 3.2.2). 
3.2.1.3 Prosperity
Poverty reduction and economic growth are necessary for 
achieving shared global prosperity. By raising individual 
and national capabilities, particularly skills and productive 
knowledge, education plays a key role in poverty reduction. 
Likewise, recent studies have consistently shown the positive 
relationship between education and economic growth, especially 
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Figure 3.4. World population until 2100 according to two scenarios and educational attainment. Source: Lutz et al. (2018). 
by disaggregating the level of educational attainment and age 
(Crespo Cuaresma et al., 2014; Lutz et al., 2008) and the quality 
of education (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008; Hanushek and 
Kimko, 2000). Given that the SDG agenda explicitly aims to 
ensure inclusion and equity, it is also important to consider the 
relationship between economic and educational inequalities. 
In fact, there is evidence that educational equality in a country 
promotes income growth (Vinod et al., 2001)  and reduces 
income inequality (Coady and Dizioli, 2018). As the country 
develops, however, the positive impact of educational expansion 
on income diminishes. Subsequently, policies that address 
educational quality are considered to be crucial in enhancing 
the role of education in reducing income inequality (Coady and 
Dizioli, 2018). 
3.2.1.4 Peace 
The explicit inclusion of ‘Peace’ in the SDG agenda highlights 
that peaceful and inclusive societies are fundamental for 
sustainable development. The absence of violence is a 
prerequisite for peace (Galtung, 1969) and violence and conflict 
are less likely in societies where institutions are democratic 
(Hegre, 2014). Likewise, political participation and inclusion 
are vital to social cohesion and for ensuring democratic 
transformation. Not only does education increase political 
knowledge, it also promotes civic culture and participation in 
democratic politics as demonstrated in the association between 
education and democracy (Glaeser et al., 2007; Barro, 1999). 
There is also evidence that education is a more important 
underlying driver of democratization than income (Lutz et al., 
2010). While political participation is higher among highly 
educated individuals (Mayer, 2011), they are more likely to 
engage in nonviolent civil actions. Accordingly, it is found that 
countries with higher levels of primary and secondary school 
enrolment experience lower risk of outbreak of civil war and 
armed conflict (Barakat and Urdal, 2009; Thyne, 2006; Collier 
and Hoeffler, 2004). By reducing deprivation and vulnerability, 
education thus is a powerful instrument to reduce grievances 
(Aoki et al., 2002). 
3.2.2 Health 
As is the case for education, human health is central to sustainable 
development and improving population health will support 
achievement of the SDGs. In return, the achievement of each 
of the SDGs will contribute toward improving health outcomes, 
either directly, through improving access to and quality of 
health services, or indirectly, through protecting biodiversity 
and reducing unsustainable practices that contribute to adverse 
health outcomes. 
3.2.2.1 People
Lack of access to water, sanitation, and hygiene services exposes 
individuals to diarrheal diseases, which can cause severe illness 
and death, particularly in infants and children. Estimates based 
on 2012 data find that lack of access to these services resulted 
in 842,000 premature deaths from diarrheal disease, over 
40% of which occurred in children under age 5 (Prüss-Ustün 
et al., 2014). Traditional cooking technologies, such as using 
open fires with biomass or charcoal, result in a heavy risk of 
respiratory and cardiovascular diseases due to the indoor air 
pollution these fuels generate, which disproportionally affects 
women and children. Estimates from 2010 found 3.9 million 
premature deaths worldwide that year due to household air 
pollution (Smith et al., 2014). Addressing these challenges 
requires increased investment in providing safe, convenient, 
and affordable alternatives to traditional methods for accessing 
water or energy. Critically, these solutions must be culturally 
appropriate and address the users’ needs. Researching and 
funding a variety of solutions that address locally-specific needs 
will be critical to addressing gaps in water and energy access. 
3.2.2.2 Planet
Many of the SDGs are targeted at reducing unsustainable be-
haviors and protecting biodiversity; and doing so would likely 
positively affect human health. For instance, globally, pollution 
has immense consequences for global public health. Recent es-
timates suggest that worldwide, roughly nine million prematu-
re deaths are attributable to diseases caused by pollution (air, 
water, chemical, etc.), with disproportionately high effects on 
populations in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (Landrigan 
et al., 2018). Fossil fuel use also drives climate change, which is 
associated with a variety of adverse health outcomes, including 
from exposure to extreme temperatures, growing ranges of in-
fectious or vector-borne diseases, and more powerful disasters 
that can lead to injuries or loss of life (McMichael, 2013). Addi-
tionally, as CO2 levels rise, nutrient losses in staple crops such 
as wheat and rice are occurring, leading to vitamin  and micro-
nutrient deficiencies (Zhu et al., 2018). 
Preventing biodiversity loss also has important health impli-
cations for human health, particularly through impacts on nu-
trition. For instance, fish catches worldwide are expected to fall 
sharply in the coming decades due to increased fishing pressu-
res and environmental change, placing over 800 million people 
at risk of micronutrient deficiency (Golden et al., 2016). Aside 
from the health impacts of climate change, high levels of red 
meat consumption, as found in many developed countries and 
increasingly in rapidly developing countries such as China, can 
result in an increased risk of premature death (Pan et al., 2012). 
FAO (2011) estimates that 20-30% of food worldwide is cur-
rently wasted. Reducing losses across the food system can help 
reduce problems associated with the under- and malnutrition 
connected to global change (Popp et al., 2017).
Importantly, policies that reduce GHG emissions can have po-
sitive impacts on human health, generally referred to as co-be-
nefits. For instance, reducing emissions from power plants can 
also reduce other air pollutants, such as particulate matter, that 
can cause or aggravate respiratory illnesses and cause prematu-
re mortality (Chang et al., 2017). Designing urban spaces that 
encourage the use of active forms of transport, such as walking 
or bicycling, can reduce the use of polluting vehicles, while si-
multaneously providing health improvements through exercise. 
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3.2.2.3 Prosperity
Collectively, the lack of prosperity for all individuals due to 
poverty and inequality represents one of the most prominent 
barriers to improving global health outcomes. Recent national 
surveys from sub-Saharan Africa show that inequality correlates 
closely with poor health outcomes, knowledge about health, and 
an inability to receive high-quality health services. For instance, 
in Tanzania, the poorest fifth of children are at least eight 
times more likely to test positive for malaria compared to the 
wealthiest fifth (Ministry of Health and ICF, 2016). Examples 
such as this illustrate how by shaping individual knowledge and 
capabilities as well as influencing where and how people live, 
poverty and inequality can generate health disparities.
Addressing health disparities associated with poverty requires 
improving access to and the quality of health care services, 
particularly in the lowest resource settings. At least half of the 
world’s population cannot obtain essential health services, with 
the result that large numbers of households are pushed into 
poverty because they must pay for health care out of their own 
pockets. Approximately 800 million people spend at least 10% 
of their household budgets on health expenses for themselves or 
a sick family member (WHO and World Bank, 2017). Policies 
that promote universal access (SDG target 3.8), such as removing 
user fees to access public health care facilities, as has been done 
in countries such as Uganda, can significantly increase service 
use among the poorest populations (Nabyonga Orem et al., 
2011). However, barriers such as inadequate finances and low 
levels of human capital hinder universal access goals in low- and 
middle-income countries (Frenk, 2015). 
3.2.2.4 Peace 
SDG target 16.1 seeks to reduce all forms of violence, which 
takes a considerable toll on global public health. Estimates 
show roughly 150,000 deaths worldwide in 2016 due to acts of 
war and terrorism, with an additional 390,000 deaths due to 
interpersonal violence (Naghavi et al. 2017). Globally, women 
and girls are more likely than men and boys to experience 
intimate partner violence (Desmarais et al., 2012). SDG target 
5.2 calls for eliminating all forms of violence against women 
and girls, yet there is a long way to go before this target is met. 
Global estimates for experiences of intimate partner violence 
are troublingly high—over 40% of women age 15 or over in 
sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia have experienced intimate 
partner violence or sexual violence from a non-partner at 
some point during their lifetime (World Health Organization 
2013). Even in high-income countries, roughly one in three 
women have experienced such violence. Children are also 
disproportionately harmed by violence, the effects of which 
can stretch well into adulthood due to an increased risk of 
mental health disorders (Norman et al., 2012). SDG target 16.2 
articulates the need to eliminate all forms of violence against 
children. Achieving SDGs related to health and violence will 
require a range of efforts to address violent conflict, as well as 
the causes of interpersonal violence. Reducing gender-based 
violence requires developing, testing, and scaling interventions 
to prevent violence, particularly in low- and middle-income 
countries, as well as changing legal regimes that place women at 
greater risk of violence. Globally, there is a lack of evidence on 
interventions designed to prevent gender-based violence, and 
most of the outstanding evidence is from high-income countries, 
despite a greater risk of violence in low- and middle-income 
countries (Ellsberg et al., 2015). Moreover, programs which 
support caregivers when children are young can help reduce 
the risk of violence against children (UNICEF, 2014). Recent 
estimates suggest that among the nearly two billion children 
age 2-17 around the world, at least half (54%) experienced 
some form of violence during the past year, rising to over 
three quarters (76%) when moderate forms of violence such 
as spanking are included (Hillis et al., 2016). In jurisdictions 
without specific penalties for domestic violence, creating such 
penalties can help discourage potential perpetrators and hold 
abusers accountable for their actions.
3.2.3 Investments in health and education
The two-directional positive link between health and education 
indicates that there is a self-reinforcing positive feedback: 
educational improvements cause health improvements, which 
in turn affects education positively. Such relationships are very 
powerful in providing an (in this case) desirable change (Collste 
et al., 2017). However, there are also fundamental delays in the 
feedbacks between the two and how they affect development 
overall. As only children go to school, it takes time for the 
full effects of educational investments to have an effect on a 
societal scale and impact e.g., fertility outcomes and labor force 
productivity. Educational achievements are also dependent on 
the development of other sectors. For example, investments 
in infrastructure in rural areas (SDG 9) promotes access to 
schools and increases the time children can spend on education 
(Brenneman and Kerf, 2002). Also, electricity investments 
(SDG7) can enable children to study at night which improves 
their educational performance and, in turn, educational 
attainment (Collste et al., 2017; Fay et al., 2005; Brenneman and 
Kerf, 2002). North-South partnerships are needed to provide 
financial and technical resources to low- and middle-income 
countries coping with health challenges, particularly those 
associated with climate change. Likewise, to achieve quality 
education for all, global ‘partnership’ with inclusive engagement 
from diverse stakeholders in all countries is necessary. Policies 
that emphasize sustainable development and collaboration, in 
line with SSP1, will lay the groundwork for mutually-beneficial 
partnerships (Sellers and Ebi, 2018). 
3.3 Pathways towards selected SDGs 
In Section 3.3, we assess in more detail existing scenario literature 
on the achievement of a set of selected SDGs, which are under 
review at the High-level Political Forum (HLPF) 2018: SDG 6, 
7, 11, 12 and 15. This includes more in depth insights into the 
interlinkages from the perspective of these SDGs, important for 
holistic policy design. We start with SDG 12 as consumption 
provides a good cross-sectoral entry point (3.1.3). This is followed 
by resources and basic needs of SDGs 7, 15 and 6. An assessment 
of pathways related to SDG 11 completes this section. 
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3.3.1 SDG 12: Responsible consumption and 
production 
SDG 12 relates to several other SDGs. This includes the focus on 
transformative in the use of key resources (water, energy, food, 
land, oceans, and climate protection). However, SDG  12 also 
integrates explicitly the supply- and demand-side perspectives 
of resource systems (Box 3.2), thus opening the avenue to 
discuss consumption choices, preference, and lifestyles in the 
SDG discourse. (SDG 11 on cities being another example of 
an SDG that lends itself to a discussion from an end-use and 
demand perspective, Section 3.3.5).
A key concept for SDG 12 is the notion that material well-
being does not necessarily rely on the utilization (“consumpti-
on”) of resources per se, but rather on the services and amenities 
these help to provide (Creutzig et al., 2018b). Wellbeing arises 
from nutritious and balanced diets rather than from purchase 
of food items, part of which end-up as food waste even prior to 
consumption. Likewise, thermal comfort (temperature and hu-
midity control) of a shelter is first of all determined by the cha-
racteristics of the building envelope (insulation levels), which 
then determines the amount of energy needed. For mobility as 
well, a focus on services and their determinants (e.g., private 
but also collective decisions such as infrastructure) could lead 
to different choices. The services and amenities from final con-
sumption (nutrition, thermal comfort, and mobility) require 
“upstream” services as well: food needs to be produced, goods 
manufactured and transported buildings and infrastructures 
built. While this systemic interdependence between demand 
and supply is at the core of SDG 12, it is ultimately driven by 
consumption choices. 
We need to further disentangle the resource efficiency of end-
use and consumption patterns. The resource (i.e., energy) needs 
(“consumption”) for mobility services arises from the combined 
effects of five interrelated clusters of variables: a) service level 
demand (e.g., is a trip needed at all), b) individual transport 
mode choice (e.g., public versus private transport), c) the ser-
vice efficiency of transport mode usage (e.g., load factors in pu-
blic transport, or alternative organizational models to individu-
al vehicle ownership such as car sharing that lead to greater asset 
utilization), and lastly d) the technological (energy) efficiency of 
the transport vehicle (e.g., a bus or a road vehicle for individual 
transport services such as a taxi, a car of a car sharing scheme, or 
a private, individually owned vehicle) and e) the energy source 
used for the transport vehicle. Ceteris paribus, the levers on re-
source consumption tend to be larger the closer to the actual 
service demand the system is leveraged (e.g., avoiding a car trip 
altogether has a larger impact than switching an internal com-
bustion engine car to biodiesel) (Section 2.3.9). It is important 
to understand however, that individual choices, while critically 
important, also face constraints and limitations from the “ups-
tream” supply sectors (industry and businesses) that constrain 
individual choices with respect to technological and service effi-
ciency. Through innovation and new business models these can 
also enhance individual choices.
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Box 3.2. SDG 12 targets. Source: UN (2015).
12.1 Implement the 10-year framework of programs on sustainable consumption and production, all countries taking action, 
with developed countries taking the lead, taking into account the development and capabilities of developing countries
12.2 By 2030, achieve the sustainable management and efficient use of natural resources
12.3 By 2030, halve per capita global food waste at the retail and consumer levels and reduce food losses along production 
and supply chains, including post-harvest losses
12.4 By 2020, achieve the environmentally sound management of chemicals and all wastes throughout their life cycle, in 
accordance with agreed international frameworks, and significantly reduce their release to air, water and soil in order to 
minimize their adverse impacts on human health and the environment 
12.5 By 2030, substantially reduce waste generation through prevention, reduction, recycling and reuse
12.6 Encourage companies, especially large and transnational companies, to adopt sustainable practices and to integrate 
sustainability information into their reporting cycle
12.7 Promote public procurement practices that are sustainable, in accordance with national policies and priorities
12.8 By 2030, ensure that people everywhere have the relevant information and awareness for sustainable development and 
lifestyles in harmony with nature 
12.a Support developing countries to strengthen their scientific and technological capacity to move towards more sustainable 
patterns of consumption and production
12.b Develop and implement tools to monitor sustainable development impacts for sustainable tourism that creates jobs and 
promotes local culture and products 
12.c
Rationalize inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption by removing market distortions, in 
accordance with national circumstances, including by restructuring taxation and phasing out those harmful subsidies, 
where they exist, to reflect their environmental impacts, taking fully into account the specific needs and conditions of 
developing countries and minimizing the possible adverse impacts on their development in a manner that protects the 
poor and the affected communities
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Several frameworks exist for steering synergistic strategies of 
responsible consumption and production: 
Avoid/Shift/Improve. A simple concept of “avoid/shift/im-
prove” has been proposed by Creutzig et al. (2018b) to outline 
generic strategies for more responsible consumption. “Avoid” 
refers to strategies that avoid resource-intensive systems of ser-
vice provision altogether such as telecommuting substituting 
for physical transport. “Shift” refers to strategies substituting 
resource-intensive systems of service provision by less-resour-
ce-intensive ones (e.g., modal choices away from individual 
transport models to walking and cycling). Lastly, “Improve” 
refers to strategies of improving technological and service ef-
ficiency in service provision (e.g., shared electric vehicles for 
individual transport).
ReSOLVE. Similar ideas are also expressed in frameworks like 
“ReSOLVE” (Ellen MacArthur Foundation et al., 2015). ReSOL-
VE integrates strategies that aim to minimize waste, closing 
material loops, improve efficiency and asset utilization aiming 
to Regenerate, Share, Optimize, Loop, Virtualize, and Exchange 
resource flows and modes of service provision. 
3.3.1.1 Over- and under-consumption
The previous discussion of strategies for more “responsible con-
sumption” addresses issues mainly arising from “overconsump-
tion” or inefficiencies in the current systems (Section 2.3.9) but 
remains largely amiss of a core concern of the SDGs: to redress 
the current imbalances in access to and the benefits1 of service 
provision of modern systems of resource use. Billions remain 
excluded from access to basic services of adequate nutrition, 
water and sanitation, clean energy services, among others (UN, 
2017). Providing basic access to these services by 2030 is con-
sequently a core concern of a number of SDGs and also consti-
tutes the first element to start to define what “responsible con-
sumption” means for those that remain to date excluded from 
the benefits of modern forms of service provision. 
Providing access to basic services and amenities by 2030 for 
all still begs the question of “what next”? Given the time frame 
of 2050 for TWI2050, a natural question to pose is: what would 
constitute “responsible consumption” for the world’s poor over a 
longer time frame that rebalances development aspirations with 
resource constraints and planetary boundaries? Clearly in a sus-
tainable development context the “overconsumption” model of 
the Global North cannot be an aspirational goal for the consu-
mers of the Global South. The concept of decent living stan-
dards (DLS) aims to assure that people have the material means 
to pursue a decent life and avoid harm to their basic interests 
(Doyal and Gough, 1991). Following Rao and Min (2017) these 
requirements include a set of amenities and services that en-
sure good health, and those that enable people to engage with 
society. They include safe and uncramped shelter, nutrition and 
1 Due to international trade impacts and benefits of resource exploitation can be spaced far apart. Over-consumption, that often externalizes its footprints and un-
der-consumption are therefore often interlinked. For an illustration and a scenario of redistribution benefits see e.g., Steffen, W. & Stafford Smith, M. 2013. Planetary 
boundaries, equity and global sustainability: why wealthy countries could benefit from more equity. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 5, 403-408.
water, clothing, health care, education and basic comforts in the 
home, such as lighting and thermal comfort (including water 
heating), refrigerators and clean cooking devices. These basic 
comforts serve to avoid harm from extreme weather, disease 
and pollution. In engaging with society, people seek knowledge 
about the world, and the means to communicate with others, 
which give rise to the need for education, devices in the home to 
communicate (e.g., mobile phones) and access broadcast media 
(e.g., television), and access to mobility. Rao and Min (2017) 
provide quantitative guideposts for such a set of amenities and 
services that support decent standards of living, including in-
ter alia 2500 kcal per day food, 10 m2 per capita floor space, 
amenities such as a cellphone a fridge and a TV, as well as a 
minimum of 7000 km/capita per year of mobility. In a scenario 
exercise inspired by the SDGs (Grubler et al., 2018) have com-
pared the resource implications for aggressive downsizing of 
the energy system through demand-side technologies with the 
energy needs for providing DLS for all by 2050. Given persistent 
heterogeneity and differences between and within countries and 
subpopulations, assuring DLS of for all also implies that aver-
ages need to be substantially higher than minimum values. The 
conclusion from this scenario exercise is that providing decent 
standards of living based on the Rao and Min (2017) quantitati-
ve framework is possible so long as high levels of leapfrogging in 
advanced energy systems and electrification in the Global South 
can be achieved. The greater the extent of the proliferation of the 
highest standards in waste minimization and technological and 
service end-use resource efficiency, the more the average living 
standards can exceed minimum levels (Figure 3.5a) while sig-
nificantly reducing energy and material resource requirements 
(Figure 3.5b). Figure 3.5 thus illustrates a globally converging 
perspective on “responsible consumption” that maintains high 
levels of material wellbeing while minimizing resource inputs, 
wastes and pollution. Combining, behavioral change, new busi-
ness models (e.g., sharing economy) and technological and usa-
ge efficiency measures with transformations in upstream sectors 
under a responsible consumption and production paradigm all-
ows the achievement of high levels of material wellbeing while 
minimizing resource inputs and wastes.
3.3.1.2 Resource dimensions of SDG 12 
Currently SDG 12 comprises 11 illustrative targets (Box 3.2) 
that combine generic institutional and informational goals with 
goals related to resource use. These indicators currently howe-
ver lack specificity, with the exception of goal 12.3 (half global 
per capita food waste by 2030) as noted by the first scientific re-
view of the SDGs (ICSU and ISSC, 2015). Waste minimization, 
“environmentally sound management of chemical and wastes”, 
or “rationalization [of] inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies” are fur-
ther examples of resource-related goals referred to under SDG 
12. Here, we adopt a pragmatic approach of assessing various 
scenarios available in the literature in terms of their illustration 
of and implications for SDG 12. The appropriate resource flows 
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Figure 3.5. Panel a (top). Indicators of per capita material wellbeing for the Global South in 2020 and 2050 in comparison to minima formulated by decent stan-
dards of living and per capita values in the Global North. 2050 values are shown for the low energy demand (LED) scenario (Grubler et al., 2018) where high levels 
of material wellbeing are achieved with the lowest energy and resource consumption levels reported in the scenario literature for 2050. Panel b (bottom). Indicators 
of per capita resource inputs to meet activity demands (panel a) for the Global South in 2020 and 2050 in comparison with per capita values in the Global North 
2020 and 2050. Graphic courtesy of Narasimha Rao and Arnulf Grubler.
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to be considered for SDG 12 are those that a) provide a direct 
service benefits to consumers (e.g., food, or drinking water), are 
b) key in current models of service provision (e.g., energy, ma-
terials for housing, vehicles, appliances, etc.), or c) that while 
not “consumed” per se by end users are nonetheless strongly 
influenced by consumption choices in “upstream” sectors, i.e., 
land resources needed to provide food, fiber, energy, and mate-
rials. By looking at a resource matrix, including water, energy, 
land, and materials2 it is possible to describe the interactions 
and interlinkages of responsible consumption and production. 
Given the dominance of climate change mitigation scenarios 
in the literature available to date, one could also include GHG 
emissions in this resource assessment matrix (Figure 3.6). Sce-
narios addressing the elements in the matrix all illustrate the 
resource implications of integrated systems of production and 
use combining both the “upstream” resource implications of 
changing consumption preferences, as well as the “downstream” 
implication of changed production and end-use service provi-
sion patterns that are at the core of SDG 12.
To date there exists not a single scenario illustrating an integ-
rated SDG 12 pathway to 2050 (which TWI2050 is aiming to 
provide, see Section 3.1.3). Therefore, a selection of scenarios 
that pertain to SDG 12 are briefly reviewed here and assessed in 
terms of their SDG 12 resource matrix implications below (Fi-
gure 3.6). The review and assessment is necessarily incomplete, 
reflecting the time and resource constraints of this assessment 
as well as the limitations of the available scenario literature that 
has a very strong climate mitigation focus (and a supply-side 
mitigation options bias in general), and often lacks specificity in 
reporting consumption patterns (e.g., service levels for housing 
floor space or mobility) or resource impacts beyond GHGs and 
energy, with land, and in some instances also materials resource 
implications reported. Five illustrative scenarios (or clusters of 
scenario studies) have been identified of particular relevance to 
SDG 12:
Circular Economy in Europe 2030
This study (Ellen MacArthur Foundation et al., 2015) is a 
comprehensive assessment of the concept of the circular economy 
as well as short-term (2030) options for its implementation in 
Europe, mostly from a business perspective. It mainly assesses 
the circular economy in terms of economic variables, but 
provides quantitative scenario and options quantifications for 
food, mobility, and housing (materials). A valuable specificity 
of the study is the quantification of takeback (rebound) effects 
potentially arising from lowered service provision costs in a 
circular economy.
International Resource Panel, Efficiency plus Climate 
Mitigation Scenario
This scenario study (Ekins et al., 2017; Hatfield-Dodds et al., 
2017)has a focus on material use, embracing an Industrial 
Ecology perspective and integrating consumption and 
production perspectives of materials use. Of particular 
relevance for SDG 12 is the scenario combining high levels of 
2 This resource matrix was first proposed at IIASA as a method for non-monetary assessment of the resource implications of energy strategies .
materials efficiency with climate mitigation for which selected 
end-use consumption for a range of raw materials and energy 
are reported.
IMAGE Model Scenario and Sensitivity Analysis of 
End-use Options
Using the IMAGE Integrated Assessment model, a series of 
studies has explored the implications of reaching a number 
of SDGs drawing on alternative strategies that include also 
consumption/behavioral strategies. van Vuuren et al. (2015a) 
explored the implications of reaching a number (8) of SDG-
related indicators. Their “consumption-based” strategy, albeit 
far from implying drastic changes, suggests that comparable 
SDG benefits can be achieved via a consumption-based 
approach, compared to more conventional technology-based 
strategies. Two studies (Bijl et al., 2017; Stehfest et al., 2009) 
explored in particular the impact of changing food demand, 
including also scenarios of dietary shifts and waste reduction 
that yield significant reductions in global crop demands and 
corresponding land requirements and agricultural emissions. 
In van den Berg et al. (2016) an explicit scenario of resource 
efficiency coupled with climate policies was explored. This 
scenario is comparable to the scenario presented in Ekins et 
al. (2017) (see discussion above). The model was also used to 
look into the relationships between energy, land and water – 
and the options to reduce pressures on these resources via both 
increasing efficiency and lifestyle change (van Vuuren et al., 
2017). Lastly, a recent model sensitivity analysis (van Vuuren et 
al., 2018) also includes consumption and demand-side options 
to explore the potential of reaching an ambitious 1.5˚C climate 
target without negative emission technologies. The scenario of 
“lifestyle changes” explored however only assumes marginal 
changes and as a result its impact is rather small (substituting 
all negative emission technologies of the baseline 1.5˚C scenario 
requires to draw on all scenario sensitivity analysis options, 
including supply-side measures, lifestyle changes, as well as a 
lower population projection).
IEA ETP B2DS Scenario
The “Beyond 2 Degrees” scenario of the International Energy 
Agency’s Energy Technology Perspectives illustrates the energy 
and materials resource implications of a scenario significantly 
below the 2˚C climate target (1.7˚C) and also provides 
consumption activity level details of the scenario quantification 
of relevance for SDG 12.
LED (Low Energy Demand) Scenario
This recent scenario exercise (Grubler et al., 2018), using the set 
of IAMs of IIASA (MESSAGE, GLOBIOM, GAINS), embraces 
an end-use perspective of reaching an ambitious 1.5⁰C climate 
target, with no temperature/emissions overshoot and without 
relying on negative emissions technologies (CCS, BECCS). Its 
specifics include an explicit representation of the concept of 
Decent Standards of Living as well as a rich scenario narrative 
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Figure 3.6. Resource impact matrix for water, energy, land, materials and GHGs (industrial sources of CO2) for selected scenarios illustrating SDG 12 at the global 
level. (Regional indicators are currently not reported comprehensively in the published scenario literature). Note in particular that ceteris paribus the lower the re-
source impacts of a scenario, the higher its SDG 12 benefit. Scenarios pictured: LED = Low Energy Demand scenario (Grubler et al., 2018) in case of water withdra-
wal LED is represented by the “integrated SDG” scenario (Parkinson et al. 2018, based on Grubler, et al. 2018), ETP B2DS = IEA’s Energy Technology Perspectives, 
Beyond 2°C Scenario (IEA ), Efficiency Plus = Efficiency Plus scenario of the International Resource Panel (Ekins et al., 2017; Hatfield-Dodds et al., 2017), which 
is a combination of their Resource Efficiency and Ambitious Climate scenarios, RECP = Global resource efficiency and climate policy scenario of IMAGE (van 
den Berg et al., 2016), LiStCh = Life Style Change scenario of IMAGE (van Vuuren et al., 2018). Panel a) Scenario data for water are currently mostly unavailable. 
Panel b) Direct equivalence method has been used to transform available primary energy scenario data to desired final energy metric (using implied efficiencies in 
the LED scenario for 2050). Panel c/1) LED: total forest area includes managed, natural and harvested area; Efficiency Plus scenario is based on Ekins et al. (2017) 
Fig. 108 that reports a range of literature values incl. IPCC AR5; RECP scenario: includes exploited forest and plantation forest as reported in van den Berg et al., 
2016, Fig.4.; LiStCh scenario: includes all forests as reported in van Vuuren et al, 2018, Fig 3.a. Panel c/2) LED: agricultural land includes total cropland, pasture, 
and harvested area; Efficiency Plus is based on Ekins et al., 2017, Fig. 105, which uses data from various sources by adapting UNEP (2012); RECP scenario: includes 
grassland, bioenergy crops, and arable land as reported van den Berg et al., 2016, Fig.4.; LiStCh scenario: includes energy drop, pasture and crop land as reported in 
van Vuuren et al., 2018, Fig 3.a. Panel d) Materials included in the different scenarios: LED: steel, aluminum, cement, paper, petrochemicals, other, feedstock; ETP: 
cement, high value chemicals, ammonia, methanol, crude steel, paper, aluminum; Efficiency Plus: biomass, fossil fuels, metal ores, non-metallic minerals. Graphic 
courtesy of Arnulf Grubler and Benigna Boza-Kiss.
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in which new trends in ICT convergence, digitalization, and 
sharing economy concepts translate into step changes in 
materials and energy efficiency from an end-use perspective 
leading to rapid decarbonization at end-use that in turn drives 
upstream decarbonization.
3.3.1.3 Synergies and trade-offs with other SDGs
Although a comprehensive assessment of synergies and trade-
offs of SDG 12 versus other SDGs remains outstanding and 
will require the development of further scenario and modeling 
studies, some preliminary conclusions are nonetheless possible.
First, the higher the degree of fulfillment of the SDG 12 tenets 
of responsible consumption and production can be achieved 
(Figure 3.6), the higher will be the co-benefit on other SDGs. 
Lessening resource impacts and wastes allows not only the 
reduction of environmental burdens and the furthering of the 
goals of related SDGs on water, biodiversity, climate and oceans, 
but also stands to free the resources for addressing poverty and 
aiming at a more equitable distribution of material wellbeing. 
This main conclusion is illustrated in Figure 3.7 below, where 
indeed the highest synergies and co-benefits are achieved 
in the scenarios of highest degree of resource efficiency and 
waste minimization. The LED scenario with the highest SDG 
12 benefits also generally scores highest on six other SDGs 
suggesting that responsible consumption and production might 
indeed be a synergistic entry point for many other SDGs as well. 
Second, the available evidence of potential trade-offs between 
3 Rebound effects describe potential increases in consumption after realized cost savings. E.g. a more fuel efficient car reduces mobility costs, savings of which might 
be used to purchase more mobility services (driving longer distances).
SDG 12 and other SDGs is currently too sparse to draw any 
firm conclusion from. Impacts on labor markets and so-called 
“rebound” (takeback) effects3 are often mentioned as potential 
trade-offs in scenarios of low resource inputs. 
Evidently, moving from current systems to more resource-
efficient ones, embracing concepts from the circular and the 
sharing economy, might reduce the demand for certain products 
and commodities (e.g., individually owned vehicles), but in turn 
they also create new job opportunities. A first quantification of 
the employment effects of a circular economy for Europe (EU-
27) by 2030 suggests overall net employment benefits with job 
losses in raw materials sectors (extraction and processing) and 
in some manufacturing sectors (consumer durables, vehicles) 
more than compensated by new job creation in waste recycling 
and new manufacturing jobs (Ellen MacArthur Foundation et 
al., 2015). The largest labor market impact is estimated to arise 
from the indirect effect of higher consumption induced by 
significantly lower prices for materials and energy in a circular 
economy scenario (Ellen MacArthur Foundation et al., 2015). 
The same study however also estimates the potential rebound 
effect from lessened resource prices in a circular economy 
in Europe to be rather small: €0.3 trillion by 2030, which 
corresponds with between 4% of current resource costs (€7.2 
trillion Euro) to 6% of total resource costs by 2030 (€5.4 trillion) 
(Ellen MacArthur Foundation et al., 2015) compared to a typical 
range of potential rebound effects of 5% to 30% (Sorrel, 2007). A 
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scenario sensitivity analysis performed by (Grubler et al., 2018) 
suggests that the SDG benefits of low resource consumption of 
their LED scenario could be preserved even with 50% higher 
demands, suggesting the potential trade-offs from potential 
rebound effects to be rather small.
3.3.2 SDG 7: Affordable and clean energy 
The overarching aim of SDG 7 is to “ensure access to affordable, 
reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all”. Underpinning 
this grand objective are targets with respect to access to modern 
energy, efficiency improvement and renewable energy (Box 3.3).
The impacts of energy production and consumption can be 
far-reaching, certainly with respect to environmental impacts. 
This means that pathways need to also to comply with climate 
goals, for instance (SDG 13 and Paris Agreement). The scientific 
community thus has a critical role to play here in improving the 
science underlying the key relationships. 
3.3.2.1 Key characteristics of pathways achieving 
SDG 7 and SDG 13
Ensuring universal access to affordable, reliable and modern 
energy services (SDG 7.1) can be translated into universal access 
to electricity and to clean cooking by 2030. Achieving these two 
targets implies that yearly, around 92 million people obtain 
access to electricity and 190 million people start relying on clean 
fuels and cooking technologies annually (IEA, 2017). According 
to the scenario literature, cost-efficient provision of electricity 
access could rely mainly on decentralized solutions, both 
mini-grid (35%) and off-grid (26%), which are the most viable 
options in rural and remote areas where basic energy needs still 
have to be met (Dagnachew et al., 2018; IEA, 2017; Pachauri et 
al., 2013). Renewable sources would play a major role in such 
cases, covering up to 84% and 92% of the additional electricity 
demand in mini-grid and off-grid applications, respectively 
(solar PV is the most promising technology for both mini-grid 
and off-grid solutions) (IEA, 2017). The remaining additional 
electricity demand (39%) would need to be supplied by the grid, 
which is more fossil-intensive than the other options (37% of 
energy mix). The investment necessary to guarantee a universal 
minimum electricity household consumption (500 kWh in 
urban and 250 kWh in rural areas) amounts to 725 billion US$ 
for the period 2017-2030, with sub-Saharan Africa being the 
main recipient (IEA, 2017). 
Considering the heterogeneity in electricity access, from basic 
(e.g., lighting) to complex energy services (e.g., air conditioning 
or productive use applications), it is worth noting that off-
grid solutions play a major role (80% of electricity supply) in 
scenarios; however, the more complex the services demanded, 
the more important is the role of grid and mini-grid solutions 
(respectively 68-75% and 25-16% of electricity supply), whereas 
off-grid solutions are less cost-effective (Mentis et al., 2017; 
Pachauri et al., 2013). The target daily per-household electricity 
requirements and assumptions on supply technologies 
determine much of the variation in the assessment of cumulative 
investment needed: between US$2005 9 and US$2005 12 billion 
every year for guaranteeing 420 kWh per household per year 
in rural areas (Pachauri et al., 2013) or between US$12 and 
US$134 billion considering an average consumption between 
100 and 456 kWh per household per year in urban areas and 
between 50 and 360 kWh per household per year in rural areas 
(Bazilian et al., 2010).
The universal access to clean, reliable and modern energy for 
cooking implies a shift in the fuel mix away from traditional 
biomass towards gas (35%), LPG (30%), electricity (17%) and 
improved biomass (16%) (IEA, 2017). Compared to electricity 
access, lower investments are required (US$61 billion), but 
the outcome is more uncertain. The main hindering factors, 
affordability constraints on new more efficient appliances and 
cultural preferences, call for a targeted polices at local and 
community level (IEA, 2017). Also in this case, investment range 
estimates differ widely: 38-50 billion US$2005 yearly between 
2010 and 2030 (Pachauri et al., 2013) and 1.4-2.2 US$ yearly 
(Bazilian et al., 2010). Past experience has shown that the most 
effective policies combine support for fuel prices with grant/
loans for purchasing more efficient stoves (Pachauri et al., 2013).
Achieving SDG target 7.1 may have implications on 
energy demand. The sign and magnitude strongly depend on 
compliance of energy sector with a greener fuel mix (SDG target 
7.2), on efforts to speed up energy efficiency improvement rates 
in all sectors (SDG target 7.3), and ultimately on the actions 
87
Sustainable Development Pathways 3
Box 3.3. SDG 7 targets. Source: UN (2015). 
7.1 By 2030, ensure universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services
7.2 By 2030, increase substantially the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix
7.3 By 2030, double the global rate of improvement in energy efficiency
7.a By 2030, enhance international cooperation to facilitate access to clean energy research and technology, including renew-
able energy, energy efficiency and advanced and cleaner fossil-fuel technology, and promote investment in energy infra-
structure and clean energy technology
7.b By 2030, expand infrastructure and upgrade technology for supplying modern and sustainable energy services for all in 
developing countries, in particular least developed countries, small island developing States, and land-locked developing 
countries, in accordance with their respective programs of support
adopted to combat climate change and its impacts (SDG 
13). The optimal pathway for achieving the SDG target 7.1 
(considering some improvements also in targets 7.2 and 7.3) 
shows that expanding electricity access leads only to a small 
rise of residential energy demand (1%-2% by 2030 with respect 
to a “no new policy scenario”); however, the high efficiency of 
modern energy appliances can completely offset this, shrinking 
energy use by 31-46% (Pachauri et al., 2013). When some 
mitigating  actions (SDG 13) are added to the policy mix, the 
universal energy access can still be achieved by 2030 with even 
lower energy requirements (17% lower with respect to energy 
demand in the “current policy scenario”) through a radical 
transformation of production and consumption patterns (IEA, 
2017).
Pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to well 
below 2°C above pre-industrial levels (Holz et al., 2018), which 
is implicitly at the core of SDG 13, will require a dramatically 
reshaping of the global energy system, leading to net-zero 
carbon emissions by mid-century. Achieving the three targets 
of SDG 7 can help, but more ambitious actions will need to 
follow post-2030. A strong contraction of CO2 emissions can be 
achieved through a progressive phase-out of fossil-based power 
generation: more than 70% of electricity will likely need to be 
produced with low-carbon technologies in 2030 (nearly 100% 
in 2050), and the power sector will need to satisfy a growing 
share of energy demand (around 25% in 2030 and 42% in 2050). 
Meanwhile, the transport sector could register a contraction of 
yearly emission up to 70% in 2050, industrial sector up to 100%, 
and residential sector more than 600% with respect to 2010 
levels (Rogelj et al., 2015). 
3.3.2.2 Synergies and trade-offs with other SDGs
McCollum et al. (2018a) assess the scientific literature exploring 
the impacts that the kinds of energy solutions enumerated by 
SDG 7 (renewables, efficiency, energy for the poor) could poten-
tially have on the various other SDGs, or vice-versa the effects 
that actions and policies in these other domains could have on 
the energy SDG targets. The authors score the target-level inter-
actions identified – in terms of whether it is positive or negative 
and to what extent – by employing the typology and seven-point 
scale presented in Nilsson et al. (2016). Earlier synthesis-type pa-
pers exploring selected energy-related SDG interactions include, 
among others, (Fuso Nerini et al., 2017; Aether, 2016; Jakob and 
Steckel, 2016; Lim et al., 2016; von Stechow et al., 2016; Raji et 
al., 2015; von Stechow et al., 2015; Aranda et al., 2014; Shaw et 
al., 2014; Bhattacharyya, 2013; Pueyo et al., 2013; Saunders et al., 
2013; Smith et al., 2013a; WBGU, 2013; Riahi et al., 2012; Cook, 
2011). Figure 3.8 summarizes the interactions identified in the 
energy literature on an SDG target-by-target basis. It should be 
noted, however, that it is difficult to assign unequivocal scores. 
The assessment shows that SDG 7 has strong relationships with 
several other SDGs. In many cases, there are rather positive inter-
actions between SDG 7 and the other SDGs, indicating that posi-
tive interactions might outweigh negative ones, both in number 
and magnitude. Examples include sustainable urban develop-
ment (among other reduction of air pollution), climate change 
(reduction of CO2 emissions), development of marine and ter-
restrial biodiversity (among others via reduced climate change), 
eradication of poverty and hunger and decent work and econo-
mic growth (via provisioning of energy services), and good health 
and wellbeing (provisioning of energy services and reduction 
of air pollution). Trade-offs, on the other hand, were identified 
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Figure 3.8. Nature of the interactions between SDG 7 (Energy) and the non-energy SDGs. Licensed under CC-BY 3.0 by McCollum et al. (2018a). The relationships 
may be either positive (left panel) or negative (right panel) to differing degrees. See Nilsson et al. (2016) for definitions pertaining to each score from +3 (positive) to 
–3 (negative) in integer increments. The absence of a colored wedge in either the left or right panels indicates a lack of positive or negative interactions, respectively; 
if wedges are absent in both panels for a given SDG, this indicates a score of 0 (‘consistent’). Only one positive or negative score is shown per SDG; in instances 
where multiple interactions are present at the underlying target level (positive and negative treated separately), the individual score with the greatest magnitude is 
shown. Note that, while not illustrated by this figure, some SDG linkages may involve more than simple two-way interactions (e.g., the energy-water-land ‘nexus’). 
No scoring is done for the “means of implementation” SDG 17.
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in particular for SDG 2 (via the production of bioenergy). Lar-
ge-scale 2nd generation bioenergy deployment is a key element 
of 1.5°C and 2°C transformation pathways (SDG 7 and SDG 13) 
(Schleussner et al., 2016; Rogelj et al., 2015). However, large-scale 
bioenergy production might have negative sustainability implica-
tions and thus may conflict with the SDGs, especially with climate 
(Popp et al., 2014) and biodiversity protection, food and water 
security (Bonsch et al., 2016) as well as environmental pollution 
(e.g., nitrogen).  does not show any trade-off between climate mi-
tigation and universal modern energy access objectives; in this 
case two opposite forces are at play. According to Cameron et al. 
(2016), mitigation efforts increase energy costs for the poor: e.g., 
in South Asia  plus 44% by 2030 under stringent climate mitiga-
tion with respect to no climate policy case. Moreover, mitigation 
policies can spur greater efficiency, both in electricity production 
and end-use appliances, which results in lower electricity de-
mand. A recent study analyzing universal electrification scenarios 
for sub-Saharan Africa estimates that while electricity prices are 
likely to be higher in scenarios that include climate mitigation po-
lices, the total investments required for achieving universal elect-
ricity access could be 20% lower than in a “no climate policy” case 
(Dagnachew et al., 2018).
3.3.2.3 Policies that maximize synergies and 
minimize trade-offs
There is a positive and reinforcing feedback between policies 
targeting SDG 7, in particular target 7.1, and poverty 
and malnutrition alleviation, better health and education 
perspectives, less risks and more opportunity for women. The 
SDG targets 7.2 and 7.3 can boost economic growth reducing 
the impact on the environment. 
Trade-offs may arise among SDGs and policies focused on 
achieving one single target can go to the detriment of others. 
This is the case of large-scale bioenergy production that are part 
of the energy mix transformation required by SDG target 7.2. 
On this purpose, policies boosting renewable energy production 
should also foresee environmental protection measures such as 
forest or water conservation schemes. However, more level of 
interactions and feedback needs to be accounted when design-
ing a policy because regulating one environmental externality 
of bioenergy production may again interfere with other SDGs 
(Humpenöder et al., 2018): bioenergy production coupled with 
forest protection, deforestation and associated emissions decline 
substantially may increase food prices (Popp et al., 2011), 3.3.3. 
Another strategy to align large-scale bioenergy production with 
the SDG agenda is the implementation of measures reducing 
the pressure on land in general (land-sparing measures). Tilman 
et al. (2011) showed that, indeed, trade-offs between bioenergy 
production and other sustainability trade-offs (such as defor-
estation, CO2 emissions from land-use change, nitrogen losses) 
can significantly be lowered by improved agricultural produc-
tivity or reduced consumption of resource-intensive livestock 
products combined with less household waste (Humpenöder et 
al., 2018; Smith et al., 2013b). 
Even SDG 7 and SDG 13, which look mutually reinforcing, 
hide some trade-offs: climate policy can in some cases hinder 
universal access to energy. Therefore, when designing climate 
policies additional interventions to shield the poor from 
potential price rises need to be adopted. Research for South 
Asia (Cameron et al., 2016) suggests that a combination of fuel 
subsidies on cleaner cooking fuels and grants or microfinance 
for the purchase of cleaner and more efficient stoves can be 
effective in making these more affordable for poor households 
even in the face of steep increases in fuel prices caused by 
stringent climate mitigation policies. Other options include pro-
poor tariffs, or cross-subsidization to protect the poor from any 
potential electricity price increases. Evidence from many Asian 
and Latin American nations (Borges da Silveira Bezerra et al., 
2017)suggest that shielding the poor from potential energy price 
rises may also be achieved through non-energy policies. Wider 
social assistance programs such as targeted and conditional 
cash transfers, minimum income schemes, or other safety nets 
can also be effective in shielding the poor from potential price 
changes and making modern energy services more affordable 
to them.
3.3.3 SDG 15: Life on land
Land use to provide essential natural goods and resources is 
one of the foundations of human wellbeing (de Fries 2004). 
The evolving food needs of a population of about 9-10 billion 
people (in 2050) (Lutz et al., 2018) has to be met. Historically, 
increasing demand has led to expanding the cultivated agricul-
tural area and with a technological revolution that has increased 
yields through increases in modern inputs such as irrigation 
water, improved seeds, fertilizer, machinery and pesticides. But 
land is a limited resource that has to fulfill multiple functions, 
including protecting biodiversity. Moreover, other SDGs imply 
that the environmental impacts of food production need to be 
mitigated (Section 3.3.3.3). Climate change will strongly affect 
agricultural yields, freshwater availability and biodiversity. Such 
potential future pressures on the land system would pose huge 
challenges for the sustainability both of agricultural and fores-
try production and of terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems and the 
services they provide to society, endangering the achievement of 
SDG 15 targets (Box 3.4).
3.3.3.1 Key characteristics of pathways achieving 
SDG 15
Foley et al. (2011) suggest sustainable land use will have to 1) cut 
greenhouse gas emissions from land use and agricultural pro-
duction; 2) reduce biodiversity and habitat losses; 3) decrease 
unsustainable water withdrawals; and 4) control nitrogen pollu-
tion. As environmental preservation and sustainable use of the 
Earth’s terrestrial species and ecosystems are strongly related, 
recent scenario studies have evaluated interconnections among 
the above key aspects and show pathways to a global sustainable 
future of land use (Humpenöder et al., 2018; Erb et al., 2016; 
Obersteiner et al., 2016; Popp et al., 2014; Foley et al., 2011). 
Most of these studies agree that a wide option space exists to 
achieve a sustainable global land use in the future. Effective en-
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vironmental protection of forest and water resources in com-
bination with land-sparing measures (such as agricultural in-
tensification and dietary change) are key for feeding a growing 
population while mitigating the pressures on land and other 
sustainability goals (Figure 3.9).
The protection of the environment (such as forest and water) 
can directly contribute to avoid the current unsustainable use 
of land. Around 40% of land is used for agriculture (Foley et al., 
2011) and 15% of land is currently under protection (UNEP-
WCMC and IUCN, 2016), but that does not cover all areas im-
portant for biodiversity. 70% of total freshwater withdrawal is 
used for providing food which is responsible for 80% of total 
water consumption (WWAP, 2012) (Section 3.3.4). The heavy 
use of fertilizers and animal waste is a major driver of the global 
nitrogen cycle anthropogenic intervention. Environmental pro-
tection is needed to strengthen natural resource management. 
Land protection would protect the Earth’s terrestrial ecosys-
tems and key biodiversity areas. Improved water-use efficiency 
would reduce water demand while improved nitrogen manage-
ment would reduce nitrogen requirement and loss (Muller et 
al., 2017; Bodirsky et al., 2015). For example, nitrogen pollution 
or loss can be avoided by removing the nitrogen from livestock 
manure, sewage and household waste such as wasted food, and 
recycling it on the field as well as low-input farming systems, 
such as organic agriculture.
Agricultural technological innovation can significantly con-
tribute to improve efficiency of land, food, and water systems, 
compensate for restrictions on agricultural expansion and re-
duce the pressure on the environment under the given food 
demand for feeding growing population (Humpenöder et al., 
2018; Obersteiner et al., 2016; Popp et al., 2014; Foley et al., 
2011). Recent studies suggest that sufficient food or nutrient 
(protein) can be provided without increasing cropland area by 
increasing crop yields (Mauser et al., 2015; Tilman et al., 2011) 
and with massive trade volumes (Billen et al., 2015). However, 
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Figure 3.9. Overview of the characteristics of good future of land. Graphic cour-
tesy of Tomoko Hasegawa.
Box 3.4. SDG 15 targets. Source: UN (2015). 
15.1 By 2020, ensure the conservation, restoration and sustainable use of terrestrial and inland freshwater ecosystems and their 
services, in particular forests, wetlands, mountains and drylands, in line with obligations under international agreements
15.2 By 2020, promote the implementation of sustainable management of all types of forests, halt deforestation, restore degrad-
ed forests and substantially increase afforestation and reforestation globally
15.3 By 2030, combat desertification, restore degraded land and soil, including land affected by desertification, drought and 
floods, and strive to achieve a land degradation-neutral world 
15.4 By 2030, ensure the conservation of mountain ecosystems, including their biodiversity, in order to enhance their capacity 
to provide benefits that are essential for sustainable development 
15.5 Take urgent and significant action to reduce the degradation of natural habitats, halt the loss of biodiversity and, by 2020, 
protect and prevent the extinction of threatened species
15.6 Promote fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources and promote appropri-
ate access to such resources, as internationally agreed
15.7 Take urgent action to end poaching and trafficking of protected species of flora and fauna and address both demand and 
supply of illegal wildlife products
15.8 By 2020, introduce measures to prevent the introduction and significantly reduce the impact of invasive alien species on 
land and water ecosystems and control or eradicate the priority species
15.9 By 2020, integrate ecosystem and biodiversity values into national and local planning, development processes, poverty 
reduction strategies and accounts 
15.a Mobilize and significantly increase financial resources from all sources to conserve and sustainably use biodiversity and 
ecosystems
15.b Mobilize significant resources from all sources and at all levels to finance sustainable forest management and provide 
adequate incentives to developing countries to advance such management, including for conservation and reforestation 
15.c Enhance global support for efforts to combat poaching and trafficking of protected species, including by increasing the 
capacity of local communities to pursue sustainable livelihood opportunities
there is still a large gap between potential yields and current ac-
tual yields (Foley et al., 2011). Most of the yield gaps is in the re-
gions where productivity may be limited by poor management. 
There are significant opportunities to increase yields across 
many parts of Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe, whe-
re nutrient and water limitations seem to be strongest (Foley et 
al., 2011). Transfer of high-efficiency production technologies 
including advanced crop species and improved management 
for existing crop varieties from other regions should contribute 
to close the yield gaps, while improvements in crop species in-
cluding genetic modifications will probably increase potential 
yields into the future. In addition, grazing intensification and 
efficiency gains in global livestock systems have also been iden-
tified as a crucial element because of their large feed require-
ments and an enhanced use of crop-based concentrate (Weindl 
et al., 2017a; Weindl et al., 2017b; Havlik et al., 2014). However, 
knowledge is still limited due to the very limited data availabi-
lity and the huge range of uncertainty related to the extent and 
intensity of grazing on the global scale (Erb et al., 2016; Herrero 
et al., 2013). Changes in consumption patterns (3.3.1) are anot-
her key determination for sustainable land and food systems. 
Dietary change such as less meat and reduced food waste can 
lower demand for food, feed, water, and other resources and 
then reduce the pressure on land and the environment (Erb et 
al., 2016; Obersteiner et al., 2016; Hasegawa et al., 2015; Bajželj 
et al., 2014; Stehfest et al., 2009). Currently, mainly in developed 
regions, actual food consumption is much above the recom-
mended (maximum) dietary requirement corresponding to the 
energy needs of an individual at the maximum acceptable Body 
Mass Index, engaged in vigorous physical activity (FAO, 2015). 
Excessive food consumption can be reduced by putting taxa-
tion on animal-sourced food (e.g., red meat) or unhealthy food 
which have been introduced in attempt to overcome increasing 
obesity rates and improving health in some countries (e.g., Col-
chero et al. (2016)). In addition to dietary change, consumption 
structural change are expected to substantially contribute to 
feed the projected world population without compromising en-
vironmental sustainability (Hasegawa, in preparation) and (Bil-
len et al., 2015). If an equitable human diet is established within 
countries and globally, the environmental impacts associated 
with feeding the future growing population can be reduced or 
even becomes positive (Hasegawa, in preparation). Combining 
policies, such as food support targeted on the undernourished 
accompanied with reducing overconsumption and food waste, 
would reduce food production and contribute to sustainable use 
of land by reducing water demand, deforestation and land-use 
change emissions and bring benefit to food security and human 
health by reducing obesity and related diseases.
3.3.3.2 Synergies and trade-offs with other SDGs
Measures and policies for preserving and sustainably using the 
Earth’s terrestrial species and ecosystems (SDG 15) are strongly 
related with other SDGs. Land and water protection schemes 
for preserving and sustainably using the Earth’s terrestrial spe-
cies can indeed decrease deforestation, associated emissions and 
biodiversity loss (SDGs 13 and 15) whereas it can increase com-
petition for land and hence affect food security via increased 
food prices (SDG 2) and climate action via increased bioenergy 
prices (SDG 13) (Humpenöder et al., 2018; Popp et al., 2011; 
Wise et al., 2009). In addition, land protection schemes focusing 
on one single land-use type such as forests could lead to displa-
cement effects into non-forest land-use types which also could 
contain high carbon and biodiversity value (Popp et al., 2014). 
Regeneration of natural ecosystems via e.g., afforestation could 
have beneficial effects on carbon uptake (SDG 13) (Humpenö-
der et al., 2014; Strengers et al., 2008). However, this beneficial 
effect for climate could be eaten up by biophysical drivers such 
as albedo (Arora and Montenegro, 2011; Bathiany et al., 2010).
Agricultural intensification schemes may help reduce cropland 
expansion and deforestation and avoid biodiversity loss (SDG 
15), while also benefiting food security by lowering food price 
(SDG 2), and mitigating climate change through reducing CO2 
emissions from land-use change and decreasing bioenergy prices 
(SDG 13) (Humpenöder et al., 2018; Obersteiner et al., 2016). 
However, agricultural intensification may be associated with 
higher agricultural inputs and can cause environmental pressu-
res such as nitrogen contamination (Humpenöder et al., 2018; 
Obersteiner et al., 2016; Billen et al., 2015) and higher water use 
(SDG 6) (Humpenöder et al., 2018; Obersteiner et al., 2016).
Diet change towards less meat-intensive diets and reducing 
food waste (SDG 12) and mitigating land pressure (SDG15) 
contribute to decrease food prices (Figure 3.10), mitigate com-
pletion on food and provide global food security (SDG2) (Hum-
penöder et al., 2018; Obersteiner et al., 2016; Bajželj et al., 2014). 
It also contributes to climate change mitigation through leading 
to lower land-use change CO2 emissions (SDG 13) (Spring-
mann et al., 2016b; Stehfest et al., 2009). In addition, dietary 
changes to less meat or plant-based protein could promote hu-
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Figure 3.10. A synergy and trade-offs between possible land-based options and 
food prices. Source: Obersteiner et al., 2016. CC-BY-NC 4.0. Climate-BE: Mo-
derate bioenergy and nuclear energy: ΔT < 2°C; Climate-BE+: High bioenergy 
and no nuclear: ΔT < 2°C; Low (High) flexibility : slow (rapid) production sys-
tem shifts and high (low) waste; +30% (+50%) yield: nominal input-neutral yi-
eld growth + 30% (+ 50%); Zero Def(/Grslnd): no gross forest loss (or grassland 
loss); Biodiversity: Moderate protection of biodiversity hotspots; Biodiversity+: 
no conversion of biodiversity hotspots; GHG US$10(US$50): LULUCF emis-
sions tax: US$ 10/tCO2eq (US$50/tCO2eq); Diet-: Western diet globalization; 
Diet+: Reduced meat demand. 
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man health (SDG 3) and climate mitigation (SDG 13) (Spring-
mann et al., 2016a; Stehfest et al., 2009). These global food tran-
sition would reduce the agricultural production and cropland 
and pasture expansion, resulting in a large carbon uptake from 
regrowing vegetation and substantial reduction in methane and 
nitrous oxide emission (SDG13). In contrast, without any com-
plementary policy, some negative side-effects of dietary change 
would occur on livestock farmers who will face income losses 
which might be an important barrier in implementing low-me-
at diets (Stehfest et al., 2009). Moreover, equitable food distribu-
tion and globally converging diets need more international tra-
de which would decreases self-sufficiency of many developing 
regions with regard to their local needs for food and nutrient 
(Erb et al., 2016; Billen et al., 2015).
3.3.3.3 Policies that maximize synergies and 
minimize trade-offs
A holistic perspective and combination of multiple measures and 
policies is needed to solve the current unsustainable development 
trajectory. As many challenges are strongly interrelated with 
each other, single options are prone to involve trade-offs among 
multiple sustainability goals (Humpenöder et al., 2018) (Figure 
3.11). For example, a combination of agricultural intensification 
with forest and water protection schemes, nitrogen mitigation 
measures and improved fertilization efficiency would be needed 
to avoid the side-effects of agricultural intensification on water 
use and nitrogen pollution (Humpenöder et al., 2018; Bodirsky et 
al., 2014). Moreover, a combination of supply and demand-side 
options would be effective to avoid the side-effects of a single-
side option. For example, low-input farming systems (such as 
organic agriculture and reductions food-competing feed from 
arable land) accompanied with reduction of food waste would 
contribute to reduce the side-effects of lower productivity due to 
low-input farming system. Regarding negative effects of dietary 
change on livestock farmers, revenue from taxing resource-
intensive food or unhealthy food would bring a significant 
source of new income which could be used for diet programs 
including development of new income opportunities for the 
affected farmers. With regard to food insecurity associated with 
forest protection and climate mitigation, international aid or 
domestic income transfer is expected to offset such adverse side 
effect attaining stringent climate stabilization. 
A number of policy options exist for dealing with specific 
negative effects of unsustainable land use. Clearly enforced 
and controlled nature protection areas can limit agricultural 
land expansion. Public and private investment in agricultural 
technologies, especially plant breeding, has shown very high 
economic returns (Lotze-Campen et al., 2014). Emission 
taxation can effectively reduce air pollution and greenhouse 
gas emissions. Water pricing can help to improve water-
use efficiency (Section 4.4.1). However, these specific policy 
measures have to be better coordinated and need to be made 
coherent across sectors.
We reviewed studies that assess sustainability of land and 
food systems and represent the state-of-art knowledge about 
the sustainable future of land, effects of policies, and pathways 
to sustainable development. Many studies show many optional 
spaces to realize such future. Current change is not enough. 
A new dynamic innovation with combining the effective 
multi-sectoral measures (Section 4.4.3.1) would be needed. 
This includes a strong coordination among the various policy 
measures to induce the technological and organizational 
changes needed for achieving multiple sustainability goals.
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Figure 3.11. The global option space matrix for the year 2100. Licensed under CC BY 3.0 by Humpenöder et al 2018. REDD: forest protection by putting a price 
on CO2 emissions from the conversion of forests and other carbon-rich ecosystems; EffNfert: improved soil nitrogen uptake efficiency; WaterProt: protection of 
water resources based on environmental flow requirements; IntensAg: higher food and bioenergy crops yields and higher livestock productivity; All: combination 
of REDD, EffNfert, Water-Prot and IntensAg.
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3.3.4 SDG 6: Clean water and sanitation 
The overarching objective of SDG 6 is to ensure the availability 
and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all. The 
SDG 6 targets are presented in Box 3.5. This section overviews 
the building blocks needed for moving towards a global pathway 
consistent with SDG 6, the interactions with other SDGs and 
the policies for maximizing synergies and offsetting trade-offs. 
It is estimated that more than 2.1 billion people remain wit-
hout access to a type of improved water source, and that more 
than 1.7 billion lack access to improved sanitation (UNICEF 
and WHO, 2017). Moreover, in developing countries, almost 
90% of sewage is discharged without any treatment (WWAP, 
2012), while some developed countries also continue to release 
wastewater to the environment without sufficient treatment 
(Baum et al., 2013). Recent analysis suggests that almost 36 mil-
lion hectares of irrigated cropland (about 10% of the global irri-
gated area) exists in catchments with high levels of dependence 
on urban wastewater flows (Thebo et al., 2017). Another recent 
analysis suggests that projected socioeconomic development to 
2030 will leave more than 3.5 billion people without sufficient 
access to piped water and wastewater infrastructure needed to 
meet SDG 6 (Figure 3.12) (Parkinson et al., 2018).
At the same time, the volume of water being used by humans 
continues to increase. Global water withdrawals in 2010 were 
estimated to have reached 4000 km3 (FAO, 2016). The agricul-
tural sector withdrew approximately 67%, followed by the in-
dustry (23%) and domestic (10%) sectors (Flörke et al., 2013). 
About 12% of the industry and domestic withdrawals was con-
sumed globally and 88% was discharged back into the environ-
ment (Flörke et al., 2013). There is significant regional diversity, 
depending on the development of water recycling. Global scale 
assessments anticipate growth of water demands to between 
6,000 and 8,500 km3 by 2050 (Bijl et al., 2016; Wada et al., 2016; 
Hejazi et al., 2014). Much of this increased demand will occur in 
urban areas, placing strain on surrounding water resource sys-
tems (McDonald et al., 2014).
3.3.4.1 Key characteristics of pathways achieving 
SDG 6
To achieve SDG 6, a massive investment in water supply, 
sanitation and wastewater treatment will be required. When 
water demand outstrips the available resource in a given area, 
water scarcity ensues, causing increased pressure and potential 
shortages for water users. It is estimated that approximately four 
billion people currently live in areas facing severe water scarcity 
for at least one month of the year (Mekonnen and Hoekstra, 
2016), and that this number could grow to reach almost six billion 
by 2050 if unmitigated. Besides physical water availability, other 
key determinants of water scarcity include water quality, water 
access, the cost of transporting and storing water, institutional 
constraints and governance (e.g., user prioritization schemes), 
and the competition for water across alternative uses (Vanham 
et al., 2018; Jaeger et al., 2017; van Vliet et al., 2017). Climate 
change can worsen water scarcity as well.
The concept of water wedges (Figure 3.13) can help combining 
different strategies that could together reduce the population 
living with water scarcity (Wada et al., 2014). It shows that 
increasing access to water supply and sanitation does not only 
depend on increasing supply using infrastructure measures – 
but also increasing the efficiency of water use.
Key technologies for increasing water availability and 
accessibility to meet these new demands depend on region or 
country. Groundwater can be an attractive water source (as 
opposed to extracting water from nearby rivers) because it is 
less sensitive to climate variability. However, about 1.7 billion 
people live in areas where groundwater resources and/or 
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Box 3.5. SDG 6 targets. Source: UN (2015). 
6.1 By 2030, achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water for all
6.2 By 2030, achieve access to adequate and equitable sanitation and hygiene for all and end open defecation, paying special 
attention to the needs of women and girls and those in vulnerable situations
6.3 By 2030, improve water quality by reducing pollution, eliminating dumping and minimizing release of hazardous chemi-
cals and materials, halving the proportion of untreated wastewater and substantially increasing recycling and safe reuse 
globally
6.4 By 2030, substantially increase water-use efficiency across all sectors and ensure sustainable withdrawals and supply of 
freshwater to address water scarcity and substantially reduce the number of people suffering from water scarcity
6.5 By 2030, implement integrated water resources management at all levels, including through transboundary cooperation 
as appropriate
6.6 By 2020, protect and restore water-related ecosystems, including mountains, forests, wetlands, rivers, aquifers and lakes
6.a By 2030, expand international cooperation and capacity building support to developing countries in water- and sani-
tation-related activities and programs, including water harvesting, desalination, water efficiency, wastewater treatment, 
recycling/reuse technologies
6.b Support and strengthen the participation of local communities in improving water and sanitation management
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groundwater-dependent ecosystems are already under threat 
(Gleeson et al., 2012), and impacts of groundwater extraction 
on long-term groundwater availability can be difficult to 
monitor due to limited ground monitoring worldwide. Recent 
research proposes possible indices and standards for ensuring 
groundwater sustainability (Gleeson and Richter, 2018; Wada 
and Bierkens, 2014). Packaged water has emerged as an effective 
approach to ensure improved water access in developing urban 
areas facing scarcity due to a lack of existing water infrastructure 
(Vedachalam et al., 2017).
Water efficiency measures provide a crucial lever in this 
framework because such measures are usually the least-
cost option for addressing water constraints (as opposed to 
expanding water supply). For example, it is anticipated that 
switching to more efficient irrigation methods in many regions 
could provide a substantial amount of water to support future 
urban demand growth in water scarce areas reducing water 
competition among different sectors (Bijl and al, 2018; Flörke et 
al., 2018; Jägermeyr et al., 2016). Likewise, a significant amount 
of water is lost during water distribution due to leakage and 
evaporation, and prioritizing refurbishment can improve water 
availability and reduce risks of water contamination (Lee and 
Schwab, 2005; LeChevallier et al., 2003). 
As water flows vary from year-to-year due to both climatic 
variability and changing human influences such as reservoir 
regulation and land-use change, it is important for water 
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Figure 3.12. Number of people requiring piped water access and wastewater treatment in 2030 under an SDG 6 pathway relative to a baseline (business-as-usual) 
human development scenario: a. spatially-explicit results; b. results aggregated by country; and c. results aggregated by ecoregion. Licensed under CC-BY-NC by 
Parkinson et al. (2018).
Figure 3.13. Strategies for reducing water stress. Source: after Wada et al. (2014). 
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resource managers to develop adaptive ground- and surface 
water strategies. Increased water storage capacity can also 
reduce water-related hazards such as floods. Specifically, many 
developing regions require storage to manage challenging 
hydrology brought about by variable flows and drought 
conditions (Grey and Sadoff, 2007). Expanding water storage 
capacity by developing new reservoirs is a contentious issue 
because of the associated impacts to land availability and shifts 
in the natural flow regime in up- and downstream rivers (Liu 
et al., 2018; Grill et al., 2015). However, small to medium sized 
storage systems could provide a better solution in some regions. 
In addition, managed aquifer recharge through intelligent 
irrigation practices (e.g., flooding fields during the off-season) or 
direct injection into aquifers could provide an alternative means 
for increasing storage capacity without consuming additional 
land (Niswonger et al., 2017). The performance of many existing 
reservoirs should also be enhanced by reducing sedimentation 
built-up over many years of reservoir operation (Wisser et al., 
2013) or by optimizing the location of new reservoirs (Schmitt 
et al., 2018; Kondolf et al., 2014). 
The SDG 6 targets involving water quality and ecosystem 
protection are to be partially addressed by mitigating water 
scarcity, because this will ensure sufficient flows in rivers and 
aquifers (van Vliet et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2016a). However, 
expanded access to wastewater treatment will be needed to 
ensure water quality. Expanding wastewater treatment capacity 
can be expensive. Nevertheless, there are both centralized 
and decentralized solutions to choose from, with costs and 
benefits dependent on the specific location (Kavvada et al., 
2016; McDonald et al., 2016). It should be noted that treated 
domestic wastewater unsuitable for municipal water supplies 
may be perfectly suitable for industrial cooling and landscape 
irrigation (Stillwell and Webber, 2014; Grant et al., 2012). 
Direct wastewater recycling can be achieved in this context by 
cascading water uses, but this will only be possible if there exists 
capacity and willingness to distinguish wastewater flows and 
apply them elsewhere (Terpstra, 1999). Wastewater recycling 
technologies are thus a critical component of SDG 6 pathways 
because they simultaneously address quality, efficiency and 
scarcity indicators. 
Desalination can also provide needed freshwater security in 
water scarce regions, but should be viewed as a complementary 
option in the sense that it is used once all other potential sources 
of water supply and of managing water demand (e.g., through 
water pricing or water saving technologies) are exhausted. This 
is because desalination is expensive, can require a significant 
amount of energy, and produces waste in the form of brine that 
must be managed separately to mitigate environmental impacts 
(Sommariva, 2010). Moreover, desalination can result in 
thermal pollution, posing a risk to marine ecosystems. Despite 
these challenges, there are many industrial applications where 
desalination technologies provide the means to safely treat 
highly contaminated flows (Shaffer et al., 2013).
Wastewater treatment will promote improved sanitation 
(SDG target 6.2) by protecting downstream users from harmful 
water-borne illnesses. Universal access to improved sanitation 
is an important component of SDG 6 because it is closely linked 
with access to clean water. The World Bank outlines a number 
of different options and provide a recent economic analysis for 
achieving the water access and sanitation targets (Hutton and 
Varughese, 2016). The assessed options include providing piped 
water to houses in both urban and rural areas, collection and 
treatment of wastewater using centralized technologies, and the 
use of distributed pit latrines and septic systems for wastewater 
management. It is estimated that between 61 and 123 billion 
dollars per year of spending will be needed to meet the 2030 
targets for drinking water, sanitation and hygiene.
A key step in achieving the SDG 6 targets is more integrated 
and transboundary water resources management. However, 
in many regions transboundary management is complicated 
by difficult political tension brought about by historical 
conflicts between countries and regions, e.g., the Nile and 
Indus basins (Tawfik and Dombrowsky, 2018; Swain, 2017). 
Overcoming political disputes along the road towards effective 
transboundary management is perhaps the most challenging 
aspect of achieving the SDG 6 objectives (Subramanian et al., 
2014). However, some positive progress towards this target 
has occurred in many European basins, and to some extent 
for instance in the Mekong, coordinated by the Mekong River 
Commission (Schmeier, 2012). 
3.3.4.2 Synergies and trade-offs with other SDGs 
Water is a basic service, making the water-access targets 
ingrained in SDG 6 fully integrated with the objective to reduce 
poverty (SDG 1). Without clean water and adequate sanitation, 
it is difficult to achieve good health and wellbeing. Moreover, 
as women often travel long distances to obtain water from 
unimproved sources, this time is not available to them for other 
purposes such as education (Graham et al., 2016). Improved 
sanitation services can also help to protect women’s health and 
safety (Fisher, 2008). 
Water availability is also linked intimately to the agriculture 
and energy system. Increasing agriculture production often 
requires more water consumption. At the same time, increasing 
irrigation and fertilizer use could lead to greater water stress and 
degraded water quality in some regions (Nilsson et al., 2017). 
Some low-carbon energy technologies consume significant 
amounts of water (e.g., irrigated bioenergy feedstocks) or may 
impact flow regimes (e.g., hydropower), while some clean water 
technologies are energy-intensive. These characteristics can 
create trade-offs between clean water and targets of SDG 7 and 
climate mitigation (SDG13) (Humpenöder et al., 2018; Fricko et 
al., 2016; Parkinson et al., 2016a; Hejazi et al., 2015). Mitigating 
climate change will help to stabilize hydro-climatic systems 
driving water resource availability around the world.
There are important linkages between water and SDGs related 
to prosperity and poverty as well. Developing and managing 
water resources and infrastructure will leads to more jobs 
(SDG8). Areas facing water security challenges also typically face 
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stagnated economic growth (Grey and Sadoff, 2007). Water is a 
critical input for many industrial processes with implications for 
water availability and quality (Flörke et al., 2013) and economic 
output.  Reduced inequality at higher overall income levels is 
likely to lead to greater demands for water resources because 
historically increased income leads to more consumption 
(Parkinson et al., 2016b). However, reduced inequalities are 
likely to also enable populations to more effectively implement 
advanced technologies and integrated management options. 
Cities and communities that are sustainable will require 
universal access to clean water and sanitation, and stable 
water supply and quality. Likewise, sustainability measures 
taken across all sectors will include avoiding impacts to water 
resources and water-related ecosystems. 
Preventing marine pollution contributes to improving 
water quality. Marine and coastal conservation can support 
integrated water resource management and will help to protect 
water-related ecosystems and vice-versa (Nilsson et al., 2017). 
Terrestrial ecosystems can become polluted from poor quality 
water, and thus water quality targets in SDG 6 are consistent 
with SDG 15. Management of forests and other land-use types 
in line with SDG 15 impacts water storage, water quality and 
aquifer recharge (Guse et al., 2015).
SDG 6 objectives for integrated and transboundary 
management are consistent with the SDG 16 targets for reduced 
human conflict. Cooperation across countries (SDG 17) and 
sectors, as well as increased access to financing will be critical 
towards ensuring sufficient investment in water infrastructure 
for developing regions and transboundary water management.
3.3.4.3 Policies that maximize synergies and 
minimize trade-offs
Integrated valuation of end-use water and energy efficiency 
measures and coupled planning of supply-side projects 
will ensure long-term development meets multiple targets 
(Parkinson et al., 2016a; Bartos and Chester, 2014). For 
example, cascading water uses can ensure wastewater recycling 
is achieved in an energy-efficient way (Grant et al., 2012). 
Agricultural and trade policies that shift food production from 
water-stressed regions will help to achieve water scarcity targets 
(Flörke et al., 2018; Davis et al., 2017), and promoting organic 
farming practices (i.e., minimal fertilizer use) will protect water 
resources (Reganold and Wachter, 2016). Water pricing reforms 
in certain regions will boost allocative efficiency while ensuring 
affordability for the poor (Burdack et al., 2014). Basin-scale 
planning and data sharing in transboundary basins will be critical 
for coordinated management and benefit sharing for conflict 
prevention (Arjoon et al., 2016; Dombrowsky, 2009). Moreover, 
institutional reforms will support implementation of integrated 
water resources management (Horlemann and Dombrowsky, 
2012). Presumptive environmental flow standards will avoid 
water scarcity and protect ecosystems (Gleeson and Richter, 
2018; Wada and Bierkens, 2014). Managed aquifer recharge and 
other so-called ‘nature-based solutions’ are important options 
for supporting increased storage and wastewater management 
capabilities without developing new infrastructure (Sonneveld 
and Alfarra, 2018; Niswonger et al., 2017; Drewes, 2009). 
3.3.5 SDG 11: Sustainable cities and 
communities
SDG11 on sustainable cities and communities directly interacts 
with the livelihoods of people. It addresses the most tangible 
assets of daily living, including housing, mobility, basic 
services, and the quality of life, which are also covered by other 
SDGs. With urbanization, SDG 11 also confronts one of the 
megatrends of the 21st century. By 2050, close to 70% of the 
world population will live in cities, and 90% of this increase will 
happen in Asia and Africa (UNDESA, 2018). This all-to-obvious 
observation is nonetheless of incredible importance, as it points 
to not only improving current urban infrastructures and living, 
but also to designing sustainable cities and urban areas that are 
currently build. SDG 11 also is the most spatially-explicit SDG 
in that spatial context determines access to affordable housing, 
transport and green spaces. Spatial design and interplay play 
hence a crucial role in achieving this SDG. 
3.3.5.1 Key characteristics of pathways achieving 
SDG 11
The specific targets of SDG 11 are listed in Box 3.6. A pathway 
characterization cannot however start with a purely quantitative 
specification of outcomes, but also needs to understand both 
processes, power and context-dependence that is rooted both 
in the diversity of cities and their inhabitants and power rela-
tions. Collective praxis with collaborative dialogs are hence an 
important tool and empowering principle for sustainable urba-
nization (Peake, 2016). In fact, participatory processes improve 
the likelihood of inclusive and resource-efficient projects (Fern-
andez Milan and Creutzig, 2015). Successful SDG 11 pathways 
hence require a participatory approach that avoids one-size-
fits-all solutions and standardization (e.g., the urban planning 
ideas of Le Corbusier) or simple characterization in a few dozen 
quantitative parameters (such as the ratio of road space to resi-
dential area). Instead, the pathways will start with processes that 
give voice to those in vulnerable situations and those commonly 
excluded from decision making processes. Paradoxically, par-
ticipatory processes also require strong leadership of munici-
pal agents that set the setting and infrastructure for dialog and 
collective action not only at municipal but also on communal 
levels. It will also require leadership at communal level that use 
participatory processes to empower neglected people in their 
communities. 
Pathways for sustainable cities in 2050 involve targets that go 
beyond those detailed in Box 3.6. To structure those, this sec-
tion now focuses on the dimensions of housing, mobility, and 
urban form, aiming to achieve inclusion of vulnerable popula-
tions, climate-proofing/resource-efficiency, and avoiding local 
pollution. While not capturing all targets of SDG 11 equally, 
this 3x3 matrix is nonetheless a useful tool for structuring the 
TWI2050 pathway. 
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By 2014, more than 880 million urbanites lived in slums (UN 
Habitat, 2016). At current trends indicate, urban population is 
expected to raise by 2.500 billion from about 4.2 billion inha-
bitants in 2018 to 6.7 billion inhabitants in 2050 (UNDESA, 
2018). Hence, adequate urban housing for more than three bil-
lion people will need to be provided in the next 30 years to meet 
SDG 11 targets. Strategies to provide shelter include a) slum 
upgrading (which can be very challenging to achieve without 
expelling poor populations to worse locations via gentrifica-
tion processes); b) re-modularizing existing housing stock to 
avoiding demographic lock-in (e.g., seniors remaining stuck in 
big houses after children have moved out); and c) new building 
stock. If housing units will in average by occupied by four te-
nants, then about 400-600 million new housing units will need 
to be provided by 2050, or 13-20 million per year. These are best 
provided in compact environments, limiting floor space whi-
le offering high accessibility and designed in resource-efficient 
manner (e.g., promoting wood-based materials instead of ce-
ment and steel) and matching technologies. Such design can 
offer up to 44% saving in terms of life-cycle energy compared 
to the counterfactual default case (Mastrucci and Rao, 2017). 
Lack of accessibility is a concern in cities on all continents, 
characterized for example by a pushing out of poor and midd-
le-class inhabitants to urban peripheries in, for example Paris 
and Berlin, by transit deserts in US cities, and by lack of mo-
de-choices in African cities, where walking remains often the 
only option. Access to cities has been mapped in spatial detail, 
highlighting the African continent (Weiss et al., 2018). However 
similar maps for intra-city accessibility are missing, and are an 
important challenge for research. Safety is a crucial component 
of accessibility (World Bank, 2017). 
The urban form emerges from the spatial relation between 
buildings and transport networks. Urban design considerations 
deserve extra emphasis as they capture important complements 
to housing and mobility. In general this concerns the design of 
public space that is inviting for people to stay, or in other words, 
the capability of designing cities at human scale (Gehl, 2013). This 
involves safe street design, e.g., by proper lighting and high visi-
bility to prevent crime and violence. It also includes green spaces 
for recreation and urban cooling, counteracting urban heat island 
effects and mitigating deadly heat waves. Especially in arid zones, 
this involves the design of narrow street canyon providing sha-
dow and channeling wind for cooling. It will be crucial to design 
these options at community and micro-scale not only for rich 
neighborhoods, but especially for poorer communities to offset 
existing disadvantages (Fernandez Milan and Creutzig, 2015). 
Long-term urbanization pathways have recently been discus-
sed and their importance has increased in line with the inter-
national recognition that there is an urgent need to integrate 
sustainable strategies into national and local development plans. 
Due to the complexity of urban systems, however, system integ-
ration for implementation of plans requires a novel framework 
involving interdisciplinary approaches. The Urban Climate 
Change Research Network has introduced five pathways which 
provide a foundational framework for climate actions for cities. 
This includes disaster management, reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions, governance, and institutional networks (Rosenzweig 
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Box 3.6. SDG 11 targets. Source: UN (2015). 
11.1 By 2030, ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services and upgrade slums
11.2 By 2030, provide access to safe, affordable, accessible and sustainable transport systems for all, improving road safety, 
notably by expanding public transport, with special attention to the needs of those in vulnerable situations, women, chil-
dren, persons with disabilities and older persons
11.3 By 2030, enhance inclusive and sustainable urbanization and capacity for participatory, integrated and sustainable human 
settlement planning and management in all countries
11.4 Strengthen efforts to protect and safeguard the world’s cultural and natural heritage
11.5 By 2030, significantly reduce the number of deaths and the number of people affected and substantially decrease the direct 
economic losses relative to global gross domestic product caused by disasters, including water-related disasters, with a 
focus on protecting the poor and people in vulnerable situations
11.6 By 2030, reduce the adverse per capita environmental impact of cities, including by paying special attention to air quality 
and municipal and other waste management
11.6 By 2030, provide universal access to safe, inclusive and accessible, green and public spaces, in particular for women and 
children, older persons and persons with disabilities
11.a Support positive economic, social and environmental links between urban, peri-urban and rural areas by strengthening 
national and regional development planning
11.b By 2020, substantially increase the number of cities and human settlements adopting and implementing integrated poli-
cies and plans towards inclusion, resource efficiency, mitigation and adaptation to climate change, resilience to disasters, 
and develop and implement, in line with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, holistic disaster 
risk management at all levels
11.c Support least developed countries, including through financial and technical assistance, in building sustainable and resi-
lient buildings utilizing local materials
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et al., 2018). WBGU (2016) has examined the great transforma-
tion towards sustainability, and tried to clarify the challenges 
and opportunities looking at the areas where urbanization tra-
jectories require fundamental changes. 
Cities are recognized as powerful drivers of global environ-
mental change. In order to develop methodologies for sustaina-
ble long-term pathways for cities, the coherence of macro and 
micro level societal transformation also needs to be taken into 
account. The SSPs describe five alternative societal transitions 
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Box 3.8. Case Study: Dynamic urbanization prospects: Bhutan SSPs interlinked with SDG 11.
Bhutan is a rapidly growing country. It has developed and 
adopted a unique Gross National Happiness (GNH) index for 
national policy strategies. Rapid urbanization is beginning to 
occur, which is likely to lead to a number of large developments 
and densely populated areas, potentially causing the expan-
sion of social disparity and social segregation, along with the 
destruction of natural resources and local identities. Therefore, 
conserving local areas is a key factor for SSP1: Sustainability 
scenario which represents decentralized urbanization strategies. 
On the other hand, SSP2: Business-As-Usual scenario assumes 
an increase of highly populated areas. This Sustainability sce-
nario might be seen as a contradiction to efficient urban growth 
strategies, however, this is an important point which suggests 
each city and region requires their own pathways which fit to a 
specific local context. There is large potential to reconsider how 
to achieve an efficient lifestyle. In the case of Bhutan, traditional 
industries and local agriculture, and natural resources are vul-
nerable assets which have to be maintained by local inhabitants. 
This traditional spirit has cultivated a unique local context. It should be noted that these assets are also significant targets in SDG 
11 (Figure 3.15). This Sustainability scenario is linked with GNH indicators specifically cultural diversity, community vitality, and 
ecological diversity. Local governance and institutional partnership also need to be well organized.
Box 3.7. Case Study: Alternative sustainable scenarios: Tokyo SSPs interlinked with SDG 11.
Tokyo has experienced huge urbanization during a period of 
high economic growth, from the 1960s to the 1980s. However, 
in the sprawling edge of the city, the population gradually has 
shrunk, and urban functions have begun to decrease. There 
have also been additional concerns about the deterioration of 
old infrastructures. Making up the core of the megacity region, 
Tokyo has very complex social functions and expectations for a 
sustainable vision. Therefore, Tokyo sustainable pathway (SSP1) 
has been developed with some alternative sustainable goals. The 
main focuses are i) social and cultural vitality, wellbeing, ii) ef-
ficiency, and iii) self-sufficiency. Through a technical scenario 
writing method, two scenarios have been developed for SSP1, 
namely Local Vitality (Happiness) scenario, and efficiency sce-
nario (Kamei et al., 2016). Local Vitality scenario emphasizes 
social equity, basic social services, good quality of urban ameni-
ties, and local cultural assets. On the other hand, the efficiency 
scenario focuses more on advanced technology and efficient lifestyles. In order to achieve SDG 11, the integration of both scenarios 
is required. However, some quantitative analysis also projects that the Local Vitality scenario can also achieve high-level efficiency 
by applying efficient technology and novel thinking on lifestyles. SDG 11 targets require the factors of inclusive social welfare, social 
diversity, and human capital as well as efficient use of social materials. Therefore, Local Vitality scenario has huge potential to realize 
SDG 11 in the case of Tokyo (Kamei et al., submitted)(Figure 3.14). It requires more investments on renovating existing infras-
tructures and maintaining safe and good quality local public services. More research into investigating trade-offs and synergies of 
compact and dispersed development, e.g., considering PV deployment (Yamagata and Seya 2013), can further elucidate the specific 
characteristics of promising pathways.
Figure 3.14. SSP1 Local Vitality (Happiness) scenario Tokyo. Graphic courtesy 
of Miho Kamei.
Figure 3.15. Bhutan SSP1: Sustainability scenario. Graphic courtesy of Miho 
Kamei.
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in a global world which were constructed with mitigation and 
adaptation measures (O’Neill et al., 2017), Section 3.1.2. SSP1, 
for instance, represents the most ideal future pathway called 
‘Sustainability’. By linking with SSPs, urbanization factors (e.g., 
demographics) can be projected by applying downscaling ap-
proaches (Terama et al., 2017). For the sake of identifying sus-
tainable visions for each different city, SSPs-cities can be deve-
loped that are also applicable for quantitative projections (e.g., 
building, transport, and material flow) based on the alternative 
pathways (Kamei et al., 2016). Two case studies and interactions 
with SDG 11 are shown in Box 3.7 and Box 3.8.
3.3.5.2 Synergies and trade-offs with other SDGs
There are relationships between the development of cities and 
most other SDGs. For instance, urban infrastructures shape 
consumption patterns (SDG 12). The fast-growing urbanization 
trend, in particular in Asia and Africa, will result in a growing 
need for new urban infrastructures, providing huge challenges 
but also opportunities. The choices made, due to the longevity of 
the nature of urban infrastructure (in particular for transport and 
buildings systems) introduces path dependency effects shaping 
consumption patterns for the coming decades and even century. 
For instance, urban planning affects travel distances the attracti-
veness of low-carbon transport modes and reduced heating and 
cooling needs. Alternative buildings approaches could include 
less floor space per person, alternative material use and modified 
production process of materials in, for example, the steel and ce-
ment sector (Creutzig et al., 2016; Muller et al., 2013).
The majority of the final energy use occurs within the urban 
environment, creating strong interlinkage with SDG 7 and rela-
ted synergies and trade-offs (Section 3.3.2). While in developing 
countries more energy per capita is consumed in urban areas 
due to on average higher income, in industrialized countries the 
more compact urban form combined with the availability of pu-
blic transport infrastructure results in lower final energy use on 
average than in sub-urban or rural areas (Grubler and Fisk, 2012). 
Urbanization also influences the challenge to provide modern 
energy for all, as less infrastructure is needed. At the same time, 
however, it does provide a strong link with air pollution.
Access to clean water and sanitation (SDG 6) is a key issue to 
sustainable cities, and closely linked to public health, especially 
the prevention of infectious diseases. A recent investigation of 
SDG 6 found that all of its six targets have strong synergies with 
SDG 11, and indeed that SDG 11 has most synergies of all other 
SDGs with SDG 6 (Fernandez Milan and Creutzig, 2017). Ho-
wever cities with higher population growth, especially those in 
sub-Saharan Africa, also have the lowest rate of access to clean 
water and sanitation (Fernandez Milan and Creutzig, 2017). 
Changing the use of existing as well as new urban infrastruc-
ture through modal shift, building retrofitting, using state of the 
art design principles, improved public transit systems could re-
duce GHG emission with 27-57% in 2050 (SDG 13). Combined 
with low-carbon production of urban infrastructure, (which is 
a commonly underestimated issue) emissions would further re-
duce to 45%-68% (Creutzig et al., 2016). Informal settlements 
(often within the city environment) are particularly vulnerable 
for climate related hazards such as flooding. Climate impact can 
be mitigated and resilience improved by urban design features 
such as vegetation corridors, green parks, reed bed and low ly-
ing areas that can soak up water, when integrated in the build 
environment while contributing to biodiversity and carbon sto-
rage (Bai et al., 2018).
3.3.5.3 Policies that maximize synergies and 
minimize trade-offs
In essence, the combination of SDG 11 with the other SDGs 
discussed requires the provision of access to shelter, mobility, 
and energy for all at adequate levels, while keeping material 
consumption and GHG emissions at bay, helping to avoid the 
crossing of planetary boundaries (Rockstrom et al., 2009). 
The most important policy instrument to achieve is most li-
kely taxes on fuels (or the GHG emissions in fuels), identified as 
crucial long-term driver of energy-efficient urbanization both 
by empirical data analysis of cities worldwide (Creutzig et al., 
2015), and by theoretical urban economic modeling (Borck and 
Brueckner, 2016; Creutzig, 2014). Unit taxes on land and/or ta-
xing building envelopes are important complements for incen-
tivizing efficient building design (Borck and Brueckner, 2016), 
and to provide for equitable distribution of high urban land 
rents (George, 1879).
To respect that every city is different and requires place-speci-
fic action, but also to still provide information relevant for global 
pathways, typologies of cities provide a useful tool bridging this 
gap (Baiocchi et al., 2015; Creutzig et al., 2015), Figure 3.16). Such 
typologies could be leveraged by a) hybridizing them with sys-
tematic literature reviews of cities and policy solutions (Lamb et 
al., 2018); and b) by combining them with big data approaches in 
the analysis of human settlements (Creutzig et al., 2018a).
As an illustration, let us consider three types of cities. First, 
we take the low-density human settlements like Edmonton, Ca-
nada. Here, available space offers the low-cost construction of 
above-ground rail-based transit. Sub-urban environments can 
be connected with shared automated, electric vehicles. New 
housing will focus on high-rises around public transit stations, 
making the best use of abundant woody resources. 
Second, we consider Nairobi, a city based on walking and 
matatu-minibusses, creating congestion while providing little 
additional mobility. Bus rapid transit systems or tramways are 
the option of choice to create higher volume transit also to the 
new sub-urban settlements. This requires overcoming the po-
litical economy of matatu business owners and providing new 
jobs. The example of Addis Ababa demonstrates the possibility 
of this approach. Housing efforts will focus on slum upgrading 
and providing new settlements along transit lines. 
Third, we consider Beijing, which has built a world-class sub-
way system but at the same is stuck in tremendous congestion. 
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Flexible bike-sharing offers a way forward to increase access 
to the subway network(Wu and Xue, 2017). However, to com-
bat congestion and air pollution high congestion charges will 
be needed (Creutzig and He, 2009). Policy-centric design and 
a fostering of less central cities, as already attempted with the 
high-speed-railway network will further serve preventing high 
pollution impact in dense urban environments. The greening 
of cities is seen as crucial to mitigate urban heat island effects 
(Weng and Yang, 2004).
3.4 Research needs 
In the previous section, we discussed how different analytical 
approaches and model-based pathways provide information on 
achieving specific SDGs and longer-term sustainability by 2050. 
However, the question on how to achieve the full set of SDGs 
requires further accounting for the interlinkages across various 
domains. While IAMs and the scenarios developed by and for 
these models have contributed to providing more integrated 
perspectives on domains such as energy, food, water security, 
biodiversity and air pollution, they would need to be further 
developed to widen their applicability, in terms of sectors, spa-
tial coverage and detail (van Soest et al., in review; Zimm et 
al., 2018). Advances in individual disciplines (e.g., health, de-
mography, urbanization, governance, and digitalization) and 
interdisciplinary research on how to integrate this knowledge 
in IAMs and their analyses are needed. On the way to SDPs, a 
range of different approaches may be undertaken that address 
the limitations of currently available tools and analyses. These 
research needs can be grouped into two broad categories: 1) 
IAM development, and 2) collaboration with other disciplines. 
These are discussed in further detail below.
3.4.1 IAM development
A key priority is further development of IAMs towards a more 
holistic analysis of SDPs. While IAMs were originally developed 
to analyze climate change mitigation strategies, adopting them 
for the analysis of SDGs and longer-term SDPs requires advan-
ces in several areas. We summarize those advances in a set of 
research priorities for the use of IAMs in sustainable develop-
ment analysis:
Increasing coverage of SDG interactions
Van Soest et al. (in review) provide an overview of key linkages 
across SDGs and experts’ assessment of which individual SDGs 
and which linkages are currently covered by the models, and 
which would be covered in the near future based on planned mo-
del developments. This analysis shows that a few SDGs are not 
well captured by IAMs (Figure 3.17), foremost the human de-
velopment and social goals on education (SDG 4), gender (SDG 
5), inequalities (SDG 10), and peace and governance (SDG 16), 
and partly also cities (SDG 11) and oceans (SDG 14) (van Soest 
et al., in review). Some of these SDGs and related linkages are, 
however, reflected in upcoming model advances. Areas resear-
chers are working on include the poverty-hunger-health nexus, 
interlinkages between health and clean water and inequalities, 
and between (energy) poverty and climate. Further down the 
road, potential coverage could include the effects of poverty on 
health and economy, of education on inequalities, renewables 
on cities, climate mitigation on the oceans, and of cities on wa-
ter, economy, governance and infrastructure. Many other inter-
actions and areas identified by experts for model development 
are related to poverty (linkages with access to education, health 
care, clean energy and water, nutritional food), health (linkages 
with food, air pollution, clean water, energy, climate change, life 
below water and on land), industry, innovation and infrastruc-
ture (cutting across cities, buildings, public transport, digitaliza-
tion and automation, technological progress, and governance), 
education and inequalities (linkages to gender equality, health, 
poverty, consumption patterns, access  to resources, peace and 
governance),  and consumption and production patterns (linka-
ges to climate, land, oceans and resource access). 
Using models within a consistent framework
IAMs can cover more SDG dimensions and interactions than 
they currently do, but they will not be able to include ever-
ything, also because fully endogenizing all SDGs is neither 
feasible nor desired. This requires the adoption of a carefully 
tailored scenario and soft links approach, which allows to ex-
plore the synergies and trade-offs within and between SDPs in 
a systematic way. Furthermore, the diversity of IAMs should be 
reflected in their application, considering each IAM’s strengths 
and intended application. For example, the integration of IAMs 
with sectoral bottom-up models could be enhanced. Enhancing 
feedbacks and links between models and other tools, inclu-
ding through a consistent framework such as put forward by 
TWI2050, are options for improvement (van Soest et al., in re-
view; Zimm et al., 2018). Such a framework could be based on a 
structural assessment of the input assumptions and key equati-
ons, clarifying how IAMs differ in modeling SDG interactions. 
Better integration of SDG indicators
Another way forward towards improving the representation of 
relevant SDG indicators is to move beyond the status of “output” 
indicators (i.e. only one-way relationships, quantifying first-or-
der impacts) towards a more dynamic integration including 
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Figure 3.16. An urban typology with respect to drivers of energy use, classifying 
225 representative cities into eight types. Similar typologies, organized around 
policy measures and SDG pathways, will help to bridge the gap between ur-
ban-specific solutions and global pathways. Source: Creutzig et al. (2015).
feedback effects. This is especially relevant for policy solutions 
that are assessed by IAMs. In addition, a more detailed repre-
sentation of policy instruments is required for 1) analyzing the 
effect of specific policies that are (proposed to be) implemented 
on the ground on other SDG domains, and 2) contributing to 
the design of smart policy packages that avoid trade-offs, and 
where possible even enhance synergies. To get a full picture 
of the synergies of and trade-offs from policy options, IAMs 
should aim to advance the representation of relevant proces-
ses and dynamics across SDGs. This can include, for example, 
better representation of distributional aspects of socioeconomic 
dynamics and better mapping of non-technological strategies in 
IAMs, and is also relevant for the degree of detail of how poli-
cy instruments are reflected in the models (e.g., climate policy 
being often represented by a carbon tax). Ongoing model de-
velopment is currently aiming at allowing the testing of various 
sets of policy instruments to help design smart policy packages 
that avoid trade-offs (Bertram et al., 2018). To this end, impro-
ving transparency of databases and assumptions of models will 
be essential. 
Better representation of geographies and actors
SDGs cut across a range of geographical scales, from local to 
national to global (Bijl et al., 2018; Weitz et al., 2018; Allen et 
al., 2016). While most IAMs are able to cover different scales, 
such as the national level, for a certain set of SDG aspects, 
increasing their spatial resolution would be one way to increase 
the usefulness of their assessments to policymakers. This will 
have to happen with feedbacks to the regional or global level 
in mind. Including heterogeneity in modeling explicitly in 
order to reflect the distributional dimensions of many SDGs 
is also required. This can relate to geographic scale, such as 
differentiating between urban and rural households, but also 
to cultural, religious or socioeconomic groups, all relevant for 
targeted policymaking. However, improving actor heterogeneity 
and geographical resolution is subject to availability of data 
as well as to capacity of modeling approaches. Another way 
forward is to improve interactions across models representing 
different resolutions, both in terms of space (e.g., global and 
national or local level) as well as actor heterogeneity (e.g., 
different household types, private sector, governments). This 
will allow for higher spatial and actor-based resolution of the 
analysis, making models more useful for national policymaking 
during the implementation process (Gao and Bryan, 2017; Allen 
et al., 2016). TWI2050 has already initiated work on bringing 
in regional perspectives and diverse stakeholders to improve 
pathway development (Box 3.9).
3.4.2 Collaboration with other disciplines 
Many of the identified limitations cannot be addressed by IAMs 
alone. The underlying assumptions, granularity of available 
data or the analysis of results require IAMs to draw on insights 
from other disciplines or to develop new tools jointly with other 
scientific communities. As the 17 SDGs cover many scientific 
fields, providing research needs for all these domains would be 
beyond the scope of this report. We focus here on select research 
needs conceivable to be relevant for IAMs in the foreseeable 
future and related to trends dealt with in this chapter.
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Figure 3.17. IAM representation of SDGs. Colors represent average score for individual target coverage based on a survey among IAM models. Green: SDG is well 
captured and most targets can be modeled (darkest green: average score above 3, green: average score between 2 and 3, light green: average score between 1.5 and 2). 
Orange: SDG can partly be quantified (not all targets or only proxy indicators), with average scores between 1 and 1.5. Red: SDG is not well captured, with average 
scores below 1. Source: adapted from van Soest et al. (in review).
Linking scientific communities and developing 
integrated pathways within a consistent framework 
Many interactions, deemed important by experts, are not 
currently covered by IAMs, and in some cases they are also not 
considered to be fully quantifiable in the foreseeable future  (van 
Soest et al., in review). Knowledge gaps lie in interactions across 
the human development goals, where research could aim to 
identify and test the causal links. This relates mainly to human 
development interactions and governance, institutions and 
existence of legal frameworks and policies (Allen et al., 2016) 
and their effects on many other SDGs: the effect of poverty 
on education, of education on economy, of gender equality on 
inequalities, and of peace on international cooperation. These 
could be covered differently than through model advances, 
foremost e.g., by linking scientific communities and combining 
models. Such an approach would be beneficial especially for the 
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Box 3.9. Bringing regional perspectives to TWI2050 – The African Dialogues.
Highlighting the regional perspectives in SDPs will be key to foster the transformation processes at multiple levels. Therefore, an 
important branch of activities in the TWI2050 consortium focuses on cross-scale questions including the regional perspectives 
and cross-scale relationships. This is also illustrated by the different trends in land use in two alternative sustainability-oriented 
scenarios: i.e. the SSP1 baseline and the derived mitigation scenario consistent with the 1.5°C climate target (Doelman et al., 2018; 
Rogelj et al., 2018; van Vuuren et al., 2017) (Figure 3.18). Similar differences in regional land use also play a role other sustainability 
scenarios.
Figure 3.18. Change in land use (percentages of grid cells) between 2010 and 2100; deforestation and conversion of other natural land to agriculture (red) and 
reforestation and abandonment of agriculture to other natural land (green) for SSP1 baseline scenario and SSP1 1.5 °C mitigation scenarios (1.9 W/m2). The circles 
emphasize the contrasting resulting land use patterns for Latin America and Africa. In SSP1, the premise is that livestock sector intensifies substantially, and food 
losses and dietary preferences for animal products are reduced, leading to abandonment of grazing land. Abandonment takes place in relatively productive areas 
(predominantly north-western Brazil, for instance) leading to high potential for bioenergy production.  In sub-Saharan Africa, SSP1 shows a decrease of grazing 
land, though cropland is still expanding. When considering additional mitigation measures (b), the amount of deforestation in the Brazilian Cerrado and sub-Saha-
ran Africa reduces significantly, with a considerable increase of forest areas. REDD together with reforestation of degraded forest areas leads to substantial increases 
in forest area in the mitigation scenarios. However, in Africa, in the mitigation scenario, agricultural demand cannot be fulfilled within the region, requiring high 
levels of net import from other regions. Doelman et al (2018).
social and institutional areas (e.g., demography, governance, 
and poverty research) (van Soest et al., in review; Zimm et al., 
2018). 
More integrated pathways with contributions from a variety 
of scientific communities could be brought together by a joint 
narrative and harmonized exogenous assumptions, similar to 
the SSPs (O’Neill et al., 2017; Riahi et al., 2017). Zimm et al. 
(2018) provide an overview of knowledge gaps (e.g., on gender, 
oceans or governance) within the SSPs vis-à-vis the SDGs that 
call for collaboration across scientific fields. They call for fur-
ther development of the SSP narrative and quantifications to 
encompass SDG dimensions currently not considered, on a way 
to a more comprehensive framework. Already today, the SSPs 
enable researchers from different scientific disciplines to base 
their work on consistent assumptions and to adapt them to their 
specific needs and methods (e.g., Hegre et al. (2016)), telling a 
joint story. This kind of research approach needs to be broade-
ned to inform policymakers working on SDG implementation. 
It also leads to cross-fertilization between research communi-
ties, especially social and natural sciences. These communities 
need to develop a common understanding and language to be 
able to work together and find solutions for the grand challen-
ges the SDGs aim to overcome. The TWI2050 framework aims 
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In the coming years, it is foreseen that multiple SDPs will be created in the scope of TWI2050, also presenting regional differences, 
representing different regional branching points, trade-offs, policy options and – not less important - premises related to the regio-
nal developments. A good illustration is the first regional stakeholder workshop of the TWI2050 process, which was held in 2017 
in close collaboration with SwedBio and the SDG Centre for Africa in Kigali, Rwanda. The focus of the 1st Dialog Workshop was 
on how agriculture in Africa can contribute to meeting the SDGs within the planetary boundaries. The Dialog brought together 
a diverse group of stakeholders to explore SDPs and add different African perspectives. The event was organized around clusters 
of SDGs. Figure 3.19 presents a schematic overview of the core pathway elements discussed during the event, synthesized around 
governance and agricultural practices issues. The long-term vision is to refine the process of building regional pathways, using them 
to enrich the global pathways, while also promoting the cross-scale discussion about SDG implementation in subsequent work-
shops. Those will, for instance, use a structured multi-scale, participatory scenario process (Rosa et al., 2017; Folhes et al., 2015; 
Oteros-Rozas et al., 2015) to create and integrate pathways according to the TWI2050 framework. We intend this to be the seed for 
many other similar activities to be replicated in other contexts. 
Figure 3.19. Messages from the discussions of the African Dialog include that SDPs must acknowledge the multiple roles, functions and impacts of agriculture for 
social-ecological resilience and wellbeing. Africa’s agricultural landscapes and food systems have been shaped and sustained by deep social, traditional and cultural 
values. African cultural values for food and agriculture need reviving in many places and need recognition and protection in policy. Furthermore, participants 
argued that rural and agricultural livelihoods need to be seen as attractive. The current waves of urbanization compound the problems of degradation of natural re-
sources and fragmentation of rural communities. The view that only cities provide opportunities is particularly prevalent among the youth, driving a sector-specific 
brain drain that harms the sustainability and effectiveness of the agricultural sector at large. Incentives and policies to retain youth and increase women’s 
partici-pation in agribusiness may counteract this trend. The complete workshop report is available at: https://swed.bio/reports/report/dialogue-workshop-
report-african-dialogue-twi2050/ Source: Collste et al. (in prep.).
to provide such a bridging function, and the interdisciplinary 
CD-LINKS4, PATHWAYS5 and REINVENT6 projects provide 
further examples of developing a common understanding.
Reflecting societal change and governance better 
IAMs apply a number of concepts, including narratives, pa-
thways, policy assumptions, etc. which so far largely use ad 
hoc assumptions on societal change and governance. Thorough 
theory-based assumptions that underpin causal relationships 
between societal change and governance on the one side and 
sustainable development on the other are only now emerging 
(Chapter 5). These concepts provide entry points for social sci-
ence knowledge, which can enrich modeling efforts in various 
ways: i) insights on the use and function of narratives in socie-
ties, ii) insights on (drivers of) value changes in societies, iii) 
insights on (drivers of) changes of political systems and orders, 
iv) insights on (drivers of) policy change and diffusion, v) in-
sights on the adoption rates of certain technologies, vi) a review 
of current suggestions and potentially further development of 
indicators for measuring SDGs 16 and 17, vii) an indicator and 
data set on country implementation capacities at a global scale, 
viii) country case studies on the political economy of policy/
nexus/SDG implementation. Social science research is also re-
levant when it comes to the implementability and acceptability 
of policies(Devine-Wright et al., 2017). Empirical analyses will 
also be needed for concrete policy advice at local and national 
level (van Soest et al., in review). 
Application of demographic tools in the field of global 
environmental change
Despite a close link between population and sustainability, 
demography remains under-represented in global change re-
search. Historical development of the field of population and 
environment since the 1960s in which the Malthusian ‘limits 
to growth’ was dominant carries bitter controversies regarding 
family planning and reproductive rights. This makes many con-
temporary demographers shy away from the topic of environ-
mental change (McDonald, 2016). However, demography has 
relevant theoretical concepts and methodological tools that 
can be useful in sustainability research. This includes, for in-
stance, population estimates and projections and the study of 
differential vulnerability (Muttarak et al., 2015). In particular, 
the potential in forecasting can contribute to the understanding 
of how the world will look like under different socioeconomic 
development scenarios (Lutz and Muttarak, 2017). More appli-
cation of demographic tools in the field of global change and 
sustainable development thus is needed. In particular, taking 
account of heterogeneous characteristics of the population and 
their spatial distribution is crucial for policy planning since 
consumption patterns and vulnerability vary with population 
characteristics (Lutz and Striessnig, 2015). Recent population 
projections by IIASA researchers, for example, have introduced 
education and labor force participation in addition to age and 
4 http://www.cd-links.org/ 
5 http://www.pathways-project.eu/
6 https://www.reinvent-project.eu/ 
7 The IPCC secretariat is currently consolidating a research agenda on urbanization, cities and climate change: https://citiesipcc.org/beyond/conference-outputs/ 
sex to describe population heterogeneities (Lutz et al., 2018; 
Lutz et al., 2017; Loichinger, 2015). These population characte-
ristics matter not only for demography but also for a societies’ 
adaptive capacity, economic growth, governance and the like 
(Lutz and Muttarak, 2017; Muttarak and Lutz, 2014; Lutz et al., 
2010; Lutz et al., 2008). 
Education as a means for achieving other SDGs
Education is commonly treated as an end, a goal in the sustai-
nable development agenda. However, recently it has been argued 
that education is also a means through which other goals are to be 
met (Bengtsson et al., 2018). In the context of health, for instance, 
a recent study empirically shows that it was an increase in mean 
years of schooling that explains an increase in life expectancy glo-
bally, and not income as presented in early literature (Lutz and 
Kebede, 2018). Similarly, in the field of vulnerability, the level of 
education is found to be a better predictor of disaster mortality in 
a country than GDP (Striessnig et al., 2013). Research of this kind 
is needed, especially because it can inform policymakers which 
area of sustainable development to prioritize. 
Advancing health research and global change
The complex interactions and feedbacks between health, de-
velopment, and drivers of global change remain largely unex-
plored. Better understanding of these feedbacks could provide 
insights into facilitating transformations to achieve the SDGs 
and future health goals. A comprehensive health research agen-
da would emphasize first and foremost a vision of system trans-
formation in light of global changes. Thus, cross-disciplinary 
collaborations between health experts and those in other sectors 
are needed to better understand likely feedbacks between health 
and other systems, which could further inform existing narrati-
ves around health systems under global change with regards to 
the level and timing of investments to protect and promote health 
in a future that will differ significantly from today (Sellers and Ebi, 
2018). Once feedbacks between health and other sectors are better 
understood, then they could be incorporated into IAMs to quantify 
their spatial and temporal variability as well as likely magnitude. 
Pushing urbanization research
Key research gaps in urbanization research are the development 
of structured scenarios that quantitatively and qualitatively cha-
racterize sustainability implications of different choices made. 
The specific goals of SDG 11 have not yet been explored quan-
titatively and with respect to development in 2030 or 2050. One 
reason is that the urban/housing/mobility community empha-
sizes the problematic situation in specific cities but hesitates to 
generalize patterns and dynamics across cities. Another reason 
is that issues like adequate housing have been not consistently 
defined and may subjectively vary between different cities. Top-
down scenarios in turn might not be very informative as they 
lack detail. A transdisciplinary approach would be very helpful 
to push the agenda7. 
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Developing an integrated understanding of demand
Using consumption and demand as an entry point (3.3.1) to dif-
ferent systems opens up a diverse research area which on the 
one hand, calls for individual disciplines (such as anthropology, 
sociology, psychology, economics, engineering) to deepen their 
knowledge on the underlying drivers (Creutzig et al., 2018b)A 
synthesis of research on cultural norms and values, socio-demo-
graphics, habits, preferences and structural aspects of consump-
tion and consumption patterns is essential. On the other hand, 
bringing together the scientific knowledge of these diverse di-
sciplines to jointly work on an integrated assessment of demand 
for services and products and their potential environmental im-
pacts (e.g., carbon or material footprint) will push the scientific 
frontier. Interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research will 
improve modeling human decisions, and further approaches 
treating humans as agents.
In addition, research on policy options that influence demand 
and its socioeconomic and environmental impacts is needed; 
on question of: which measures are effective, socially and poli-
tically acceptable, and under which conditions can they be im-
plemented? Combining theories on behavioral tipping points, 
social norms, transition theory, and insights from bottom-up 
assessment of techno-economic studies and models with IAMs 
will be one way forward, reflecting interactions between sectors 
and systems. For more consistent and systematic modeling ef-
forts, it is important to be able to access and compare grounded 
assumptions on demand. A common interdisciplinary frame-
work such as put forth by TWI2050 can help systematize such 
assumptions and how they are reflected in models, fostering 
cross-sectoral learning.
Improving the representation of labor markets, 
innovation and inequality
Macro-economic modeling frameworks capturing the inter-
action between technological progress, frictional labor markets 
and distributional implications for household income are ac-
tively researched, and a better understanding is needed which 
of these frameworks are mature and computationally efficient 
enough to be adopted by large-scale numerical modeling with 
IAMs. A huge force in shaping future innovation, employment, 
and inequality will be the digital revolution and the associated 
automation of cognitive tasks. Collaboration between the ma-
cro-economics, machine learning and sustainability research 
communities is needed to assess the opportunities and threats 
of these developments for a sustainability transformation. 
All the above research needs address elements that will enhan-
ce the evidence-base guiding the implementation of the SDGs, 
provided that the scientific community can convey its knowled-
ge to national decision makers on policy choices and actions, 
strengthening the national science-policy interface (Colglazier, 
2018). For this to happen, governments and institutions at all 
levels need to prepare for these advances and actively promote 
and support the scientific community.
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4.1 Introduction 
The six transformations to sustainability are different from 
previous transformations – they differ with regard to scale, time, 
space and connectedness with each other. Getting governance 
and the economics as well as social change right is fundamental 
for achieving these transformations. While the previous 
chapters focused on the necessary content of sustainability 
policies and the social, environmental as well as economic 
trends, this chapter addresses the political and institutional 
points of departure of the six transformations. It focuses on 
governance in nation states because states are still the center of 
binding, political decision-making. However, to make the six 
transformations happen, transformative governance is needed 
from the local to the global level. For instance, governance 
needs to be flexible enough to accommodate state and non-state 
actors from different sectors and global governance still must 
be stronger for addressing inter- and transnational problems 
effectively. Elements of transformative governance as well as 
economic principles will be addressed cursorily in this chapter 
and they will build the basis for future research of TWI2050. 
The 2030 Agenda also acknowledges governance on all 
levels as a goal in itself and as an enabler of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDG) implementation (especially SDGs 
16 and 17). This chapter starts with a mapping of governance 
and state capacities all around the world and assesses its 
implications for the transformations to sustainability (Section 
4.2.1). Then it turns to violent conflicts and state fragility as 
structural impediments for achieving the SDGs (Section 4.2.2). 
Departing from these preconditions, the chapter presents what 
we know about integrated implementation of sustainability 
policies and, more particular, how to govern the interlinkages 
during implementation (Section 4.3). General principles for 
governance and financing the SDGs as well as solving political 
problems (politics) are addressed. The chapter concludes with 
a description of the global context of the six transformations 
to sustainability. It acknowledges three bifurcations on the way 
to sustainability and gives a direction towards sustainability 
(Section 4.4). 
4.2 Enabling political and societal conditions for 
the transformations to sustainability 
Peace and good governance are uncontested preconditions for 
sustainable human development (Fukuyama, 2016; Boutros-
Ghali, 1992; World Bank, 1992). However, neither peace nor good 
governance are sufficient for achieving the six Transformations 
Towards Sustainability. While there are a number of countries 
that need to improve the capacity and performance of political 
institutions to achieve sustainable development, there are 
others, which are well governed and stable but fail to meet the 
SDGs or even obstruct their achievement globally. For instance, 
least developed countries need to enhance their governance 
capabilities to be able to improve food security and waste 
Key Messages
1. Peace and good governance are uncontested preconditions for sustainable human development. However, neither peace 
nor good governance is sufficient for achieving the six Transformations Towards Sustainability. Good policies, change of social 
values and a reformed culture of global cooperation are as relevant.
2. Inclusive institutions are crucial in bringing about egalitarian societies, which have been demonstrated to perform better 
in promoting innovation, prosperity and wellbeing.
3. Transformations to sustainability require governing interlinkages between Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This 
implies adaptive polycentric multi-sector, multi-level, multi-scale and multi-actor governance approaches, even though they 
may be hindered by veto players, power asymmetries, transaction costs and low capacities.
4. Transformations to sustainability are likely to be disruptive and, thus, could even trigger violent conflict. In history, most 
great transformations have been accompanied by violent conflict, including wars. Acknowledging governance reforms to go-
vern social change as a vital part of pathways to transformation is thus crucial.
5. Many of our societies are now at a tipping point where they can step up the pace of transition towards implementing 
the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement. This tipping point situation is characterized by three major bifurcations: The 
transformation towards sustainability, nationalist counter-transformations and the far-reaching dynamics of the digital trans-
formation.
management. OECD countries, on the other hand, neither 
meet certain goals, nor foster their achievement such as the 
reduction of CO2 emissions because neither their economic 
priorities and climate policies nor the consumption preferences 
of their populations have prioritized sustainability. In other 
words, OECD countries have the capabilities to change towards 
sustainability but need to get their policies right. Creating a 
collective culture of sustainability1 requires that states promote 
behavioral and ethical norms that change the values, actions, 
and attitudes of political elites, the private sector, civil society 
and people at large. Developing countries face larger challenges 
because missing capabilities and institutions need to be built 
simultaneously with the right policies and attitudinal changes 
(World Bank, 2017; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012).
Peace and stability are decisive factors for development. The 
relationship between peace and development is often described 
as a sequence. First stability and peace, then development. 
However, for building scenarios for 2050 the reversed causality 
of this relationship is as important. Transformations to 
sustainability are likely to be disruptive and, thus, could even 
trigger violent conflict. In history, most great transformations 
were accompanied by violent conflict, including war 
(Osterhammel, 2009). Although a peaceful transformation to 
sustainability is the role model for the 2030 Agenda as TWI2050 
we need to consider scenarios, which take into account potential 
outbreaks of conflictive dynamics.
1 See also Section 4.3.
2 Although state capacity is not explicitly mentioned in SDG 16 it highlights a related concept, namely effective and transparent institutions (SDG target 16.6). 
4.2.1 Governance and state capacities
A capable state2, which is able to meet the challenges of 
complex governance modes, is an important prerequisite for 
peaceful transformations to sustainability. Strong political 
institutions are crucial but they will only be effective for an 
integrated implementation of the Agenda 2030 if they are 
able to accommodate the disperse distribution of power, 
multiple centers of authority and competitive relationships 
that characterize policymaking between the state, market and 
society in a multi-polar world (Fukuyama, 2004). This holds 
true for countries in the OECD and developing regions.
Whether democratic regimes are better suited to foster 
sustainable development than autocratic regimes is an ongoing 
debate. Empirical studies yield mixed results, which suggest 
that democracies do not outperform autocracies with regard 
to development results, for instance, the provision of public 
goods such as education or clean water and climate-friendly 
policies (Stepping and Banholzer, 2017). However, democracies 
do better in providing security, internal peace and protecting 
the individual rights of their citizens than autocracies (Stoker, 
2017; Faust, 2007). Given these mixed results of specific regime 
types, this chapter focuses on specific characteristics of political 
institutions, state capacity and governance for implementing 
the 2030 Agenda. Before getting closer into the characteristics 
of political institutions and governance modes we first focus on 
political macro-structures. Despite polycentric dynamics, the 
state is still a central entity for governing individual societies, 
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Box 4.1. From good governance to inclusive governance.
Good governance is not the only game in town anymore. In international development debates, we are currently observing a shift 
away from good governance to the notion of “inclusive governance”. Although good governance is still widely used to assess the 
quality of governance processes and government performance (the keywords being accountability, transparency, efficiency, govern-
ment responsiveness, effectiveness), practitioners and scholars criticize the hitherto prevailing concept of good governance because 
it does not capture all attributes that are necessary to build equal societies in which no one is left behind. While good governance 
implies effective government for sustainable development outcomes, recent studies address the need to include the distribution of 
policy outcomes. In this sense, political institutions must be inclusive and able to redistribute public goods and foster equality bet-
ween the people (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). In its recent World Development Report “Governance and the Law”, the World 
Bank emphasizes that the distribution of political power drives institution-building and the distribution of policy outcomes (World 
Bank, 2017). The Bank concludes that building capacities is important but not sufficient unless power constellations are taken into 
account.
By adopting SDG 16 on peace, justice and strong institutions and SDG 10 on equality, as well as the guiding principle of “leave 
no one behind”, the 2030 Agenda responds to these debates and to a critical gap identified over the process of MDG implemen-
tation. This strong emphasis placed on the achievement of peaceful societies, general reduction of violence, inclusion and social 
justice through adequate governance constitutes a veritable shift in the global development agenda. Although the importance of 
good governance was cursorily mentioned in the Millennium Declaration, no specific MDG was developed to focus attention and 
resources on governance issues, let alone the question of political inclusion. By contrast, there is now a broad consensus that the 
governance targets under SDG 16 are not merely desirable development outcomes, but need to be understood as indispensable 
enablers for achieving all other goals (e.g. Sachs, 2015). Although there is a common agreement amongst states about the need to 
properly governing the SDGs (Kanie and Biermann, 2017), the concept of governance is still contested and more time will be nee-
ded to see whether the notion of inclusive governance will effectively replace the current concept of good governance.
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global affairs and for regulating markets. If states turn fragile, 
they face serious governance problems, which inhibit effective 
policymaking for sustainable development (World Bank, 2017). 
On the other hand, if states turn too strong, they are more likely 
to concentrate power and limit the freedoms of their people.  
State fragility recurs in different patterns. Different types of 
state fragility have different implications for state performance. 
We use the “Constellations of State Fragility”, developed by the 
German Development Institute, to describe the implications 
for meeting the SDGs (Grävingholt et al., 2018). The literature 
on state fragility identifies a number of dimensions of fragility, 
which describe the core functions of the state (Grävingholt 
et al., 2015; Call, 2011; Carment et al., 2010). We distinguish 
three core dimensions of state functions (and, by implication, 
of fragility): state authority (i.e., the ability to uphold the state 
monopoly of violence); state capacity (the ability to deliver basic 
services to the population); and state legitimacy (the general 
acceptance by the citizenry of the state institutions’ claim to 
set and implement binding rules) (Grävingholt et al., 2015). 
Each dimension refers to a specific constellation of state-society 
relation. Differentiating and measuring these three dimensions 
enables to identify six clusters of states, whereby each cluster 
displays distinct statehood qualities or deficiencies. The six 
clusters thus represent empirically observable constellations of 
state fragility (see Table  4 .1). 
The world map of most likely constellations of state fragility 
shows how the macro-political starting points for implementing 
the Agenda 2030 vary across regions (Figure  4 .1). Dysfunctional 
states located in Africa and Asia face complex problems and 
war, which requires state-building and renewing the contract 
between state and society. Achieving peace and stability (SDG 
16) is certainly the most important objective in these countries, 
where 3.6% of the world population live. Although small in total 
numbers, dysfunctional states can destabilize entire regions 
and increase instability in neighboring countries (Stewart, 
2006). In case of countries with low capacities, the likeliness 
of destabilization and violent conflict due to external shocks 
such as floods is higher than in more capable states. More 
than one third of the world population lives in these countries 
(37%). For instance, if the Malian state would have had capable 
institutions to govern its whole territory before 2012, the inflow 
of weapons and militias from Libya would not have been as 
likely to destabilize a whole country. Low capacity is thus not 
only a threat to service delivery and policy implementation 
but also to security and stability in a country (Asadullah and 
Savoia, 2018; Yanguas, 2017; Bukena and Yanguas, 2013). In 
turn, states with low levels of authority but better capacity and 
legitimacy struggle with localized conflict and high numbers of 
crime (e.g., Brazil, El Salvador or South Africa). They are able 
to provide basic services to their populations and implement 
development policies effectively (to around 7% of the world 
population). However, low authority will hinder efficient and 
full SDG implementation because it is often correlated with 
high levels of corruption and mismanagement (Fukuyama, 
2018). Low legitimacy states are marked with a weak or 
mediocre relationship between citizens and state. They might 
perform well in service delivery but are not able to provide a 
societal environment free of fear and distrust. Around 35% of 
the world population live in these states. Semi-functional states 
have good preconditions for improving their situation (around 
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Observable constellations Qualitative description
DYSFUNCTIONAL STATES States in this cluster have very low scores on all dimensions of statehood. These states usually have very limited 
authority over the use of physical violence, have little capacity to provide basic public services and score low 
on legitimacy.
LOW AUTHORITY STATES States in this cluster have very limited authority over the use of physical violence, but have the capacity to 
provide some basic public services and have medium scores on legitimacy.
LOW-CAPACITY STATES States in this cluster display little capacity to provide basic public services, but they have decent authority over 
the use of physical violence and usually have mediocre scores on legitimacy.
LOW-LEGITIMACY STATES States in this cluster have low to mediocre scores of legitimacy, but usually have decent authority over the use 
of physical violence and the capacity to provide some basic public services.
SEMI-FUNCTIONAL STATES States in this cluster have medium scores on all dimensions of statehood. These states usually have decent 
authority over the use of physical violence, possess the capacity to provide some basic public services and score 
better than average on legitimacy.
WELL-FUNCTIONING STATES States in this cluster display very good scores on all dimensions of statehood. These states usually have the 
authority over the use of physical violence, possess the capacity to comprehensively provide basic public 
services and score high on legitimacy. They are not considered as “fragile”.
Table 4.1. Description of constellations of state fragility. Source: For more information on theory, methodology and measurement see Grävingholt et al. (2018) 
available at www.statefragility.info.
6% of world population). However, semi-functional and well-
functioning states have in common the fact despite a generally 
good predisposition, vested interests, power asymmetries and 
competitive relationships between central players can hinder 
the implementation of the SDGs (affecting 11% of world 
population in well-functioning states). In these cases, SDG 
implementation is more a question of the ability and political 
will to reform political institutions and incentivize collective 
action for a global common good.   
All types of fragility have in common that they result from 
governance deficiencies. In order to overcome fragility, 
institutions need to be transformed. The notion of effective 
institutions is closely related to the concept of state capacity. 
Development literature formerly strongly focused on the effects 
of state capacity on economic development. More recently, 
there has been growing evidence and scholarly agreement 
that capable state institutions are key to the delivery of public 
services and consequently critically affect other development 
outcomes such as poverty and inequality (Asadullah and 
Savoia, 2018; Denney et al., 2017; Savoia and Sen, 2015; OECD, 
2014; Petersen and Engberg-Pedersen, 2013). Institutional 
effectiveness - i.e., the degree to which institutions are able 
to meet their assigned missions and achieve their intended 
outcomes - is hence an important requirement if states are 
to fulfill their mandates of administrating public affairs and 
providing basic goods and services. However, state capacity 
cannot be measured exclusively by the outputs and outcomes 
that a state produces (e.g. Fukuyama, 2014; Holt and Manning, 
2014). Instead, the ability of institutions to produce these 
outcomes should be a function of inputs, such as establishing 
a common-good oriented culture for public servants, adequate 
financing, staffing, and training, as well as procedures; i.e., the 
design and enforcement of the rules and regulations that these 
institutions have to adhere to. The improvement of development 
outcomes therefore critically hinges on improving these rules 
and regulations as well as the right mandates and policies for 
public institutions (Asadullah and Savoia, 2018; Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2008)
Transparency and accountability (as outlined in SDG target 
16.6) are mutually dependent elements of governance, which 
are of enormous importance for delivering the SDGs. Ensuring 
that governments are honoring their commitments to the 
2030 Agenda is only possible when adequate mechanisms 
for monitoring progress are in place. For example, knowing 
whether the commitment to the principle “leave no one behind” 
is being adequately funded, is impossible in the absence of 
transparency about the resources dedicated to each of the SDGs 
and the disclosure of data disaggregated by disability, gender 
and age. However, holding governments and their institutions 
to account for deviating from their commitments requires 
the existence of effective sanction mechanisms. Effective 
accountability hence both involves the obligation of public 
officials to inform about and explain their actions, as well as 
the capacity of citizens and accounting agencies to punish those 
in power if they violate their public duties (e.g., Behn, 2001; 
Schedler, 1999). The absence of effective accountability opens 
the floodgates to clientelism and corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 
2006; Lederman et al., 2005; Strom et al., 2003; Ferejohn, 
1999; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; O’Donnell, 1998), both of which 
facilitate the abuse of public office for private gain. Clientelism, 
in addition to directing public resources towards specific client 
groups, distorts political competition and undermines the 
optimal allocation of public goods and services (Fox, 1994). 
Corruption, in addition to enriching individual public servants, 
distorts markets and compromises service delivery (Rose-
Ackerman, 1999). This has serious implications since it diverts 
resources that are needed to meet sustainable development 
goals. The worldwide cost of corruption alone is estimated 
at 2 to 5% of global GDP per year (European Parliament’s 
Committee on Development, 2015; OECD, 2015).
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Figure 4.1. Constellations of state fragility worldwide (2015). See description of constellations in Table  4 .1. Source: Grävingholt et al. (2018) 
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Figure   4.2 shows the global average development of 
accountability from 1900-2016 using the Varieties of 
Democracies Accountability Index. The index measures three 
dimensions of accountability: vertical accountability, i.e., the 
ability of citizens to hold their governments accountable through 
elections and political parties; horizontal accountability, i.e., 
the capacity of state institutions such as legislatures and the 
judiciary to oversee the government;  diagonal (or social) 
accountability, i.e., the oversight executed by civil society 
and media (Mechkova et al., 2018). Values run from -2 (total 
absence of accountability) to 2 (full accountability).
As can be seen from Figure   4.2, since the beginning of the 
20th century three phases of accountability development 
worldwide can be distinguished, which concur with the three 
waves of democratization (Diamond, 1996; Huntington, 1991). 
Starting from low levels at the beginning of the 20st century, 
average accountability further declines during the 1930s 
and 1940s. Following World War II, the global average of 
accountability rises above pre-war levels and finally experiences 
a steep rise following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. 
However, it stagnated and did not contribute to further global 
spread and deepening of democracy in the 2000s. In sum, we 
can observe a positive global trend towards more accountability 
in a historic perspective. Although this implies a trend towards 
achieving SDG 16 (target 16.6), it does not necessarily mean 
that more accountability on a globally averaged level facilitates 
the implementation of the other SDGs. There are two caveats. 
First, individual countries and regions perform differently with 
regard to accountability. Second, policy content matters for 
judging whether more accountability leads to better policies for 
the transformations to sustainability. For instance, governments 
might be held accountable on many policy issues. But as long 
as there are no proper policies that lead to more sustainability, 
accountability does not contribute to the transformations to 
sustainability.   
Inclusive institutions are key in bringing about more 
egalitarian societies (SDG targets 10.2 and 16.6). They ensure 
equal protection of rights, provide equal access to power, 
and facilitate equal access to resources and services. Inclusive 
institutions thus ensure that the state grants and protects 
rights and freedoms evenly across social groups. The equal 
distribution of resources ensures that individuals’ basic 
necessities are taken care of, thus enabling them to exert 
those rights and freedoms. Egalitarian societies have been 
demonstrated to perform better in fostering innovation and 
sustained economic growth, which is why inclusive institutions 
are considered key to nations’ prosperity and wellbeing 
(Carter, 2014; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). In practice, 
however, politics and policymaking can empower some 
groups while marginalizing or excluding others. For example, 
those with greater organizational and financial resources may 
disproportionally influence policy making through lobbying 
(Baumgartner et al., 2009; Mahoney, 2007). The prevalence of 
private interest influence on state institutions entails the risk of 
state capture (Crabtree and Durand, 2017; World Bank, 2007; 
Hellman, 2000). As a result, powerful individuals, economic 
actors, or even organized crime can shape a nation’s policies, 
legal environment, and economy to benefit their own private 
interests (Martini, 2014; Stigler, 1971). 
Figure  4.3 shows the trajectory of inclusive institutions from 
1900 to 2016 using V-Dems egalitarian component index. 
It ranges from 0 to 1, with zero corresponding to a complete 
absence of egalitarianism, while a score of one would indicate 
that equal protection of rights, equal access to power, and equal 
distribution of key resources have been fully achieved. 
To date, no country in the world ever has reached a perfect 
score on this index (V-Dem, 2017). Yet, on average, the world 
(black line) experienced a wave of expansion of egalitarianism 
after World War I, a tendency toward reversal during World 
War II, and a second, protracted but dramatic wave of 
expansion after the war. However, no automatism is observable 
between the expansion of political egalitarianism and economic 
equalities. For instance, in Western Europe and Northern 
America, the decline of the quality of inclusive institutions 
concurs with increasing income inequality since 2010. 
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Figure  4.2. Accountability, global and regional trends, 1900–2016. Source: 
Coppedge et al. (2016).
Figure  4.3. Inclusive institutions, global and regional trends, 1900-2016. 
Source: Coppedge et al. (2016).
Participatory decisionmaking implies that individuals from 
all social groups are equally capable of exercising their political 
rights and influencing the political and governing processes. 
Participatory institutions are considered important enabler for 
the implementation of 2030 Agenda, as it is important that all 
sectors and groups of society are be able to articulate the main 
challenges that they face. The risk of destabilization increases 
where political decision-making constantly excludes and 
marginalizes certain social groups. One illustrative example 
of this is the way in which the exclusion of unemployed youth 
from economic, social, and political opportunities contributed 
to protest mobilization in the Arab Spring movements 
(Abdalla, 2015; Asseburg and Wimmen, 2015; Breuer et al., 
2014; Ayeb, 2011). Establishing participatory institutions is 
thus not only a goal in itself (SDG target 16.7) but also a task 
for successful implementation of other SDGs. There is still a 
need to ensure that all groups and sectors have the space and 
adequate mechanisms at their disposal to contribute to aligning, 
designing and implementing the SDGs.
Figure  4.4. Participatory decision making, global and regional trends, 1900-
2016. Source: Coppedge et al. (2016).
Figure 4.4 displays the levels of participatory decision 
making across the world from 1900 to 2016 using V-Dems 
participatory component index. The index captures three 
aspects of participatory decision making 1) the participation in 
civil society organizations, 2) the ability of citizens to decide on 
issues directly at the ballot box through mechanisms of direct 
democracy, and 3) popular participation and representation 
in sub-national level governments. Values run from 0 (total 
absence of participation) to 1 (full participation). As can be seen, 
on an average, the level of participation has steadily improved 
globally over the last century. The most dramatic changes in 
participation over time occurred in the region of Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the 
independence of its former constituent republics, triggered a 
rapid increase of participation in Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia, following which, levels of participation also broadened in 
other regions of the world, including Middle East and North 
3 Rising levels of overeating (estimated 3 billion by 2030)  is likely to be the next driver of death Harari, Y. N. 2017. Homo deus: A brief history of tomorrow, New 
York, Harper Collins E-Books. 
Africa (MENA), Asia and the Pacific and sub-Saharan Africa. 
However, a high number of political regimes with limited 
participation persists and various countries, including some 
in Eastern Europe, face increasing illiberalism and democratic 
backsliding (Mechkova et al., 2018). Part of this trend is the 
shrinking space of civil society where regulations and laws 
over-regulate, limit and inhibit the funding and actions of civil 
society organizations (Poppe and Wolff, 2017)
4.2.2 Peace, conflict and state fragility
Historical analyses of various forms of violence show that 
violence has been declining over the past centuries (Pinker, 
2011, chapter 5); Nevertheless, despite a general decline, these 
processes are prone to setbacks in individual regions and could 
possibly reverse even globally. While we observed a substantial 
decline of international violent conflicts between states after the 
end of the Cold War in 1990, intrastate conflicts have since then 
increased. However, given the current political tensions in global 
politics it does not seem too unlikely that this trend reverses. 
Figure  4.5 shows a global decline in battle-related deaths in the 
post-Cold War era. However, following the year 2005, which saw 
the lowest number of victims from battle-related deaths in recent 
history, the past five years, have seen a renewed rise in conflict-
related fatalities which exceed even the highest levels from the 
post-Cold War era. This strong increase can be mainly attributed 
to the conflicts in Syria and the rise of ISIS in the wider Middle 
East (Allansson et al., 2017). Although in history more people 
have died from hunger and epidemics than from warfare, armed 
conflict and the instability which arises from war and post-conflict 
situations can be major facilitators of hunger and epidemics 
(Gates et al., 2012). The data of battle-related deaths described 
above account only for fatalities from direct violence, the death 
toll and suffering inflicted through the indirect consequences of 
armed conflict will be much higher.3 Considering both the direct 
and indirect effects of major armed conflicts, battle-related death 
from wars and violent conflict remain a challenge in affected 
regions and geographical areas. 
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Figure  4.5. Battle-related deaths 1989-2016, own calculation based on 
Allansson et al. (2017).
Achieving the ambitious objectives of the 2030 Agenda and 
beyond will only be possible if political instability and organized 
violence can be avoided or at least mitigated (Brundtland et 
al., 1987). Examining the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), which preceded the 2030 Agenda, highlights that 
armed conflict and war are detrimental to many development 
outcomes in affected countries. Major intrastate conflicts 
usually stall economic growth and can destroy years of 
economic development as well as state structures which are 
needed to enable sustainable development. Similarly, violent 
conflicts tend to exacerbate undernourishment and increase 
child mortality (Gates et al., 2012).  90% of all civil wars are 
recurrences in previously conflict-ridden countries. Walter 
(2015) finds that every civil war that has started after 2003 (with 
the exception of Libya) has been a continuation of previous civil 
war. Thus, affected countries risk being caught in a negative 
spiral which undermines any efforts to achieve the 2030 Agenda 
(United Nations and World Bank, 2018). While positive cases of 
effective international strategies to support sustainable peace do 
exist, armed violent conflicts and war pose a threat of widening 
the gap between different countries or entire regions and puts 
the global ambition of the SDGs at risk. 
Given that armed conflict can derail the transformation 
to sustainable development, it is important to target the 
circumstances which breed organized violence. During the 
past decades, academic research has provided a comprehensive 
assessment of the conditions which predict armed conflict (Hegre 
and Sambanis, 2006). Many of these conditions can be found 
among the targets and indicators described in the SDGs. This 
reveals an important circular relationship among many SDGs on 
one side as well as peace and stability on the other. Implementing 
the SDGs should coincide with substantive reduction in the risk 
of conflict outbreak. At the same time, however, conflicts that 
do occur will undermine the progress towards reaching many of 
the targets in the affected regions. It is thus essential to identify 
and work towards the targets which are linked with lower risks of 
violence and instability. Given the high risk of recurrence, parallel 
efforts need to be made to stabilize and end ongoing conflict as 
well as to support SDG implementation in post-conflict settings. 
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Box 4.2. The negative externalities of wind power in Mexico: poor governance and social conflict.
Introducing new policies such as renewable energies can foster trade-offs between SDG and create social conflict if inclusive 
and integrated governance is missing. Following the liberalization of its energy market in 2013, Mexico has become a regional 
leader in the production of renewable energy (SDG 7). However, issues of social justice and peace (SDG 16) and land control by 
small-scale peasants (SDGs targets 1.4 and 2.3) associated with the production of wind energy were not integrated into Mexico’s 
policy approach. The trade-offs and social conflicts related to the production of wind energy in Mexico were caused by inadequate 
multi-level and missing inclusive governance, which are characterized by top-down decision making within a weak institutional 
framework and exclusive decision-making. 
Technical studies have identified the Isthmus of Tehuantepec in the federal state of Oaxaca as the most attractive region in the 
country to implement wind farms. At the same time, however, Oaxaca is one of the poorest Mexican states with 62% of its mostly 
indigenous population living under the poverty line and 23% living in extreme poverty. Wind energy planning has, this far, been a 
predominantly federal responsibility, with minor or no participation of the regional government (Oaxaca state) and local authori-
ties and populations who are directly affected by the wind parks.
In view of Mexico’s limited economic and technological capacities, it was considered essential to attract foreign private investment 
to develop the country’s wind potential. After a long phase of state-led development starting from the 1990s, Mexico engaged in 
neoliberal structural adjustments. The liberalization of the energy sector and land tenure regimes paved the way for wind power as 
a profit-driven industry and enacted the introduction of private investment in the rural landscape of the Isthmus, which had previ-
ously mainly been organized through social and collective forms of property. As a consequence, multinational foreign enterprises 
emerged as the main protagonists in exploiting wind power. 
Wind energy in Mexico is developing under a legal framework of self-supply (autoabastecimiento) that allows private power pro-
ducers to partner with industrial off-takers, who invest in the project in order to benefit from a long-term fixed price on their 
electricity. By August 2015, the installed capacity in the Isthmus was 2160 megawatts (MW), from over 2000 wind turbines, out of 
which only seven were publicly owned.
Over the past years, the Isthmus region has experienced increasing socio-environmental conflicts that are not only threatening the 
continued expansion of wind development but also social stability. Following the initial negotiations between private foreign inves-
tors and the federal government, indigenous communities had made demands for comprehensive information about wind energy 
projects, to which the government did not respond.  The resistance of local residents against large-scale wind energy projects is 
mainly targeted against the lack of formal participatory consultation (SDG target 16.7), illegal and unfair leasing contracts, and 
the meager compensations offered to land holders by private investors. While the worldwide average of payments to landowners 
fluctuates between 1 and 5% of wind farms’ gross income, on the Isthmus these average between 0.025 and 1.5%. Furthermore, 
with the majority of energy generated going to industrial off-takers in distant cities, impoverished residents of the Isthmus are not 
directly benefitting from the product that is being produced on their lands. 
Sources: Avila-Calero (2017), Huesca-Pérez et al., (2015), Hernandez-Cortez and Codero, (2014), Juárez-Hernández and León, 
(2014).
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Among the most robust findings in the study of organized 
violence is the fact that conflicts appear most frequently in the 
poorest and most undeveloped regions of the world (Hegre 
and Sambanis, 2006). Establishing food security (SDG 1) and 
making economic growth inclusive (SDG 8) worldwide should 
therefore coincide with a substantial decrease in conflict risk. 
But economic growth alone will not be sufficient to decrease 
conflict incidence. For example, child mortality has been found 
to be a strong predictor of subsequent civil wars and political 
instability (Goldstone et al., 2010). Although child mortality 
is certainly not a direct cause of war, the statistical association 
can be understood as strong evidence that conflicts result from 
contexts of poor living conditions which leave large parts of the 
population excluded. Reducing child mortality substantially 
(SDG target 3.2) by using technical improvements will therefore 
not lead to a decline in conflicts. On a larger level, however, 
working towards universal health coverage (SDG target 3.8), 
can go along with a larger set of policies providing for inclusive 
social institutions that help promote peaceful societies.
It is important to promote inclusive political and social 
institutions and mitigate disparities in society (SDG 10 and SDG 
target 16.7). Aside from absolute deprivation, the equality and 
exclusion of specific social groups matters. There is increasing 
evidence that politically marginalized groups are more likely to 
engage in armed rebellion (Cederman et al., 2011). Similarly, 
economic inequality between ethnic, religious or other social 
identity groups appear to drive conflict (Buhaug et al., 2014). 
However, it is unlikely that economic inequality single-handedly 
causes violent conflict. It only causes the outbreak of violent 
conflict if combined with other factors such as social identities, 
access to resources and particularistic interests (Bartusevičius, 
2014). Promoting political and economic equality within 
societies (SDG 10) and establishing or strengthening inclusive 
institutions (SDG target 16.7) should provide more stability to 
diverse societies and help reduce the risk of armed conflict.
Although democracy is not explicitly enshrined in the 
SDGs, democratic institutions are generally associated with 
considerable peace and stability. Democratic regimes are more 
stable in the long-run when compared to most autocratic 
regimes (Goldstone et al., 2010). Moreover, the empirical 
observation that democratic nations do not wage war against 
each other is one of the most established empirical regularities 
in international relations (Dafoe et al., 2013). Nevertheless, 
like most major transformations, changes in political regimes 
are often associated with internal conflict (Hegre et al., 2001). 
However, predominantly closed autocratic regimes that face an 
abrupt change of power are likely to cause internal war, whereas 
semi-open systems are less likely to face violence (Ziaja, 2017). 
This should serve as a cautioning observation against dramatic 
action for regime change. 
However conflicts with high intensity violence are not the 
only threat to achieving and implementing the SDGs. Protests 
with a lower intensity of conflict such as local protests, riots and 
vandalism have been increasing during the last decade. This has 
been an overlooked phenomenon, which increasingly occurs 
across all types of states in the OECD and developing world 
in both democracies and autocracies. Highly mobilized social 
groups protest on an ad hoc-basis to complain about living 
conditions, for instance against the increase of food prices or 
unwelcome mega-infrastructure projects (see also Box  4.3). Local 
protests can be a blessing and a curse for sustainable development 
and peace, depending on the contextual circumstances. In 
contexts with functioning and open political institutions they can 
be important means to channel citizens’ interests and challenge 
vested interests, which would have otherwise undermined 
common goods. At the same time, powerful local interests can 
also challenge common goods, for instance protests against 
renewable energy generation, opposition against improved 
electricity grids in Central and Southern Germany. Where local 
conflicts meet challenging societal structures they are likely to 
add-up to major incidences of violence. For instance, the intensity 
of violence is likely to increase where political institutions fail to 
include peoples’ interest and unfavorable structural conditions, 
such as increasing inequalities and an exponential population 
growth (which increases the number of young and mobilized 
people) evolve.
All in all, the observation that implementing many SDGs 
should go along with a reduced risk of armed conflict is 
comforting. Nevertheless, SDG implementation can only 
serve as a long-term strategy of conflict prevention and not 
for managing and stopping violent conflict. Even with major 
advancements toward sustainable development, conflicts will 
always occur, especially in turbulent times of change. Recent 
projections contend that with the most optimistic scenarios, the 
number of conflicts worldwide can be substantively reduced, 
but war and instability cannot be prevented completely 
(Hegre et al., 2016). In each affected location or region, these 
conflicts may put sustainable development in jeopardy. In these 
situations, conflict will have to be contained and resolved as 
quickly as possible. This will require substantive efforts by the 
international community and reliance on well-established tools 
of conflict management: robust peacekeeping engagements 
paired with concerted diplomatic efforts to end the conflict.
The international community is not empty handed when it 
comes to conflict management and resolution. Simulations 
of global peacekeeping allocation suggest that extensive 
international commitment and financial contributions to 
peacekeeping can substantively reduce the level of conflict 
worldwide over the next decades (Hegre et al., 2011). There is 
increasing evidence that robust and well-staffed peacekeeping 
missions are able to deescalate ongoing conflicts and protect the 
civilian population (Hultman et al., 2014; Hultman et al., 2013). 
These findings suggest that states should build the capacity 
and be willing to contribute to these missions. Alongside 
peacekeeping operations, the international community will 
need to patiently push for diplomatic solutions to ongoing 
conflicts and support mediated conflict resolution. Third 
party mediation appears to be associated with a higher chance 
of peaceful settlement and more durable peace (Ruhe, 2018). 
Upon successful resolution, peacekeeping operations are again 
an important policy response to ensure that conflicts do not 
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Box 4.3. Reforms needed for governing the Transformations Towards Sustainability.
Basic reforms for the economy and governance need to guide the deep changes needed to implement the 2030 Agenda. They 
will be the basis for transformative governance and guide economic instruments and policies as well as. TWI2050 will develop 
principles of transformative governance further in its future work.
ECONOMIC REFORMS
Problems to solve Reforms needed
Significant public investments needed Increasing and stabilizing domestic tax revenues
Doubling local, national, global infrastruc-
tures by 2050
Investment oriented policies; long term oriented financing
Fighting poverty and inequalities Redistributive policies; investments in human capabilities; focusing on the bot-
tom 40% nationally and globally
Aligning markets with the 2030 Agenda Re-embedding market dynamics
Stabilizing local and global commons Commons oriented investments and guardrails
Trusted globalization Global and national governance to triggering inclusive development; transparent 
and accountable global economic governance
However, the Transformations Towards Sustainability require not only capable institutions, inclusive governance strategies, and 
adequate policies on all levels, but also a clear understanding of potential pitfalls and resistance against change, driven by politics. 
Five dimensions are critical:
GOVERNANCE REFORMS
Problems to solve Reforms needed
Sustainability transformation as a civiliza-
tional challenge
Four normative innovations:
• Earth system responsibility
• Global commons perspective – transnational fairness & justice
• Anticipate impacts of decisions for many generations to come
• Culture of global cooperation and norm diffusion through transnational go-
vernance 
Flexible but stable institutions needed Network governance fostering interplay between formal institutions and gover-
nance networks
Overcoming institutional, political, sectorial 
path dependencies
Building transformative alliances across sectors and public spheres (state, market 
and civil society) from local to global
Integrated policymaking across borders, 
sectors and SDGs
Polycentric, multi-scalar governance and integrated management
Deep transformations lack public legitimacy Investment in drivers of motivational change:
• Normative triggers: How can we accept that?
• Demonstrating success
• Attractive future narratives
Dysfunctional and weak international orga-
nizations (IOs)
Reinforcement of multilateral cooperation; strengthen autonomy of IOs
It’s politics, stupid!
Dimensions Problem description
1.Vested interests Owners of fossil fuels, beneficiaries of unsustainable businesses or lifestyles
2. Power of elites Resistance to regulation, redistribution, taxation
3. Public – private relations Capture by private interests, weak civil societies
4. Conflicts Political blockades and eroding social contracts
5. Disruptive dynamics Deep change producing legitimacy challenges
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recur (Fortna and Howard, 2008; Fortna, 2004). Furthermore, 
improvements towards good governance principles and 
improvements of rule of law (e.g., SDG target 16.3) can act 
as important stability anchors in fragile societies (Hegre and 
Nygård, 2015; Walter, 2015). 
4.3 Achieving SDGs 6, 7, 11, 12 and 15 - 
governing interlinkages as an element of 
sustainability transformations
This section argues that one element of the sustainability 
transformation relates to governing interlinkages among 
multiple SDGs. It suggests that governing interlinkages among 
the 2018 HLPF priority SDGs 6, 7, 11, 12, and 15 can be informed 
by the evolving debate on governing the water-energy-food 
(WEF) nexus. Section  4.3.1 lays out the need for governing 
interlinkages related to the 2018 HLPF priority SDGs 6, 7, 11, 
12, and 15 and introduces into the WEF nexus debate. Section 
4.3.2 provides selected examples of WEF nexus situations 
and related governance challenges and approaches. Section 
4.3.3 discusses elements of and obstacles towards governing 
interlinkages in general and the WEF nexus in particular. 
Section 4.3.4 concludes and reflects to what extend the insights 
gained can be generalized for dealing with interrelated goal 
systems beyond the WEF nexus. 
4.3.1 Why governing interlinkages?
In Chapter 3, interlinkages related to the 2018 HLPF priority 
SDGs, namely SDGs 6, 7, 11, 12, and 15 were discussed. This 
section further explores what such a systematic perspective 
implies for governance. By doing so it largely draws on an 
evolving debate on governing the water-energy-food (WEF) 
nexus (e.g. Pahl-Wostl, 2017; Weitz et al., 2017). The WEF 
nexus debate discusses how the simultaneous provisioning of 
water (SDG 6), energy (SDG 7), food security (SDG 2) and of a 
world with less than 2 degree Celsius global warming (SDG 13) 
increases pressures on various input dimensions, such as water 
resources (SDG 6) as well as land use, soils and biodiversity 
(SDG 15) (Müller et al., 2015a) (Figure   4 .6). Hence, SDGs 
2, 6, 7, 13 and 15 can be considered to be at the center of the 
WEF-climate nexus debate (in the following referred to as 
WEF nexus). However, the sustainable provisioning of water, 
energy, food and other ecosystem services is a precondition 
for sustainable cities (SDG 11) and WEF nexus challenges 
become also highly visible in cities. Furthermore, sustainable 
consumption and production (SDG 12), especially of food and 
non-food crops, is also closely interlinked with resource use 
and ecosystem provision (SDGs 6 and 15). In the following we 
draw on the WEF nexus debate, even if SDG 2 (no hunger) was 
already included in the 2017 HLPF review and SDG 13 (climate 
actions) will be included in 2019 HLPF review. We assume that 
a WEF nexus situation is present when at least two of the four 
output dimensions, water, energy, food security and climate 
change mitigation are being pursued simultaneously and if 
this produces synergies or competing demands for natural 
resources. 
Figure  4.6. The water-energy-food-climate nexus. Source: Reprinted from 
Müller et al. (2015b), with permission from Elsevier.
As mentioned in Chapter 3 pursuing different goals 
simultaneously may entail synergies and trade-offs. For 
example, subsidies for electricity in arid regions (SDG 7) can 
contribute towards increasing local food security, SDG 2) 
through irrigation. However, this strategy may at the same time 
go along with falling groundwater tables and thus counteract 
the sustainable and efficient use of water resources (SDG 6) 
(Müller et al., 2015a; Shah et al., 2003). In water-scarce regions, 
water pricing e.g., through cap-and-trade schemes, can be an 
efficient instrument to balance water use between agriculture, 
private households, industry and ecosystems (Burdack et al., 
2014). However, in poor countries increasing costs for water 
may have negative effects on poverty (SDG1) and food security 
(SDG 2). Another example are the side effects of a potential 
large-scale deployment of bio-energy (BE) with carbon capture 
and storage (CCS) in order to generate renewable energy and 
achieve negative carbon dioxide emissions. In fact, most of the 
scenarios that envision limiting global warming to a maximum 
of 1.5° Celsius (SDG 13) assume the large-scale use of BECCS 
(Smith et al., 2015; Fuss et al., 2014). It is expected that this 
will considerably increase pressures on land use, ecosystems 
and biodiversity (SDG 15), water resources (SDG 6), and food 
prices (SDG2) (Humpenöder et al., 2018; Field and Mach, 2017; 
Popp et al., 2017; Bonsch et al., 2016). 
However, certain actions related to SDGs 6, 7, 11, 12 and 15 
may also generate synergies and co-benefits for other SDGs. For 
example, investments in wastewater treatment with energy co-
production may simultaneously contribute to increasing water 
(SDG 6) and energy (SDG 7) security, public health (SDG 3) and 
contribute towards more sustainable cities (SDG 11) (Never and 
Stepping, forthcoming; Never, 2016b; Never, 2016a). Dietary 
change can reduce pressures on land and water resources (SDGs 
6, 15), reduce nitrogen pollution (SDG 12) and generate health 
co-benefits (SDG 3) (Humpenöder et al., 2018). Such co-benefits 
can be drivers of change since actions related to one SDG may 
contribute directly or indirectly towards further SDGs.
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Maximizing synergies and mediating trade-offs is significantly 
related to investments in infrastructure and technology, but it 
is also a governance task. Nexus thinking therefore argues for 
the need to ‘overcome’ decision-making in silos and to enhance 
policy coherence across sectors, levels and actors (Rasul and 
Sharma, 2016; Hoff, 2011). Authors hence stress the need for 
cross-sector coordination, multi-level as well as multi-actor 
governance, taking into account the geographical scale of 
the respective nexus problem (Pahl-Wostl, 2017; Weitz et al., 
2017; Müller et al., 2015a). Drawing upon Paavola (2007) and 
Müller et al. (2015a), we understand WEF nexus governance 
as a dynamic and recursive process involving state and non-
state actors who establish, reaffirm or change institutions to 
resolve conflicts and negotiate political decisions in a way that 
takes into account interdependencies between soil, water and 
biodiversity systems in the provision of water, energy, food and 
climate security.
However, as Weitz et al. (2017) point out, our understanding 
of what governing the WEF nexus means and under which 
conditions it works or not remains limited. Furthermore, many 
barriers exist towards governing the WEF nexus, including 
vested interests, power asymmetries and transaction costs. This 
section therefore summarizes initial insights of research on 
governing the WEF nexus. 
4.3.2 Examples of WEF nexus situations 
and related governance challenges and 
approaches
The following examples provide snapshots of three WEF nexus 
situations and related governance challenges and approaches. 
The three examples cover both developed and developing 
countries, rural and urban areas, situations characterized by 
negative cross-sector externalities as well as an example wherein 
technology innovation may generate cross-sector co-benefits. 
Thus, they cover a broad spectrum of different nexus situations 
and related governance challenges and approaches.
Example 1: Voluntary agreements to reduce nitrate 
from agriculture into drinking water sources in 
Germany 
In many developed countries, the intensification of agriculture 
and the increased use of nitrogen and phosphorous for food 
production (SDG 2) has led to a heavy influx of pollutants into 
surface and ground water (Bodirsky et al., 2014). This can have 
detrimental effect on water quality (SDG 6) and biodiversity 
(SDG 15) in water bodies and potential negative health effects 
(SDG 3) if nitrate concentrations in the drinking water exceed 
the critical limits. In Germany, since 2008 on an average, 18% 
of all measuring points in groundwater bodies exceed the 
threshold value of 50 milligrams nitrate per liter of as set by 
the European Nitrate Directive (UBA, 2017). As a consequence, 
drinking water suppliers are expecting a considerable rise in 
water treatment costs, and hence in drinking water prices in 
future. 
In order to avoid additional treatment costs and nevertheless 
comply with the German Drinking Water Ordinance, in recent 
decades many water suppliers have concluded voluntary 
agreements with farmers in their areas of operation in order to 
induce good farming practices that minimize nitrate leaching 
into water bodies. These Measures include needs-based fertilizer 
planning, sealed storage for manure and special technologies 
for liquid manure application. They are financed by the water 
suppliers. In North Rhine-Westphalia, water suppliers can 
offset their expenses against the water abstraction levy they 
pay to the federal state. In many regions, the combination of 
the underlying European and German regulations and these 
voluntary agreements with the private sector have shown 
positive effects. Important prerequisites are that use rights 
are clearly stipulated, that stakeholder participation is taken 
seriously and that a good data basis as well as reliable monitoring 
of compliance are in place (Richerzhagen and Scheumann, 
2016). An example is the Wahnbachtalsperre, a drinking water 
reservoir, which supplies to the city of Bonn and successfully 
meets the required standards (ibid.). 
In contrast, in other regions such as Lower Saxony - an area 
of intensive livestock farming - similar programs led to some 
initial declines of nitrate concentrations in groundwater in the 
early 2000s. However, since 2007 nitrate levels have been rising 
again (Pahl-Wostl, 2017). Reasons for this include a continuing 
intensification of livestock production, aggravated by the 
increasing cultivation of energy plants, like maize in particular. 
This also reveals more fundamental problems with existing 
subsidy schemes, especially as part of the EU Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). Despite some decoupling of 
subsidies from production, there are still incentives for 
agricultural intensification, while e.g., nitrogen pollution 
control is insufficiently enforced. Negative health effects from 
nitrogen compounds include health damages from respiratory 
diseases as well as the loss of aquatic ecosystem productivity 
and fish production. Nitrogen-related pollution accounts for 
economic damages of 0.3–3% of gross world product (Bodirsky 
et al., 2014; Sutton et al., 2013; Sutton et al., 2011). In addition, 
the pressure for intensification and nitrogen fertilizer use is 
further increased by subsidies for maize production as part of 
German and European legislation on biomass-based renewable 
energy production. Given the breach of the Nitrate Directive, 
in 2016 the European Commission has initiated treaty violation 
proceedings against Germany (Awater-Esper, 2016). German 
taxpayers might thus have to cover a fine of several billion 
Euros.
Example 2: Payment for ecosystem services to manage 
the WEF nexus related to hydropower plants - The 
Hidrosogamoso case in Columbia
Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) is  one popular instrument 
to internalize externalities, also across different resource uses. 
This raises the question of whether the instrument is capable of 
fostering an integrated WEF nexus perspective. This question 
was studied using the case of the Hidrosogamoso hydropower 
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plant (HPP) in Colombia (Rodriguez-de-Francisco et al., under 
review; Rodriguez-de-Francisco, 2016). The Hidrosogamoso 
HPP uses PES to pay for the conservation of upstream forests 
in order to improve water provision, reduce sedimentation 
and offset environmental impacts. An analysis of the socio-
environmental impacts (costs and benefits) for different actors 
at different scales up- and downstream of the HPP shows that 
the PES scheme successfully provides water security (SDG 
6) for hydropower production (SDG 7). However, despite 
the PES scheme and an Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA), the HPP negatively affects the water and food securities 
of marginalized communities further downstream. In 
particular, the principle of prior and informed consent was not 
applied in the EIA. The consequent impact of the HPP led to 
demonstrations and protests, which, however, were suppressed 
by the government. It turns out that the Hidrosogamoso 
public-private partnership has been able to successfully sell the 
HPP as positive contribution to national energy security (SDG 
7) and a contribution to combating climate change (SDG 13), 
while also highlighting the benefits of the PES scheme for local 
biodiversity protection (SDG 15). However, at the same time 
the basin scale including downstream water (SDG 6) and river-
related food (SDG 2) security is neglected in the company’s 
discourse. The case therefore illustrates how actors’ strongly 
divergent economic and political powers lead to prioritizing 
certain securities related to the WEF nexus, while suppressing 
others. Thus, examining the on-the-ground politics of PES and 
the WEF nexus is key to understanding their impact on the 
equitable and sustainable provision of water, energy and food in 
the everyday lives of millions of resource users. It becomes clear 
that a market mode alone did not solve the nexus challenges in 
this case, and that additional hierarchical modes of governance 
are needed to either balance the competing demands or at least 
provide for compensation mechanisms for those who lose out 
in this nexus situation.
Example 3: The urban nexus: Promoting wastewater 
treatment and energy co-production in Indian growing 
cities
Wastewater treatment plants in cities and settlements contribute 
towards public health (SDG 3), protecting water resources and 
ecosystems from pollution (SDGs 6, 15) and securing future 
water supplies (SDG 6). However, many standard technologies, 
such as activated sludge, consume considerable amounts of 
energy. At the same time, significant potential for energy saving, 
and even energy co-generation, exist in wastewater treatments 
plants, e.g., by means of biogas or combined heat and power 
production in the treatment plant. A large sewage treatment 
plant can cover up to 80% of its own energy requirements and 
thus contribute towards SDGs 7 and 13. For combined heat 
and power production, even energy self-sufficiency is possible 
(Never, 2016b). However, in upper middle income countries 
only 38%, and in least developed countries only 8% of the 
wastewater is treated in the first place (Sato et al., 2013), and 
energy-saving technologies remain very rare in wastewater 
treatment in developing countries. For instance, in India only 
30% of the population is connected to sewerage systems and 
only 10% of the wastewater produced is treated. At the same 
time, planned and unplanned urbanization proceeds at a high 
rate, implying a steadily growing number of people that needs 
to be connected to sewerage systems. 
Research on wastewater treatment in Indian cities reveals a 
number of obstacles towards wastewater treatment in general, 
and for energy co-production in such plants in particular 
(Never and Stepping, forthcoming; Never, 2016b; Never, 
2016a). First, there is lack of incentives to invest in wastewater 
treatment in the first place, for instance given that no cost-
covering wastewater tariffs are in place. Second, regulations 
are not conducive towards energy co-production as in India 
no standards exists for sludge disposal and the reuse of treated 
wastewater. There is also no feed-in tariff for biogas and tender 
procedures hinder innovation. Third, capacities at local level 
are usually low, there is a high turn-over of positions, and 
risk aversion and old management paradigms prevail. Hence, 
water pricing and subsidy reforms, binding discharge standards 
and regulations on energy savings would be key instruments 
to promote wastewater treatment as well as the diffusion 
of energy-efficient technologies in wastewater treatment. 
Research elsewhere shows that standards and regulations are 
especially effective when they are introduced sequentially and 
monitored locally. This should go hand-in-hand with using cost 
arguments and fostering a lifecycle-oriented mindset. Climate 
funds could be a means to finance resource-efficient solutions. 
Still, while the hope would be that a ‘Mercedes Benz’ solution 
of wastewater treatment with energy co-generation would pay-
off in the long-run, the Indian case nevertheless does raise the 
question of whether the priority should not be to cover as many 
people with conventional wastewater treatment in the first 
place.
4.3.3 Elements and challenges of WEF nexus 
governance
There is a broad consensus in the WEF nexus literature 
regarding the need for cross-sector coordination and multi-
level governance, taking into account the geographical scale 
of the respective nexus problem (Pahl-Wostl, 2017; Tosun 
and Leininger, 2017; Weitz et al., 2017; Leck et al., 2015). 
However, there is no consensus on what cross-sector and 
multi-level WEF nexus governance entails and under which 
conditions it comes about (Weitz et al., 2017). On the contrary, 
various schools of thought have different understandings 
of the underlying concepts of coordination and governance 
and highlight different aspects related to them. For instance, 
Weitz et al. (2017) identify seven relevant schools of thought 
on integrative environmental governance, including literature 
on environmental policy integration, inter-organizational 
relations, institutional interaction and interplay, policy mixes 
and smart regulation, groups of regimes, meta-governance and 
orchestration or landscape governance. Concepts originating 
from this literature may contribute towards understanding 
challenges related to governing the WEF nexus, even if they 
have rarely been applied to WEF nexus problems. 
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However, despite all differences, various governance literature 
distinguishes three stylized types of governance modes upon 
which coordination may rely: hierarchies, markets and 
networks. In the following, we argue that coordination across 
sectors and levels may be supported by combining different 
governance modes and related policy instruments. Therefore, 
the three governance modes are briefly introduced at this 
stage. Hierarchies, markets and networks can be distinguished 
according to the types of actors involved (state, non-state) 
and the formality or informality of institutions (rules) upon 
which they rely (Figure  4 .7). Non-state actors can be further 
broken down into the private sector on the one hand and civil 
society on the other. In hierarchies (such as state organizations 
or private companies) coordination is achieved through top-
down orders based on legitimate authority (Pahl-Wostl, 2015). 
Market governance relies on prices to coordinate exchange 
between self-interested actors (Williamson, 1985). In networks, 
coordination is achieved through interactions “between 
actors whose interorganizational relations are ruled by the 
acknowledgement of mutual interdependencies, trust and the 
responsibilities of each actor” (Bouckaert et al., 2010: 36). 
In the following, we identify a number of challenges and 
associated elements of governing SDG interlinkages in general, 
and the WEF nexus in particular, drawing on various literature.
Element 1: Design policy mixes that take SDG and WEF 
interlinkages into account
The first challenge to governing SDG interlinkages in general and 
the WEF nexus in particular is that multiple policy objectives 
can usually not be achieved by a single policy instrument. Policy 
instruments can be grouped into regulatory (e.g., standards), 
market-based (e.g., pricing) and informational (e.g., awareness 
raising) instruments. According to economist Jan Tinbergen, 
there should be as many independent instruments as there are 
targets or goals. Hence, any simultaneous pursuit of several policy 
objectives should rely on an adequate policy mix that takes cross-
sector interdependencies and related externalities into account.
According to the policy-mix literature, in an ideal world, an 
adequate policy mix relies on the consistency of its different 
elements (Rogge and Reichardt, 2016). This includes 1) the 
alignment of policy objectives, 2) a consistent instrument mix: 
regulative, market-based and informational instruments to 
reinforce rather than undermine each other and 3) consistency 
of the instrument mix with policy strategy. In addition to 
a consistent policy mix, coherence of processes involves 
synergistic and systematic policymaking and implementation 
processes along the entire policy cycle contributing towards 
policy objectives (Tosun and Leininger, 2017; Rogge and 
Reichardt, 2016). Policies on paper do not suffice, if they are not 
well-implemented.
Case studies on governing the WEF nexus give multiple 
indications that adequate policy mixes matter. In the case of 
the Wahnbachtalsperre (Example 1 above), the combination 
of regulatory instruments and voluntary agreements helps 
reducing nitrate leaching from agriculture into the drinking 
water reservoir. In the Hidrosogamoso case (Example 2), a PES 
scheme contributes towards mitigating negative externalities 
of land use upstream on the hydropower plant. However, 
additional instruments such as an Environmental and Social 
Impact Assessment (ESIA) and ideally the application of the 
principle of prior and informed consent would be needed to 
address the effects of the hydropower plant on water and food 
security downstream (Rodriguez-de-Francisco et al., under 
review). In order to foster wastewater treatment with energy 
co-production in India (Example 3), reforms of standards and 
water pricing instruments could potentially foster transitions 
to innovative wastewater systems. It is also important to note 
that instruments which may be first-best solutions from a 
single-sector perspective, e.g., a GHG tax for climate change 
mitigation, may not be adequate in a multi-sector, multi-
objective context. In line with Tinbergen, such a tax should 
be combined with other effective instruments to assure 
the achievement of multiple goals. For example, ambitious 
climate change mitigation (SDG 15) needs to be combined 
with biodiversity conservation measures (SDG 15), protection 
of water resources (SDG 6), e.g., through water pricing, and 
compensation payments for poor food consumers (SDG 2), to 
avoid negative side-effects (Humpenöder et al., 2018).
An important aspect of an adequate policy mix is the 
consideration of subsidy reform and a general reduction of 
harmful subsidies in pursuing multiple SDGs. As mentioned 
above, agricultural policies in many OECD countries provide 
incentives for intensive production, excess nitrogen and 
phosphorus use and related water and air pollution as well as 
biodiversity loss. Existing fossil-fuel subsidies in many countries 
worldwide effectively create a negative price on emissions 
and deter the spread of renewables (Jakob et al., 2015). Fuel 
subsidies for water pumps are meant to support farm income in 
Northern India, but lead to falling groundwater tables (SDG6) 
(Shah et al., 2003). The reduction of these harmful subsidies, 
and financial reforms in general, would reduce the pressure 
on public budgets and create opportunities for introducing 
more effective SDG policy instruments as well as compensation 
payments for low-income groups (e.g. Klenert et al., 2016).
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Figure 4.7. Governance modes. Source: After Pahl-Wostl (2009).
Element 2: Foster horizontal and vertical coordination 
within the public sector
A second challenge of governing SDG interlinkages in general 
and the WEF nexus in particular is decision-making in silos 
within the public sector. Hence, there are calls for greater 
horizontal and vertical coordination among public sector 
agencies when food, water and/ or energy security are at risk. 
In this context, coordination can be understood as the “extent 
to which organizations attempt to ensure that their activities 
take into account those of other organisations” (in Bouckaert et 
al., 2010: 15; Hall et al., 1976: 459). Horizontal (or cross-sector) 
coordination refers to coordination among organizations at the 
same hierarchical tier of government (e.g., between ministries 
or agencies). Vertical coordination (or multi-level governance) 
refers to coordination across levels of government (e.g., across 
municipal, provincial, national and international levels). 
In general, the public sector constitutes a hierarchy and 
therefore also strongly relies on hierarchy-type coordination 
mechanisms (such as orders, etc.). This pertains in particular to 
vertical coordination when higher level bodies give hierarchical 
directions to lower level bodies. However, this notwithstanding, 
market- and network-type coordination mechanisms also 
play important and maybe increasing roles in public sector 
coordination (Bouckaert et al., 2010). This pertains in particular 
to horizontal coordination. 
Horizontal coordination is primarily of a voluntary nature 
and therefore it relies strongly on market- or network-type 
governance mechanism (Bouckaert et al., 2010). Market-type 
mechanisms are based on price, competition and supply and 
demand (Bouckaert et al., 2010: 43). Network-type coordination 
depends on bargaining, negotiation and mutual co-optation. 
It may be supported by different mechanisms “ranging from 
simple information exchange between bodies, to platforms 
for concertation to negotiation, and to joint decision-making 
bodies and even joint organizations” (Bouckaert et al., 2010: 
46). Horizontal coordination across sectors may furthermore 
be easier to achieve if it takes place in the shadow of hierarchy, 
for instance if a decision has to be ratified by a minister or the 
cabinet (Scharpf, 1993). 
The nitrate (Example 1) and the wastewater (Example 3) 
nexus situations above illustrate governance across different 
jurisdictional levels. They show how national and even 
supranational standards may provide important framework 
conditions for addressing local nexus situations.
Element 3: Match the scale of the WEF nexus problem 
Many WEF nexus situations pose an additional problem to 
vertical and horizontal coordination in and by public sector 
organizations given that physical interdependencies of WEF 
nexus problems often do not usually coincide spatially (or 
temporally) with jurisdictional boundaries. Depending on 
the WEF nexus problem at hand, the spatial scale of these 
externalities can even be of transboundary or globally 
teleconnected nature (Müller et al., 2015a). In such cases, 
WEF nexus governance might require action beyond single 
countries and span across regions through international trade 
of goods and services (e.g., virtual trade in water, Allan, 2003). 
Hence, governing the WEF nexus may require horizontal 
coordination across affected jurisdictions or countries sharing 
a transboundary resource or even across teleconnected nexus 
situations. 
More generally spoken, WEF nexus problems might 
require multi-scalar governance or for that matter cross-scale 
interactions, e.g., across spatial (or temporal) and jurisdictional 
scales. Scale can be understood as the spatial, temporal or 
other analytical dimensions used to measure or analyze a 
phenomenon. Levels are “…units of analysis that are located 
at different positions on a scale” (Cash et al., 2006: 8). In 
political science, multi-level governance is usually thought of as 
governance across levels on the jurisdictional scale (e.g., across 
municipal, provincial, national or inter-government levels). 
However, whenever jurisdictions have to coordinate in order to 
match other spatial or temporal scales, this can be understood 
as multi-scalar governance. In fact, next to the so-called type 
I onion model of multi-level governance of nested general-
purpose jurisdictions, so-called type II multi-level governance 
arrangements may also exist. These type II arrangements are 
task specific, while their spatial scale may transcend general-
purpose jurisdictions (Marks and Hooghe, 2004). An example 
is that of river basin organizations, which typically add 
an additional layer of governance across general-purpose 
jurisdictions (Huitema and Meijerink, 2017) and it has been 
argued that interstate (Burdack et al., 2014) or international 
river basin commissions (Dombrowsky et al., 2016; UNECE, 
2015) could play a particular role in governing the WEF nexus 
in interstate or international river basins.
A related concept in this context is the idea of landscape 
governance, which refers to the interconnections between 
socially constructed spaces (the politics of scale) and ‘natural’ 
conditions of places (Görg, 2007). The latter might be of interest 
for WEF nexus analyses by highlighting the politics behind 
interconnected social and ecological systems.
Case studies on WEF nexus situations illustrate the crucial 
importance of governance not only across levels, but also across 
scales, taking the respective scale of the WEF nexus problem into 
account. As the Hidrosogamoso case (Example 2) illustrates, 
energy planning may take place at different spatial scales than 
planning for integrated water resources management, which 
may lead to cross-scale conflicts (see also Hensengerth, 2015 
for a transboundary case). As such, given the scale dimension, 
the WEF-climate nexus and other biophysical SDGs add a 
particular requirement for governing interlinkages across 
scales.
Element 4: Governance beyond the government: WEF 
nexus governance as multi-actor and polycentric 
governance? 
Finally, WEF nexus governance is usually not only about the 
government, but the private sector and civil society may play 
important roles. As mentioned above, hierarchies, markets and 
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networks can be distinguished according to the types of actors 
involved (state, private sector, civil society) and the formality or 
informality of institutions (rules) upon which they rely. Each 
mode comes along with strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, 
it has been suggested that synergistic combinations of different 
governance modes may meet coordination challenges in 
complex resource or WEF nexus situations better than in 
one single governance mode (Weitz et al., 2017; Pahl-Wostl, 
2015). Forms of governance that try to combine the strengths 
of each governance mode in a complementary way may also 
be stipulated as hybrid governance (Pahl-Wostl, 2015). The 
successful self-governance of local common pool resources by 
local communities studied by Ostrom (1990) is an example of 
the sustainable governance of natural resources beyond states 
and markets. Leach et al. (2007) also argue for governance 
models with more dynamic and reflexive processes that 
incorporate norm setting of various types of actors and herewith 
move beyond the linear and state-centric governance model 
of decision-making. Furthermore it is sometimes suggested 
in the literature that the so-called ‘boundary institutions’ or 
‘intermediaries’ that bring different stakeholders together may 
play a special role in governing cross-sector linkages (Hoff, 
2011). Also at the international level, an increasing role of non-
state actors in environmental governance can be observed. This 
phenomenon has been referred to as transnational governance 
(e.g., Chan et al., 2016).
Against the backdrop of the need for multi-sector, multi-
level, multi-scalar and multi-actor governance, it has been 
suggested that WEF nexus governance would benefit from 
polycentric and adaptive governance (Gallagher et al., 2016). 
Following Ostrom et al. (1961), polycentric governance 
systems are characterized by multiple centers of authority 
and distribution of power, which at the same enter into 
competitive relationships, contractual arrangements or 
cooperative undertakings. Thus, such polycentric arrangements 
may be conducive towards governing the WEF nexus, which 
requires relating different types of actors, sectors and levels of 
decisionmaking. Adaptive governance refers to the ability of a 
governance system to alter processes and to adapt structural 
elements as a response to current or anticipated changes in the 
social or natural environment (Pahl-Wostl, 2015; Dietz et al., 
2003), a feature that may also be conducive towards governing 
the WEF nexus. Polycentric governance may also contribute 
to adaptive governance (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2009). At the same 
time, it should also be mentioned that polycentric governance 
might not be good per se (Thiel, 2017), and the relevance of the 
concept for WEF nexus governance should be further studied 
in future.
Element 5: Presence of generic good governance 
principles 
There are indications that governing trade-offs between 
different policy objectives is easier, if meta-governance or good 
governance principles, such as transparent, accountable, and 
inclusive institutions are in place (Weitz et al., 2017). Hence, 
WEF nexus governance may be supported by the presence of 
meta-governance principles as reflected in SDG 16 (target16.6: 
‘Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions 
at all levels’ and target 16.7 ‘Ensure responsive, inclusive, 
participatory and representative decision-making at all levels’ 
as well as by multi-stakeholder partnerships call for in SDG 17 
(Section 4.2)). It can furthermore be argued that governing of 
interlinkages relies heavily on the existence of rule of law and 
enforcement of rules and institutions. The Hidrosogamoso case 
(Example 2) illustrates how failing to apply the principle of 
prior and informed consent may lead to conflict with affected 
communities.
4.3.4 Obstacles towards governing SDG 
interlinkages and the WEF nexus
Obviously, multiple obstacles towards governing interlinkages 
exist. Based on their comprehensive evaluation of the literature 
on Integrative Environmental Governance, Weitz et al. (2017) 
highlight the following challenges for governing the WEF nexus: 
1) negotiation usually take place among actors with unequal 
power, 2) nexus governance may be inhibited by the transaction 
costs of involving all affected actors, and 3) that solutions may 
simply lie outside the concerned WEF nexus sectors. These 
and additional barriers have been illustrated by various case 
studies on different types of nexus situations (Examples 1-3). 
Research on developing countries also confirms these obstacles, 
but highlights additional challenges in these settings in dealing 
with WEF nexus problems that pertain to low state and 
implementation capacities (Section 4.2) as well as lack of data 
related to natural resource use (summarized in Dombrowsky et 
al., 2016). The latter makes the assessment of externalities and 
the design of responses obviously much more difficult. 
Overall, in dealing with trade-offs it has to be acknowledged 
that competing demands and conflicting interests over natural 
resources may not always be overcome and may require 
compromises to mediate such trade-offs instead of solving 
them. The larger the extent (spatial, sectorial or temporal) of 
a trade-off is, the more winners and losers will be produced 
through a decision and the more difficult it will be to mediate the 
trade-off; or the higher the time urgency is to achieve a goal (for 
example climate action), the costlier it will be to delay action. 
Hence decision-making of how to deal with existing trade-offs 
requires a critical reflection process of the competing demands 
and interests to arrive at justifiable recommendations regarding 
the prioritization and sequencing of policy actions. Norms 
and ethical criteria may differ between contexts, depending for 
example on the social contract on which a society is based, or on 
the cultural norms that are prevalent in this society. Mediating 
trade-offs requires dealing with these three dimensions: 1) 
“How to deal with the trade-off?” (procedural dimension), 2) 
“Who is eligible to take decisions?” (legitimization dimension) 
and 3) “For whom are decisions taken and what compensation 
mechanisms may be applicable?” (justification dimension) 
(Breuer et al., 2017).
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4.3.5 Conclusions
Dealing with the synergies and trade-offs related to the 
pursuit of interrelated goal systems – and hence governing 
interlinkages among various SDGs – is one important 
element of a transformation towards sustainability. The 
WEF nexus debate arguably provides important insights 
for simultaneously pursuing HLPF SDGs 6, 7, 11, 12 and 15. 
Governing interlinkages may require adequate policy mixes, 
including comprehensive reforms of public finance and 
existing subsidy schemes, and fostering multi-sector, multi-
level, multi-scalar and multi-actor governance processes. It is 
likely that this would be supported by synergistically combining 
the strengths of hierarchical, market and network governance 
within polycentric governance arrangements. It furthermore 
relies on effective governance capacities and arguably the 
presence of transparent and inclusive institutions. However, 
governing interlinkages also needs actively addressing the 
role of asymmetrical power balances and the politics behind 
interconnected social and biophysical systems. While these 
arguments may hold in general for implementing the system of 
17 interrelated goals of the 2030 Agenda, governing the SDGs 
related to the WEF nexus requires particular attention to the 
scale of physical interdependencies and relies on adequate data 
and information to inform decision-making. 
In view of the HLPF’s sectoral approach towards the thematic 
reviews, the section also highlights why we should not limit 
ourselves to monitoring individual SDGs.
4.4 Three bifurcations on the road to 
sustainability
This report shows that a major transformation towards 
sustainability is both necessary and possible. The past 
few decades have seen many of the foundations laid for 
transitioning to sustainability: Technologies, transformative 
networks of actors, mental models, sectoral roadmaps for 
sustainable transformation (e.g., in energy management, the 
mobility sector, the agricultural industry) and entrepreneurial 
business models geared towards sustainability have been 
developed in many countries. The 2030 Agenda and the Paris 
Agreement can be considered the pillars of a global social 
contract for the transformation towards sustainability in the 
21st century. “The conditions of possibility” (Immanuel Kant) 
for this transformation are now in place. From this perspective, 
the global sustainability evolution has succeeded and many 
of our societies are now at a tipping point where they can 
step up the pace of transition towards implementing the 2030 
Agenda and the Paris Agreement. This tipping point situation is 
characterized by three major bifurcations: The transformation 
towards sustainability, nationalist counter-transformations and 
the far-reaching dynamics of the digital transformation.
4.4.1 Major challenges in the transformation 
towards sustainability
In many countries the forerunners and pioneers of the 
transformation to sustainability are not yet large and powerful 
enough to direct the economy and society as a whole onto 
sustainable pathways. As in other epochal transitional 
phases, such as the “transformation of the world in the 19th 
century” (Osterhammel, 2009) from agrarian to industrial 
societies, there can be great leaps forward as well as setbacks 
– even in parallel. Deep transformations are times of historical 
discontinuity based on a concurrence of multiple changes 
(Häufigkeitsverdichtungen) in many areas of society and the 
economy towards the formation of a new societal regime 
(Messner, 2016). These Häufigkeitsverdichtungen can either 
be an ongoing progress or take place with interruptions; they 
can occur either additively or cumulatively, either reversibly or 
irreversibly, either at a steady or an unsteady pace. Phases of deep 
change are driven by economic, social, technological, political 
and cultural processes at different speeds (Osterhammel, 2009; 
Braudel, 1985). We have seen huge changes within the energy 
sector in recent decades with regard to renewable energy 
production; these developments took place simultaneously in 
many places around the world. Currently there are some signs 
of similar transformations in the mobility sector as well. When 
it comes to the agricultural sector, or resource consumption, 
and the construction of new cities for the two to three billion 
additional people that will move to urban areas by 2050 
worldwide, movement on the sustainability front has so far 
only been tentative and slow. Inequality is also on the rise in 
many countries, reducing people’s development prospects 
and undermining social cohesion within many societies. The 
transformation towards sustainability is not an event, but rather 
a process characterized by asynchronisms.
In order to actually implement the Paris Agreement and 
the 2030 Agenda, it is necessary to scale up approaches for 
sustainable transformation, accelerate change processes and 
leverage dynamics of systemic change, for example with regard 
to deep decarbonization, a comprehensive circular economy 
and urban development that includes globally the lower 20 to 
40% of urban dwellers. The transition from the “conditions of 
possibility” to a radical transformation is an ambitious one that 
needs to be properly shaped by drivers of change, but that could 
also fail and generate resistance and crises.
Common analyses and theories of social change (Chan, 2018; 
Messner, 2016; Geels, 2014; Kahneman, 2011; Appiah, 2010; 
Osterhammel, 2009; Leach et al., 2005; Mayntz, 2002) show 
that, for the transformation towards sustainability to succeed, 
there is a need for reorientation at the following levels:
4.4.1.1 Constellations of change agents
Past interests are always better organized than emerging 
future interests. We often fail to overcome climate-damaging 
production patterns and incentive systems due to social, 
political and power based path dependencies and well organized 
interests within the fossil fuel-based economy. Consequently, it 
is especially important to develop transformative partnerships 
and pioneer alliances for sustainable transformation. Cross-
sectoral cooperation between change agents from the business 
and financial sector, research, policymaking, cultural and 
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societal spheres brings about structural change and breaks up 
traditional networks representing past interests. As this report 
illustrates, many societies are on the move: new companies and 
business models are emerging, some of them in “old” sectors as 
well (such as automotive and energy companies); civil society 
actors, cities and science could become the driving force behind 
the transformation towards sustainability. Reform processes, 
such as the one at the World Bank, show how bastions of the 
“old economy” can become drivers of decarbonization (World 
Bank, 2015). Key actors, such as Governor of the Bank of 
England Mark Carney, are unlocking transformation prospects 
from the center of the global financial sector (Carney, 2018). 
The Paris Agreement has contributed to a multiplication of 
partnerships of climate change mitigation actors (Chan, 2018; 
WBGU, 2016).
4.4.1.2 Three motivating factors that create a 
willingness for transformation
Sustainability research has shown that tipping points could be 
triggered in our planetary system over the course of the 21st 
century, with far-reaching consequences for human civilization 
(Rockström et al., 2009). Social science studies outline how the 
erosion of societal cohesion can pose a risk to stability and security 
and trigger conflict (Alvaredo et al., 2018; World Bank, 2016). 
Scientific investigation has played a key role in highlighting 
future risks and establishing the need for a transformation 
towards sustainability. At the same time, such crisis scenarios 
can also leave people feeling paralyzed and give rise to a sense 
of helplessness, hopelessness and sometimes even anger. 
Attractive, hopeful, future-oriented and horizon-broadening 
narratives of opportunities and pathways to change can help 
people look to the future with confidence. Transformation 
(towards sustainability), that is, radical change, goes hand in 
hand with disruption, insecurity, unintended consequences, and 
events that cannot be planned and are often virtually impossible 
to anticipate. Equally, these costs and risks of transformation 
are some of the reasons people hold on to the established order 
and are resistant to sustainability reforms. Historically, people 
and societies only develop a willingness to change when there is 
a major crisis. European unification, the United Nations and the 
development of European welfare states were the consequences 
of two devastating world wars. The current crisis has a different 
shape. There is now a need in the 21st century to avoid reaching 
irreversible tipping points in our planetary system. When it 
comes to sustainability transformation, we need to move from 
a crisis mode of transformation to a preventive action mode. As 
such, it is necessary to generate, boost and spread motivation 
for the transformation towards sustainability. What drives 
people to work to bring about sustainable transformation? 
There are three main drivers of motivation that could play a 
key role here: 1) People respond to normative challenges and 
to developments that they consider to be unacceptable states 
of affairs – “How can we accept it that...?” is the initial impetus 
here. “How can we accept that this generation is destroying the 
environmental foundations for all future generations? How 
can we accept it that, despite all the prosperity we enjoy, a large 
proportion of the world’s population still has no access to vital 
infrastructure?” “Moral revolutions” (Appiah, 2010) can serve 
as a starting point for transformation. 2) Fears about the largely 
unforeseeable consequences of deep changes (decarbonization 
of energy and mobility systems) can be allayed through the 
documentation of examples of successful transformation, 
thus, “showing what is possible...”, e.g., the Energiewende 
(energy transition) in Germany, implementation of ambitious 
decarbonization plans in northern European cities, positive 
effects of resource-efficient business practices on labor markets 
in the United States and China, and an intelligent and generous 
refugee policy on the part of Uganda, a poor nation, since 
the outbreak of civil war in South Sudan. Demonstrating 
that transformations can succeed is a key driver for boosting 
motivation and bolstering courage for change. 3) The third 
type of motivational driver for difficult transformations is quite 
likely the most powerful (and renewable!) driver in the cultural 
evolution of humankind: imagination, creativity and the desire 
to create something new, beautiful, worthwhile and good. 
Time, and again visions, that is, positive narratives, of possible 
and better futures, have motivated people to push ahead with 
changes despite all the uncertainty they bring with them. 
Democracy, human rights, the end of slavery and welfare states 
are examples for such path breaking social innovations which 
changed the trajectories of human civilization. Currently, the 
2030 Agenda is one such universal narrative of the possibility 
of a good life for many people – leave no one behind. It must 
be translated in many countries, regions, cities, communities 
and companies into diverse, attractive and practical future 
strategies which reflect the unique characteristics of the actors 
and communities concerned.
4.4.1.3 Four key normative innovations in the 
transition to sustainability
The transformation towards sustainability requires 
technological, institutional and economic innovations. 
However, for these to succeed, there needs to be a reinvention 
of people’s normative horizons. Immanuel Kant described 
the essence of the enlightenment as a change in people’s ways 
of thinking (Veränderung der Denkungsart der Menschen) 
– human rights, the rule of law and democracy that were 
“invented” and then spread successively to many societies. 
The transition to sustainability calls for similar normative 
innovations and reorientations, the four core elements of which 
are already found in the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement: 
1) the responsibility of the respective acting generations to 
prevent irreversible and dangerous changes in the planetary 
system (Rockström et al., 2009); 2) the linking of the concepts 
of national and global commons, which cannot take place 
without transnational reconciliation of interests, fairness 
and justice (Pogge and Mehta, 2016); 3) the acceptance of 
responsibility for the consequences of our current actions for 
many or (in cases e.g., of climate-induced sea level rises) even 
all future generations (WBGU, 2014); 4) the development of a 
global culture of cooperation which builds on the mobilization 
of the diversity of societies, their cultures, and the whole range 
of different normative systems of human communities as a 
resource for solving globally connected future problems (Zürn, 
123
Governing the Transformations Towards Sustainability 4
2018; Messner and Weinlich, 2016a; Tomasello, 2014). These 
core elements form the central points of reference of a new 
world view of global sustainable development. Anchoring them 
in our societies by means of education, knowledge diffusion, 
culture, joint action, standards, norms, political regimes and 
investments is a civilizational task.
4.4.1.4 Protection of the planetary system, efforts 
to strengthen social cohesion, and global 
cooperation are three linked concepts
Experience in many countries show that, without massive 
investment in the reduction of inequalities and the 
strengthening of social cohesion, it will not be possible to 
mobilize legitimation for structural reforms to mitigate climate 
change and protect other parts of the planetary system (WBGU, 
2017). The social and environmental issues can only be solved 
through an integrated approach. At the same time, we see social 
justice and social cohesion within societies provide a basis 
not only for climate change mitigation and protection of the 
planetary system, but also for global cooperation (Messner and 
Weinlich, 2016b). If the social glue of societies crumbles and 
dangerous nationalist movements increase, then the willingness 
to engage in transnational cooperation for global sustainable 
development will decrease (Messner and Nakicenovic, 2017). 
It becomes clear that the “conditions of possibility” (Kant) 
for mobilizing a major transformation towards sustainability 
and overcoming resistance to this transformation is a cultural 
and civilizational challenge for humankind, of an order similar 
to the major civilizational transformations that came in the 
wake of the Neolithic Revolution some 10,000 years ago and 
the Industrial Revolution, which began well over 200 years ago 
(WBGU, 2011).
Moreover, it is important to realize, that the sustainability 
transformations are taking place at a historic moment 
characterized by two other fundamental change dynamics 
that were still largely disregarded during the preparation and 
ratification of the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement in 
2015: “our county first” movements on the one hand and digital 
change processes on the other. The sustainability transformation 
can only succeed by simultaneously finding an appropriate 
response to these two major trends at the beginning of the 21st 
century.
4.4.2 How to deal with setbacks resulting from 
“our country first” movements
In many developing countries, emerging economies and OECD 
nations, nationalist, (in many cases) authoritarian, xenophobic, 
climate change-skeptical and anti-scientific movements and 
governments are becoming increasingly prominent. Not least 
in Europe, as well as at the transatlantic level, they represent 
a kind of “counter-transformation” to the sustainability 
transformation. Multilateral cooperation, climate change 
mitigation, universal norms and standards, and science are 
being called into question. While these movements address 
current challenges in the area of justice and the societal impacts 
of globalization, they do so in a way that is restricted to a 
nationalist, backwards-looking agenda (Messner, 2017).
There are no simple answers to such regressive trends, but 
there are four points to note here. First, the 2030 Agenda can 
offer part of the answer to this counter-transformation: More 
investment in fighting inequality and poverty, job creation 
and connecting economic and environmental modernization 
with social inclusion can help to reduce the insecurities and 
fears about the future that many people experience. Second, 
the confrontation between the concept of sustainability 
transformations and “our country first”– movements essentially 
comes down to a clash between fundamentally differing norm 
and value systems. The 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement 
are based on universal human rights and principles of global 
cooperation, transnational justice and responsibility, things 
which are being undermined and questioned by nationalist 
movements and governments. This conflict over the “defining 
cultures” of our societies and the prerogative of interpretation 
regarding the future needs to be resolved. Third, we should take 
account of the fact that the “program” for the sustainability 
transformation (e.g., scaling up of decarbonization efforts, 
acceleration of the transition to sustainability, disruption and 
systemic change as characteristics of transformative change) 
can itself give rise to and exacerbate insecurities and fears 
about the future among people who already feel threatened by 
the dynamics of globalization and technological change. Social 
policy and efforts to combat inequality will not suffice in and 
of themselves to curb nationalist backlashes. Disruptive change 
on the way to sustainability transformation can only succeed 
if at the same time confidence in the future grows, social 
cohesion is fostered, eroding identities are replaced by new 
local, national and transnational commonalities, cultures, and 
orientations, and if attractive future prospects arise. Strategies 
for transformation towards sustainability must take account 
of these insecurities that many people experience and find 
appropriate ways of responding to them, for example, through 
inclusive municipal policies, social, economic and political 
participation, educational offerings, the creation of development 
prospects for neglected regions, refugee integration initiatives 
which also help to improve living conditions for the vulnerable 
local population, international cooperation, and the promotion 
of clear standards and values, such as universal human rights, 
global responsibility and a global culture of cooperation.
Fourth, experiences in Europe between 1890 and 1910 
(Kandel, 2012; Blom, 2008), the first phase of accelerated 
globalization, should offer warnings and lessons for the future. 
In many respects, today’s dynamics are similar to those of that 
period from a structural point of view: Accelerated international 
economic activity, exploding trade, and profound structural 
change as a result of technological advances, profoundly 
changing labor markets, growing disparities between urban 
and rural areas, scientific breakthroughs (such as past ones in 
physics, microbiology, brain research and psychoanalysis and 
current ones in the areas of digitalization, nanotechnology and 
neurosciences) – and societies overwhelmed and stressed as a 
124
Governing the Transformations Towards Sustainability4
result of these accelerated structural change and modernization 
processes and lacking appropriate governance and normative 
frameworks needed to shape such ground-breaking innovations 
and trends. In many European countries and Germany in 
particular, the radical upheaval in the transition to the 20th 
century gave rise to political polarization, authoritarian 
nationalist movements and, ultimately, two devastating world 
wars. A look at history should provide us with a reminder and 
a warning in our converging global society at the beginning 
of the 21st century to fight centrifugal forces within our social 
contexts and work together to develop solutions to transnational 
interdependence problems instead of undermining national 
and international stability and security through nationalism.
4.4.3 The digital revolution – “What we need to 
talk about!”
The digital revolution, virtual realities, and (general purpose) 
artificial intelligence have recently entered the public discourse 
in many countries. Looking back, it is almost impossible to 
believe that digitalization barely featured in the 2030 Agenda or 
the Paris Agreement. It is increasingly clear that digital changes 
are becoming a key driving force in societal transformation 
(Tegmark, 2017; Domingos, 2015). The transformation towards 
sustainability must be linked with the digital transformation by 
gearing the opportunities and dynamics of the digital revolution 
to the goals of the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement 
(Villani, 2018; WBGU, 2018). At the same time, the digital 
transformation will radically alter the sustainability paradigm 
itself. There are five correlations at the heart of the integration 
of the sustainability and digital transformations.
First, many studies (Acatech, 2016; Acatech, 2015) show that 
digital technologies can help to drive decarbonization (in the 
energy, mobility and industrial sectors), circular economy, 
dematerialization, resource and energy efficiency, and the 
monitoring and conservation of ecosystems at a much faster 
rate than would be possible without them. This does not happen 
in and of itself. There is a need for corresponding regulatory 
policies, which at present only exist in a small number of sectors 
and a limited number of countries.
Second, if it is not shaped appropriately and geared to the 
SDGs of the 2030 Agenda, then digitalization could multiply 
already existing problems in many societies: inequalities (e.g., 
in the labor market, in education systems and in the division 
of labor at international level) and centrifugal forces within 
society could increase further; economic and, by extension, 
political power could become more concentrated (see, for 
example, the significance of the “big five” - Amazon, Apple, 
Facebook, Google, Microsoft for the digital transformation); 
data sovereignty and civic rights could be restricted further and 
the monitoring of citizens and consumers (“social scoring”) 
stepped up, especially in authoritarian societies; governance 
capacities of public organizations could erode further, since, 
for example, it is very difficult to tax digital business models 
in virtual environments. At the same time, digitalization could 
also help tackle these difficulties, and yet there are still very few 
instances of successful processes for shaping and governing 
digitalization around the world (WBGU, 2018). The accelerated 
technological developments threaten to overwhelm citizens and 
governments alike.
Third, policy makers, researchers, companies and civil society 
actors must multiply their efforts to understand and explain the 
multiple effects of digital change and anticipate far-reaching 
structural change in order to create a basis for shaping the 
digitalization process and gearing it to the 2030 Agenda and 
the Paris Agreement. Autonomous technical systems, based on 
learning machines and general purpose artificial intelligence, will 
fundamentally transform all areas of society and the economy 
in the near future (Villani, 2018; McKinsey Global Institute, 
2017; Tegmark, 2017; Acatech, 2015; Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 
2014; Barrat, 2013): Mobility, industrial sectors and production 
processes, value chains and the international division of labor, 
labor markets, financial systems, science and research, education, 
health care systems, political decision-making processes, and the 
judiciary. By processing enormous volumes of data, AI-based 
machinery will steer production processes, traffic, and financial 
flows, revolutionize medical diagnostics, change the way 
insurance companies make decisions, make decision documents 
available to parliaments and governments, and generate 
behavioral forecasts for individuals and groups (Domingos, 
2015). During the last two to three million years, human 
civilization has been based on human intelligence – human 
intelligence has had no rival. Now it is being supplemented by 
artificial intelligence, which, in some areas at least, is far superior 
to human analytical capabilities. Linking human and artificial 
intelligence and creating “meaningful artificial intelligence” 
geared to the goals of sustainable human development (Villani, 
2018) is set to become a major task for humanity in the first 
half of the  21st century. How can we reduce the error rate of 
(globally) connected technical infrastructures and make it more 
robust? How can our legal systems keep pace with accelerated 
technological change? How can the unintended effects of 
private investment in the development of self-learning technical 
systems and virtual environments be understood by citizens 
and governments, and be geared to and shaped in accordance 
with our standards systems? How can prosperity be multiplied 
through automation and the principle of leaving no one behind 
observed at the same time? What are the implications of the 
technological revolution for the poorest developing countries? 
Where is the line when it comes to using technology to alter, 
improve and manipulate people’s cognitive, physical and 
emotional capacities? What ethical guardrails should be put in 
place in the discussion about the transformation of humans and 
human enhancement? These questions illustrate the magnitude 
of the formative tasks associated with the digital transformation 
in the context of building a sustainable global economy. 
Fourth, technological breakthroughs offer mind-blowing 
potential for human civilization, provided the digitalization 
process and associated technologies are shaped appropriately: 
the expected explosion of knowledge, possibilities for 
transnational networks in virtual environments as the 
basis for the establishment of transnational cultures of 
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cooperation, opportunities for comprehensively monitoring 
and, by extension, conserving the planetary system, and the 
multiplication of options for horizontal participation on the 
part of many people as a result of digital networking. The 
printing press, which from an artificial intelligence perspective 
may appear to be a rather small step in human development, 
was the innovation that made the enlightenment, scientific 
investigation, democracy and the industrial revolution possible 
in the first place. Might we see a new kind of Enlightenment 
as a result of combining artificial and human intelligence with 
human empathy and social intelligence? How can we exploit the 
potential of digitalization to tackle the major challenges facing 
humanity in the  21st century – and avoid the daunting risks of 
accelerating technological changes running out of control?
Fifth, we will only be able to exploit the opportunities of 
digitalization, virtual realities, and artificial intelligence, 
and curb their potential risks and link the digital and the 
sustainability transformation if the digital and sustainability 
research communities converge, something which is still a long 
way off right now. Connecting the greatest innovative dynamics 
in human history with the major transformation towards 
sustainability, in order to stabilize the planet and enable a good 
life for a nine to ten billion civilization in the  21st century will 
require tremendous efforts, swift actions, institutional changes, 
huge investments, patience and a clear normative framework 
(WBGU, 2019).
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L. (eds.) Global energy assessment: toward a sustainable 
future. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rosegrant, M. W. & Cline, S. A. 2003. Global food security: challenges 
and policies. Science, 302, 1917-1919.
Rosenzweig, C., Elliott, J., Deryng, D., Ruane, A. C., Müller, C., 
Arneth, A., Boote, K. J., Folberth, C., Glotter, M. & 
Khabarov, N. 2014. Assessing agricultural risks of climate 
change in the 21st century in a global gridded crop model 
intercomparison. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 111, 3268-3273.
Roser, M. 2018. Our World in Data [Online]. Available: https://
ourworldindata.org/ [Accessed 6/21/2018].
Rost, S., Gerten, D., Bondeau, A., Lucht, W., Rohwer, J. & Schaphoff, 
S. 2008. Agricultural green and blue water consumption and 
its influence on the global water system. Water Resources 
Research, 44.
Rudel, T. K., Schneider, L., Uriarte, M., Turner, B. L., DeFries, R., 
Lawrence, D., Geoghegan, J., Hecht, S., Ickowitz, A. & 
Lambin, E. F. 2009. Agricultural intensification and changes 
in cultivated areas, 1970–2005. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 106, 20675-20680.
Sadras, V. O., Grassini, P. & Steduto, P. 2011. Status of water use 
efficiency of main crops: SOLAW Background Thematic 
Report-TR07. Food and Agricultural Organization.
Scheelbeek, P. F., Bird, F. A., Tuomisto, H. L., Green, R., Harris, F. 
B., Joy, E. J., Chalabi, Z., Allen, E., Haines, A. & Dangour, 
A. D. 2018. Effect of environmental changes on vegetable 
and legume yields and nutritional quality. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences.
Scheidel, W. 2017. The great leveler: Violence and the history of 
inequality from the stone age to the twenty-first century, 
Princeton University Press, 1400884608.
Schewe, J., Heinke, J., Gerten, D., Haddeland, I., Arnell, N. W., Clark, 
D. B., Dankers, R., Eisner, S., Fekete, B. M. & Colón-
González, F. J. 2014. Multimodel assessment of water 
scarcity under climate change. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 111, 3245-3250.
Selian, A. N. 2003. ICTs in support of human rights, democracy and 
good governance. Available: https://scholarworks.umass.
edu/ncdg/4/.
Semenza, J. C., Lindgren, E., Balkanyi, L., Espinosa, L., Almqvist, 
M. S., Penttinen, P. & Rocklöv, J. 2016. Determinants 
and drivers of infectious disease threat events in Europe. 
Emerging infectious diseases, 22, 581-589.
Seto, K. C., Golden, J. S., Alberti, M. & Turner, B. L. 2017. 
Sustainability in an urbanizing planet. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 114, 8935-8938.
Seto, K. C., Güneralp, B. & Hutyra, L. R. 2012. Global forecasts of 
urban expansion to 2030 and direct impacts on biodiversity 
and carbon pools. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 109, 16083-16088.
Smartmatic. 2018. Identity Management [Online]. Available: 
http://www.smartmatic.com/egov/identity-management/ 
[Accessed 04/06/18].
Smith, P., Haberl, H., Popp, A., Erb, K. h., Lauk, C., Harper, R., 
Tubiello, F. N., Siqueira Pinto, A., Jafari, M. & Sohi, S. 
2013. How much land‐based greenhouse gas mitigation 
can be achieved without compromising food security and 
environmental goals? Global change biology, 19, 2285-
2302.
Smith, W. C., Anderson, E., Salinas, D., Horvatek, R. & Baker, D. 
P. 2015. A meta-analysis of education effects on chronic 
disease: the causal dynamics of the Population Education 
Transition Curve. Social Science & Medicine, 127, 29-40.
Stanaway, J. D., Shepard, D. S., Undurraga, E. A., Halasa, Y. A., 
Coffeng, L. E., Brady, O. J., Hay, S. I., Bedi, N., Bensenor, 
I. M. & Castañeda-Orjuela, C. A. 2016. The global burden 
of dengue: an analysis from the Global Burden of Disease 
Study 2013. The Lancet infectious diseases, 16, 712-723.
Steffen, W., Richardson, K., Rockström, J., Cornell, S. E., Fetzer, I., 
Bennett, E. M., Biggs, R., Carpenter, S. R., De Vries, W. & 
de Wit, C. A. 2015. Planetary boundaries: Guiding human 
development on a changing planet. Science, 347, 1259855.
Steinberger, J. K. & Krausmann, F. 2011. Material and energy 
productivity. Environmental science & technology, 45, 1169-
1176.
Stone, B., Hess, J. J. & Frumkin, H. 2010. Urban form and extreme 
heat events: are sprawling cities more vulnerable to 
climate change than compact cities? Environmental health 
perspectives, 118, 1425-1428.
Strumsky, D. & Lobo, J. 2015. Identifying the sources of technological 
novelty in the process of invention. Research Policy, 44, 
1445-1461.
Strumsky, D., Lobo, J. & Tainter, J. A. 2010. Complexity and the 
productivity of innovation. Systems Research and Behavioral 
Science, 27, 496-509.
Summers, L. H. 2016. The age of secular stagnation: What it is and 
what to do about it. Foreign Affairs, 95.
Sutcliffe, B. 2004. World inequality and globalization. Oxford Review 
of Economic Policy, 20, 15-37.
Tegmark, M. 2015. An Open Letter: Research Priorities for Robust and 
Beneficial Artificial Intelligence (Future of Life Institute).
Tian, H., Hu, S., Cazelles, B., Chowell, G., Gao, L., Laine, M., Li, 
Y., Yang, H., Li, Y. & Yang, Q. 2018. Urbanization prolongs 
hantavirus epidemics in cities. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 115, 4707-4712.
Tilman, D., Balzer, C., Hill, J. & Befort, B. L. 2011. Global food 
demand and the sustainable intensification of agriculture. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108, 
133
References
20260-20264.
Timmer, H., Dailami, Mansoor, Irving, J., Hauswald, R. & Masson, P. 
2011. Global development horizons 2011 : Multipolarity - 
the new global economy. Washington, DC.
Tokarska, K. B. & Gillett, N. P. 2018. Cumulative carbon emissions 
budgets consistent with 1.5° C global warming. Nature 
Climate Change, 8, 296-299.
Tsiamis, K., Gervasini, E., D’Amico, F., Deriu, I., Roglia, E., Schade, 
S., Craglia, M. & De Jesus Cardoso, A. 2017. Citizen 
Science Application Invasive Alien Species Europe.
Tuan, Y.-F. 1977. Space and place: The perspective of experience, 
Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1452905533.
UNDESA 2017. World Population Prospects. Working Paper. New 
York: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, Population Division.
UNDESA 2018. World Urbanization Prospects: The 2018 Revision 
New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Population Division.
UNDESA, UNCTAD, Africa, E. C. f., Europe, E. C. f., Caribbean, E. 
C. f. L. A. a. t., Pacific, E. a. S. C. f. A. a. t. & Asia, E. a. 
S. C. f. W. 2018. World Economic Situation and Prospects 
2018. New York.
UNEP 2017. The Emissions Gap Report 2017. A UN Environment 
References Report. United Nations Environment 
Programme.
UNICEF & WHO 2017. Progress on drinking water, sanitation and 
hygiene: 2017 update and SDG baselines. World Health 
Organization.
UNICEF, WHO & World Bank Group 2017a. Levels and Trends in 
Child Malnutrition.
UNICEF, WHO, World Bank Group & United Nations Population 
Division 2017b. Levels and Trends in Child Mortality.
US Federal Reserve 2016. Annual Report. Washington, D.C.
Ussher, L. J., Haas, A., Töpfer, K. & Jaeger, C. C. 2018. Keynes and 
the International Monetary System: Time for a Tabular 
Standard? European Journal of the History of Economic 
Thought, 25, 1-34.
Van den Bergh, J. C. & Kallis, G. 2012. Growth, a-growth or degrowth 
to stay within planetary boundaries? Journal of Economic 
Issues, 46, 909-920.
Washington Center for Equitable Growth. 2018. Equitable Growth 
[Online]. Available: https://equitablegrowth.org/ [Accessed 
23/06/2018].
Weisz, H., Suh, S. & Graedel, T. 2015. Industrial Ecology: The role 
of manufactured capital in sustainability. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 112, 6260-6264.
WHO 2015a. WHO guidelines for indoor air quality: household 
fuel combustion, Geneva: World Health Organization, 
9241548878.
WHO 2015b. World report on Ageing and Health. Geneva: World 
Health Organization.
Wikipedia. 2018. Social Progress Index vs Energy Use per capita 
[Online]. Available: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_
countries_by_energy_consumption_per_capita [Accessed 
06/26/2018].
Zadeh, L. A. 1975. Fuzzy logic and approximate reasoning. Synthese, 
30, 407-428.
Chapter 3
Aether 2016. Scoping study on the co-benefits and adverse side-effects 
of climate change mitigation: final report. Prepared for the 
UK Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC).
Alderman, H. & Headey, D. D. 2017. How Important is Parental 
Education for Child Nutrition? World Development, 94, 
448-464.
Alexander, P., Brown, C., Arneth, A., Finnigan, J., Moran, D. & 
Rounsevell, M. D. 2017. Losses, inefficiencies and waste in 
the global food system. Agricultural Systems, 153, 190-200.
Allen, C., Metternicht, G. & Wiedmann, T. 2016. National pathways to 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): A comparative 
review of scenario modelling tools. Environmental Science 
& Policy, 66, 199-207.
Aoki, A., Bruns, B., Drabble, M., Marope, M., Mingat, A., Moock, 
P., Paci, P., Patrinos, H., Tan, J.-P., Thomas, C., Winter, C. 
& Yang, H. 2002. Chapter 19: Education. In: Klugman, J. 
E. (ed.) A Sourcebook for Poverty Reduction Strategies: 
Volume 2 - Macroeconomic and Sectoral Approaches. 
Washington, DC: World Bank.
Aranda, C., Kuesel, A. C. & Fletcher, E. R. 2014. A systematic review 
of linkages between access to electricity in healthcare 
facilities, health services delivery, and health outcomes: 
findings for emergency referrals, maternal and child services. 
Zurich: UBS Optimus Foundation & Liberian Institute for 
Biomedical Research.
Arjoon, D., Tilmant, A. & Herrmann, M. 2016. Sharing water and 
benefits in transboundary river basins. Hydrology and Earth 
System Sciences, 20, 2135-2150.
Arora, V. K. & Montenegro, A. 2011. Small temperature benefits 
provided by realistic afforestation efforts. Nature Geoscience, 
4, 5.
Bai, X., Dawson, R. J., Urge-Vorsatz, D., Delgado, G. C., Salisu 
Barau, A., Dhakal, S., Dodman, D., Leonardsen, L., Masson-
Delmotte, V., Roberts, D. C. & Schultz, S. 2018. Six research 
priorities for cities and climate change. Nature, 555, 23-25.
Baiocchi, G., Creutzig, F., Minx, J. & Pichler, P.-P. 2015. A spatial 
typology of human settlements and their CO2 emissions in 
England. Global Environmental Change, 34, 13-21.
Bajželj, B., Richards, K. S., Allwood, J. M., Smith, P., Dennis, J. 
S., Curmi, E. & Gilligan, C. A. 2014. Importance of food-
demand management for climate mitigation. Nature Climate 
Change, 4, 5.
Baker, D. 2014. The Schooled Society: The Educational Transformation 
of Global Culture, Stanford, Stanford University Press. 
Baker, D. P., Leon, J., Smith Greenaway, E. G., Collins, J. & Movit, 
M. 2011. The education effect on population health: a 
reassessment. Population and Development Review, 37, 
307-32.
Barakat, B. & Urdal, H. 2009. Breaking the waves? Does education 
mediate the relationship between youth bulges and political 
violence? Policy Research working paper. World Bank.
Barro, Robert J. 1999. Determinants of Democracy. Journal of 
Political Economy, 107, S158-S183.
Bartos, M. D. & Chester, M. V. 2014. The conservation nexus: Valuing 
interdependent water and energy savings in Arizona. 
Environmental Science & Technology, 48, 2139-2149.
134
References
Bathiany, S., Claussen, M., Brovkin, V., Raddatz, T. & Gayler, V. 
2010. Combined biogeophysical and biogeochemical effects 
of large-scale forest cover changes in the MPI earth system 
model. Biogeosciences, 7, 1383-1399.
Baum, R., Luh, J. & Bartram, J. 2013. Sanitation: A Global Estimate of 
Sewerage Connections without Treatment and the Resulting 
Impact on MDG Progress. Environmental Science & 
Technology, 47, 1994-2000.
Bazilian, M., Nussbaumer, P., Haites, E., Michael, L., Howells, 
M. & Yumkella, K. K. 2010. Understanding the Scale of 
Investment for Universal Energy Acces. Geopolitics of 
Energy, 32, 21-42.
Becker, G. S. 1962. Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical 
Analysis. Journal of Political Economy, 70, 9-49.
Bengtsson, S., Barakat, B. & Muttarak, R. 2018. The Role of Education 
in Enabling the Sustainable Development Agenda, 
Routledge, 9781138307957.
Bertram, C., Luderer, G., Popp, A., Minx, J. C., Lamb, W. F., 
Stevanović, M., Humpenöder, F., Giannousakis, A. & 
Kriegler, E. 2018. Targeted policies can compensate most 
of the increased sustainability risks in 1.5 °C mitigation 
scenarios. Environmental Research Letters, 13.
Bhattacharyya, S. C. 2013. Financing energy access and off-grid 
electrification: A review of status, options and challenges. 
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 20, 462-472.
Bijl, D. & al, e. 2018. The future struggle for water: A global analysis 
of inter-sectoral allocation schemes for the water-food-
energy nexus.
Bijl, D. L., Bogaart, P. W., Dekker, S. C., Stehfest, E., de Vries, B. 
J. & van Vuuren, D. P. 2017. A physically-based model of 
long-term food demand. Global Environmental Change, 45, 
47-62.
Bijl, D. L., Bogaart, P. W., Dekker, S. C. & van Vuuren, D. P. 2018. 
Unpacking the nexus: Different spatial scales for water, food 
and energy. Global Environmental Change, 48, 22-31.
Bijl, D. L., Bogaart, P. W., Kram, T., Vries, B. J. M. & Vuuren, D. P. 
2016. Long-term water demand for electricity, industry and 
households. Environmental Science & Policy, 55, 75-86.
Billen, G., Lassaletta, L. & Garnier, J. 2015. A vast range of 
opportunities for feeding the world in 2050: trade-off 
between diet, N contamination and international trade. 
Environmental Research Letters, 10.
Bodirsky, B. L., Popp, A., Lotze-Campen, H., Dietrich, J. P., 
Rolinski, S., Weindl, I., Schmitz, C., Muller, C., Bonsch, 
M., Humpenoder, F., Biewald, A. & Stevanovic, M. 
2014. Reactive nitrogen requirements to feed the world in 
2050 and potential to mitigate nitrogen pollution. Nature 
Communications, 5.
Bodirsky, B. L., Rolinski, S., Biewald, A., Weindl, I., Popp, A. & 
Lotze-Campen, H. 2015. Global food demand scenarios for 
the 21st century. PloS one, 10.
Bonsch, M., Humpenöder, F., Popp, A., Bodirsky, B., Dietrich, J. P., 
Rolinski, S., Biewald, A., Lotze‐Campen, H., Weindl, I., 
Gerten, D. & Stevanovic, M. 2016. Trade‐offs between land 
and water requirements for large‐scale bioenergy production. 
Global Change Biology Bioenergy, 8, 11-24.
Borck, R. & Brueckner, J. K. 2016. Optimal Energy Taxation in Cities. 
CESifo Working Paper Series. CESifo Group Munich.
Borges da Silveira Bezerra, P., Callegari, C. L., Ribas, A., Lucena, 
A., F. P., Portugal-Pereira, J., Koberle, A., Szklo, A. & 
Schaeffer, R. 2017. The power of light: socio-economic and 
environmental implications of a rural electrification program 
in Brazil. Environmental Research Letters, 12, 095004.
Brenneman, A. & Kerf, M. 2002. Infrastrucutre and poverty linkages: 
A literature review. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Burdack, D., Biewald, A. & Lotze-Campen, H. 2014. Cap-and-trade 
of water rights. A sustainable way out of Australia’s rural 
water problems? GAIA-Ecological Perspectives for Science 
and Society, 23, 318-326.
Butz, W., Lutz, W. & Sendzimir, J. 2014. Education and differential 
vulnerability to natural disasters. Ecology and Society, Vol. 
19.
Cameron, C., Pachauri, S., Rao, N. D., McCollum, D., Rogelj, J. & 
Riahi, K. 2016. Policy trade-offs between climate mitigation 
and clean cook-stove access in South Asia. Nature Energy, 
1, e15010.
Carson, R. T. 2010. The Environmental Kuznets Curve: Seeking 
Empirical Regularity and Theoretical Structure. Review of 
Environmental Economics and Policy, 4, 3-23.
Chang, K. M., Hess, J. J., M. Balbus, J., Buonocore, J., Cleveland, D., 
A., Grabow, M. L., Neff, R., K. Saari, R., Tessum, C. W., 
Wilkinson, P., Woodward, A. & Ebi, K. L. 2017. Ancillary 
health effects of climate mitigation scenarios as drivers of 
policy uptake: a review of air quality, transportation and 
diet co-benefits modeling studies. Environmental Research 
Letters, 12, 113001.
Chankrajang, T. & Muttarak, R. 2017. Green Returns to Education: Does 
Schooling Contribute to Pro-Environmental Behaviours? 
Evidence from Thailand. Ecological Economics, 131, 434-
448.
Chaplin-Kramer, R., Sharp, R. P., Mandle, L., Sim, S., Johnson, J., 
Butnar, I., Milà i Canals, L., Eichelberger, B. A., Ramler, 
I., Mueller, C., McLachlan, N., Yousefi, A., King, H. 
& Kareiva, P. M. 2015. Spatial patterns of agricultural 
expansion determine impacts on biodiversity and carbon 
storage. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 
112, 7402-7407.
Clarke, L., Jiang, K., Akimoto, K., Babiker, M., Blanford, G., Fisher-
Vanden, K., Hourcade, J.-C., Krey, V., Kriegler, E., Löschel, 
A., McCollum, D., Paltsev, S., Rose, S., Shukla, P. R., 
Tavoni, M., Zwaan, B. v. d. & Vuuren, D. P. v. 2014. Chapter 
6 - Assessing transformation pathways, In Climate Change 
2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. IPCC Working Group 
III Contribution to AR5.
Coady, D. & Dizioli, A. 2018. Income inequality and education 
revisited: persistence, endogeneity and heterogeneity. 
Applied Economics, 50, 2747-2761.
Cohen, J. E., Bloom, D. E. & Malin, M. B. E. 2007. Educating All 
Children/ A Global Agenda Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
MIT Press and American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 
9780262033671.
Colchero, M. A., Popkin, B. M., Rivera, J. A. & Ng, S. W. 2016. 
Beverage purchases from stores in Mexico under the excise 
tax on sugar sweetened beverages: observational study. 
BMJ, 352, h6704.
Colglazier, E. W. 2018. The Sustainable Development Goals: 
135
References
Roadmaps to Progress. Science & Diplomacy, March 2018.
Collste et al. (in prep.). Bottom-up and top-down pathways for food 
and agriculture in Africa: a cross-scale analysis derived from 
the TWI2050 African Dialogues.
Collier, P. & Hoeffler, A. 2004. Greed and grievance in civil war. 
Oxford Economic Papers, 56, 563-595.
Collste, D., Pedercini, M. & Cornell, S. E. 2017. Policy coherence 
to achieve the SDGs: using integrated simulation models 
to assess effective policies. Sustainability Science, 12, 921-
931.
Cook, P. 2011. Infrastructure, rural electrification and development. 
Energy for Sustainable Development, 15, 304-313.
Crespo Cuaresma, J., Lutz, W. & Sanderson, W. 2014. Is the 
Demographic Dividend an Education Dividend? 
Demography, 51, 299-315.
Creutzig, F. 2014. How fuel prices determine public transport 
infrastructure, modal shares and urban form. Urban Climate, 
10, 63-76.
Creutzig, F., Agoston, P., Minx, J. C., Canadell, J. G., Andrew, R. 
M., Quéré, C. L., Peters, G. P., Sharifi, A., Yamagata, Y. 
& Dhakal, S. 2016. Urban infrastructure choices structure 
climate solutions. Nature Climate Change, 6, 1054.
Creutzig, F., Baiocchi, G., Bierkandt, R., Pichler, P.-P. & Seto, K. C. 
2015. Global typology of urban energy use and potentials 
for an urbanization mitigation wedge. Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America, 112, 6283-6288.
Creutzig, F. & He, D. 2009. Climate change mitigation and co-benefits of 
feasible transport demand policies in Beijing. Transportation 
Research Part D: Transport and Environment, 14, 120-131.
Creutzig, F., Lohrey, S., Bai, X., Dawson, R., Dhakal, S., Lamb, W., 
McPhearson, T., Minx, J., Munoz, E. & Walsh, B. 2018a. 
Upscaling urban data science for global climate solutions. 
Edmonton: IPCC Cities.
Creutzig, F., Roy, J., Lamb, W. F., Azevedo, I. M., de Bruin, W. B., 
Dalkmann, H., Edelenbosch, O. Y., Geels, F. W., Grubler, 
A. & Hepburn, C. 2018b. Towards demand-side solutions 
for mitigating climate change. Nature Climate Change, 8, 
260-263.
Cutler, D. & Lleras-Muney, A. 2008. Education and Health: Evaluating 
Theories and Evidence. In: House, J., Schoeni, R., Kaplan, 
G. & Pollack, H. (eds.) Making Americans Healthier: Social 
and Economic Policy as HealthPolicy. New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation.
Cutler, D. M. & Lleras-Muney, A. 2010. Understanding differences in 
health behaviors by education. Journal of Health Economics, 
29, 1-28.
Dagnachew, A. G., Lucas, P. L., Hof, A. F. & van Vuuren, D. P. 2018. 
Trade-offs and synergies between universal electricity 
access and climate change mitigation in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Energy Policy, 114, 355-366.
Davis, K. F., Rulli, M. C., Seveso, A. & D’Odorico, P. 2017. Increased 
food production and reduced water use through optimized 
crop distribution. Nature Geoscience, 10, 919-924.
Desmarais, S. L., Reeves, K. A., Nicholls, T. L., Telford, R. P. & 
Fieber, M. S. 2012. Prevalence of Physical Violence in 
Intimate Relationships, Part 1: Rates of Male and Female 
Victimization. Partner Abuse, 3.
Devine-Wright, P., Batel, S., Aas, O., Sovacool, B., Labelle, M. C. & 
Ruud, A. 2017. A conceptual framework for understanding 
the social acceptance of energy infrastructure: Insights from 
energy storage. Energy Policy, 107, 27-31.
Doelman, J. C., Stehfest, E., Tabeau, A., van Meijl, H., Lassaletta, L., 
Gernaat, D. E. H. J., Hermans, K., Harmsen, M., Daioglou, 
V., Biemans, H., van der Sluis, S. & van Vuuren, D. P. 2018. 
Exploring SSP land-use dynamics using the IMAGE model: 
Regional and gridded scenarios of land-use change and land-
based climate change mitigation. Global Environmental 
Change, 48, 119-135.
Dombrowsky, I. 2009. Revisiting the potential for benefit sharing in 
the management of trans-boundary rivers. Water Policy, 11, 
125-140.
Doyal, L. & Gough, I. 1991. A Theory of Human Need, Basingstoke, 
UK, Macmillan Education Ltd., 978-0333383254.
Drewes, J. E. 2009. Ground water replenishment with recycled 
water—water quality improvements during managed aquifer 
recharge. Groundwater, 47, 502-505.
Drèze, J. & Sen, A. 2002. India: Development and Participation, New 
York, Oxford University Press. 
Ekins, P., Hughes, N., Brigenzu, S., Arden Clark, C., Fischer-Kowalski, 
M., Graedel, T., Hajer, M., Hashimoto, S., Hatfield-Dodds, 
S. & Havlik, P. 2017. Resource Efficiency: Potential and 
Economic Implications. A report of the International 
Resource Panel. Paris, France: UNEP.
Ellen MacArthur Foundation, McKinsey Center for Business and 
Environment & Institute for Study of Labor (IZA) 2015. 
Growth within: a circular economy vision for a competitive 
Europe. Isle of Wight, UK: Ellen MacArthur Foundation.
Ellsberg, M., Arango, D. J., Morton, M., Gennari, F., Kiplesund, S., 
Contreras, M. & Watts, C. 2015. Prevention of violence 
against women and girls: what does the evidence say? The 
Lancet, 385, 1555-1566.
Erb, K.-H., Lauk, C., Kastner, T., Mayer, A., Theurl, M. C. & Haberl, 
H. 2016. Exploring the biophysical option space for feeding 
the world without deforestation. Nature Communications, 7, 
11382.
FAO 2011. Global Food Losses and Food Waste - Extent, causes and 
prevention. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations.
FAO 2015. The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2015. Rome: 
Food and Agriclture Organization of the United Nations.
FAO 2016. AQUASTAT. Available at: http://www.fao.org/nr/water/
aquastat/main/index.stm. Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations.
FAOSTAT 2018. FAOSTAT Statistics Database. Available at: http://
www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/OA. Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations.
Fay, M., Leipziger, D., Wodon, Q. & Yepes, T. 2005. Achieving child-
health-related millennium development goals: The role of 
infrastructure. World Development, 33, 1267-1284.
Fernandez Milan, B. & Creutzig, F. 2015. Reducing urban heat wave 
risk in the 21st century. Current Opinion in Environmental 
Sustainability, 14, 221-231.
Fernandez Milan, B. & Creutzig, F. 2017. Lifting peripheral fortunes: 
Upgrading transit improves spatial, income and gender 
equity in Medellin. Cities, 70, 122-134.
136
References
Fisher, J. 2008. Women in water supply, sanitation and hygiene 
programmes. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil 
Engineers - Municipal Engineer, 161, 223-229.
Flörke, M., Kynast, E., Bärlund, I., Eisner, S., Wimmer, F. & Alcamo, 
J. 2013. Domestic and industrial water uses of the past 60 
years as a mirror of socio-economic development: A global 
simulation study. Global Environmental Change, 23, 144-
156.
Flörke, M., Schneider, C. & McDonald, R. I. 2018. Water competition 
between cities and agriculture driven by climate change and 
urban growth. Nature Sustainability, 1, 51-58.
Foley, J. A., Ramankutty, N., Brauman, K. A., Cassidy, E. S., Gerber, 
J. S., Johnston, M., Mueller, N. D., O’Connell, C., Ray, D. 
K., West, P. C., Balzer, C., Bennett, E. M., Carpenter, S. R., 
Hill, J., Monfreda, C., Polasky, S., Rockstrom, J., Sheehan, 
J., Siebert, S., Tilman, D. & Zaks, D. P. 2011. Solutions for a 
cultivated planet. Nature, 478, 337-42.
Folhes, R. T., Aguiar, A. P. D. d., Stoll, E., Dalla-Nora, E. L., Araújo, 
R., Coelho, A. & Canto, O. d. 2015. Multi-scale participatory 
scenario methods and territorial planning in the Brazilian 
Amazon. Futures, 73, 86-99.
Frenk, J. 2015. Leading the way towards universal health coverage: a 
call to action. The Lancet, 385, 1352-1358.
Fricko, O., Parkinson, S. C., Johnson, N., Strubegger, M., Vliet, M. T. 
H. & Riahi, K. 2016. Energy sector water use implications 
of a 2°C climate policy. Environmental Research Letters, 11, 
034011.
Fuso Nerini, F., Tomei, J., To, L. S., Bisaga, I., Parikh, P., Black, M., 
Borrion, A., Spataru, C., Castán Broto, V., Anandarajah, G., 
Milligan, B. & Mulugetta, Y. 2017. Mapping synergies and 
trade-offs between energy and the Sustainable Development 
Goals. Nature Energy, 3, 10-15.
Galtung, J. 1969. Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. Journal of 
Peace Research, 6, 167-191.
Gangadharan, L. & Valenzuela, M. R. 2001. Interrelationships 
between income, health and the environment: extending 
the Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis. Ecological 
Economics, 36, 513-531.
Gao, L. & Bryan, B. A. 2017. Finding pathways to national-scale land-
sector sustainability. Nature, 544, 217-222.
Gehl, J. 2013. Cities for people, Washington, DC, Island press, 
1597269840.
George, H. 1879. Progress and poverty: An enquiry into the cause 
of industrial depressions, and of increase of want with 
increase of wealth. The Remedy, London, K. Paul, Trench 
& Company, 
Glaeser, E. L., Ponzetto, G. A. M. & Shleifer, A. 2007. Why does 
democracy need education? Journal of Economic Growth, 
12, 77-99.
Gleeson, T. & Richter, B. 2018. How much groundwater can we pump 
and protect environmental flows through time? Presumptive 
standards for conjunctive management of aquifers and 
rivers. River Research and Applications, 34, 83-92.
Gleeson, T., Wada, Y., Bierkens, M. F. P. & Beek, L. P. H. 2012. 
Water balance of global aquifers revealed by groundwater 
footprint. Nature, 488, 197-200.
Golden, C. D., Allison, E. H., Cheung, W. W. L., Dey, M. M., Halpern, 
B. S., McCauley, D. J., Smith, M., Vaitla, B., Zeller, D. & 
Myers, S. S. 2016. Nutrition: Fall in fish catch threatens 
human health. Nature, 534, 317–320.
Goldman, B. 2012. Meta-Analysis of Environmental Kuznets Curve 
Studies: Determining the Cause of the Curve’s Presence. 
Honors Projects.
Graham, J. P., Hirai, M. & Kim, S.-S. 2016. An analysis of water 
collection labor among women and children in 24 Sub-
Saharan African countries. PloS one, 11, e0155981.
Grant, S. B., Saphores, J.-D., Feldman, D. L., Hamilton, A. J., Fletcher, 
T. D., Cook, P. L. M., Stewardson, M., Sanders, B. F., Levin, 
L. A., Ambrose, R. F. & others 2012. Taking the “waste” 
out of “wastewater” for human water security and ecosystem 
sustainability. Science, 337, 681-686.
Grey, D. & Sadoff, C. W. 2007. Sink or swim? Water security for 
growth and development. Water Policy, 9, 545-571.
Grill, G., Lehner, B., Lumsdon, A. E., MacDonald, G. K., Zarfl, C. 
& Liermann, C. R. 2015. An index-based framework for 
assessing patterns and trends in river fragmentation and flow 
regulation by global dams at multiple scales. Environmental 
Research Letters, 10, 015001.
Grossman, G. M. & Krueger, A. B. 1991. Environmental impacts of a 
North American free trade agreement. NBER Working Paper. 
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Grossman, M. & Kaestner, R. 1997. Effects on Education on Health. 
In: Behrman, J. R. & Stacey, N. (eds.) The Social Benefits 
of Education. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan 
Press.
Grubler, A. & Fisk, D. 2012. Energizing Sustainable Cities: Assessing 
Urban Energy, Abingdon-on-Thames, UK, Earthscan/
Routledge, 9781849714389. 
Grubler, A., Wilson, C., Bento, N., Boza-Kiss, B., Krey, V., McCollum, 
D., Rao, N. D., Riahi, K., Rogelj, J. & De Stercke, S. 2018. A 
Low Energy Demand Scenario for Meeting the 1.5dC Target 
and Sustainable Development Goals without Negative 
Emission Technologies. Nature Energy, 3, 515-527.
Guse, B., Kail, J., Radinger, J., Schröder, M., Kiesel, J., Hering, 
D., Wolter, C. & Fohrer, N. 2015. Eco-hydrologic 
model cascades: simulating land use and climate change 
impacts on hydrology, hydraulics and habitats for fish and 
macroinvertebrates. Science of the Total Environment, 533, 
542-556.
Hanushek, E. A. & Kimko, D. D. 2000. Schooling, Labor-Force 
Quality, and the Growth of Nations. American Economic 
Review, 90, 1184-1208.
Hanushek, E. A. & Woessmann, L. 2008. The role of cognitive skills 
in economic development. Journal of Economic Literature, 
46, 607-68.
Hasegawa, T. in preparation.
Hasegawa, T., Fujimori, S., Takahashi, K. & Masui, T. 2015. Scenarios 
for the risk of hunger in the twenty-first century using Shared 
Socioeconomic Pathways. Environmental Research Letters, 
10, 014010.
Hatfield-Dodds, S., Schandl, H., Newth, D., Obersteiner, M., Cai, 
Y., Baynes, T., West, J. & Havlik, P. 2017. Assessing 
global resource use and greenhouse emissions to 2050, 
with ambitious resource efficiency and climate mitigation 
policies. Journal of Cleaner Production, 144, 403-414.
Havlik, P., Valin, H., Herrero, M., Obersteiner, M., Schmid, E., Rufino, 
137
References
M. C., Mosnier, A., Thornton, P. K., Bottcher, H., Conant, R. 
T., Frank, S., Fritz, S., Fuss, S., Kraxner, F. & Notenbaert, 
A. 2014. Climate change mitigation through livestock 
system transitions. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the Unites States of America, 111, 3709-14.
Hegre, H. 2014. Democracy and armed conflict. Journal of Peace 
Research, 51, 159-172.
Hegre, H., Buhaug, H., V. Calvin, K., Nordkvelle, J., T. Waldhoff, S. & 
Gilmore, E. 2016. Forecasting civil conflict along the shared 
socioeconomic pathways. Environmental Research Letters, 
11, 054002.
Hejazi, M., Edmonds, J., Clarke, L., Kyle, P., Davies, E., Chaturvedi, 
V., Wise, M., Patel, P., Eom, J., Calvin, K. & others 2014. 
Long-term global water projections using six socioeconomic 
scenarios in an integrated assessment modeling framework. 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 81, 205-226.
Hejazi, M. I., Voisin, N., Liu, L., Bramer, L. M., Fortin, D. C., 
Hathaway, J. E., Huang, M., Kyle, P., Leung, L. R., Li, H.-
Y., Liu, Y., Patel, P. L., Pulsipher, T. C., Rice, J. S., Tesfa, 
T. K., Vernon, C. R. & Zhou, Y. 2015. 21st century United 
States emissions mitigation could increase water stress more 
than the climate change it is mitigating. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 112, 10635-10640.
Herrero, M., Havlík, P., Valin, H., Notenbaert, A., Rufino, M. C., 
Thornton, P. K., Blümmel, M., Weiss, F., Grace, D. & 
Obersteiner, M. 2013. Biomass use, production, feed 
efficiencies, and greenhouse gas emissions from global 
livestock systems. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America, 110, 20888-20893.
Hervieux, M.-S. & Mahieu, P.-A. 2014. A detailed systematic review 
of the recent literature on environmental Kuznets curve 
dealing with CO2.
Hill, R. J. & Magnani, E. 2002. An Exploration of the Conceptual 
and Empirical Basis of the Environmental Kuznets Curve. 
Australian Economic Papers, 41, 239-254.
Hillis, S., Mercy, J., Amobi, A. & Kress, H. 2016. Global prevalence of 
past-year violence against children: a systematic review and 
minimum estimates. Pediatrics, 137, e20154079.
Holz, C., Kartha, S. & Athanasiou, T. 2018. Fairly sharing 1.5: national 
fair shares of a 1.5 °C-compliant global mitigation effort. 
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and 
Economics, 18, 117-134.
Horlemann, L. & Dombrowsky, I. 2012. Institutionalising IWRM in 
developing and transition countries: the case of Mongolia. 
Environmental Earth Sciences, 65, 1547-1559.
Humpenöder, F., Popp, A., Bodirsky, B. L., Weindl, I., Biewald, A., 
Lotze-Campen, H., Dietrich, J. P., Klein, D., Kreidenweis, 
U., Müller, C. & others 2018. Large-scale bioenergy 
production: How to resolve sustainability trade-offs? 
Environmental Research Letters, 13, 024011.
Humpenöder, F., Popp, A., Dietrich, J. P., Klein, D., Lotze-Campen, 
H., Bonsch, M., Bodirsky, B. L., Weindl, I., Stevanovic, M. 
& Müller, C. 2014. Investigating afforestation and bioenergy 
CCS as climate change mitigation strategies. Environmental 
Research Letters, 9, 064029.
Hutton, G. & Varughese, M. 2016. The costs of meeting the 2030 
sustainable development goal targets on drinking water, 
sanitation, and hygiene. Washington, DC: World Bank.
ICSU & ISSC 2015. Review of the Sustainable Development Goals:The 
Science Perspective, Paris, International Council for Science 
(ICSU), 978-0-930357-97-9.
IEA 2017. World Energy Outlook Special Report 2017: Energy Access 
Outlook. Paris: International Energy Agency.
Jaeger, W. K., Amos, A., Bigelow, D. P., Chang, H., Conklin, D. R., 
Haggerty, R., Langpap, C., Moore, K., Mote, P. W., Nolin, A. 
W. & others 2017. Finding water scarcity amid abundance 
using human--natural system models. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 114, 11884-11889.
Jägermeyr, J., Gerten, D., Schaphoff, S., Heinke, J., Lucht, W. & 
Rockström, J. 2016. Integrated crop water management 
might sustainably halve the global food gap. Environmental 
Research Letters, 11, 025002.
Jakob, M. & Steckel, J. C. 2016. Implications of climate change 
mitigation for sustainable development. Environmental 
Research Letters, 11, 104010.
Kamei, M., Hanaki, K. & Kurisu, K. 2016. Tokyo’s long-term 
socioeconomic pathways: Towards a sustainable future. 
Sustainable Cities and Society, 27, 73-82.
Kamei, M., Kurisu, K. & Hanaki, K. submitted. Evaluation of long-
term urban transitions in a megacity’s building sector based 
on alternative socioeconomic pathways. Sustainable Cities 
and Society.
Kavvada, O., Horvath, A., Stokes-Draut, J. R., Hendrickson, T. P., 
Eisenstein, W. A. & Nelson, K. L. 2016. Assessing location 
and scale of urban nonpotable water reuse systems for life-
cycle energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. 
Environmental Science & Technology, 50, 13184-13194.
Kondolf, G. M., Gao, Y., Annandale, G. W., Morris, G. L., Jiang, E., 
Zhang, J., Cao, Y., Carling, P., Fu, K., Guo, Q. & others 
2014. Sustainable sediment management in reservoirs and 
regulated rivers: Experiences from five continents. Earth’s 
Future, 2, 256-280.
Krey, V., Riahi, K., Hasegaw, T., Luderer, G., Ohashi, H., Parkinson, 
S., Poblete-Cazenave1, M., Rafaj, P., Vrontisi, Z., Arvesen, 
A., Fragkiadakis, K., Fricko, O., Fujimori, S., Heyes, C., 
Huppmann, D., Kiesewetter, G., Klimont, Z., Kolp, P., 
Matsui, T., Pachauri, S., Pehl, M., Schöpp, W., Hammer 
Strømman, A., Bertram, C., Harmsen, M., Kriegler, E., 
Roelfsema, M., Schaeffer, R., van Soest, H. L., Ueckerdt, 
F., van Vuuren, D. P., Bosetti, V., Despres, J., Drouet, L., 
Emmerling, J., Frank, S., Gidden, M., Gi, K., Gusti, M., 
Havlik, P., Keramidas, K., Klein, D., Popp, A., Takahashi, 
K., Chen, W., Edmonds, J., Garg, A., Iyer, G., Koberle, A., 
Li, N., Mathur, R., Oshiro, K., Sudharmma Vishwanathan, 
S., den Elzen, M., Höhne, N., Iacobuta, G., McCollum, D. L. 
& Rogelj, J. submitted. Implications of the Paris agreement 
for achieving the 1 Sustainable Development Goals. Nature 
Climate Change.
Kriegler, E., Riahi, K., Bauer, N., Schwanitz, V. J., Petermann, N., 
Bosetti, V., Marcucci, A., Otto, S., Paroussos, L., Rao, S., 
Arroyo Currás, T., Ashina, S., Bollen, J., Eom, J., Hamdi-
Cherif, M., Longden, T., Kitous, A., Méjean, A., Sano, F., 
Schaeffer, M., Wada, K., Capros, P., P. van Vuuren, D. & 
Edenhofer, O. 2015. Making or breaking climate targets: The 
AMPERE study on staged accession scenarios for climate 
policy. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 90, 
138
References
24-44.
Lamb, W. F., Callaghan, M. W., Creutzig, F., Khosla, R. & Minx, J. 
C. 2018. The literature landscape on 1.5°C climate change 
and cities. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 
30, 26-34.
Landrigan, P. J., Fuller, R., Acosta, N. J. R., Adeyi, O., Arnold, R., Basu, 
N., Baldé, A. B., Bertollini, R., Bose-O’Reilly, S., Boufford, 
J. I., Breysse, P. N., Chiles, T., Mahidol, C., Coll-Seck, A. 
M., Cropper, M. L., Fobil, J., Fuster, V., Greenstone, M., 
Haines, A., Hanrahan, D., Hunter, D., Khare, M., Krupnick, 
A., Lanphear, B., Lohani, B., Martin, K., Mathiasen, K. V., 
McTeer, M. A., Murray, C. J. L., Ndahimananjara, J. D., 
Perera, F., Potočnik, J., Preker, A. S., Ramesh, J., Rockström, 
J., Salinas, C., Samson, L. D., Sandilya, K., Sly, P. D., Smith, 
K. R., Steiner, A., Stewart, R. B., Suk, W. A., van Schayck, 
O. C. P., Yadama, G. N., Yumkella, K. & Zhong, M. 2018. 
The Lancet Commission on pollution and health. The Lancet, 
391, 462-512.
LeChevallier, M. W., Gullick, R. W., Karim, M. R., Friedman, M. & 
Funk, J. E. 2003. The potential for health risks from intrusion 
of contaminants into the distribution system from pressure 
transients. Journal of Water and Health, 1, 3-14.
Lee, E. J. & Schwab, K. J. 2005. Deficiencies in drinking water 
distribution systems in developing countries. Journal of 
Water and Health, 3, 109-127.
Lim, S. S., Allen, K., Bhutta, Z. A., Dandona, L., Forouzanfar, M. H., 
Fullman, N., Gething, P. W., Goldberg, E. M., Hay, S. I., 
Holmberg, M., Kinfu, Y., Kutz, M. J., Larson, H. J., Liang, 
X., Lopez, A. D., Lozano, R., McNellan, C. R., Mokdad, 
A. H., Mooney, M. D., Naghavi, M., Olsen, H. E., Pigott, 
D. M., Salomon, J. A., Vos, T., Wang, H., Abajobir, A. A., 
Abate, K. H., Abbafati, C., Abbas, K. M., Abd-Allah, F., 
Abdulle, A. M., Abraham, B., Abubakar, I., Abu-Raddad, L. 
J., Abu-Rmeileh, N. M. E., Abyu, G. Y., Achoki, T., Adebiyi, 
A. O., Adedeji, I. A., Afanvi, K. A., Afshin, A., Agarwal, A., 
Agrawal, A., Kiadaliri, A. A., Ahmadieh, H., Ahmed, K. Y., 
Akanda, A. S., Akinyemi, R. O., Akinyemiju, T. F., Akseer, 
N., Al-Aly, Z., Alam, K., Alam, U., Alasfoor, D., AlBuhairan, 
F. S., Aldhahri, S. F., Aldridge, R. W., Alemu, Z. A., Ali, R., 
Alkerwi, A. a., Alkhateeb, M. A., Alla, F., Allebeck, P., Allen, 
C., Al-Raddadi, R., Alsharif, U., Altirkawi, K. A., Martin, E. 
A., Alvis-Guzman, N., Amare, A. T., Amberbir, A., Amegah, 
A. K., Amini, H., Ammar, W., Amrock, S. M., Andersen, H. 
H., Anderson, B. O., Anderson, G. M., Antonio, C. A. T., 
Anwari, P., Ärnlöv, J., Artaman, A., Asayesh, H., Asghar, R. 
J., Atique, S., Avokpaho, E. F. G. A., Awasthi, A., Quintanilla, 
B. P. A., Azzopardi, P., Bacha, U., Badawi, A., Balakrishnan, 
K., Banerjee, A., Barac, A., Barber, R., Barker-Collo, S. 
L., Bärnighausen, T., Barrero, L. H., Barrientos-Gutierrez, 
T., Basu, S., et al. 2016. Measuring the health-related 
Sustainable Development Goals in 188 countries: a baseline 
analysis from the Global Burden of Disease Study 2015. The 
Lancet, 388, 1813-1850.
Liu, J., Liu, Q. & Yang, H. 2016a. Assessing water scarcity 
by simultaneously considering environmental flow 
requirements, water quantity, and water quality. Ecological 
Indicators, 60, 434-441.
Liu, L., Oza, S., Hogan, D., Chu, Y., Perin, J., Zhu, J., Lawn, J. E., 
Cousens, S., Mathers, C. & Black, R. E. 2016b. Global, 
regional, and national causes of under-5 mortality in 2000–
15: an updated systematic analysis with implications for the 
Sustainable Development Goals. The Lancet, 388, 3027-
3035.
Liu, L., Parkinson, S., Gidden, M., Byers, E., Satoh, Y., Riahi, K. & 
Forman, B. 2018. Quantifying the potential for reservoirs to 
secure future surface water yields in the world’s largest river 
basins. Environmental Research Letters, 13, 044026.
Loichinger, E. 2015. Labor force projections up to 2053 for 26 EU 
countries, by age, sex, and highest level of educational 
attainment. Demographic Research, 32, 443-486.
Lotze-Campen, H., von Lampe, M., Kyle, P., Fujimori, S., Havlik, P., 
van Meijl, H., Hasegawa, T., Popp, A., Schmitz, C., Tabeau, 
A., Valin, H., Willenbockel, D. & Wise, M. 2014. Impacts 
of increased bioenergy demand on global food markets: 
an AgMIP economic model intercomparison. Agricultural 
Economics, 45, 103-116.
Lutz, W., Butz, W. P. & Samir, K. C. e. 2017. World Population & 
Human Capital in the Twenty-First Century: An Overview, 
Oxford University Press, 0192542834.
Lutz, W., Cuaresma, J. C. & Abbasi‐Shavazi, M. J. 2010. Demography, 
Education, and Democracy: Global Trends and the Case of 
Iran. Population and Development Review, 36, 253-281.
Lutz, W., Cuaresma, J. C. & Sanderson, W. 2008. The Demography 
of Educational Attainment and Economic Growth. Science, 
319, 1047-1048.
Lutz, W., Goujon, A., K.C., S., Stonawski, M. & Stilianakis, N. 2018. 
Demographic and Human Capital Scenarios for the 21st 
Century: 2018 assessment for 201 countries, Luxembourg, 
Publications Office of the European Union, 978-92-79-
78023-3.
Lutz, W. & Kebede, E. 2018. Education and Health: Redrawing the 
Preston Curve. Population and Development Review, 44, 
343-361.
Lutz, W. & Muttarak, R. 2017. Forecasting societies’ adaptive 
capacities through a demographic metabolism model. Nature 
Climate Change, 7, 177-184.
Lutz, W., Muttarak, R. & Striessnig, E. 2014. Environment and 
development. Universal education is key to enhanced 
climate adaptation. Science, 346, 1061-2.
Lutz, W. & Striessnig, E. 2015. Demographic aspects of climate change 
mitigation and adaptation. Population Studies, 69, S69-S76.
Mastrucci, A. & Rao, N. D. 2017. Decent housing in the developing 
world: Reducing life-cycle energy requirements. Energy and 
Buildings, 152, 629-642.
Mauser, W., Klepper, G., Zabel, F., Delzeit, R., Hank, T., Putzenlechner, 
B. & Calzadilla, A. 2015. Global biomass production 
potentials exceed expected future demand without the need 
for cropland expansion. Nature Communications, 6, 8946.
Mayer, A. K. 2011. Does Education Increase Political Participation? 
The Journal of Politics, 73, 633-645.
McCollum, D., Nagai, Y., Riahi, K., Marangoni, G., Calvin, K., 
Pietzcker, R., van Vliet, J. & van der Zwaan, B. 2013. 
Energy Investments under climate policy: A comparison of 
global models. Climate Change Economics, 04, 1340010.
McCollum, D. L., Gomez Echeverri, L., Busch, S., Pachauri, S., 
Parkinson, S., Rogelj, J., Krey, V., Minx, J. C., Nilsson, 
139
References
M., Stevance, A.-S. & Riahi, K. 2018a. Connecting the 
sustainable development goals by their energy inter-
linkages. Environmental Research Letters, 13, 033006.
McCollum, D. L., Zhou, W., Bertram, C., de Boer, H.-S., Bosetti, 
V., Busch, S., Després, J., Drouet, L., Emmerling, J., Fay, 
M., Fricko, O., Fujimori, S., Gidden, M., Harmsen, M., 
Huppmann, D., Iyer, G., Krey, V., Kriegler, E., Nicolas, C., 
Pachauri, S., Parkinson, S., Poblete-Cazenave, M., Rafaj, 
P., Rao, N., Rozenberg, J., Schmitz, A., Schoepp, W., van 
Vuuren, D. & Riahi, K. 2018b. Energy investment needs for 
fulfilling the Paris Agreement and achieving the Sustainable 
Development Goals. Nature Energy.
McDonald, P. 2016. Engagement of demographers in environmental 
issues from a historical perspective. Vienna Yearbook of 
Population Research 2015, 2015, 15-18.
McDonald, R. I., Weber, K., Padowski, J., Flörke, M., Schneider, C., 
Green, P. A., Gleeson, T., Eckman, S., Lehner, B., Balk, D. & 
others 2014. Water on an urban planet: Urbanization and the 
reach of urban water infrastructure. Global Environmental 
Change, 27, 96-105.
McDonald, R. I., Weber, K. F., Padowski, J., Boucher, T. & Shemie, 
D. 2016. Estimating watershed degradation over the last 
century and its impact on water-treatment costs for the 
world’s large cities. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 113, 9117-9122.
McMichael, A. 2013. Globalization, Climate Change, and Human 
Health. New England Journal of Medicine, 369, 94-96.
Mekonnen, M. M. & Hoekstra, A. Y. 2016. Four billion people facing 
severe water scarcity. Science Advances, 2, e1500323.
Meng, X. & D’Arcy, C. 2012. Education and Dementia in the Context 
of the Cognitive Reserve Hypothesis: A Systematic Review 
with Meta-Analyses and Qualitative Analyses. PLOS ONE, 
7, e38268.
Mentis, D., Howells, M., Rogne, H., Korkovelos, A., Arderne, C., 
Zepeda, E., Siyal, S., Taliotis, C., Bazilian, M., de Roo, 
A., Tanvez, Y., Oudalov, A. & Scholtz, E. 2017. Lighting 
the World: the first application of an open source, spatial 
electrification tool (OnSSET) on Sub-Sharan Africa. 
Environmental Research Letters, 12, 085003.
Meyer, A. 2015. Does education increase pro-environmental behavior? 
Evidence from Europe. Ecological Economics, 116, 108-
121.
Ministry of Health, N. B. o. S.-N. T. & ICF 2016. Tanzania Demographic 
and Health Survey and Malaria Indicator Survey 2015-2016. 
Dar es Salaam.
Muller, A., Schader, C., El-Hage Scialabba, N., Bruggemann, J., 
Isensee, A., Erb, K. H., Smith, P., Klocke, P., Leiber, F., 
Stolze, M. & Niggli, U. 2017. Strategies for feeding the 
world more sustainably with organic agriculture. Nature 
Communications, 8, 1290.
Muller, D. B., Liu, G., Lovik, A. N., Modaresi, R., Pauliuk, S., 
Steinhoff, F. S. & Brattebo, H. 2013. Carbon emissions 
of infrastructure development. Environmental Science & 
Technology, 47, 11739-46.
Munamati, M., Nhapi, I. & Misi, S. 2016. Exploring the determinants 
of sanitation success in Sub-Saharan Africa. Water Research, 
103, 435-443.
Muttarak, R. & Chankrajang, T. 2015. Who is concerned about and 
takes action on climate change? Gender and education 
divides among Thais. Vienna Yearbook of Population 
Research, 13, 193-220.
Muttarak, R. & Lutz, W. 2014. Is Education a Key to Reducing 
Vulnerability to Natural Disasters and hence Unavoidable 
Climate Change? Ecology and Society, 19, 42.
Muttarak, R., Lutz, W. & Jiang, L. 2015. What can demographers 
contribute to the study of vulnerability? Vienna Yearbook of 
Population Research, 2015, 1-13.
Nabyonga Orem, J., Mugisha, F., Kirunga, C., Macq, J. & Criel, B. 
2011. Abolition of user fees: the Uganda paradox. Health 
Policy and Planning, 26, ii41-ii51.
Neumann, K., Verburg, P. H., Stehfest, E. & Müller, C. 2010. The 
yield gap of global grain production: A spatial analysis. 
Agricultural Systems, 103, 316-326.
Nilsson, M., Griggs, D., McCollum, D. & Stevance, A. 2017. A guide 
to SDG interactions: From science to implementation. Paris: 
International Council for Science (ICSU).
Nilsson, M., Griggs, D. & Visbeck, M. 2016. Policy: Map the 
interactions between Sustainable Development Goals. 
Nature, 534, 320–322.
Niswonger, R. G., Morway, E. D., Triana, E. & Huntington, J. L. 2017. 
Managed aquifer recharge through off-season irrigation in 
agricultural regions. Water Resources Research, 53, 6970-
6992.
Norman, R. E., Byambaa, M., De, R., Butchart, A., Scott, J. & 
Vos, T. 2012. The Long-Term Health Consequences of 
Child Physical Abuse, Emotional Abuse, and Neglect: A 
Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis. PLOS Medicine, 9.
Nunes, A. R., Lee, K. & O’Riordan, T. 2016. The importance of 
an integrating framework for achieving the Sustainable 
Development Goals: the example of health and well-being. 
BMJ Glob Health, 1, e000068.
O’Neill, B. C., Kriegler, E., Ebi, K. L., Kemp-Benedict, E., Riahi, 
K., Rothman, D. S., van Ruijven, B. J., van Vuuren, D. P., 
Birkmann, J., Kok, K., Levy, M. & Solecki, W. 2017. The 
roads ahead: Narratives for shared socioeconomic pathways 
describing world futures in the 21st century. Global 
Environmental Change, 42, 169-180.
Obersteiner, M., Walsh, B., Frank, S., Havlík, P., Cantele, M., Liu, 
J., Palazzo, A., Herrero, M., Lu, Y., Mosnier, A., Valin, 
H., Riahi, K., Kraxner, F., Fritz, S. & van Vuuren, D. 
2016. Assessing the land resource–food price nexus of 
the Sustainable Development Goals. Science Advances, 2, 
e1501499.
Oteros-Rozas, E., Martín-López, B., Daw, T. M., Bohensky, E. L., 
Butler, J. R. A., Hill, R., Martin-Ortega, J., Quinlan, A., 
Ravera, F., Ruiz-Mallén, I., Thyresson, M., Mistry, J., 
Palomo, I., Peterson, G. D., Plieninger, T., Waylen, K. A., 
Beach, D. M., Bohnet, I. C., Hamann, M., Hanspach, J., 
Hubacek, K., Lavorel, S. & Vilardy, S. P. 2015. Participatory 
scenario planning in place-based social-ecological research: 
insights and experiences from 23 case studies. Ecology and 
Society, 20.
Pachauri, S., Brew-Hammond, A., Barnes, D. F., Bouille, D. H., 
Gitonga, S., Modi, V., Prasad, G., Rath, A. & Zerrifi, H. 
2012. Chapter 19: Energy access for development. In: 
Team, G. E. a. W. (ed.) Global Energy Assessment: Toward 
140
References
a Sustainable Future. pp.1401-1458 (October 2012): 
Cambridge University Press and IIASA.
Pachauri, S., van Ruijven, B. J., Naga, Y., Riahi, K., van Vuuren, D. 
P., Brew-Hammond, A. & Nakicenovic, N. 2013. Pathways 
to achieve universal household access to modern energy by 
2030. Environmental Research Letters, 8, 024015.
Pamuk, E. R., Fuchs, R. & Lutz, W. 2011. Comparing relative effects 
of education and economic resources on infant mortality in 
developing countries. Population and Development Review, 
37, 637-64.
Pan, A., PhD, Sun, Q., Md, ScD, Bernstein, A. M., Md, ScD & et al. 
2012. Red meat consumption and mortality: Results from 
2 prospective cohort studies. Archives of Internal Medicine, 
172, 555-563.
Parkinson, S., Krey, V., Huppmann, D., Kahil, T., McCollum, D., 
Fricko, O., Byers, E., Gidden, M., Mayor, B., Khan, Z. 
& others 2018. Balancing clean water-climate change 
mitigation tradeoffs. IIASA Working Paper, 18, 1-41.
Parkinson, S. C., Djilali, N., Krey, V., Fricko, O., Johnson, N., Khan, 
Z., Sedraoui, K. & Almasoud, A. H. 2016a. Impacts of 
groundwater constraints on Saudi Arabia`s low-carbon 
electricity supply strategy. Environmental Science & 
Technology, 50, 1653-1662.
Parkinson, S. C., Johnson, N., Rao, N. D., Jones, B., Vliet, M. T. 
H., Fricko, O., Djilali, N., Riahi, K. & Flörke, M. 2016b. 
Climate and human development impacts on municipal water 
demand: A spatially-explicit global modeling framework. 
Environmental Modelling & Software, 85, 266-278.
Peake, L. 2016. On feminism and feminist allies in knowledge 
production in urban geography. Urban Geography, 37, 830-
838.
Popp, A., Calvin, K., Fujimori, S., Havlik, P., Humpenöder, F., Stehfest, 
E., Bodirsky, B. L., Dietrich, J. P., Doelmann, J. C. & Gusti, 
M. 2017. Land-use futures in the shared socio-economic 
pathways. Global Environmental Change, 42, 331-345.
Popp, A., Dietrich, J. P., Lotze-Campen, H., Klein, D., Bauer, N., 
Krause, M., Beringer, T., Gerten, D. & Edenhofer, O. 2011. 
The economic potential of bioenergy for climate change 
mitigation with special attention given to implications for 
the land system. Environmental Research Letters, 6, 034017.
Popp, A., Rose, S. K., Calvin, K., Van Vuuren, D. P., Dietrich, J. P., 
Wise, M., Stehfest, E., Humpenöder, F., Kyle, P., Van Vliet, 
J., Bauer, N., Lotze-Campen, H., Klein, D. & Kriegler, 
E. 2014. Land-use transition for bioenergy and climate 
stabilization: model comparison of drivers, impacts and 
interactions with other land use based mitigation options. 
Climatic Change, 123, 495-509.
Portugal-Pereira, J., Koberle, A., Lucena, A. F. P., Rochedo, P. R. R., 
Império, M., Carsalade, A. M., Schaeffer, R. & Rafaj, P. 
2018. Interactions between global climate change strategies 
and local air pollution: lessons learnt from the expansion of 
the power sector in Brazil. Climatic Change, 148, 293-309.
Pradhan, P., Costa, L., Rybski, D., Lucht, W. & Kropp, J. P. 2017. A 
Systematic Study of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 
Interactions. Earth’s Future, 5, 1169-1179.
Prüss-Ustün, A., Bartram, J., Clasen, T., Colford, J. M., Cumming, 
O., Curtis, V., Bonjour, S., Dangour, A. D., De France, J., 
Fewtrell, L., Freeman, M. C., Gordon, B., Hunter, P. R., 
Johnston, R. B., Mathers, C., Mäusezahl, D., Medlicott, 
K., Neira, M., Stocks, M., Wolf, J. & Cairncross, S. 2014. 
Burden of disease from inadequate water, sanitation and 
hygiene in low- and middle-income settings: a retrospective 
analysis of data from 145 countries. Tropical Medicine & 
International Health, 19, 894-905.
Pueyo, A., Gonzalez, F., Dent, C. & DeMartino, S. 2013. The Evidence 
of Benefits for Poor People of Increased Renewable 
Electricity Capacity: Literature Review (Evidence Report 
31). Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.
Raji, B., Tenpierik, M. J. & van den Dobbelsteen, A. 2015. The impact 
of greening systems on building energy performance: 
A literature review. Renewable and Sustainable Energy 
Reviews, 45, 610-623.
Rao, N. D. & Min, J. 2017. Decent living standards: material 
prerequisites for human wellbeing. Social Indicators 
Research, 138, 225-244.
Reganold, J. P. & Wachter, J. M. 2016. Organic agriculture in the 
twenty-first century. Nature Plants, 2, 15221.
Riahi, K., Dentener, F., Gielen, D., Grubler, A., Jewell, J., Klimont, Z., 
Krey, V., McCollum, D., Pachauri, S., Rao, S., van Ruijven, 
B., van Vuuren, D. P. & Wilson, C. 2012. Chapter 17 - Energy 
Pathways for Sustainable Development. Global Energy 
Assessment - Toward a Sustainable Future. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA 
and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 
Laxenburg, Austria.
Riahi, K., van Vuuren, D. P., Kriegler, E., Edmonds, J., O’Neill, B. 
C., Fujimori, S., Bauer, N., Calvin, K., Dellink, R., Fricko, 
O., Lutz, W., Popp, A., Cuaresma, J. C., Kc, S., Leimbach, 
M., Jiang, L., Kram, T., Rao, S., Emmerling, J., Ebi, K., 
Hasegawa, T., Havlik, P., Humpenöder, F., Da Silva, L. 
A., Smith, S., Stehfest, E., Bosetti, V., Eom, J., Gernaat, 
D., Masui, T., Rogelj, J., Strefler, J., Drouet, L., Krey, V., 
Luderer, G., Harmsen, M., Takahashi, K., Baumstark, L., 
Doelman, J. C., Kainuma, M., Klimont, Z., Marangoni, G., 
Lotze-Campen, H., Obersteiner, M., Tabeau, A. & Tavoni, 
M. 2017. The Shared Socioeconomic Pathways and their 
energy, land use, and greenhouse gas emissions implications: 
An overview. Global Environmental Change, 42, 153-168.
Rockstrom, J., Steffen, W., Noone, K., Persson, A., Chapin, F. S., 
3rd, Lambin, E. F., Lenton, T. M., Scheffer, M., Folke, C., 
Schellnhuber, H. J., Nykvist, B., de Wit, C. A., Hughes, 
T., van der Leeuw, S., Rodhe, H., Sorlin, S., Snyder, P. K., 
Costanza, R., Svedin, U., Falkenmark, M., Karlberg, L., 
Corell, R. W., Fabry, V. J., Hansen, J., Walker, B., Liverman, 
D., Richardson, K., Crutzen, P. & Foley, J. A. 2009. A safe 
operating space for humanity. Nature, 461, 472-5.
Rogelj, J., Luderer, G., Pietzcker, R. C., Kriegler, E. & Schaeffer, M. 
2015. Energy system transformations for limiting end-of-
century warming to below 1.5 °C. Nature Climate Change, 
5, 519-527.
Rogelj, J., Popp, A., Calvin, K. V., Luderer, G., Emmerling, J., Gernaat, 
D., Fujimori, S., Strefler, J., Hasegawa, T., Marangoni, 
G., Krey, V., Kriegler, E., Riahi, K., van Vuuren, D. P., 
Doelman, J., Drouet, L., Edmonds, J., Fricko, O., Harmsen, 
M., Havlík, P., Humpenöder, F., Stehfest, E. & Tavoni, M. 
2018. Scenarios towards limiting global mean temperature 
141
References
increase below 1.5 °C. Nature Climate Change, 8, 325-332.
Rosa, I. M. D., Pereira, H. M., Ferrier, S., Alkemade, R., Acosta, 
L. A., Akcakaya, H. R., den Belder, E., Fazel, A. M., 
Fujimori, S., Harfoot, M., Harhash, K. A., Harrison, P. 
A., Hauck, J., Hendriks, R. J. J., Hernández, G., Jetz, W., 
Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, S. I., Kim, H., King, N., Kok, M. T. 
J., Kolomytsev, G. O., Lazarova, T., Leadley, P., Lundquist, 
C. J., García Márquez, J., Meyer, C., Navarro, L. M., 
Nesshöver, C., Ngo, H. T., Ninan, K. N., Palomo, M. G., 
Pereira, L. M., Peterson, G. D., Pichs, R., Popp, A., Purvis, 
A., Ravera, F., Rondinini, C., Sathyapalan, J., Schipper, A. 
M., Seppelt, R., Settele, J., Sitas, N. & van Vuuren, D. 2017. 
Multiscale scenarios for nature futures. Nature Ecology & 
Evolution, 1, 1416-1419.
Rosenzweig, C., Solecki, W. D., Romero-Lankao, P., Mehrotra, S., 
Dhakal, S. & Ibrahim, S. A. 2018. Climate Change and 
Cities: Second Assessment Report of the Urban Climate 
Change Research Network, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge 
University Press, 1316603334.
Saunders, L. E., Green, J. M., Petticrew, M. P., Steinbach, R. & 
Roberts, H. 2013. What Are the Health Benefits of Active 
Travel? A Systematic Review of Trials and Cohort Studies. 
PLoS ONE, 8, e69912.
Schleussner, C.-F., Rogelj, J., Schaeffer, M., Lissner, T., Licker, R., 
Fischer, E. M., Knutti, R., Levermann, A., Frieler, K. & 
Hare, W. 2016. Science and policy characteristics of the 
Paris Agreement temperature goal. Nature Climate Change, 
6, 827-835.
Schmeier, S. 2012. Governing international watercourses: River 
basin organizations and the sustainable governance of 
internationally shared rivers and lakes, Oxford, UK, 
Routledge. 
Schmidt-Traub, G. 2015. Investment Needs to Achieve the Sustainable 
Development Goals. Understanding the Billions and 
Trillions. SDSN Working Paper. Sustainable Development 
Solutions Network.
Schmitt, R. J. P., Bizzi, S., Castelletti, A. & Kondolf, G. M. 2018. 
Improved trade-offs of hydropower and sand connectivity by 
strategic dam planning in the Mekong. Nature Sustainability, 
1, 96-104.
Schultz, T. W. 1961. Investment in Human Capital. The American 
Economic Review, 51, 1-17.
Sellers, S. & Ebi, K. 2018. Climate Change and Health under the 
Shared Socioeconomic Pathway Framework. International 
Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 15, 
3.
Sen, A. 1985. Commodities and Capabilities, Amsterdam, North-
Holland. 
Sen, A. 1997. Editorial: Human capital and human capability. World 
Development, 25, 1959-1961.
Sen, A. 1999. Development as Freedom, Oxford, UK, Oxford 
University Press. 
Shaffer, D. L., Arias Chavez, L. H., Ben-Sasson, M., Romero-Vargas 
Castrillón, S., Yip, N. Y. & Elimelech, M. 2013. Desalination 
and reuse of high-salinity shale gas produced water: drivers, 
technologies, and future directions. Environmental Science 
& Technology, 47, 9569-9583.
Shaw, C., Hales, S., Howden-Chapman, P. & Edwards, R. 2014. 
Health co-benefits of climate change mitigation policies in 
the transport sector. Nature Climate Change, 4, 427-433.
Smith, K. R., Bruce, N., Balakrishnan, K., Adair-Rohani, H., Balmes, 
J., Chafe, Z., Dherani, M., Hosgood, H. D., Mehta, S., Pope, 
D. & Rehfuess, E. 2014. Millions Dead: How Do We Know 
and What Does It Mean? Methods Used in the Comparative 
Risk Assessment of Household Air Pollution. Annual Review 
of Public Health, 35, 185-206.
Smith, K. R., Frumkin, H., Balakrishnan, K., Butler, C. D., Chafe, Z. 
A., Fairlie, I., Kinney, P., Kjellstrom, T., Mauzerall, D. L., 
McKone, T. E., McMichael, A. J. & Schneider, M. 2013a. 
Energy and Human Health. Annual Review of Public Health, 
34, 159-188.
Smith, K. R. & Sagar, A. 2014. Making the clean available: Escaping 
India’s Chulha Trap. Energy Policy, 75, 410-414.
Smith, P., Gregory, P. J., van Vuuren, D., Obersteiner, M., Havlik, P., 
Rounsevell, M., Woods, J., Stehfest, E. & Bellarby, J. 2010. 
Competition for land. Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 365, 2941-2957.
Smith, P., Haberl, H., Popp, A., Erb, K. h., Lauk, C., Harper, R., 
Tubiello, F. N., Siqueira Pinto, A., Jafari, M. & Sohi, S. 
2013b. How much land‐based greenhouse gas mitigation 
can be achieved without compromising food security and 
environmental goals? Global Change Biology, 19, 2285-
2302.
Sommariva, C. 2010. Desalination and advanced water treatment: 
Economics and financing, Hopkinton, MA, Balaban 
Desalination Publications 0-86689-069-6.
Song, G., Li, M., Semakula, H. M. & Zhang, S. 2015. Food 
consumption and waste and the embedded carbon, water and 
ecological footprints of households in China. Science of The 
Total Environment, 529, 191-197.
Sonneveld, B. G. J. S. & Alfarra, A. 2018. Nature-based solutions for 
managing water availability. In: Wwap/Un-Water (ed.) The 
United Nations World Water Development Report 2018. 
Nature-Based Solutions for Water. Paris: UNESCO.
Springmann, M., Godfray, H. C., Rayner, M. & Scarborough, P. 2016a. 
Analysis and valuation of the health and climate change 
cobenefits of dietary change. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 113, 4146-51.
Springmann, M., Mason-D’Croz, D., Robinson, S., Garnett, T., 
Godfray, H. C. J., Gollin, D., Rayner, M., Ballon, P. & 
Scarborough, P. 2016b. Global and regional health effects 
of future food production under climate change: a modelling 
study. The Lancet, 387, 1937-1946.
SSP Database 2012-2016. Available at: https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/SspDb.
Steffen, W. & Stafford Smith, M. 2013. Planetary boundaries, equity 
and global sustainability: why wealthy countries could 
benefit from more equity. Current Opinion in Environmental 
Sustainability, 5, 403-408.
Stehfest, E., Bouwman, L., van Vuuren, D. P., den Elzen, M. G. J., 
Eickhout, B. & Kabat, P. 2009. Climate benefits of changing 
diet. Climatic Change, 95, 83-102.
Stern, D., Common, M. S. & Barbier, E. 1996. Economic Growth and 
Environmental Degradation: The Environmental Kuznets 
Curve and Sustainable Development. World Development, 
24, 1151-1160.
Stillwell, A. S. & Webber, M. E. 2014. Geographic, technologic, 
142
References
and economic analysis of using reclaimed water for 
thermoelectric power plant cooling. Environmental Science 
& Technology, 48, 4588-4595.
Strengers, B. J., Van Minnen, J. G. & Eickhout, B. 2008. The role of 
carbon plantations in mitigating climate change: potentials 
and costs. Climatic Change, 88, 343-366.
Striessnig, E., Lutz, W. & Patt, A. G. 2013. Effects of Educational 
Attainment on Climate Risk Vulnerability. Ecology and 
Society, 18, 16.
Subramanian, A., Brown, B. & Wolf, A. T. 2014. Understanding and 
overcoming risks to cooperation along transboundary rivers. 
Water Policy, 16, 824-843.
Swain, A. 2017. Water Insecurity in the Indus Basin: The Costs of 
Noncooperation. In: Adeel, Z. & Wirsing, R. (eds.) Imagining 
Industan.  Water Security in a New World Springer.
Tawfik, R. & Dombrowsky, I. 2018. GERD and Hydropolitics in the 
Eastern Nile: from Water-Sharing to Benefit-Sharing. In: 
Yihdego, Z., Rieu-Clarke, A. & Cascao, A. (eds.) The Grand 
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the Nile Basin: Implications 
for Transboundary Water Cooperation. London: Routledge.
Terama, E., Clarke, E., Rounsevell, M. D. A., Fronzek, S. & Carter, 
T. R. 2017. Modelling population structure in the context of 
urban land use change in Europe. Regional Environmental 
Change, 1-11.
Terpstra, P. M. J. 1999. Sustainable water usage systems: models for 
the sustainable utilization of domestic water in urban areas. 
Water Science and Technology, 39, 65-72.
Thebo, A. L., Drechsel, P., Lambin, E. F. & Nelson, K. L. 2017. A 
global, spatially-explicit assessment of irrigated croplands 
influenced by urban wastewater flows. Environmental 
Research Letters, 12, 074008.
Thyne, C. 2006. ABC’s, 123’s, and the Golden Rule: The Pacifying 
Effect of Education on Civil War, 1980-1999. International 
Studies Quartlery, 50, 733-754.
Tilman, D., Balzer, C., Hill, J. & Befort, B. L. 2011. Global food 
demand and the sustainable intensification of agriculture. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108, 
20260-20264.
Tiwari, R. & Nayak, S. 2013. Drinking water and sanitation in Uttar 
Pradesh: A regional analysis. Journal Of Rural Development 
32, 61-74.
UN 2015. Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development. New York: United Nations General Assembly.
UN 2017. The Sustainable Development Goals Report. New York: 
United Nations.
UN Habitat 2016. Slums Almanac 2015–16. Tracking Improvement in 
the Lives of Slum Dwellers. Nairobi. United Nations Human 
Settlements Programme. 
UNDESA 2017. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. Key 
Findings and Advance Tables. United Nations, Department 
of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division.
UNDESA 2018. 2018 Revision of World Urbanization Prospects. 
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Population Division.
UNEP-WCMC & IUCN 2016. Protected Planet Report 2016. 
Cambridge UK and Gland, Switzerland: UNEP-WCMC and 
IUCN.
UNEP 2012. Global Environment Outlook 5: Environment for the 
future we want. Nairobi: United Nations Environment 
Programme.
UNESCO 2016. Education for people and planet: Creating sustainable 
futures for all (Global Education Monitoring Report). 
Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization.
UNICEF 2014. Ending Violence Against Children: Six Strategies for 
Action. New York: United Nations Children’s Fund.
UNICEF & WHO 2017. Progress on Drinking Water, Sanitation and 
Hygiene: 2017 Update and SDG Baselines. United Nations 
Children’s Fund, World Health Organization.
van den Berg, M., Neumann, K., van Vuuren, D. P., Bouwman, A., 
Kram, T. & Bakkes, J. 2016. Exploring resource efficiency for 
energy, land and phosphorus use: Implications for resource 
scarcity and the global environment. Global Environmental 
Change, 36, 21-34.
van Ruijven, B. J., Schers, J. & van Vuuren, D. P. 2012. Model-based 
scenarios for rural electrification in developing countries. 
Energy, 38, 386-397.
van Soest, H. L., van Vuuren, D. P., Hilaire, J., Minx, J. C., Harmsen, 
M. J. H. M., Krey, V., Popp, A., Riahi, K. & Luderer, G. 
in review. Sustainable Development Goals: Analysing 
Interactions with Integrated Assessment Models. Nature 
Sustainability.
van Vliet, M. T. H., Flörke, M. & Wada, Y. 2017. Quality matters for 
water scarcity. Nature Geoscience, 10, 800-802.
van Vuuren, D. P., Kok, M., Lucas, P. L., Prins, A. G., Alkemade, R., 
van den Berg, M., Bouwman, L., van der Esch, S., Jeuken, 
M., Kram, T. & Stehfest, E. 2015a. Pathways to achieve a 
set of ambitious global sustainability objectives by 2050: 
Explorations using the IMAGE integrated assessment 
model. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 98, 
303-323.
van Vuuren, D. P., Stehfest, E., Gernaat, D. E. H. J., Doelman, J. C., 
van den Berg, M., Harmsen, M., de Boer, H. S., Bouwman, 
L. F., Daioglou, V., Edelenbosch, O. Y., Girod, B., Kram, T., 
Lassaletta, L., Lucas, P. L., van Meijl, H., Müller, C., van 
Ruijven, B. J., van der Sluis, S. & Tabeau, A. 2017. Energy, 
land-use and greenhouse gas emissions trajectories under a 
green growth paradigm. Global Environmental Change, 42, 
237-250.
van Vuuren, D. P., Stehfest, E., Gernaat, D. E. H. J., van den Berg, 
M., Bijl, D. L., de Boer, H. S., Daioglou, V., Doelman, J. 
C., Edelenbosch, O. Y., Harmsen, M., Hof, A. F. & van 
Sluisveld, M. A. E. 2018. Alternative pathways to the 1.5 °C 
target reduce the need for negative emission technologies. 
Nature Climate Change, 8, 391-397.
van Vuuren, D. P., van Sluisveld, M. & Hof, A. F. 2015b. Implications 
of long-term scenarios for medium-term targets (2050). PBL 
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency.
Vanham, D., Hoekstra, A. Y., Wada, Y., Bouraoui, F., Roo, A., 
Mekonnen, M. M., Bund, W. J., Batelaan, O., Pavelic, P., 
Bastiaanssen, W. G. M. & others 2018. Physical water 
scarcity metrics for monitoring progress towards SDG target 
6.4: An evaluation of indicator 6.4.2 Level of water stress. 
Science of the Total Environment, 613, 218-232.
Vedachalam, S., MacDonald, L. H., Omoluabi, E., OlaOlorun, F., 
Otupiri, E. & Schwab, K. J. 2017. The role of packaged 
143
References
water in meeting global targets on improved water access. 
Journal of Water Sanitation and Hygiene for Development, 
7, 369-377.
Vinod, T., Wang Yan & Fan Xibo 2001. Measuring education inequality 
- Gini coefficients of education. Policy Research Working 
Paper. Washington, DC: World Bank.
von Stechow, C., McCollum, D. L., Riahi, K., Minx, J. C., Kriegler, E., 
van Vuuren, D. P., Jewell, J., Robledo-Abad, C., Hertwich, 
E., Tavoni, M., Mirasgedis, S., Lah, O., Roy, J., Mulugetta, 
Y., Dubash, N. K., Bollen, J., Ürge-Vorsatz, D. & Edenhofer, 
O. 2015. Integrating Global Climate Change Mitigation 
Goals with Other Sustainability Objectives: A References. 
Annual Review of Environment and Resources, 40, 363-394.
von Stechow, C., Minx, J. C., Riahi, K., Jewell, J., McCollum, D. L., 
Callaghan, M. W., Bertram, C., Luderer, G. & Baiocchi, G. 
2016. 2°C and SDGs: united they stand, divided they fall? 
Environmental Research Letters, 11, 034022.
Wada, Y. & Bierkens, M. F. P. 2014. Sustainability of global water use: 
Past reconstruction and future projections. Environmental 
Research Letters, 9, 104003.
Wada, Y., Flörke, M., Hanasaki, N., Eisner, S., Fischer, G., Tramberend, 
S., Satoh, Y., Van Vliet, M. T. H., Yillia, P., Ringler, C., 
Burek, P. & Wiberg, D. 2016. Modeling global water use 
for the 21st century: The Water Futures and Solutions 
(WFaS) initiative and its approaches. Geoscientific Model 
Development, 9, 175-222.
Wada, Y., Gleeson, T. & Esnault, L. 2014. Wedge approach to water 
stress. Nature Geoscience, 7, 615-617.
WBGU 2013. World in Transition: Governing the Marine Heritage. 
Berlin: WBGU - German Advisory Council on Global 
Change.
WBGU 2016. Humanity on the move: Unlocking the transformative 
power of cities. Berlin: WBGU- German Advisory Council 
on Global Change.
Weindl, I., Bodirsky, B. L., Rolinski, S., Biewald, A., Lotze-Campen, 
H., Müller, C., Dietrich, J. P., Humpenöder, F., Stevanović, 
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Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Forestry and Forest Products Research Institute (FFPRI)
Future Earth
Future Ocean
Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)
Fundação Oswaldo Cruz
Global Environment Facility (GEF)
Global Science Technology and Innovation Conferences (G-STIC)
Imperial College London
Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) 
International Council for Science (ICSU)
Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies (IASS)
Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES)
Institute for Social Ecology, University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences (BOKU) Vienna 
Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (INPE)
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) 
International Energy Agency (IEA)
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 
Partnering and 
Contributing Organizations
153
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
Joint Global Change Research Institute at the University of Maryland at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL)
Korea University (KU) 
London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine (LSHTM)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change (MCC)
Millennium Institute
National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR)
National Institute for Environmental Studies (NIES)
National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL)
PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Oxford University, Environmental Change Institute (ECI)
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK), Member of the Leibniz Association
Research Institute of Innovative Technology for the Earth (RITE)
Rheinisch-Westfälische Technische Hochschule Aachen (RWTH)
Science for Decisions
Stockholm Resilience Center (SRC) | Stockholm University (SU) 
Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) 
Sustainable Development Goals Center for Africa
Stakeholder Forum
SwedBio – A Programme at Stockholm Resilience Centre
Swedish Research Council for Sustainable Development (FORMAS)
Tsinghua University
University of Washington
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA)
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
Université Catholique de Louvain
University of Sussex
US National Academy of Sciences (NAS)
US National Science Foundation (NSF)
Vlaamse Instelling voor Technologisch Onderzoek (VITO)
World Bank
World Wildlife Fund (WWF)
Partnering and Contributing Organizations
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Transformation towards a sustainable future is 
possible but ambitious action is needed now!
Six transformations are necessary to achieve the 
SDGs!
Attaining the SDGs in a resilient and lasting way, 
requires vigorous action now, and a people and 
planet focus beyond 2030!
As everything is integrated in the connected 
world, the grand transformation requires a holi-
stic perspective!
Transformational change is needed but to succeed 
we must take along winners and losers!
The world is at crossroads as we are currently ex-
periencing signs of a counter-transformation!
A central element of the sustainability transfor-
mation is effective and inclusive governance!
Think globally, act locally! Think long-term, act 
now! It is all a matter of scale!
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
